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This is the first longitudinal, retrospective, qualitative, descriptive and multi-case study of 
hurricanes in Puerto Rico, from 1899 to 1956, researching for planning purposes the key lessons 
from the disaster management changes that happened during the transition of Puerto Rico from a 
Spanish colony to a Commonwealth of the United States. The selected time period is crucial to 
grasp the foundations of modern disaster management, development and planning processes. 
Disasters are potent lenses through which inspect realpolitik in historical and current times, and 
grasp legacies that persist today, germane planning tasks. Moreover, Puerto Rico is an exemplary 
case; it has been an experimental laboratory for policies later promoted by the US abroad, and it 
embodies key common conditions to develop my research interface between urban planning and 
design, meteorology, hydrology, sociology, political science, culture and social history. 
 
After introducing the dissertation, I present a literature review of the emergence of the secular 
characterization of disasters and a recent paradigm shift for understanding what a disaster is, its 
causes and how to respond. Next, I summarize the multidisciplinary research and policy 
knowledge concerning Puerto Rican hurricanes. Subsequently, I explain my methodological 
sequential data analysis, beginning with three case studies, followed by cross-case comparisons 
and assessments, ending in answer, recommendations and conclusions. I implemented a version 





standpoint that valued people's experiences and interpretations of the world. I aimed to 
denaturalize so-called ‘natural disasters’, exposing with a political economy lens the political 
character of public decision-making before, during and after a disaster; and grasp how politics 
impacted the society under study. My research methods were archival research in the field and 
online, visual sociology and case study. Based on information-oriented sampling, I chose the 
destructive hurricanes San Ciriaco (1899), San Felipe (1928) and Santa Clara (1956), which 
occurred at critical historical junctures. I examined three themes: characterization, causation, and 
relief. Those themes divided into six sub-questions and thirty-eight variables, summarized later. 
 
Answer: Disaster management vastly improved mirroring shifting ideas of God, nature, 
knowledge and humanity; always influenced by the dependent position of the island. 
Historically, citizens tried to handle hurricanes through mythological beliefs, empirical 
observations, rituals and material practices; some of which endured colonization and 
modernization into the mid 20
th
 century. Disaster management emerged haphazardly; at first it 
was ineffective and improvised relief, without much preventive or reconstructive policy-making. 
The official perception of hurricanes changed from being essentially uncontrollable religious or 
natural events, to natural events that could be tamed with technology, physical changes and 
policies. Yet, it was a more nuanced confluence of environmental, economic, social, cultural, and 
political factors that enabled storms to become destructive disasters affecting the Puerto Rican 
economy, environment and society. The social groups that experienced higher resilience or 
vulnerability during a disaster respectively corresponded to the groups that were best and least 
served during relief and who could or could not produce public transcripts and policies. Such 





colonial administrative policies, social hierarchy that merged local and external power dynamics, 
and notions of habitus
1
. Eventually, the growing understanding of citizens’ rights was critical to 
reduce hurricane casualties and the worst forms of vulnerability through New Deal and 
Commonwealth developmental projects. By also including contentious aims though, they created 
other forms of underdevelopment and dependency from the US; whilst technology and 
modernity paradigms bolstered new risks that would become rather costly. Simultaneously, 
disaster management became a federal responsibility, which reached Puerto Rico; but it was the 
unplanned intersection of a hodge-podge of disciplines, approaches and institutions, centered on 
physical interventions and neglecting the role of culture and the political economy of disasters 
with negative lasting impacts. Although improvised, contradictory and controversial; the main 
factors enabling the rise of disaster management were increased governmental leadership, 
knowledge construction, public awareness, planning and investment in hard and soft 
infrastructure, and relief provision. 
 
My dissertation contributes to Puerto Rican Studies and to emerging planning discussions about 
the Circum-Caribbean. Also, it contributes to disaster management, an area of academic and 
practice-oriented literature relevant for planning, fastly growing given the rising frequency and 
intensity of multiple disasters; and which is usually focused on contemporary events, prospective 
forecasting and proposal-making. Contrastingly, my dissertation’s strengths reside in being a 
critical and exhaustive historical study of hurricanes that proposes an option to the customary 
deleterious disciplinary fragmentation of disaster studies and management, and to the emphasis 
on physical change that remain standards in most countries. 
                                                 
1
 Understood as durable structures or frameworks of thought which motivated individuals and groups to pursue and 
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Chapter I. Introduction 
 
“The Huracán is the most horrendous phenomenon of all that are visible on this island, and I 
even believe that in all America. It is a furious wind accompanied by rain, lightening, 
thunderstorms and most times by earth tremors, all terrible and devastating circumstances that 
can be gathered to ruin a country in a few hours: the whirlpools that the air forms and the 
torrential rains that inundate towns and countryside, accompanied by lightening, seem to be 
announcing the last convulsions of the universe” 
 
-Notes from “Geographic, civil and natural history of the island of Saint John the Baptist of Puerto Rico”, the 
earliest and outstanding  Puerto Rican historical account covering from 1493 to 1783, first published in 1788 




This dissertation is the first longitudinal, retrospective, qualitative, descriptive and multi-case 
study of hurricanes in Puerto Rico -from 1899 to 1956- focused on the contemporary 
transformation of disaster management; analyzing hurricanes San Ciriaco (1899), San Felipe 
(1928) and Santa Clara (1956).  
 
Disasters in Puerto Rico are a germane urban planning topic that merits rigorous examination, as 
the island is located in a highly hazard-prone region due to the confluence of various tectonic 
plates, extensive local fault systems, and exposure to diverse meteorological processes. Thus, 





social, cultural and environmental losses from hurricanes
2
, storms, cold fronts, four types of 
floods -riverine, urban, flash and coastal-, landslides, earthquakes, seismic induced tsunamis, 
subsidence and surface collapse, wildfires, heat waves, droughts, and accentuated bipolar 
climatic system -intensive rainy and dry seasons- (Palm & Hodgson, 1993). That catalog of 
destructive events expands with human-triggered combustions, chemical pollution (Agencia 
Estatal de Manejo de Emergencias y Administración de Desastres, 2008), famines, epidemics, 
plagues, and decades of U.S. multi-site military weapon testing
3
. In other words, the 
development of Puerto Rico is tied to disaster management, an area of studies rich of overlapping 
interests needing multidisciplinary approaches, as this dissertation will demonstrate. 
 
1.1 Historical and current relevance of hurricanes in Puerto Rico 
Hurricanes have been the most prominent type of disaster on the island due to their higher 
recurrence and harmfulness; thus, around them more diverse representations, rituals, 
superstitions and observations developed, including knowledge that has been validated by 
practice and science centuries later (Auld/Powhatan, 2007; R. J. Grace, 1956; Schwartz, 2005). 
The earliest tangible and intangible evidence of how humans understood and coped with 
                                                 
2
 Hurricanes are Western Hemisphere tropical storms that form in the Atlantic Ocean and northern Pacific Ocean, 
east of the International Date Line, and exceed the intensities of tropical depressions and tropical storms. They are 
called typhoons in the Western Pacific, cyclones in the Indian Ocean and Willy-Willy in Australia. 
3
 The latter left a legacy that includes impoverished communities at high risk, environmental degradation and 





destructive crises on the archipelago dates back to pre-Columbian times. Indigenous peoples of 
the Circum-Caribbean shared an understanding of disasters vinculated to supernatural deities 
who commanded nature. For instance, Carib, Arawak, and Taíno islanders adored and gave 
offerings to a mighty Goddess or God commander of hurricanes, who was known by several 
names and could be related to chaos, weather and wind (Gutiérrez Calvache, Fernández Ortega, 
& González Tendero, n.d.; Mulcahy, 2006). For some groups, the powerful deity created the 
Antilles and remained entitled to destroy them. Pre-Columbian indigenous in parts of the 
Caribbean properly identified signs of impending storms according to Fray Iñigo Abbad y 
Lasierra (Abbad y Lasierra, 1866), who was a Spanish Benedictine monk, traveler in the 
Americas, and fine pioneering author of Puerto Rican and Caribbean history. In other words, 
mythological beliefs and superstitions about storms coexisted with useful experiential 
knowledge. 
 
Spanish Catholic colonizers also viewed hurricanes as an otherworldly affair, though vinculated 
to a different God that essentially chastised sinful behavior (Abbad y Lasierra, 1866; Alvarez-
Curbelo, 1997; Centeno Añeses, 2000; Perpiñá y Pibernat, 1899). Moreover, indigenous 
forecasting was typically understood as despicable sorcery or satanic pact; thus, after Christopher 
Columbus’s first expedition to the Americas in 1492, Spaniard newcomers neglected indigenous 





practices to ward off storms and survive them (Molina Casanova, 1988; Neely, 2006), some of 
which were engrained traditions until the mid 20
th
 century. Registers of Puerto Rican disasters 
exist since the early colonial time (Abbad y Lasierra, 1866; Fowles, 1910; Van Middeldyk, 
1903); yet, they varied in accuracy, area of study, consistency, and objectivity vis-à-vis 
religiosity. Until the late 18
th
 century, a religious characterization of hurricanes prevailed on the 
Spanish territories, and biased relief and reconstruction. Hurricanes were seen as the most 
destructive catastrophe in the continent, comparable to a rapid Apocalypse (Abbad y Lasierra, 
1866). 
 
Connections between religion and disasters extended beyond the Hispanic colonies, as the 
characterization of hurricanes and the few embryonic mechanisms of prevention and mitigation 
were officially influenced by the Christian creeds brought by European colonizers (Coll y Toste, 
1976; DIVEDCO, 1965; Molina Casanova, 1988; Neely, 2006; Ortíz Díaz, 2000; Schwartz, 
2005); and also by beliefs held by surviving indigenous, enslaved Africans and later indentured 
foreign workers, although their influence was mostly informal. Diverse palimpsests of new and 
old religious beliefs, superstitions and empirical knowledge shaped the everyday life and policy-
making spheres in the fragmented colonies. Although they are seldom addressed, in each country 
they differently filtered into today’s characterizations of disasters and may interfere with or help 





Colonial records expose that hurricanes changed more than ecosystems and the built 
environment. They reshaped local social relations and even outcomes of international rivalries 
within the Caribbean and with the European metropolises (Schwartz, 2005). For instance, local 
authorities and powerful citizens used devastating storms as means to elevate protests to central 
administrators and overseas rulers, in order to renegotiate authority (Schwartz, 2005), funding, 
taxation and other critical issues. Disaster preparedness, relief and reconstruction –the latter 
possibly the most attended sphere of the disaster cycle until recently- reveal ideals of social order 
expressed in spatial relations. As my research shows, the selection of entitled and excluded 
stakeholders to elaborate post-disaster public transcripts
4
 closely relates with underlying social 
structures and interactions of human life that prefigured vulnerability
5
 or resilience to each 
hurricane; such as economic growth and profit distribution, urbanization trends, social 
hierarchies, cultural processes and political stability. Relief decisions to guarantee survival, re-
establish some sort of stability and launch recovery lacking time, information and resources 
ultimately speak of citizenship, rights and obligations, as I also demonstrate. Likewise, the nature 
of emerging conflicts, mechanisms used to negotiate or suppress them, changes in policy trends 
and power relations expose the backbone of public life. In sum, disasters are potent lenses 
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 I am using the notion of socially accepted versions of events represented in the public sphere through official 
documents, legal constructs, media messages, popular music and other means- modified from (Bryant & Bailey, 
1997). 
5
 Vulnerability is the joint between susceptibility of communities at risks vis-à-vis their economic, spatial, social and 





through which inspect realpolitik in historical and modern times, and understand legacies that 
affect the present, both pertinent tasks for planners. 
 
Hurricanes remain emblematic of disaster management and provide a rich background for 
research. They are pulsating in the everyday life sphere through spontaneous cultural 
manifestations such as music, paintings, novels, proverbs and superstitions; which I review along 
the substantial production of related planning documents, scholarly writings and policy 
decisions. Hurricanes are an essential part of the shared social fabric of Puerto Ricans; they have 
received attention and funding historically, as they have been central for active and reactive 
development processes. Furthermore, they remain strategic in the light of worse disasters due to 
the complex interaction between context transformations and climate change; the latter possibly 
the most cited example of human-induced environmental impacts on physical and biological 
processes (Bryant & Bailey, 1997) and contentious as it is tainted by ideological alignments, 
economic interests
6
, and even contradictory scientific findings. On the one hand, recent 
worldwide extreme climate records, temperature, precipitation and storms (Blakely & Carbonell, 
2012) have highlighted the topic and sparked beliefs about stronger and more frequent 
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 Discussions oscillate between sheer denial even in light of valid evidence or blind beliefs without substantiation. 
At stake are the economic and political consequences of addressing mitigation –reduction of Greenhouse Gas 
(GHG) emissions- over adaptation –tackling inevitable climate-impact risks- (Blakely & Carbonell, 2012). Most 
emitters do not bear the climate change costs of GHG emissions, they do not have to compensate those affected by 
climate change; thus, they lack economic incentives to reduce emissions. Without policy interventions, human-





meteorological events due to climate change
7
. Also, recent estimates of a global-average 
migration of tropical cyclone activity away from the tropics could indicate hurricane impacts in 
areas formerly intact, thus unprepared, and radical associated droughts and rains (Kossin, A. 
Emanuel, & Vecchi, 2014). On the other hand, climate change trends could have less direct short 
term impact on meteorological hazards than the steady variability of climate systems and other 
non-climatic risks (Jha, Bloch, & Lamond, 2012). Decadal cycles of increased hurricane activity 
have been associated with particular combinations of physical conditions
8
 and El Niño Southern 
Oscillation
9
, not necessarily with climate change. For instance, longitudinal data points to the 
beginning a more active hurricane regime since 1995
10
, which implies higher human and 
material losses in the Circum-Caribbean and Central America; but it is similar to one last 
observed between 1940s-1960s. Thus, some scholars and policy-makers claim that the 
correlation between climate change and worse events may be true, but it is not proven yet with 
available means and data sets (Goldenberg, Landsea, Mestas-Nunez, & Gray, 2001; Pielke Jr. et 
al., 2003). Ultimately, even low magnitude storms could unleash large impacts because of 
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 For example, hurricane Mitch (1998) and other recent catastrophes were attributed to global warming by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and 
influential developmental scholars (Pielke Jr., Rubiera, Landsea, Fernández, & Klein, 2003). 
8
 Including oceanic temperatures and atmospheric circulation patterns. 
9
 Commonly known as ENSO, which fluctuates between two extremes, El Niño -warmer Pacific Ocean water- and 
La Niña -colder Pacific Ocean water also called El Viejo, anti-El Niño, or simply a ‘cold event’. 
10
 In 1998, hurricanes Bonnie (Category 3), Georges (Category 4), and Mitch (Category 5) happened when La Niña 
was taking its place after a ‘Very Strong’ Niño
10
, which lasted from April 1997 to May 1998, and was the worse of 





enhanced vulnerability of human settlements (Pielke Jr. et al., 2003), which highlights the 
urgency to address social, cultural and political processes that yield relatively fast benefits. In 
addition, assuming certainty about climate change demands to build into near-term investments 
and plans an appropriate contemplation of future processes and worst-case scenarios (Jha et al., 
2012). Both options are critical for Puerto Rico; people and investments concentrate along the 
coast, implying the need to rethink worse exposure to hurricanes, storm surges, tsunamis, floods, 
sea level rise, changing ocean currents, warming of the sea surface and air temperature, 
irreversible salt-water intrusion in aquifers supplying potable water, droughts, wildfires, and heat 
waves. It also implies the urgency to anticipate possible effects such as economic stagnation, 
food and energy insecurity, water scarcity, death of species, plagues, public health emergencies 
and civil turmoil. 
 
Hurricanes remain equally relevant for planning decisions in the light of less discussed yet 
potentially exacerbated damages of complex emergencies, if combined with vast spreads of toxic 
pollution from weapon testing sites used by the U.S. Navy until the early 2000s, pharmaceutical 
plants built in recent decades, heavy industry brown fields dating from the 1950s and 1960s, and 
rusty abandoned sugar mills and associated outdated infrastructure built in the early 20
th 
century 
for example. Toxic contamination could be caused by direct human interventions -accidents, 





events-, and their combination; as the 2011 Fukushima Daishii disaster showed. Those crises can 
be worsened by territorial changes of the 20
th
 century reviewed in my dissertation, including 
purposive urbanization of risk-prone areas, food-dependency, and construction of dams, canals 
and levies calculated for low impact disasters, not for exceptional cyclical ones or those foreseen 
in climate change scenarios. Other risk-enhancing factors are poor evacuation protocols, 
unprepared aftermath response and the combination of disasters in a short time span, as the 
atrocious complex emergency of 1867
11
 examined in Chapter V. Thus, disasters that could be 
prevented or minimized will bring destruction, set back development and increase dependency 
on the U.S., potentially at times of shrinking federal economic support and economic decline. 
 
I.2 Dissertation position in relation to the literature of hurricanes on the island 
There is a robust production of academic and policy-documents addressing Puerto Rican 
hurricanes. In the last three decades approximately, it expanded in quantity, complexity and 
diversity; yet, its dispersion remains a fundamental problem. I could not find websites or 
physical archives systematically storing multidisciplinary documents for public consultation. 
Surprisingly also, given the amount of existing work, my search online and in Puerto Rican 
archives yielded that there is no annotated bibliography or critical literature review for 
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understanding the construction of scientific and formal knowledge concerning hurricanes. 
Chapter III is the first effort that takes stock of such knowledge and concludes that devastating 
hurricanes have catalyzed information production, ignoring minor events.  The most recurring 
unit of analysis is the island level, disregarding that hurricanes are a common link to understand 
the Circum-Caribbean region and diverse areas within Puerto Rico. Another drive has been the 
martial use of meteorology. In addition, physicallist, materially oriented sciences and 
technocratic approaches prevail; whilst humanities and social sciences are underdeveloped; 




 in the U.S. and other 
countries. This tendency points to a widespread understanding of hurricanes as problems to solve 
through scientific, technical interventions in the physical environment; which has filtrated into 
what urban planners typically undertook when intervening in disasters. Contrastingly, since the 
late 1960s, there is a growing understanding of disasters as socially and culturally constructed 
processes that have material basis, which has advanced disaster management and the planning 
profession, and which my research echoes. The literature addressing hurricanes on the island - as 
in other territories- hardly builds connections between disciplines, when holistic interdisciplinary 
thinking is needed to complement specialized approaches. Even within the same discipline, 
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 The field of disaster studies emerged in the 1970s, and is known by different names, including disaster research, 
disaster risk studies, disaster and emergency studies, or disasters and trauma studies; which reflects changing 
emphasis and lack of agreement on a particular name. It started by reuniting shared needs in the scientific disciplines 
that studied disasters separately –such as meteorology or seismology- and subsequently promoted interdisciplinary. 
13
 Likewise, the related practice of disaster management is known by different names such as disaster preparedness 





methodologies, focuses and units of analysis vary, which is both an epistemological strength and 
weakness. Diversity is enriching but undermines longitudinal, retrospective and comparative 
studies. The latter kind of studies focused on similarities and differences when facing the same 
peril -as my research does- denaturalize so-called ‘natural disasters’ by exposing human agency 
and political economy, which could ultimately improve policy-making. 
 
Puerto Rican hurricanes need further examination by governmental institutions, especially and 
most strikingly by urban planners, who would benefit from a historical perspective and multi-
disciplinarity to manage disasters in a culturally sensitive way; joined by anthropologists, 
ethnographers, preservationists, art historians and other professionals hardly engaged. For the 
most part, plans and studies focus on specific, contemporary examples; such emphasis disregards 
the relevance of comparative and retrospective examinations, and the need to grasp complex, 
long-term processes. Since the 1950s, procedural documents address how to act before, during 
and after a hurricane –often made by academics or public servants in the military and Civil 
Defense-. Although they could be criticized at many levels -cohesiveness and effectiveness for 
instance-; they have a valuable intention to plan and react, and they portray how disaster 
management evolved. However, a vital task tends to be missing, the elaboration of “thick 
descriptions” (Geertz, 1963, 1973) that surpass the presentation of facts -and also procedures for 





interpreted together can reveal conceptual structures and meanings, intricately layered and 
intercrossed. As a result, those engaged with disasters –in academia and practice- have shunned 
the duties of understanding how modern disaster management took off from the turn of the 20
th
 
century until the mid-1950s, and of examining the main contemporary economic, spatial and 
social processes that would bolster disaster resilience and yet create new forms of vulnerability 
simultaneously. That knowledge gap blurs the foundations of current disaster management 
practices; and how and why influential contextual transformations happened. Besides, since the 
past shapes the present, historical mistakes might be repeated or successful yet limitedly 
acknowledged practices can be discarded, without much reflection. Overall, a long term view is a 
critical contribution to scholars, policy and decision-makers. 
 
I.3 Dissertation framework 
As discussed in Chapter II, my theoretical point of departure is the rejection of the initial and still 
used secular characterization of disasters as extremes of nature capable of disrupting suddenly a 
well-organized life (Cannon, 1994; Varley, 1994), and mainly worsened by imperfect 
knowledge, ignorance and individual responsibility; which could narrowly direct to moralizing 
(Varley, 1994) or physicallist interventions (Hewitt, 1983; Hilhorst & Bankoff, 2004). Also, I 





disciplines studying and managing disasters, including meteorology. Instead, my research 
adheres to what I interpret is a paradigm shift that started in the late 1960s. It gained strength 
since the 1990s with the institutionalization of disaster management launched through the  ‘UN 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction’ (1990-2000)
14
 and subsequent 
international
15
 and city level
16
 initiatives to integrate vulnerability reduction into mainstream 
development processes, and even push “toward an international treaty that recognizes safety 
from preventable disasters to be a human right, and thus a responsibility of governments" (Ben 
Wisner, 2001, p.1). Essentially, the paradigm shift characterizes disasters as processes resulting 
from the interaction between social dynamics and environmental circumstances. The result is the 
denaturalization of so-called ‘natural disasters’ using a political economy lens to expose the 
political character of public decision-making before, during and after a disaster, and grasp how 
                                                 
14
 It advanced debates mostly through forums, publications, projects and policy guidelines; it focused on the 
behavior of nature and implicitly backed technical interventions on ‘untamed natural forces’. It gathered a large 
network of professionals and expanded awareness; although implementation was slow (Ben Wisner, 2001). 
15
 The 1996 ‘UN-Habitat Agenda: Disasters Prevention, Mitigation and Preparedness, and Post-disasters 
Capabilities’ outlined measures to reduce urban vulnerability; whilst the ‘World Bank Disaster Management 
Facilities’ was founded in 1998 to mitigate ‘natural’ disasters. Both separated city and disaster management; had a 
mismatch between policy and practice, scarce resources and political support to direct development priorities 
(Sanderson, 2000). The Local Agenda 21 and Millennium Development Goals indirectly connected with disaster 
risk and vulnerability reduction via sustainable development and socio-economic development. The International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction framework (UN/ISDR, 2004) conceptually connected risk reduction to sustainable 
development; yet, it missed defining overlaps and contradictions (Birkmann, 2006). The Kyoto Protocol went into 
effect in 2005 to lower GHG emissions; and although some of the worst emitting nations have not abided, it has 
increased research, awareness and dissemination of processes including hazards. The ‘Hyogo Framework for Action 
2005–2015’ (UN, 2005) urged to build knowledge about hazards, multi-causal vulnerabilities, and changes of both 
to shape policies, plans and programs targeting resilience (Birkmann, 2006). 
16
 For example, before 2005, over 1,000 U.S. Mayors signed the Conference of Mayors Climate Protection 
Agreement; others joined the ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection (renamed Local Governments for Sustainability), 





politics impacted the society under study. Political economy emphasis comes from the 
realization that "there is little long-term value in confining attention mainly or exclusively to 
hazards in isolation from vulnerability and its causes. Crisis will recur unless the underlying 
causes are tackled. This perspective does not reduce the importance of technical or planning 
measures to reduce physical risk, it simply insists on concerns for the deeper level" (Blaikie, 
Cannon, Davis, & Wisner, 1994, p.30). Consequently, disaster management becomes a public 
policy responsibility that should circumvent conventional dichotomous choices, implying binary 
and mutually exclusive technical versus social options in which the first ones have usually 
prevailed (Pielke Jr. et al., 2003). Instead, I see synchronizing social and technical agendas as a 
possibility to surpass previous mistakes, in order to prevent and reduce disasters and ultimately 
promote social justice. The goal of disaster management would be to facilitate people's practices 
-including their interactions with the environment- through social, political, cultural, material, 
and scientific interventions that diminish multi-causal hazards in the short and long-term whilst 
achieving social equity. 
 
The research question is: in terms of informing policies, what are the key lessons from the 
disaster management changes that happened during the transition of Puerto Rico from a Spanish 
colony to a Commonwealth of the United States? In order to answer the question, the heuristic 





with three separate case studies. The case studies follow the questions that guide ‘Chapter II. 
Literature Review: What is a disaster? What caused it? How to tackle it?’ In practice, they 
narrow down to three themes characterization, causation, and relief. As explained in Chapter IV, 
the themes are divided into sub-questions and variables that structure the case studies in the same 
order to facilitate comparisons, requiring attention to keep track of temporality. Sequential data 
analysis continues in Chapter VII with comparative assessments, summarized in Annex 1. The 
final chapter presents the answer, recommendations and conclusions. 
 
The cases presented in chronological order are hurricanes San Ciriaco (1899), San Felipe (1928) 
and Santa Clara (1956). Their names corresponding to Catholic saints indicate the persistent 
weight of religion, and they are the most significant cases of the selected time period due to two 
reasons. First, they represent extreme hydro-meteorological events. They were Cape Verdean 
hurricanes, called that way because they form off the coast of Western Africa, close to Cape 
Verde. Those are the strongest storms that threaten the Circum-Caribbean because they may gain 
a sizeable amount of energy whilst traversing the Atlantic Ocean during summertime, when 
essentially the combination of soaring heat, humidity, marine currents and atmospheric patterns 
can turn them into devastating hazards
17
. Moreover, those hurricanes made landfall and 
completely traversed Puerto Rico in a similar northwest bound track, which has two implications 
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 In contrast, storms and hurricanes formed off nearby the Circum-Caribbean region and the Pacific tend to be less 





for increasing damages. They concentrated the strongest winds in opposing directions right 
around the place where the vortex meets the earth; thus, they delivered more force on land that 
hurricanes passing further north or south, in the Atlantic Ocean or Caribbean Sea respectively. 
Also, their analogous track implies that they iteratively distressed almost the same ecosystems 
and human settlements. Hence, in the physical sense they are deviant, extreme, or atypical cases; 
which usually activate more actors and response mechanisms than typical cases, and detonate the 
production of information (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The second reason for the selected cases to be more 
significant is that they happened at the crux of particularly unstable and revealing historical 
junctures, when influential long-term decisions and social dynamics were negotiated. San 
Ciriaco (1899) corresponds to the shift from Spanish to American domination; it was 
instrumental to weaken the option of independence and laid the ground for another form of 
underdevelopment. San Felipe (1928) corresponds to the immediate preamble of the first 
economic and civil breakdown in modern times; it extended the foundations of more 
underdevelopment and fueled independence demands. Santa Clara (1956) corresponds to the 
beginnings of the Commonwealth; it unveiled iterative dependency and underdevelopment 
dangerous to admit in the new political formula. Besides, it prompted the only Commonwealth’s 
cultural proposition to address hurricanes
18
, widely used in the next years. The latter was a 
valuable effort that deserves careful examination to grasp its strengths, vacuums and 
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inconsistencies. In a nutshell, other storms and hurricanes happened during the studied period -
and I present them-; yet, San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara reunite stronger characteristics 
to yield the greatest possible amount of pertinent information, with enough variations and 
replications to reach saturation, and expose the processes under study. 
 
I.4. Chapter Summaries 
Chapter N.II. Literature Review: What is a disaster? What caused it? How to tackle it? 
This chapter departs from the view that disaster management is shaped by how we answer “What 
is a disaster? What causes it? How to tackle it?” Those interrelated questions serve to structure 
my case studies around three corresponding themes characterization, causation, and relief. Thus, 
in order to situate the research, I reviewed those questions in the literature, from the moment in 
which the modern secular characterization of disasters took shape until it became the field known 
as disaster studies, in tandem with the practice of disaster management. Therefore, this chapter 
II.1) Recapitulates the emergence of the modern secular characterization of disasters; II.2) 
Examines what I interpret as a recent paradigm shift for the understanding of disasters based on 
separate but sometimes cross-pollinating transformations in II.2.a) natural sciences, II.2.b) social 





and II.2.e) the practice of disaster management. II.3) Conclusions summarize main findings and 
inform the research design. 
 
Chapter III. Review of the Puerto Rican hurricanes literature until 2012 
This chapter is the first effort that takes stock of the multidisciplinary knowledge and policy 
issues concerning Puerto Rican hurricanes. When conducting this research, it was difficult to 
make sense of the vast existing body of work, which left me with more questions than answers. I 
organized it separated by disciplines until 2012 with two purposes, one was to frame my research 
design, case studies and contributions; and the other is to fill a knowledge gap in itself. The 
chapter discusses III.1) Introduction of the questions to be addressed; III.2) Thematic structure 
definition for a hurricane literature review found in a seminal paper; III.3) Review of the 
literature on Puerto Rican hurricanes until 2012 combining disciplinary themes and 
chronological order; III.4) Answers and recommendations. 
 
Chapter IV. Research Design 
IV.1) The Research Definition is based on a political economy lens; the Research Strategy is a 
version of Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) using both deductive and inductive 
thinking, with a phenomenologist standpoint and emphasis on qualitative work; and the 





IV.2) Case Study Selection is based on strategic criteria and information-oriented sampling. Case 
Study Analysis is done in three sequential steps. The first step is descriptive case analysis 
organized around the themes characterization, causation, and relief, divided into six sub-
questions, which in turn are unpacked into thirty-eight variables. The second step is cross-case 
comparative assessments and tables. The third step is conclusions and recommendations. 
 
Chapter V. Hurricane San Ciriaco (1898): colonial underdevelopment and dependency 
reconfirmed 
San Ciriaco is the deadliest hurricane registered in Puerto Rico and it marks the transition from 
Spanish to American control. Months before San Ciriaco, Americans invaded Puerto Rico during 
the Spanish-American War; the island became a non-incorporated U.S. territory under military 
domination, which influenced the ways in which the hurricane was addressed and remembered. 
Characterization summarizes V.1) the most relevant data, historical context in which the 
hurricane took place, main information producers, excluded information producers, and 
prevailing biases about the disaster. V.2) The chapter characterizes knowledge production 
around San Ciriaco in multidisciplinary, artistic, regional, local, multi-hazard, and multi-storm 
terms. Compared to previous disasters, San Ciriaco can be examined in diverse original 
documents. Americans had started an unprecedented documentation process of the new 





period has been studied extensively because of its decisive transitional nature; San Ciriaco has 
received academic attention as part of other topics or by itself.  
Causation is examined in a sequential and complementary manner to cover the quadricentennial 
Spanish colonial era: V.3) the ways in which economic growth and urbanization caused 
vulnerability or resilience; and V.4) the ways in which socio-cultural hierarchies, collective 
memory and knowledge production also caused vulnerability or resilience. In sum, social 
hierarchy and disaster vulnerability were correlated despite limited technical knowledge, 
awareness and means of communication. Purposive lack of preventive planning and investment, 
and permanent precariousness engrained in the Spanish legacy created selective vulnerability 
before the hurricane hit. 
Relief reviews V.5) how the Spanish regime mishandled relief during the 1867 crisis, when a 
hurricane, earthquake and tsunami took place less than a month apart. This case is the baseline to 
evaluate the transformation of disaster management. V.6) how the U.S. military government 
responded to San Ciriaco -the first organized yet questionable disaster relief example on the 
island- until the establishment of the Foraker Act in 1900, which officialized the U.S. dependent 
relationship of Puerto Rico. 







Chapter VI. Hurricane San Felipe (1928): Imperialism by neglect 
San Felipe is also known as San Felipe II or Okeechobee, and it remains the strongest hurricane 
recorded in Puerto Rico. It happened during a period of U.S. detachment from development in 
Puerto Rico concurrent with extractive policies, called ‘imperialism by neglect’, which increased 
poverty, vulnerability and turmoil. 
Characterization summarizes VI.1) most relevant data, historical context in which the hurricane 
took place, main information producers, excluded information producers, and prevailing biases 
about the disaster. VI.2) The chapter characterizes the production of knowledge around San 
Felipe in multidisciplinary, artistic, regional, local, multi-hazard, and multi-storm terms. This 
time period has been studied because it precedes the most violent years on the island during 
modern times. San Felipe is less studied than San Ciriaco as part of other topics or in itself. 
Causation examines in a sequential and complementary manner, focused on almost three 
decades of overtly exploitative U.S. dominion: VI.3) the ways in which economic growth and 
urbanization caused vulnerability or resilience; and VI.4) the ways in which socio-cultural 
hierarchies, collective memory and knowledge production also caused vulnerability or resilience. 
Social hierarchy and disaster vulnerability remained correlated, lack of U.S. administration 
preventive planning and investment enhanced selective vulnerability. 
Relief analyzes VI.5) The Red Cross relief provision for the 1927 Mississippi floods in the 





Felipe. VI.6) San Felipe relief is reviewed until 1932, when hurricane San Ciprián had a poor 
federal response, and worsened economic and social mayhem. 
VI.7) Conclusions present the top findings and introduce the next chapter. 
 
Chapter VII. Hurricane Santa Clara (1956): the New Deal legacies and the Commonwealth, 
between avocado forecasting or storm bombing 
Santa Clara, also known as Betsy, was a mild and fast hurricane that caused 9-16 casualties when 
practices to manage hurricanes included popular forecasting based on avocado crops and futile 
techno-military storm bombing. It happened after the New Deal developmental agenda and 
political repression undermined the pro-independence sector and enabled the status change of 
Puerto Rico to a U.S. Commonwealth (1952), which meant self-governing powers bound by U.S. 
federal jurisdiction. 
Characterization summarizes VII.1) most relevant data, historical context in which the hurricane 
took place, main information producers, excluded information producers, and prevailing biases 
about the disaster. Original writings reflect the views of influential men although not necessarily 
in top positions of power, such as U.S. and Puerto Rican politicians, elite members, intellectuals; 
but also middle-income journalists, artists, and scientists, who had gained access to growing 
education and media outlets. VII.2) The production of knowledge around Santa Clara in 





critical time period has been studied due to its political nature; but compared to San Ciriaco and 
even San Felipe, Santa Clara has been essentially disregarded as part of other topics or itself. 
Causation covers in a sequential and complementary manner almost two decades of: VII.3) the 
ways in which economic growth and urbanization caused vulnerability or resilience; and VII.4) 
the ways in which socio-cultural hierarchies, collective memory and knowledge production also 
caused vulnerability or resilience. The New Deal launched plans and actions to tackle 
socioeconomic and built environment deficits; preserving the U.S. interests and other 
questionable aims by force if needed. Modern disaster management emerged as a 
professionalized, identifiable field of practice. The planning profession was under redefinition 
and growth, its actions -and lack of- related to disaster management without official integration. 
Social hierarchy and disaster vulnerability correlation prevailed less blatantly, as social 
hierarchies were reaccommodating with mixed spatial consequences. 
Relief reviews VII.5) the reshaping of U.S. federal disaster management influenced by the New 
Deal, WWII, the Cold War, and the 1954-1955 hurricane seasons; which had key consequences 
for the island. VII.6) Santa Clara’s relief stage covers until 1958, when the Commonwealth 
created exceptional cultural productions to raise hurricane awareness and safety. 







Chapter VIII. Case Study Comparisons, Recommendations and Conclusions 
VIII.1) Data from the three sequential descriptive case analyses is comparatively assessed in 
correspondence with the three themes, six sub-questions and thirty-eight answering variables 
established in the methodology. 
VIII.2) Recommendations are presented. 
VIII.3) The research question is answered with concluding remarks. 
 
Annex 1. Cross-case comparison tables 
A synthesis of the three cases. 
 
I.5. Dissertation relevance 
My dissertation is a critical and comprehensive historical study of hurricanes, which proposes an 
alternative to overcome the usual deleterious disciplinary fragmentation of disaster studies and 
management, and the conventional emphasis on physical change that plagued Puerto Rico in the 
first half of the 20
th
 century, both of which remain standard in most countries. In other words, my 
dissertation provides an unusual contribution to disaster management, an area of academic and 
practice-oriented literature extremely relevant for urban planning, fastly growing given the rising 





events (e.g., hurricanes Katrina 2005 and Sandy 2012, Haiti earthquake of 2010, Fukushima 
2011), prospective forecasting and proposal-making (climate-change related literature). 
 
I showed that throughout Puerto Rican history, citizens tried to handle disasters through 
mythological beliefs, empirical observations, rituals and material practices; some of which 
subsisted until the 20
th
 century despite colonization and modernization. I summarized how the 
origins of disaster management on the island are extremely haphazard, and imbricated in colonial 
administrative policies, notions of habitus
19
 and of citizens’ rights that have taken centuries to 
question and overcome. First, disaster management was limited to tremendously ineffective and 
improvised relief, without preventive or reconstructive policy-making. Meteorological 
knowledge and media communications took off gradually. During the New Deal, multiple 
institutional changes contradictorily promoted development, whilst disaster management became 
a federal responsibility which quickly showed on the island. Even then, it was the unplanned and 
uncoordinated intersection of a hodge-podge of disciplines, approaches and institutions; which 
conventionally emphasized physical interventions, neglecting the role of culture and the political 
economy of disasters with negative lasting consequences. 
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I proposed a particular interface between urban planning, meteorology, hydrology, urban design, 
sociology, political science, social history and culture. I show why it is relevant to understand 
grass-root processes aiming to manage disasters; if they are helpful, harmless or detrimental; and 
why they should be negotiated to enhance safety through current practices. Practitioners and 
scholars need to gain a richer understanding of social and cultural processes related to hazards as 
shaping and being shaped by popular and specialized practices of disaster management. 
Specifically, planners must engage in learning from people and sharing how cultural choices 
impact environmental processes and vice versa. The role of studying and managing culture has 
traditionally been outside of planning and fallen to preservation -as in the Instituto de Cultura 
Puertorriqueña-, yet that discipline conventionally disregards disasters. Thus, planning and 
preservation need to collaborate more fully in shaping disaster studies and management. 
Significantly, urban planning remained part of the solution but also of the problem, to a great 
extent following conventional tenants of the planning profession in the US. For instance, since 
the New Deal, it put forth a model of rational top-down planning shaped by powerful interests 
which disregarded participation, and promoted urban renewal and development schemes that 
built housing on beach fronts, desiccated mangroves, flood plains, and other disaster-buffering 
areas; within a modernization context that exploited resources unlimitedly and altered ecological 






My dissertation also contributes to the body of literature of Puerto Rican Studies, which has 
unfolded in parallel to the presence of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. and to the development of local 
cultural institutions. It also adds to the planning discussions of the Circum-Caribbean, a 
relatively new epistemic community that searches to overcome the historical fragmentation of 
this region; and to similar discussions in other risk-prone areas. Puerto Rico presents distinctive 
characteristics, but it is also an exemplary case. It has been an experimental laboratory for 
policies and projects later promoted by the US abroad; which merits examination. Also, it 
embodies conditions increasingly common. For instance, Small Insular Developing States 
(SIDS) in the Caribbean and the Pacific are severely threatened by ecosystemic changes, as 
investment and citizens concentrate in the critical range of two to four meters above sea level 
(IPCC, 2014); and many other countries would also experience increased disasters along 
urbanized coasts and coastal plains. Moreover, the disconnection observed in Puerto Rico 
between disasters, urban planning, physical sciences, the humanities, social sciences and the arts 
is remarkably shared by peoples in other disaster-prone regions experiencing diverse modes of 
governance and cultural identities. Paraphrasing W.E.B Du Bois’ 1906 seminal writing, that the 
African-American’s “problem in America is but a local phase of a world problem”; the Puerto 
Rican case can be seen as a Caribbean phase of a world problem, which can shed similarities and 
differences. Therefore, this case can advance theoretical and practical ways of thinking about 
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Chapter N.II. Literature Review: What is a disaster? What causes 
it? How to tackle it? 
 
II.1 Emergence of the secular characterization of disasters 
Ancient civilizations in countries such as India, Greece, Iran, China, Mexico, and Peru studied 
the weather systematically. Yet, their pre-modern characterization of meteorological disasters 
framed them as events caused by otherworldly mythological beings or the forces of nature. In the 
Circum-Caribbean region, indigenous groups and European colonizers essentially believed that 
they were at the mercy of different deities, severely limited to counteract disasters. During the 
18
th
 century and primarily in Europe, modern meteorology emerged through significant technical 
and theoretical breakthroughs following Enlightenment ideals, which would transform the 
mainstream characterization of hurricanes and other disasters into a secular affair. Records and 
studies of weather-related events became more systematic emphasizing chronological lists –
which in turn heavily relied on notions of separated and exceptional elements-; their 
characteristics that could be observable and measurable with increasingly sophisticated 
technology; and aggregate although random destruction data. In the Hispanic Caribbean, 
meteorology took off after the second half of the 19
th
 century (Blaikie et al., 1994; Lines 
Escardo, 1998; Poey, 1862; Viñes, 1877), due to the value of exports and of the region as a stage 
of colonial power struggles. Historic meteorological records and studies contain valuable 
information; yet, their structuring principles and questions usually disregard how social 





between storms, politics and social life (Schwartz, 2005). They tend to be "thin descriptions", 
factual accounts without interpretation that are insufficient and even misleading sometimes 
(Geertz 1973). Meteorology emerged separate from its social, cultural and political meanings; as 
seismology, volcanology and other disciplines later comprised in disaster studies. It was a 
technical task that needed the allegedly value-neutral ‘rationality’ of science to address nature; 
which meant particularly biased rationales. In tandem, disaster management emerged based on a 
technocratic belief that applications of engineering and geophysical knowledge could handle 
what were seen as physical threats posed by nature (Hewitt, 1983; Hilhorst & Bankoff, 2004). 
 
Recent works have incorporated self-reflexivity on disaster-related scientific disciplines. For 
meteorology, that includes the historical impact of technology on forecasting, the 
bureaucratization of prediction through newly established weather services, and the emergence 
and politicization of relief organizations (Schwartz, 2005). However, the early emphasis on the 
quantitative climatic and geologic aspects of disasters gained currency to view them as extremes 
of nature; and such choice had arguable long-term ontological and epistemological 
consequences. Since the 19
th
 century, quantitative emphasis guided attempts to establish minute 
mathematical approximations for defining disasters -essentially to calculate geophysical, hydro-
meteorological data in a specific location-, explain material processes behind and react to them-. 
Such trend resulted in propositions such as the commonly known as Richter scale
20
 and its 
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 Initially known as the Local Magnitude Scale, it was created in 1935 by Charles Richter and Beno Guttemberg as 
a logarithmic open-ended scale to measure with a seismograph the vibrational energy released by shocks locally. 
Each single number increase indicated a 10-fold energy release. (Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984). The same authors 
created the Modified Richter Scale, to correct unreliable measurements taken at a distance. Next successor was the 
Moment Magnitude Scale (MMS), developed in the 1970s by the U.S. Geological Survey; it retains Richter’s 
continuum of magnitude values but the formulae differ. Contrastingly, the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale 
quantifies the intensity of a shock, not only its physical magnitude. Experts assess impacts on the Earth’s surface, 
buildings, and people, in a scale from I to XII; and although less used, for some scholars is a more comprehensive 





successors for seismic activity; or the Standard Hurricane Project
21
 and the Saffir-Simpson 
Scale
22
 for hurricanes, which I discuss in detail as I used them. Scientifically endorsed scales and 
postulates became academic canons to portray and compare disasters during the 20
th
 century. 
They have entered conventional media and popular use and shaped policy-making and urban 
growth via mechanisms such as legislation, zoning, disaster-resistant construction codes, formal 
and informal land markets, and insurance contracts. 
 
Behind those scientific constructs remained an uncontested paradigm until the late 1960s. 
Academics and policy-makers generally understood disasters as ‘natural’ events suddenly 
disrupting a somehow steady, ´normal’, well-organized life (Cannon, 1994; Varley, 1994). 
Essentially, two approaches prevailed. One was unapologetically naturalist, sometimes called 
physicalist, which directly attributed disasters to the violent forces of nature (Blaikie et al., 
1994). The other approach sustained an understated ‘environmental determinism’. Our imperfect 
judiciousness and misunderstandings of nature fatally molded our interactions with it; we 
reoccupied dangerous areas and rebuilt fragile settlements due to a ‘bounded rationality’ (Blaikie 
et al., 1994). When dominating views ascribed to imperfect knowledge, ignorance and individual 
liability as causes of crises, disaster responses could center on moralizing people (Varley, 1994), 
calling for inapt psychological propensities, irresponsibility and discriminatory versions of  the 
'blame the victim' approach. 
 
                                                 
21  Following devastating mid-1950s hurricanes, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Weather Bureau 
developed it to characterize storms and influence policies. 
22 In 1973, Herbert Saffir and Robert Simpson classified hurricanes in five categories of growing intensity to 
estimate potential property damage. The officially called Saffir–Simpson Hurricane Scale (SSHS) integrated 





II.2 Paradigm shift for understanding what a disaster is, its causes and how to respond 
Since the late 1960s, the mainstream secular characterization of disasters based on science has 
faced increasing contestation from diverse standpoints, opening the space for progressive disaster 
studies and management, in addition to making planners rethink their role in relation to disasters. 
I interpret that there is an emerging paradigmatic change to understand what a disaster is, its 
causes and how to tackle it. It is prompted by transformations meaningful for my research that 
are happening separately or interdependently in II.2.a) natural sciences, II.2.b) social sciences, 
II.2.c) experiential grassroots accounts and arts, II.2.d) novel complex emergencies, and II.2.e) 
disaster management practice. 
 
II.2.a) Natural sciences 
Based on methodological and ontological arguments, the characterization of disasters through 
scientific conventions has been questioned. Methodologically, challenges emerged as technology 
advanced and when long-term consequences exposed failures. In other words, a valid critique 
concerns the rigor in methods and data quality for establishing scientific measures, or scales, 
which in turn are crucial to minimize or worsen damages. One example is the Standard Project 
Hurricane (SPH), which since 1959 influenced for decades hurricane-related planning and 
construction in the U.S. section of the Gulf of Mexico. Regrettably, the SPH was 
methodologically flawed (ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel, 2005). The database 
omitted worst cases to define a representative storm, resulting in flooding protection systems 
unprepared for extreme recurrent events. Besides, the cost-benefit ratio calculations excluded the 
greater economic and social costs of failure in urban areas compared to rural ones. Against 





designed according to the SPH was not retrofitted as in the hurricane flooding protection system 
of New Orleans (Louisiana); its levees collapsed during hurricane Katrina (2005). Another 
example is precisely the successor of the SPH, the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale (SSHS). 
Citing scientific inaccuracies, in 2010 the U.S. National Hurricane Center (NHC) instituted the 
Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale (SSHWS); which focuses on sustained wind speed and 
excludes flood ranges, storm surge estimations, and other storm-related information. SSHS 
projected storm surge values were often miscalculated as they resulted from combined factors 
disregarded by the scale
23
 (National Hurricane Center, 2009). For each category, the SSHWS 
also exemplified potential damages to buildings, infrastructure and vegetation in the U.S., rising 
by about a factor of four for each category increase. In 2012, the NHC slightly modified wind 
speed range for Categories 3, 4, and 5 to correct a decadal miscalculation when rounding knots to 
miles and kilometers (The Weather Channel, post 2012). Classification of previous storms 
remains unnaltered. Scientific criticism of both Saffir-Simpson scales emerged as soon as 
practice revealed their flaws, and there is a range of proposed options that are continuous -like 
the Richter scale-
24
. Yet, even the methodological definition of variables remains contentious. 
One basic example is wind speed, for which the top disagreement lays on the choice of averaging 
time period with at least five options (3-sec, 1-min, 2-min, 3-min, 10-min). The World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO)
25
 recognized that measuring exact wind speed, particularly 
under tropical cyclone conditions, remained a hard task with potentially doubtful results due to 
available data and inconsistent theories. Since 2008, the WMO definition of wind speed is 
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 Including storm size, forward speed, bathymetry and coastline characteristics in the landfall location. 
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 For instance, the Hurricane Intensity Index focuses on the dynamic pressure due to storm winds, and the 
Hurricane Hazard Index integrates surface wind speeds, radius of maximum storm winds and translational speed. 
25





average wind measured at 10 meter height during 10 minutes; WMO regional associations and 
national weather agencies follow it to standardize information and policies (Harper, Kepert, & 
Ginger, 2009; World Meteorological Organization & Economic and Social Comission for Asia 
and the Pacific, 2011). Instead, the U.S. National Weather Service, the Joint Typhoon Warning 
Center and the Central Pacific Hurricane Center defined wind speed as average wind measured at 
33 feet (10.1 meter) height during one minute (National Weather Service, 2013). In brief, scales 
illustrate that scientific knowledge is useful yet contentious and imprecise. 
 
Moreover, in ontological terms, the mainstream scientific understanding of disasters is 
questioned for validating science at the expense of neglecting other forms of knowledge equally 
valuable, such as social constructivist perspectives, grassroots experiential accounts, and cultural 
and art-related manifestations. A central debate is the mistrust in the impartiality of science. 
Emphasis on ‘politically correct’ or ‘value-neutral’ scientific characterizations of hazards can 
nullify conflictive meanings and serve power elites to limit debates, clouding social inequality 
issues (Blaikie et al., 1994; M. J. Cohen, 2000). It has taken a long time to challenge biases 
behind technological choices and scientific information, the practical insufficiency and ethical 
fallacy of implementing such interventions separate from structural societal factors that create 
differentiated vulnerability to hazards, and without knowledge of how differently interventions 
would impact diverse social groups (Cannon, 1994). The most radical social constructivist 
perspectives tend to challenge science and even castoff mathematical models that void disasters 
and environmental discussions from their social and political components through probability 
estimates, abstruse data and simplified interpretations (M. J. Cohen, 2000). In return, scientists 





materiality of the biophysical environment and validate insights, and overdependence on cultural 
symbolism (M. J. Cohen, 2000). 
 
Another debate is the definition of disasters. Until the 1960s, disasters were geophysical 
extremes of nature, including seismic and climatologic processes such as volcanic activity, 
earthquake, tsunami, hurricane, cyclone, typhoon, monsoon, tornado, soil liquefaction, landslide, 
flood, snow blizzard, avalanche, sand storm, wildfire, heat wave and drought. Research and 
policy-making addressed them with increasing disciplinary separation that blurred the complex 
connections among them, preceding social and political background, and impacts. A 
groundbreaking dynamic led by natural scientists happened in 1969, when the Natural Hazard 
Research Group (University of Colorado) set parameters to define a disaster in terms of human 
casualties, injuries and economic losses
26
, which my research incorporates. It separated seismic 
and climatologic events from effects on human life; the former were no longer the disaster, but 
catalysts
27
 (Birkmann, 2006; Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984). As implied in the name of the 
group and their background though, they still casted disasters as natural, not as events embedded 
in social structures; and as phenomena, isolated occurrences instead of processes. 
 
Parameters of human and economic losses are valuable; they have become worldwide standards 
and enable quick comparisons along with scientific scales. For example, the initial contact of lay 
citizens with the severity of an earthquake is constructed through the media "typically in terms of 
preliminary Richter-scale readings plus early estimates of the number of dead and injured...News 
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 More than 100 people dead or injured; over $1 million in damage. (Wijkman & Timberlake, 1984). 
27
 Also called hazards, trigger events, forcing mechanisms, driving forces, perturbations, stressors, physical 





reports of disaster become the sampling frame. They identify the existence of the event" 
(Stallings, 1998, p. 132-133). Likewise, Saffir-Simpson category and parameters of human and 
economic losses characterize hurricanes. The latter parameters also feed larger indicators that 
influence policy frameworks and projects. For instance, the Disaster Risk Index (UNDP, 2004b) 
divides number of people killed by number of people exposed to evaluate the relative 
vulnerability of a country; which influences international aid, development loans and urban 
planning decisions. 
 
Yet, numeric parameters of human and economic losses have received multiple criticisms 
because they limit the characterization of disasters, needing complementary information as my 
dissertation provides. Parameters focused on large-scale impacts distort our understanding of 
disasters as interconnected multi-scalar processes, grounded on the everyday life. Most official 
registers only take account of events where 10 or more people die, 100 or more are severely 
injured, or where the aggregate economic damage is enough for international agencies to be 
called in (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003). Thus, many ‘small and medium’
28
 disasters do not qualify 
for calling in external help or for entering most national and international records; yet, they 
deserve attention for reasons that motivated me to summarize them briefly in my case studies. 
Cumulatively, their total impact
29
 may be higher than from a large disaster, as shown in Latin 
America and Africa (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003). In areas of high urbanization and social 
inequality, those events are on the rise -in number, territorial spread and negative effects-; and 
they may become larger (Lavell, 1994a). According to another view that contradicts popular 
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 Where 3-9 persons are killed, 10-99 seriously injured, or radical damage happens to people’s homes or production 
systems (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003). 
29





wisdom, megacities may be better prepared to face disasters than rural communities, small 
villages and cities that lack resources and capacities (Cross, 2001); or than suburban and sprawl 
areas, where poor coverage due to low density could be a suitable proxy of insecurity (B. 
Wisner, Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). In the latter cases, minor figures underestimate a 
crisis. At any rate, usual parameters hardly straddle urban-rural, dense-sprawled divides; or 
consider overlapping local, national and supranational boundaries. A pragmatic and ethic 
argument is that ‘small’ disasters and quotidian hazards deserve attention because they 
strengthen capacities to face larger events; the same groups, areas, economic structures and 
systems of civil and political organization tend to be exposed (Lavell, 1994a). 
 
Parameters of human and economic losses can be misleading also if applied in a contextless 
manner, which is an argument strengthening a shift towards political economy and human 
agency that I endorse-. For instance, the losses of wealthier people frequently tend to be greater 
in absolute terms but lesser in relative terms than the losses of low-income citizens (Blaikie et 
al., 1994). The latter frequently gather all their assets
30
 at the site of the disaster, which multiplies 
their losses; their rarely have cash reserves; their creditworthiness in the formal sector is minimal 
or none, subjecting them to predatory lending; and their healthcare and health conditions are 
usually precarious and mostly worsen during a shock. Their personal networks of support may 
result affected and unable to help extended family members and friends suddenly homeless, 
unemployed, dispossessed, sick, injured, emotionally traumatized and mourning. Also, loss of 
intangible assets such as solidarity, trust and peace may happen, causing grave and permanent 
disruptions of societal functioning (Bogardi & Birkmann, 2004); including increased criminality, 
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 Such as dwelling, clothing, food, tools and materials for artisanal production, subsistence animal husbandry, seeds 





violence and instability. Those are severe obstacles to overcome a crisis, yet, they are invisible in 
combined standard data. Moreover, economic figures about losses may disregard the formal built 
environment and businesses. They even more rarely incorporate destruction of precarious 
housing and informal economies; when they do, they commonly fail to reveal the severity of the 
tragedy for the affected poor and how the disaster created more poverty (Bull-Kamanga et al., 
2003). Also, parameters of casualties, injuries and economic losses may blur degrees of societal 
collapse and response capacity
31





II.2.b) Social sciences 
In the 1970s, social scientists undertook the challenge to denaturalize ‘natural’ disasters 
(O'Keefe, Westgate, & Wisner, 1976), which my dissertation follows. Those social scientists 
used empirical data to support two arguments. First, during the 20th century, the frequency of 
extreme geophysical events did not increase significantly; yet, human and material losses grew. 
Second, similar events had different context-dependent outcomes; for instance, higher human 
losses usually happened in underdeveloped countries. Henceforth, disasters were defined as 
processes dependent upon social hierarchies, everyday interactions to habitats and broad 
historical conditions that enhance or mitigate these matters (Hewitt, 1983); not merely the result 
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 Contrastingly, less used qualitative characterizations include when basic social functions are halted or destroyed 
(Oliver- Smith, 1996); all major public and private facilities need vast substitution or repair to restore primary social 
and economic services (Torry, 1979); external aid is needed for recovery (Blaikie et al., 1994); or ruin is so hefty 
survivors have nowhere to turn for help (Tobin & Montz, 1997). 
32
 One contention is if human vulnerability can be characterized without including the ‘surrounding’ eco-sphere 
vulnerability (Turner et al., 2003). The other issue is that environmental vulnerability and degradation deserve their 
own characterization, based on intra-species justice arguments (Birkmann, 2006) or an ecocentric view that puts the 





of hydro-meteorological or geophysical events. Such radical contribution questioned disasters as 
natural incidents that suddenly interrupt ‘normal’ everyday life. Disaster causes were found in 
the order of ‘normality’, in the prefiguring underlying structures and interactions of economic, 
social, cultural and political life (Hewitt, 1983). 
 
Another exceedingly relevant change during the 1970s was the introduction of the notion of 
‘vulnerability’ to disasters, used in my case studies. It has at least two traced origins. One 
explanation is that it comes from Risk-Hazard models, which interpreted risk as the combined 
result of exposure to the hazardous event and the sensitivity of the entity exposed, applied for 
environmental and climate impact assessments (Burton, Kates, & White, 1978). In the other 
explanation, the concept evolved out of social sciences to counterbalance hazard-oriented 
characterizations of disasters dominated by natural sciences (Schneiderbauer & Ehrlich, 2004). 
Next, the concept of vulnerability addressed why some individuals and specific groups 
underwent more the effects of hazards than others. The discussion focused on how social 
systems shape risks and opportunities in nature, how they put varying demands on nature and 
how nature affected them differently. Instead of sweeping, indiscriminate opportunities and risks, 
the idea was that socio-economic hierarchies create uneven access to opportunities and 
imbalanced exposures to risks (Cannon, 1994). Vulnerability discussions demanded an 
understanding of power relations through access to and control over location
33
, exploitation of 
environmental resources for economic growth
34
, prioritization of projects and problems
35
 and 
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 Generally correlated to the spatial and social distribution of hazardous activities and events. For instance, superior 
land used for commercial ranching and agriculture pushes excluded citizens to areas prone to droughts, floods or 
landslides; low income citizens may be living in buildings that governments and property owners fail to reinforce 
against hazards (Cannon 1994). 
34
 Such as water, minerals, forests, pasture, arable land, marine resources, wildlife with partial or total exclusion of 







 (Bryant & Bailey, 1997); which are connected to planning as my research 
shows. Moreover, discussions of power relations sought to expose nuanced contradictions of the 
social fabric. For instance, groups controlling some ‘bundles’ of resources or entitlements could 
be susceptible to one type of hazard more than another, without direct correspondence to relative 
wealth (Blaikie et al., 1994) or social position, and also varying across scales and time. From the 
spatial standpoint, that meant that powerful groups could be diminishing others’ vulnerability 
and increasing theirs through exclusionary land markets and legislation that monopolize 
attractive risk-prone areas, such as beachfronts or steep slopes with outstanding views. 
Impoverished citizens in upper watershed areas could be causing vulnerability to themselves or 
groups of all incomes through hazard-prone survival practices that increase landslides and 
floods; such as intensive cattle grazing, wood extraction, slash-and-burn agriculture and 
precarious urbanization. Impoverished citizens may survive the seismic collapse of their one-
storey, light and flimsy dwellings unlike higher-income residents of sturdier, taller buildings; but 
not hurricanes. In other words, although generally the poor suffer the most in a disaster (Bryant 
& Bailey, 1997; Cuny, 1987; Varley, 1994); simply equating vulnerability to poverty -measured 
by income and assets- or access to and control over particular variables was insufficient to 
propose specific and successful counterbalancing strategies. Instead, vulnerability was 
conceptualized as a multifaceted characteristic resulting from combined factors of social 
difference (Cannon, 1994) with changing and sometimes even contradictory relevance; including 
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 The capacity to direct financial, technical, administrative and other resources by directing attention to particular 
project possibilities, for practical political aims and organizational ends (Forester, 1989). 
36
 Including the content of the 'public transcript' and the mechanisms to build and spread it. Initially, the notion 
of public transcript addressed overt interactions between dominators and subaltern groups, whilst hidden 
transcript concerned underground narratives that critique power and need careful attention (J. C. Scott, 1990). A 
subsequent notion of public transcript will be used in this research, understood as socially accepted versions of 
events represented in the public sphere through official documents, legal constructs, media messages, popular music 





class, ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability, citizenship, religion, ideological 
affiliation and caste. Such understanding helped to decode everyday life processes of the 
economic, social, political, and cultural stratification of people into a detailed documentation of 
the most exposed citizens in risky environments (Varley, 1994), in order to find entry points for 
analysis and action throughout the disaster cycle. Borrowing from safety engineering and risk 
analysis studies of severity and frequency exposure to risks (Cyr, 2005), the generic formula 
“Risk (of a Disaster) = Hazard + Vulnerability” (Blaikie et al., 1994) characterized disasters as 
the interaction between a hazard and the degree of vulnerability experienced by citizens in a 
particular space and time period. Structural holistic changes were needed to reduce vulnerability, 
including improvements in capacities to anticipate, cope with, resist, recover from the event 
(Blaikie et al., 1994), influence post-disaster processes, and produce and disseminate 'public 
transcripts'. Overall, this view questioned customary narrow focuses on minimizing hazards via 
technical and material interventions, assuming indiscriminate impacts, or faulting imperfect 
knowledge and individual responsibility. Thus, vulnerability debates went to the core of power 
relations associated with decision-making and power theory notions from political science and 
public administration (Cyr, 2005). Socially stratified vulnerability could be seen as a collective 
decision –of the most dominant societal factions, politicians and technocrats- about the degrees 
of insecurity considered acceptable for different persons; in other words, different rights within a 
society. Vulnerability reduction of one group usually affected the interest of another group, 
rendering this approach contentious –too political or ideological- for governments or ‘neutral’ 
international entities (Mitlin, Satterthwaite, & Stephens, 1996; Varley, 1994). The term 
vulnerability entered academic and policy-making discourses highlighting the political economy 





1994) explained disasters as the intersection between physical exposure and vulnerability of the 
exposed unit, including root causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions
37
. In another 
proposition (Cannon, 1994), vulnerability was based on individual and group preparedness, 
degree of resilience and resistance of the particular livelihood
38
 system of an individual or group, 
and health of individuals and operation of social measures, including preventive medicine. 
Vulnerability also means the intersection between susceptibility of people and communities at 
risks vis-à-vis their economic, social, and cultural capacities to cope with potential threats 
(Hilhorst & Bankoff, 2004)
39
. Another issue is the separation between social vulnerability, 
meaning human susceptibility and the preconditions for survival and adaptation; and biophysical 
vulnerability, a notion from environmental change research meaning the degrees to which a 
system is vulnerable to climate change impacts and its (un)capacity to adjust (Change, 2005). In 
2006, the academic literature had more than 25 definitions (Birkmann, 2006), pointing to 
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 Root causes referred to limited access to power structures and resources, political and economic systems. 
Dynamic pressures comprised lack of training, investment and freedom of press; rapid urbanization, deforestation 
and fast population changes. Unsafe conditions meant physical environment, local economy, social relations and 
public actions. 
38
 Livelihood is defined as "the command an individual, family, or other social group has over an income and/or 
bundles of resources that can be used or exchanged to satisfy its needs. This may involve information, cultural 
knowledge, social networks, legal rights as well as tools, land or other physical resources" (Blaikie et al., 1994) p. 9. 
39





Table N.1. Disciplinary views of Vulnerability and Recommendations 
 
Discipline View(s) of Vulnerability Recommendation(s) 
Geography Vulnerability is determined by the use 
of hazard-prone areas 
Land-use planning that takes into 
account hazards to reduce risk 
Meteorology Vulnerability is due to a lack of 
advanced warning of severe weather 
Acquisition, creation and effective use 
of warning systems 
Engineering Vulnerability occurs when structures 
and infrastructure cannot withstand the 
forces of hazards 
Design and construction of buildings 
and infrastructure that promotes disaster 
resistance 
Anthropology Vulnerability emanates from 
constraining values, attitudes and 
practices 
Alter attitudes to discourage risk-taking 
practices and susceptibility 
Economics Vulnerability is related to poverty and 
results in an inability to prevent, prepare 
for or recover from a disaster 
Improve the distribution of wealth and 
purchase insurance to minimize losses 
and promote resilience 
Sociology Vulnerability is a product of inaccurate 
assumptions about disaster behavior and 
is related to race, gender, age, disability, 
etc. 
Understand behavioral patterns in 
disasters and pay attention to needs of 
special populations 
Psychology Vulnerability is a function of 
overlooking or minimizing risk and not 
being able to cope emotionally with 
stress and/or loss 
Help people to recognize risk and 
provide crisis counseling to enable 
resilience 
Epidemiology Vulnerability is susceptibility to disease 
or injury and is related to malnutrition 
and other health factors 
Improve provision of public 
health/emergency medical care before, 
during and after disasters 
Environmental 
Science 
Vulnerability is proneness to 
environmental degradation, which may 
change weather patterns and produce 
long-term disasters  
Conserve natural resources, protect 
green space areas, and ensure that 
debris management is performed in an 
environmentally conscious manner 
Political 
Science 
Vulnerability is produced by the 
political structure and incorrect decision 
making 
Alter structure of political system and 




Vulnerability results from misguided 
laws, the failure to implement policies 
effectively, and an inability to enforce 
regulations 
Strengthen response and recovery 
capabilities through preparedness 
measures, improved policy 
implementation and increased code 
enforcement 
Law Vulnerability results from negligence, 
which is a failure to act as reason or 
legal statutes dictate  
Understand the law, alter statutes, and 
ensure compliance to widely accepted 
ethical practices in emergency 
management 
Journalism Vulnerability is a result of insufficient 
public awareness about hazards and how 
to respond to disasters 
Dispel myths about disasters, foster 
increased media capabilities, and 
educate the public about hazards 
Emergency 
Management 
Vulnerability is the lack of capacity to 
perform important functions before and 
after disaster strikes (e.g., evacuation, 
search and rescue, public information, 
Foster public awareness about disasters 
and build capacities through hazard and 
vulnerability analyses, resource 








Vulnerability is due to cultural 
misunderstandings, permeable borders 
and fragile infrastructure, and weak 
disaster management institutions    
Correct domestic and foreign policy 
mistakes, enhance counter-terrorism 
measures, protect borders and 
infrastructure, and improve WMD 
capabilities  
(McEntire, 2007, p.10). 
 
A related concept used in my research is ‘resilience’, sometimes equated to robustness or coping 
capacity, and opposed to vulnerability (Adger, Hughes, Folke, Carpenter, & Rockström, 2005). 
Resilience was a term launched during the 1950s in psychology, first to explain tolerance 
abilities of children, and later to encompass psychological or psycho-physiological skills that 
enabled people to stay mentally and psychologically healthy while enduring and overcoming 
negative life circumstances (Ripp & Lukat, 2013). Multiple disciplines
40
 borrowed the term for 
diverse uses, particularly under the recent influence of ecological theories and experiences 
(Birkmann, 2006). The term has gained international currency concerning disasters, without 
agreement of what it means or how to attain it. The crux of the debate is whether it is the 
capacity of individuals, social groups, institutions, ecological and human-made systems to 
compensate properties that withstood damages –restoring their lost functionality-, or the capacity 
to respond flexibly to threats and thus deflect prospective hazards. In other words, the contention 
lies in whether it relates to abilities for absorbing disturbances or shocks; thus, it is tied to 
resistance. Alternatively, whether it relates to the regenerative capabilities of the examined 
entity, including learning from and adjusting to abrupt shocks or gradual changes while 
maintaining main functions; thus it is connected to coping and adaptation. The common focus is 
a system’s ability to keep its essential functions and structures during crises (Birkmann, 2006), 
and ultimately enable positive transformations. 
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 Including disasters, urban studies, human ecology, taxonomy, studies on developing economies, micro- sociology, 





II.2.c) Experiential grassroots, cultural and artistic expressions 
Until the 1980s, dominant ‘public transcripts, academic and policy-making literatures endorsed 
the voiceless and invisible presence of lay and disadvantaged citizens at risk. The neglect of 
grassroots’ characterization devalues their testimonies, understandings of the root causes of 
disasters and needs during relief and reconstruction. If the voices and actions of disempowered 
communities and individuals at risk are incorporated, the tendency has been to portray them “as 
doing so in ignorance, or out of mere perceptions of the hazard since technical expertise, not 
common sense or being there decides knowledge. Solutions are found to lie in technical 
counterforce. They need professionals and mission-oriented agencies to confront and tame 
nature" (Hewitt, 1998, p.79). In response, for progressive disasters scholars and practitioners 
incorporating experiential grassroots expressions –including non-verbal testimonies- became an 
overdue moral, humanitarian and practical debt (Hardie-Forsyth, 1999; Hewitt, 1998; López-
Marrero & Tschakert, 2011; Malchiodi, 2008); distant from the appropiation of survivers’ 
images and testimonies by governments, media, private firms and NGOs to advance their goals, 
which can result in ‘disaster tourism’ and ‘disaster pornography’ (Hewitt, 1998). My work 
searches to incorporate the former approach, also used in planning, to overcome the dichotomies 
experts vis-à-vis lay citizens, top-down vis-à-vis bottom up, and powerful vis-à-vis 
disempowered through practices that value grassroot experiences, extract context-sensitive 
lessons and facilitate policies (Lavell, 1994b). 
 
Similarly, a miriad of disaster-related cultural and artistic expressions have been overlooked and 
delegitimized in the theoretical and policy-making literatures. The root cause is possibly that 





excluded culture and art from among the top priorities (Geertz, 1963, 1973; UNDP, 2004a) or 
have commodified it (Evans, 2005; García, 2004; Miles, 2005; Miles; & R., 2005; A. J. Scott, 
1997; A.J. Scott, 2000). Therefore, the roles of culture in preventing and overcoming crises have 
been limitedly explored, which means critical knowledge voids in  “innovation and persistence in 
memory, cultural history, worldview, symbolism, social structures flexibility, religion, and the 
cautionary nature of folklore and folk tales” (A. Oliver-Smith & Hoffman, 2002, p.9). Recently, 
anthropologists, ethnographers and related professionals have reanalyzed Western-centric 
archetypical cultural constructions that separate humans vis-à-vis environment and disasters, 
interphases between material and cultural conditions that shape disasters (A. Oliver-Smith & 
Hoffman, 2002), cultural processes among communities located in risk-prone environments 
(Torrence & Grattan, 2002), and recent migratory and acculturation processes that fragmented 
intergenerational transmission of cultural memories, such as disaster warning signs (Torrence & 
Grattan, 2002). There are even less traces of learning from literary writings that record disaster-
related experiential knowledge, societal conflicts, environmental and spatial changes, economic 
processes, religious beliefs, superstitions, and potential areas of intervention. Yet, the arts are 
understudied sources which in many aspects are closer to the everyday life than technical 
writings, and frame relevant issues for disaster studies and management. That is why I included 
artistic manifestations concerning hurricanes, which have entered seldom scrutinized 'public 
transcripts' and popular consciousness. Other manifestations that I could not include due to 
unavailability are art therapy to increase crises resilience
41
, disasters as pedagogic exhibits
42
, and 
debates linking cultural heritage to a culture of disaster prevention and preparedness
43
. 
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 Art and play expose experiences of trauma, depictions, fictions and neuropsychological characteristics. Creative 
expressions –particularly non-verbal modalities- express the unspeakable, when silence is self-imposed or imposed 
by others (Malchiodi, 2008). Sensory manifestations  document acts of human degradation that may take place 
during crises, relevant for policy-makers
41





II.2.d) Complex emergencies 
The disaster debate has broadened since the 1970s from separate sudden or slow onset hazards 
with environmental triggers to comprise their overlaps, civil strife, accidents, famines, 
epidemics, biological hazards and technological collapses. A typology of disasters based on 
crises defined four types: ecosystemic, socio-technical, business-economic failures, and 
sociopathic attacks (Quarantelli, 1998). Such change reflects a different age of risks heralded by 
three complex emergencies in the U.S., soon followed by three even worse emergencies outside 
the U.S. mainland; and recognized by social theory. Their lessons are key for planners and 
motivated me to include complex historical emergencies due to the junction of climatic and 
seismic events. 
 
Love Canal (1978), Three Mile Island (1979) and Times Beach (1982) changed public 
awareness, control and legislation in the U.S. Explosion and leakage of buried municipal and 
industrial chemicals affected Love Canal (New York). Preceding residents’ complains about 
                                                                                                                                                             
sections of the brain -Broca’s area- affected during traumatic circumstances; and ease recovery as mechanisms to 
regain symbolic mastery over disruptive events (Malchiodi, 2008). Academic research examples –mostly centered 
on children- include the therapeutic powers of play, work, and creative arts to overcome crises (Frost, 2005); arts-
based learning to build post-trauma resilience (Smilana, 2009); and the arts and literature as answers to the impacts 
of  disasters, war, and terrorism (Gangia & Barowskyb, 2009). Non-academic examples for a wide audience that 
examine beyond children’s issues are a website by the International Art Therapy Organization, which includes 
diverse post-disaster rehabilitation processes using creativity, arts and performances (International Art Therapy 
Organization, 2009); and art therapy articles (Gordon, 2010; Malchiodi, 2008). 
42
 For instance, a 2012 Miami-based hurricane exhibit included artifacts recuperated from Hurricane Andrew (1992), 
a full-scale P-3 hurricane hunter aircraft to simulate a mission, game designing, constructing and testing a model 
house against hurricane-force winds; with the aim of building citizens awareness to prepare and protect themselves 
before, during and after hurricanes (Rojas Torres, 2012). 
43
 Relief and poverty reduction institutions, NGOs and other stakeholders lack studies documenting the long-term 
economic and social advantages of investing in traditional built environments and technologies, learning lessons 
from popular and vernacular cultures, and incorporating other forms of cultural heritage in disaster prevention and 
response. In turn, lack of reliable data to estimate investment returns undermines support to related interventions 






pollution and degraded living conditions were ignored for years, as the case was tainted by 
inadequate prevention and responses from officials, denial of private stakeholders, and lack of 
accountability mechanisms that guaranteed social justice (E. C. Beck, 1979). The explosion 
severity and public outrage gave way to the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act, also known as Superfund, which established emblematic 
compensations and requirements regarding a national inventory of contaminated sites (E. C. 
Beck, 1979; Blum, 2008). The Three Mile Island nuclear power station (Pennsylvania) partial 
meltdown was brought under control, without long-term health impacts on nearby residents. Yet, 
initial poor official communications, anxious evacuation of thousands of citizens, escalated 
cleanup costs, and later disclosure of critical details prompted legislation and controls for the 
industry, and anti-nuclear awareness and environmental activism possibly decisive to stop 
nuclear projects in the country (P. A. David, Maude-Griffin, & Rothwell, 1996; Hopkins, 2001). 
Also, the case inspired the pivotal work of sociologist Charles Perrow criticizing the role of 
industrialization in creating risks, which resonated with contemporary environmental activism
44
. 
In Times Beach (Missouri), a paving project made headlines as the largest civilian exposure to 
toxic dioxin in the country. Alarmed residents were evacuated when a flood worsened living 
conditions, the federal and Missouri governments acquired homes and businesses after 
contentious legal battles, and undertook expensive tidying (Hites, 2011; Humphreys, 1989). 
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 According to his ‘normal accidents’ thesis, ever increasing and unmanageable catastrophes were an inseparable 
component of the intricate human-technical processes of industrial societies (Perrow, 1984). Organizations generally 
established the framework of debates concerning risk acceptability and made choices about risks; which in turn had 
unpredictable cascading implications. Despite efforts to forestall accidents -regulation, control, design, training and 
warning-, human agency limitations prevailed, as futile regulation, disregarded warnings, incompetent response, and 
human errors. Thus, the impossibility to turn safe complex systems with catastrophic potential should deter us from 





Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986) and Exxon Valdez (1989) expanded disaster characterization. 
Pesticide leaking from a plant in Bhopal (India) became the world’s largest industrial disaster. 
The Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant (Ukraine) atmospheric release of radioactive material 
became the worst nuclear plant accident, only rivaled by the 2011Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear 
Power Station catastrophe (Japan). The Exxon supertanker oil-spilling in the south central coast 
of Alaska, close to the municipality of Valdez, was the largest and most ecologically damaging 
release of oil in North American history, only rivaled by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon/British 
Petroleum crisis in the Gulf of Mexico. The cases share large scale, complexity, initial 
inadequate official measures and censorship that worsened the crisis and made authorities and 
investors unreliable. Subsequent discoveries include known previous technical mismanagement, 
for-profit maintenance neglect, lack of mechanisms to compensate great human, economic and 
environmental costs still being accounted for (Chernobyl Forum Expert Group Environment, 
2006; Eckerman, 2006; Gill, Picou, & Ritchie, 2012; Paine et al., 1996; Palinkas, Downs, 
Petterson, & Russel, 1993; Rodin, Downs, Petterson, & Russell, 1992 ; Sriramachari, 2004). 
Contemporary social theory breakthroughs emerged in the publication of “Risk Society” by 
Ulrich Beck (1986 in German, 1992 in English), which coincided in time and some fundamental 
ideas with “The Constitution of Society” (Giddens, 1984). For Beck modernization’s purpose 
changed from distributing wealth and dominating external threats to managing risks resulting 
from industrial society (U. Beck, 1992). For Giddens, sociologists and social scientist had hardly 
developed systematic appraisals of ecological concerns
45
; yet, the crisis of modernity would 
force the transgression of epistemological and ontological boundaries (Giddens, 1990) in a new 
state called reflexive modernization. Both authors analyzed the growing and contentious role of 
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 Although pioneering sociological writings addressed mutually influencing human-environment interactions 






expertise; emergence of enhanced reflexivity; lay citizens’ mistrust of officials, experts and 
industries; concerns about low probability/high consequence events and increasing 
individualization (M. J. Cohen, 2000). Human agency marked the production and mitigation of 
modern risks
46
, and modernization would change through social pressure for risk reduction, 
industrial regulation and relinquishment of growth plans. 
 
An epistemological debate oscillates between the difficulties of providing effective analysis and 
interventions if compounding all disasters and the need to visualize even more complex 
emergencies due to previously unforeseen confluences (Perrow, 2011; Quarantelli, 1998). 
Fukushima exemplifies an extreme, potentially lethal worldwide radioactive disaster due to 
environmentally triggered events -an earthquake and associated tsunami-, overlapped with 
design and structural failures, seawater penetration and electrical blackout (Perrow, 2011). 
Ultimately, Fukushima reiterated the need to see disasters as part of a nature-culture dyad, in 
which professionals must take a broad integrative perspective to understand their causal 
mechanisms and possible responses. 
 
 II.2.e) Redefinition of the disaster management practice 
Early practices of disaster management used top-down elitist models of rational planning and 
decision-making to technologically discipline nature and tame disasters (Fischer, 1996) and to 
reestablish social order by force if needed, overshadowing social developmental issues -as my 
dissertation confirms-. Since the 19
th
 century (Neely, 2006), armed forces have often undertaken 
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 Such as changes in the food chain due to contamination and pesticide concentration, newly discovered diseases, 
biotechnological modification of species or high technology criminality. In my case study, examples are 





prevention plans, relief and reconstruction "assuming that only a military-style organization can 
function properly in a disaster area, but also because it underpins the notion of the state 
reimposing order on a devastated community" (K. Smith, 1992, p.42), sometimes at the expense 
of endorsing preceding injustices or setting up new ones. Moreover, military attempts to modify 
climate through technological interventions dates from the early 20
th
 century (Fleming, 2009; 
Gilbert, 1998; Mooney, 2007; Sloterdijk, 2009); and since the 1950s it was implemented in 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. at undisclosed costs. Despite wasted resources and ongoing social 






 century is full of examples in which politicians, media, practitioners and academics 
have framed disaster management is as a binary and mutually exclusive technical versus social 
choice, with predilection for the first option. Moreover, for profit lobbyists have promoted 
experimental costly technology disregarding vernacular, time-tested, low-cost technologies; and 
processes that address social change and touch powerful interests. Thus, the field has favored 
allegedly adequate technical changes, following conventional tenets of efficiency and 
modernization via expensive engineering-led innovations (Pielke Jr. et al., 2003). Progressive 
approaches propose a strategic interplay of structural and non-structural measures, respectively 
called ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ interventions (Pielke Jr. et al., 2003). The former indicates technical and 
material interventions; the latter calls for social innovation including education, social policies 
and economic incentives towards a lifestyle of sustainable interdependencies that includes 
disaster management. My case studies tracked both. 
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 In one research proposition, U.S. aerospace forces could ‘own the weather’ by 2025, a revolutionary capability as 
controversial as atomic bombing given its high-risks, but supposed to be exceedingly worthwhile. Weather-
modification would cover fully the battle space; from derailing adversary operations or backing those of allies via 
small-scale tailoring of weather patterns to absolute supremacy of counter space and global communications (House 





Also, progressive disaster management has moved away from the narrow leadership and 
management of specialized professionals and agencies (Bull-Kamanga et al., 2003), to 
incorporate disciplines that were tangential, new or acted separately, including planning. Often 
unacknowledged by ‘disaster experts’, lacking an educational curriculum that incorporated 
disasters, and internal debates about the multidisciplinary and politicized underpinnings of 
planning; urban specialists acted separately and limitedly on key processes related to risk 
accumulation. Land use planning and emergency management illustrate this point, examined in 
my dissertation. Avoiding high-risk areas has been traditionally the most direct tool in land use 
planning (K. Smith, 1992), requiring steps such as risk zoning and legislation, intervention in 
exclusionary land markets, dissemination of disaster memories -which planners rarely address-, 
and contentious
48
 relocation of settlements on hazard-prone areas. "Risk zoning, urban 
development ordinances, or other technical instruments rapidly become a useless (and at times 
costly) exercise if not attuned to real social conditions and to the real possibilities of control" 
(Lavell, 1994b, p.60). Also, emergency management must integrate planning explicitly. At best, 
conventional urban specialists acted limitedly during relief, a critical stage of improvised and 
accelerated decision-making that may crudely reveal persistent underlying assumptions, incipient 
long-term policies and political life trends. For instance, unplanned warning and evacuation may 
cause panic, crime, looting, widespread traffic jams, petrol scarcity, severe economic loss, 
shortages in metropolitan or national public services, public health risks for those displaced 
(Blaikie et al., 1994) and expose more citizens to psychological traumas, injuries and death. 
Neglect of warning and evacuation is a political decision with contentious underpinnings that 
merits inquiry from the planning standpoint, particularly in places with historical hazard 
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 Including high costs, opposition from powerful stakeholders or exposed communities who fear societal disruption, 





recurrence or new hazards. Another critical choice is to invest in local relief capacity; its 
weakness empowers distant administrations, foreign aid institutions, charities and outsiders. 
Crises worsens if those stakeholders are unaccountable for implementing contextless responses 
and treating disaster survivors as victims incapable of participating in the decision-making of 
their present and future, who may even ‘need’ to be disciplined with patriarchal or militaristic 
approaches. Moreover, uncoordinated responses by diverse entities can lead to vital vacuums, 
duplication of efforts, manipulation for personal or political purposes, overburden of survivors, 
generation of false expectations or skepticism, weakening of local entities which precisely 
needed strengthening (Maskrey, 1994), and ultimately reinforce injustice, underdevelopment and 
dependency (Cuny, 1987; Maskrey, 1994; B. Wisner et al., 2004). Relief “is likely to be most 
efficient when there is a clearly prioritized identification of tasks to be done and it is also 
established beforehand who is responsible for each job" (K. Smith, 1992, p.126). Ultimately, this 
reinforces the call to integrate disaster management and planning in order to achieve 
vulnerability reduction, which increasing numbers of scholars and practitioners raised since the 
1980s (Paul Susman, P. O'Keefe, & Ben Wisner, 1983; Varley, 1994). "To isolate disasters and 
make them a 'special problem' is in itself an invitation to disasters" (Lavell, 1994a, p.62). 
Another argument to integrate disasters in urban development processes was based on cost-
effective analysis (Alcira Kreimer & Mohan Munasinghe, 1992). 
 
II.3. Conclusions 
Since the late 1960s and with more strength since the 1990s, there has been a paradigm shift 





initial secular characterization of disasters as geophysical extremes of nature that suddenly 
disrupt ´normal’ life. Coming from multiple standpoints, lay citizens, activists, scholars and 
policy-makers advanced fundamental questions concerning disasters. Their central contributions 
include the failures of science and technology to characterize and handle disasters, alternative 
knowledge that addresses power relations, valorization of grassroots accounts and the arts, 
threats of industrialization and modernity, contested roles of institutions and citizens in crises 
prevention and response, rise of novel complex emergencies, and redefinition of disaster 
management practice. 
 
The resulting paradigm to understand and handle disasters can be framed as a politicized and 
human-centered approach, an alternative ‘co-evolutionary’ construct, which intends to 
circumvent dichotomous choices by synchronizing social and technical changes. Distilled to 
policy-making, the aim would be to facilitate changes of people's practices, including their 
interaction with the environment, through social, cultural, material, infrastructural or technical 
interventions, in order to promote social justice through successful interventions. From all these 
layers of knowledge, this research will undertake the following questions: What is a disaster? 
What caused it? How to tackle it? In practice, they narrow down to three themes further 
developed in the Research Design Chapter and examined in the case studies: Characterization, 
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III.1. Introduction of the questions to be addressed 
When conducting my research
49
, it was hard to grasp the body of work concerning hurricanes on 
the island. I organized it until 2012 to frame my research design, case studies and contributions, 
and fill a knowledge gap. Although I kept disciplinary separation, the following questions serve 
to extract what is relevant for my dissertation: 
 
1) Is there a robust production of literature and policy-documents for Puerto Rican 
hurricanes 
2) Which have been the main catalyst for advancing hurricane knowledge and policy 
production? 
                                                 
49
 Most of the local search was conducted at the Universidad the Puerto Rico (UPR), Río Piedras campus in San 
Juan. The UPR system of 42 libraries works as a national public with unique centennial documents; but it suffers of 
classification inconsistencies. Several collections reaching until the 1980s use non-digitalized typed cards exclusive 
to each library. The same topic can be classified under different headlines, and may not be listed in both official 
languages. When date is missing, the library notation is a question mark – for example 19? means it was published 
in the 20
th
 century-. Master’s Thesis or Doctoral Dissertations may be catalogued inconsistently and other materials 
are uncatalogued. The latter problem is shared by the archives of Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín, Puerto Rico’s 
Public Broadcasting Station (WIPR-TV), Archivo General de Puerto Rico, the Puerto Rican Planning Board and the 
Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña (ICP), which I consulted in lesser degree. Most of those institutions have had 
reductions of funding, personnel and hours of consultation during the last decade. Hence, this review could be 
lacking relevant publications. I conducted an online search during four years. Using a snowball sampling-like 
technique, I followed references in publications; and I also made random searches in scholarly journals and search 
engines. When only references were available, not the documents, I still mentioned them to construct a 
comprehensive overview and facilitate the search for scholars and policy-makers. At Columbia University, I 






3) Which are the most and least developed disciplines?  
4) Are there common threads for all the disciplines? 
5) Which are the main units of analysis? 
6) Who have been the main producers of research and policy documents?   
 
III.2. Thematic structure definition 
The historical article Hurricanes and the Shaping of Circum-Caribbean Societies (Schwartz, 
2005) succinctly advances a holistic, multidisciplinary review of the regional literature useful to 
this chapter. For the author, underneath disciplines lays a revealing and changing myriad of 
paradigms about society, environment and science. His proposition of four disciplinary themes to 
group the literature, with examples, is accompanied by an incisive synopsis of each theme’s 
developmental background: 
 
i) Sociological studies firstly structured around coping and risk management, social and 
psychological responses of individuals to disasters, and self-vulnerability enhancing 
choices. This literature was mostly written with a sociological or psychological 
background, based on qualitative information gathered through interviews and direct 
observation; and it lacked longitudinal perspective and connections with political and 
economic dynamics. 
 
ii) Policy guidelines produced mainly by governmental institutions, NGOs, scholars and 





solving, focused on disaster stages, and usually with feeble sensitivity to contextual 
characteristics including historical and cultural specificities. 
 
iii) Climatological studies to record events scientifically and improve prediction. This 
literature has grown linked to technology; yet, traditionally lacked self-reflective criticism 
of the political, social and cultural foundations of science and the manipulations of 
science. Recent topics include forecasting bureaucratization through governmental 
institutions and the historical impact of technology. 
 
iv) Historical studies which at their origins could be described as classical hurricane 
historiography, chronologically listing data such as casualties, economic losses and 
physical trajectories. This literature overlooked the social construction of disasters and 
the shaping of societies by disasters. While many historians have seen storms as a danger 
to Circum-Caribbean peoples, their ‘naturalness’ blurred their understanding as 
endogenous to historical process. Recently, hurricanes have become a legitimate topic of 
inquiry, complementing usual Caribbean meta-narratives including slavery, plantation 
economies, imperialism and race. 
 
Schwartz’s structure is a useful point of departure, but the Puerto Rican hurricanes literature is 
broader in disciplinary terms and would benefit from a fine tuned temporal and contextual 
follow-up of the disciplines and approaches within disciplines. Thus, this chapter reviews a) 
Meteorology, b) Biology, c) Physical sciences, d) Epidemiology, e) Social sciences, f) 





policy-making, k) Insurance, l) Housing, and m) Literary writings. Within each discipline, 
publications are examined in chronological order to track the development of paradigms, 
knowledge and policies. Each discipline is concluded with a succinct critique. 
 
III.3. Review of the literature on Puerto Rican hurricanes until 2012 combining 
disciplinary themes and chronological order 
 
III.3.a) Meteorology 
Since the early Spanish colony, sources recorded climate data and storm impacts in Puerto Rico 
with degrees of religiosity, accuracy, consistency and scalar coverage. Yet, Caribbean 
meteorology emerged in advanced academic Cuban institutions, with intellectuals such as 
Andrés Poey and priest Benito Viñes at the forefront (Schwartz, 2005), whilst in Puerto Rico the 
discipline remained inexistent. At the turn of the 19th century, the U.S. Army Signals Corp 
produced regional information for domestic purposes, protection of ships and cargo, and to 
extend the U.S. power (Arsenault, 2005). Data was collected from merchant and marine ships 
and complemented with personal observations, quotes from civilians, officials, travelers and 
local observatories. All informants were male. 
 
Systematic literature focused on Puerto Rican weather started to be produced by U.S. Army 
Signals Corp meteorologists in 1899. Following the U.S. invasion, the newly established San 
Juan Weather Bureau tracked storm for protection and military purposes (Neely, 2006). San 





mapped and served political and fundraising aims in Washington (Davis 1902), including 
decisions about denying independence to the island. Pioneering meteorologist in Puerto Rico 
were men from the U.S. (Alexander, 1902; E. B Garriott, 1899; E.B Garriott, 1899), and they 
amassed technical information sent from ships or gathered locally through barometric, wind 
speed and rain gauges readings. They produced scientific reports, tables and sometimes maps 
and drawings; they concomitantly produced typical listings of casualties and damages. This 
profile of information and meteorologists (Fassig, 1928; Hartwell, 1931; Weightman, Mitchell, 
& Hartwell, 1932) continued for almost four decades, integrating technological advances that 
improved data collection during San Felipe (1928), San Zenón (1930), San Nicolás (1931) and 
San Ciprián (1932). Ongoing martial emphasis included military personnel, location of weather 
monitoring station within armed forces bases, applied use of war technology, secrecy on 
information, and bellicose motivations for research, policies and projects. 
 
Since the 1940s, the meteorological literature grew fastly incorporating experiments that took 
place in Puerto Rico, without the locals having access to or decision-making power over the new 
knowledge. For instance, after an improvised flight that departed from the island to penetrate a 
storm, the U.S. War Department created in 1944 the first Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, a 
military team with an instrument equipped aircraft originally dedicated to military missions. 
Soon scientists on board collected regional meteorological data, establishing longitudinal records 
and producing theoretical works. After WWII, reduced security constrains on military 
technology enabled the practical use of radars (Maynard, 1945). Furthermore, when the race with 
the Soviet Union started, president Eisenhower followed his weather advisor -Harold T. Orville-, 





1950s until the 1980s, the military aimed to engineer storms, hurricanes and clouds as weapons 
for an all-weather air force (Mooney, 2007). U.S. conducted aerial bombing experiments over 
Puerto Rico, the Atlantic Ocean and the U.S. to modify hurricanes and storms. Meteorological 
literature produced for those military objectives and projects was often classified as confidential. 
Records in the UPR libraries are a few black and white photographs of U.S. Air Force squadrons; 
original documents are unavailable. Online searches of writings evaluating its linkages then and 
now to Puerto Rico yield meager results. At that time, mostly strictly technical writings 
circulated and they increased after the 1954/1955 disastrous Atlantic hurricane seasons and the 
Weather Bureau launching of the National Hurricane Research Project in 1955 (Mooney, 2007). 
In turn, some of those changes reflected post Santa Clara, including regional meteorological 
research for the hurricane season (Dunn, Davies, & Moore, 1956), local meteorological 
conditions and radarscope readings of the hurricane (J. A. Colón, 1959), and detailed studies 
about the hurricane eye (R. J. Grace, 1956). Similarly, after Hurricane Donna hit Puerto Rico in 
1960, research included the habitual hurricane season meteorological research (Dunn, 1961), and 
in-depth studies on weather and circulation (Tisdale, 1960), the filling of Donna over Puerto 
Rican land (B. I. Miller, 1964), and a summary of empirical studies of the horizontal motion of 
small radar precipitation echoes caused by Donna and other tropical storms affecting Puerto Rico 
and surrounding territories (Senn & Stevens, 1965).  A study of  Donna’s surface winds 
unusually took place four decades later, reinterpreting 1960 data with new methods (Dunion, 






Afterwards, the island went through a fairly quiet storm period
50
 until the late 1980s. The 
literature focused on the worse events, such as Hurricane David (1979) and tropical storm Isabel 
(1985), examples are the general summary of David’s corresponding hurricane season (Heber, 
1980), uses of weather satellite imagery in teaching the characteristics of tropical cyclones 
(Bencloski, 1981), a comparative weather report on hurricanes David and Frederic in Puerto 
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1980), a 
Ph.D. dissertation examining Puerto Rican tropical cyclone structure and intensity change 
(Nuñez, 1981), and the Atlantic hurricane season that included storm Isabel (Case, 1986). 
 
In 1989, Puerto Rico was harshly hit by Hurricane Hugo which reflected on the meteorological 
literature (Brennan, 1991; National Weather Service, 1989; F.N.  Scatena & Larsen, 1991). 
Publications following the landfall of hurricane Georges, in 1998, research includes the aircraft 
mission summary of climatological data (Aberson, Gamache, Leighton, Black, & Popstefanija, 
1998), preliminary storm report (Bennett & Mojica, 1998), complete storm report 
(NOAA/AOML, 1998), preliminary meteorological report from the National Hurricane Center 
(Guiney, 1999) and observed boundary layer wind structure and balance in the hurricane core 
(Kepert, 2006). 
 
Parallel efforts to understand climate and hurricane zonation include a commercial hurricane 
zoning map (Shell Oil Company Incorporated, 19?), a climate study for Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands (Calvesbert, 1970), a climate zonation based on principal components analysis 
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flooding impacts were severe. For instance, after hurricane David (1979), newly created FEMA declared Puerto 
Rico a disaster area due to agricultural and property flooding damages. The 1985 storm Isabel triggered what was 
considered the worst landslide disaster in North American history, killing 123-300 people in Ponce only. President 





and an artificial neural network (Malgrem & Amos, 1999), and a climate map of Puerto Rico, 
Vieques and Culebra (Daly, Helmer, & Quinones, 2003). 
 
In conclusion, the meteorological literature is increasing in numbers, length and technical 
complexity; with significant production after major events. Gaps include self-reflective criticism 
of the political, social and cultural foundations of climatological science and the manipulations 
of scientific knowledge (Schwartz, 2005). Other missing topics include secularization and 
bureaucratization through the weather bureau and related institutions, disciplinary impacts of 
local research, historical effects of technology, state of the profession at the local level, present 
and future priorities, tensions between U.S. and Puerto Rican institutions and experts, tensions 
between the dominant figure of the expert vis-à-vis general public, connections and mismatches 
with policy-making, and preventable information breaks that occur during major events. 
 
III.3.b) Biology 
The contributions from the biological sciences emerged in the early 20
th
 century and have vastly 
increased in quantity, quality and complexity. They first focused on the impacts of San Felipe on 
diverse trees and forests (C. G. Bates, 1930; C. Z. Bates, 1929), Santa Clara on forests 
(Wadsworth & Englerth, 1959), and Edith (1963) on marine life in the southwest coral reef La 
Parguera (Glynn, Almodóvar, & G., 1964). Around the 1980s, biology graduate students and 
researchers produced highly specialized studies with reduced policy implications. The first 
examples found came from marine biology; an M.Sc. thesis about the effects of hurricane David 
(1979) on the benthic macro algae La Parguera (Matta, 1981) was followed by evaluations of 





1987, 1989). A contemporary piece focused on hurricane damage and recovery in the montane 
forests of the Luquillo Experimental Forest (Weaver, 1986), a protected area in northeastern 
Puerto Rico used for tropical forestry research during nearly a century. In 1988, the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) launched the Luquillo Long-Term Ecological Research Program 
(LUQ-LTER
51
) to study natural disturbances -i.e. hurricanes, floods, landslides, and droughts- 
and ecosystem responses to them. A year later, Hugo prompted an extremely sizeable production 
of biological knowledge, including an introduction to hurricane biological impacts in the 
Caribbean emphasizing Puerto Rico (L. R. Walker, Lodge, Brokaw, & Waide, 1991); and the 
multiple hurricane impacts on Luquillo comprising animal populations responses (R. B. Waide, 
1991), shrimp abundances in a montane stream (Covich, Crowl, Johnson, Varza, & Certain, 
1991), bird populations (Robert B. Waide, 1991), forest frogs (Woolbright, 1991), tree damage 
and recovery (L. R.  Walker, 1991), light availability changes (D. S. Fernández & Fetcher, 
1991), seedling populations (Guzmán-Grajales, 1992; Guzman-Grajales & Walker, 1991), 
secondary forests and plantations (Rodríguez Pedraza, 1993), termites (McMahan & Blanton, 
1993), biomass and nutrient content of three experimental watersheds (F. N. Scatena, Silver, 
Siccama, Johnson, & Sanchez, 1993), bats (Gannon & Willig, 1994), vegetation dynamics of 
disturbance and recovery (Everham, 1996), litter dynamics along stream, riparian and upslope 
areas (Vogt et al., 1996), leaf litter spider species (Vargas Carcaña, 1997), and five-year effects 
on a flood plain Palm Forest (Frangi & Lugo, 1998), implications for parrots of pre- and post-
hurricane fruit availability (Wunderle, 1999). Comparative studies addressing Hugo include 
damage to trees related to maximum gust speeds measured or estimated in 18 urban and rural 
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sites in Puerto Rico and the Lesser Antilles (John K.  Francis & Gillespie, 1993), responses of 
tree species to hurricane winds in subtropical wet forests in Puerto Rico (Zimmerman et al., 
1994), the first five years reorganization of above ground biomass and nutrient use in three 
tropical forests in the U.S. Virgin Islands (F. N. Scatena, Moya, Estrada, & Chinea, 1996), and a 
longitudinal study of hurricane disturbance regimes in the Luquillo Experimental Forest 
landscape reproducing wind damage and meteorological impact from historical records (Boose, 
Serrano, & Foster, 2004). 
 
Likewise, after hurricane Georges, biologist gathered information about its effects on frog 
populations of the Cordillera Central (Jarrod & Vilella, 1999), several species of urban trees in 
San Juan (John K. Francis, 2000), seed and seedling bank dynamics in secondary forests 
(Lomascolo & Aide, 2001), the Artibeus jamaicensis bat (Rodriguez-Durán & Vázquez, 2001), 
forest floor decomposition in several forests (Ostertag, Scatena, & Silver, 2003), vegetation 
changes in Luquillo Experimental Forest, the Guánica Dry Forest and five cities using NOAA’s 
Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (Ayala-Silva & Twumasi, 2004), diversity and 
abundance of Anura Leptodactylidae forest frogs before and after Georges in the Cordillera 
Central (Vilella & Fogarty, 2005), resident avifauna of Maricao State Forest (Tossas, 2006), 
structural response of Guánica dry forests to hurricane winds (Van Bloem, Lugo, & Murphy, 
2006). 
 
In conclusion, this extensive literature shares some of the weaknesses concerning the 
meteorological literature. For instance, there is no self-reflective criticism of the political, social 





impacts of local research, historical effects of technology, local state of the profession, present 
and future priorities, tensions between U.S. and Puerto Rican institutions and experts, tensions 
between experts vis-à-vis general public. Most publications are conducted in isolated forests due 
to disciplinary and funding biases that dismiss urban or agricultural environments. Finally, it is 
hard to advance ecosystemic views, multidisciplinarity, and policy repercussions. 
 
III.3.c) Physical sciences 
Physical sciences publications emerged relatively late, in the 1970s; and most aim to be applied 
research, although their usefulness remains unexamined. Instability of natural and human-made 
slopes has been addressed given the landslides triggered by hurricanes and heavy rains, but also 
by seisms (DeGraff, Bryce, Jibson, Mora, & Rogers, 1989; Pando, Ruiz, & Larsen, 2004). A 
miscellaneous investigating series that included a map of landslides and areas of susceptibility to 
land sliding in Puerto Rico (Monroe, 1979) was soon followed by emergency-driven research. 
As mentioned, tropical storm Isabel unleashed lethal landslides in southern Puerto Rico during 
1985. The worse one remains the most disastrous landslide in U.S. history, killing between 127-
300 low-income residents only in Mameyes (Ponce) and generating demands for landslide 
knowledge and policy changes, including zoning. Examples are preliminary Irene storm response 
activities and recommendations of the U.S. Geological Service landslide hazard research team 
(Campbell, Herd, & Alonso, 1985), evaluation of Irene storm landslide hazards (R. W. Jibson, 
1986), geological research about debris flows in southern Puerto Rico associated to climatic 
events (Randall W. Jibson, 1989), guidelines for determining landslide risks post-Hugo based on 
slope hazard evaluation (USGS, 1991), hurricane Hugo triggered landslides in eastern Puerto 





landslides in a humid-topical environment (M. Larsen & Andrew, 1993), geographic relations of 
landslide distribution and assessment of landslide hazards in the Cibuco, Blanco and Coamo 
river basins (M.C. Larsen & Torres-Sánchez, 1995), stability analysis of western slopes 
(Divarkala & Macari, 1998), frequency and distribution of recent landslides in three mountain 
tropical regions (M.C. Larsen & Torres-Sánchez, 1998), map showing landslide susceptibility in 
Comerío (M.C. Larsen & Parks, 1998), an overview of rainfall-induced landslides that included 
the main issues, a literature summary and a proposal of rainfall intensity landslide threshold 
based on data from 1959 to 2003 to implement as a warning criterion (Pando et al., 2004), 
susceptibility to rainfall-triggered landslides in Ponce (Matthew C. Larsen, Santiago, Jibson, & 
Questell, 2004) and rainfall-induced landslide susceptibility island zonation (Lepore, Kamal, 
Shanahan, & Bras, Published online 25 February 2011). Also, publications of the last decade 
have addressed the need for landslide mitigation policies, learning from the assessment of the 
U.S. National Landslide Mitigation Strategy (National Research Council, 2004); comparative 
landslide mitigation examples from Venezuela, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic (M. C. 
Larsen & Wieczorek, 2004), and a project to forecast the hurricane-flood-landslide continuum 
effects at landfall in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico (Negri, Golden, & Updike, 
2004). 
 
Also in the 1980s, marine scientists gathered knowledge on coastal storm risks. First was a 
methodology for predicting Caribbean wave heights in storms (Lizano Rodríguez, 1988). After 
Hugo, a hurricane storm tide atlas was published for the affected eastern municipalities of 
Yabucoa, Humacao, Fajardo, Naguabo, Ceiba, Luquillo and Río Grande (Post, 1994), an 







 to manage coastal hazards (Mercado, 1994), Hugo’s effects on storm-tide 
elevations on the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico (Torres-Sierra, 1996), an evaluation of the 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's deep water wave prediction techniques during hurricane Georges 
(Hsu, Martin Jr., & Blanchard, 2000), storm impacts on eastern Puerto Rico coastal resources 
and environments with a baseline to compare the impact of future storms, in addition to coastal 
geologic hazards, their identification and recommendations (Bush, Richmond, & Neal, 2001); 
and a long-term reconstruction of relative flooding intensities causing hurricane-induced deposits 
in a Vieques coastal lagoon (Woodruff, Donnelly, Mohrig, & Geyer, 2008). 
 
In sum, geomorphology, coastal geology and hydromorphology are the most developed physical 
sciences literature addressing hurricanes and related disasters; all increased in numbers and 
complexity during the last decades, as the previously examined disciplines. Critical missing 
issues include the predominance of the figure of experts, without participatory assessments and 
approaches that help to build linkages to risk-enhancing everyday life practices and top-down 
policies, minimizing communication breakdowns. 
 
III.3.d) Epidemiology 
The Puerto Rican epidemiologic literature on the public health consequences of hurricanes is 
relatively reduced, yet it started early with a 1900 brief report after San Ciriaco by Dr. W.W. 
King, General Surgeon of the U.S. Marine-Hospital Services(King, 2006 (1900)). He provided 
an urban background to explain the crisis in Ponce -the most devastated city-, and summed up 
storm-related mortality, injuries, and infectious diseases with a racists bias. Post Santa Clara, 
researchers examined a typhoid fever outbreak in Ponce due to the sudden arrival of rural and 
                                                 
52





suburban refugees and the pollution of drinking water networks (Masi, Timothee, & Armijo, 
1958). Subsequently, researchers have assessed the health impacts of the 1985 storm Isabel 
Flood Disaster (V. J. Dietz, Rigau-Perez, Sanderson, Diaz, & Gunn, 1990), hurricane Hugo-
related deaths in South Carolina and Puerto Rico (Philen et al., 1992), an increase of 
leptospirosis in dengue-negative patients after hurricane Hortense in 1996 (Sanders et al., 1999), 
deaths associated with hurricane Georges in 1998 (Alvarez & Deseda, 1998), and dengue risk in 
relief workers after Georges (O'Leary et al., 2002). 
 
Different avenues of research emerged recently, signaling a more comprehensive view of 
hurricane-related epidemiology. Psychology and psychiatry contributions include an evaluation 
of children between 5-13 years of age who became refugees after hurricane Hugo (Santos 
Rivera, 1992), a conduct pattern comparative study of children affected and unaffected by Hugo 
(Arroyo de Jesus, 1993), Georges’ post-disaster stress in children and teenagers living in shelters, 
and proposed activities to ease the counseling process and transition to family-living conditions 
(Prewitt Diaz, 1999); whilst another paper focused on the risk of post-hurricane psychiatric 
disorders among a random sample of the child and adolescent population, providing research and 
clinical implications (Felix et al., 2011). On a different vein, a book chapter retrospectively 
examined prevailing public health mentalities during San Ciriaco from a historical perspective 
(Pabón Battle, 2000), and a self-instructional module by the Puerto Rican Health Department and 
the UPR Center for Public Health Preparation targeted the preparation of public health 






Despite those recent changes, relevant knowledge gaps include health-care infrastructure 
destruction, public health services disruption, homelessness and displacement, social dislocation, 
loss of livelihood and jobs, economic crisis, and transformation of ecosystems, as discussed in 
the seminal paper ‘Epidemiology of Tropical Cyclones: The Dynamics of Disaster, Disease, and 
Development’ (Shultz, Russell, & Espinel, 2005). Moreover, the legal underpinnings of public 
health responses remain unaddressed, for the detriment of emergency management and public 
health officials evaluating the adequacy of laws for preparedness and response activities, and 
establishing informational, educational, and training resources (Weiss, McKie, & Goodman, 
2007). Finally, identification of vulnerable groups beyond children and teenagers, conflicts with 
health insurance providers, long-term post-hurricane health care costs, and a public health 
evaluation of urban expansions at risk would contribute to disaster management, planning, and 
development policy making. 
 
III.3.e) Social sciences 
Related writing from social sciences emerged late compared to most of the disciplines examined 
above or the literature abroad; and some examples overlap with epidemiology -post-disaster 
stress-. The first available work is a Social Work Ph.D. dissertation on adult social support 
networks developed to overcome Hugo, at the island level (Bravo Vick, 1989). A subsequent 
paper examined attitudes, experience, and behaviors of homeowners in relation to hurricanes and 
other natural hazards in Puerto Rico (Palm & Hodgson, 1993). Hurricane Georges prompted an 
array of diversely focused and comparative research. A Social Work M.Sc. dissertation 
compared disaster community responses to Georges, including recovery management 





flooding vulnerable area Península de Cantera, surrounded by an estuary in San Juan; and the 
semi-rural community of Viví Arriba, in the coffee highlands of Utuado (Rivera Grajales & 
González Rivera, 1999). A cross-national study examined preparedness, resource loss, and 
psychological distress of college students following Georges in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto 
Rico, Dominican Republic, and the United States (Sattler et al., 2002); and another paper 
compared the social uses of media during Georges in eight communities of Mayagüez, western 
Puerto Rico (Perez-Lugo, 2004). A decade later, a study focused on the influence of political, 
cultural, economic and social factors on residents’ capacities to respond to natural phenomena; 
evaluating impacts and strategies (Maldonado Muñoz, 2009). The research compared Miñi-Miñi 
and Piñones, two coastal areas within Loíza, a highly impoverished and risk-prone municipality 
of the San Juan Metropolitan area. Moreover, the research compared hurricanes Hugo, Hortense 
and Georges. In between, a rare retrospective paper on education and intergenerational mobility, 
by economists, used census data to study how islanders on the margin of school entry during 
Santa Clara and residing in the most affected areas attained much lower levels of education as 
adults than their counterparts in less affected areas (Bluedorn & Cascio, 2005). 
 
In sum, most of this recent literature remains highly empirical, framed by an emphasis on short-
term coping with post-disaster situations which gives it rhetorical power, instead of longitudinal 
assessments or an emphasis on preventive approaches. Increasingly, comparative studies and 
concepts indicate updated notions of disasters as socially embedded. However those analyses 
remain detached from macro issues, such as the island status and underdevelopment, from micro 
everyday cultural practices that increase or diminish risks, and the planning profession. Thus, the 






The available economics literature is extremely limited, although data about economic losses is 
usually produced after every disaster and published as part of technical research papers, official 
documents and mass media works. A book chapter reviewed the extent and economic 
significance of landslides in Puerto Rico, including cases associated to weather events (DeGraff 
et al., 1989). Following Hurricane Marilyn (1995), brief and standardized economic recovery 
plans were simultaneously prepared by UPR scholars at the Economic Development University 
Center, for the coastal municipalities of Loíza, Culebra, Carolina, Ceiba, Naguabo, and the 
highland municipality of Juncos (José I.  Alameda-Lozada, 1997; José I. Alameda-Lozada, 1997; 
Centro de Desarrollo Económico UPR, 1997; R. Irizarry, 1997; R. L. Irizarry, 1997; Valle 
Caballero, 1997). The economic impacts of Hortense and Georges were summarized in two 
reports by the Puerto Rican Planning Board and endorsed by the Office of the Governor 
(Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Oficina del Gobernador, & Junta de Planificación, 1997, 1999). Both 
documents provide a snapshot of indicators, instead of processes; and indicators changed 
weakening comparisons. The second one provides a basic methodological explanation and 
attempts to include environmental damages with costs. For both, the Planning Board offered to 
update evolving conditions, which were unavailable. 
 
Essentially, there is a feeble understanding of the dynamic economic impacts of hurricanes in 
Puerto Rico over time; which is an overarching trend for U.S. disaster management (Deryugina, 
2011). The seminal piece “Hurricanes and Economic Research: An Introduction to the Hurricane 
Katrina Symposium” (Ewing, Brown Kruse, & Sutter, 2007) summarizes the main avenues of 





disrupted by hurricanes and other catastrophes, and how to frame and promote recovery and 
resilience. Amongst the relevant issues raised by the economics literature unaddressed in the 
Puerto Rican case are the polemic question if hurricanes and related disasters promote long-run 
growth when there is an increase of external and internal resources that unleash redevelopment 
processes (Skidmore & Toya, 2002), the macro-economic impacts of hurricanes (Strobl, 2008), 
their effects on local labor markets (Belasen & Polacheck, 2008), the economic value of 
hurricane forecasts and warning system and of improving forecast quality (L. David, S., & Lazo, 
2007), the design of fund transfer programs for general economic downturns -including welfare 
and food stamps- used as hurricane buffers even when there is no direct aid (Deryugina, 2011), 
and the recovery and resilience evaluation of an economy including fiscal costs hidden behind 
wealth or disaster-specific response policies (Deryugina, 2011). 
 
III.3.g) Law 
There is one outdated compilation of laws that lists Caribbean hurricanes (Seijo, 1965). Thus, 
there is a substantial void of knowledge concerning the role of law for enforcing disaster 
prevention and mitigation policies in Puerto Rico. For instance, one relevant yet missing analysis 
is how the human rights of a number of populations may be affected during the different phases 
of the disaster lifecycle; and how governments undertake or reject the responsibility of 
guaranteeing those rights and enforcing subsequent legal punishments and policy changes 
(National Bar Association-International Law Section & Program in lnternational Human Rights 
Law of lndiana University School of Law-Indianapolis, 2008; The Inter-American Commission 
of Human Rights, 2006). During the emergency phase for instance, survivors can be left 





transportation, sexual and gender-based violence, denial of humanitarian assistance, 
discrimination in aid distribution, forced recruitment of children, loss of documentation, unsafe 
and involuntary return or resettlement, and property dispossession. Moreover, human rights 
violations may concern more than those hit by the disaster, including reconstruction and cleanup 
workers, journalists, medical staff and volunteers. A related topic is how citizens react to the lack 
of governmental enforcement of human rights, present in unscrupulous zoning and construction 
practices, or insurance defaults. Finally, the overlap between epidemiology and law concerning 





 century groundbreaking and meticulous bibliography and chronology of 
Caribbean hurricanes; similar works were published until recently and constitute the backbone of 
historical information online and in press, with varying degrees of depth, rigor and scale (Alcalá, 
1967; Lastra Aracil, 1983; Millás, 1968; Miner Solá, 1996; Mújica-Baker, n.d. after 1998; 
Ramírez de Arellano, 1933; Salivia, 1972; Seijo, 1965; Ivan Ray Tannehill, 1956). The best of 
those sources provide valuable information and point to avenues of research. Yet, a key absence 
in those writings are the social dynamics that sustained the construction of disasters throughout 
history and the ways in which Puerto Rican society has been reshaped by disasters (Schwartz, 
2005). 
 
The first in-depth historical analysis of how a hurricane influenced Puerto Rican society and 
politics is relatively recent (Schwartz, 1992). It addresses hurricane San Ciriaco and ten years 





(Rosario Rivera, 2000b), which includes a photographic and statistic overview of the damages 
(Rosario Rivera, 2000a), the position of the military government (Santiago Caraballo, 2000) and 
the catholic church (Ortíz Díaz, 2000), traces of San Ciriaco in early 20
th
 century literature 
(Centeno Añeses, 2000), a health perspective mentioned above (Pabón Battle, 2000), and post-
hurricane migration (I. Fernández, 2000). In much less detail, San Felipe (1928) is addressed in 
the paper examined above to structure the literature review (Schwartz, 2005). Those writings 
highlight a change to see hurricanes as a valid lens to grasp history, power relations and human-
nature interactions; also taking place in fields like anthropology, sociology, ethnography, and 




III.3.i) Post-hurricane evaluations by policy-makers 
Post-hurricane evaluations precede the prevention policy-making literature for three decades, a 
trend signaling the reactive origins of disaster management. The oldest available post-hurricane 
evaluations by policy-makers or people influential to policy-making date from the late 19
th
 
century and can be characterized as descriptions, mostly enquiries without a professional 
methodology. The divergent interpretations on what caused the disaster include the forces of 
nature, the wrath of God, the sins of Puerto Ricans, weak construction techniques and ignorance 
(Abbad y Lasierra, 1866; Córdova, 1831a, 1831b; Fontán y Mera, 1868); usually with little 
reflexivity on governmental responsibilities or social inequality. Yet, an outstanding evaluation 
of the 1867 crisis by an appointed royal commission criticized lack of governmental investment 
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for causing the crisis and suggested public works to gain the good will of Puerto Ricans and 
maintain control over the colony (Schwartz, 1992). 
 
After San Ciriaco, descriptions and evaluations were written by Spanish or Creole men in 
positions of power, such as the Spanish Dean of the San Juan Dioceses (Perpiñá y Pibernat, 
1899), a Spanish ex-military official (Aráez y Ferrando, 1905) and a wealthy Creole pro-
independence (Coll y Toste, 1976). The parallel report by U.S. Governor General Davis (Davis, 
1902) marks an official transition towards secular scientific assessments and policies by 
Americans. Those works share an upper class perspective, whilst the absent voices of socially 
disadvantaged groups reveal their marginalization from telling and memorializing their 
experiences, and influencing public decisions. 
 
In the following decades, three post-disaster assessment and intervention documents indicate the 
preeminence of non-government organizations, short-lived or permanent, including the Puerto 
Rican Central Committee of Support for the 1902 Mont Pelée eruption in Martinique (Comité 
Central de Socorros a Martinica, 1903); the Red Cross which delivered short-term San Felipe 
relief in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Florida (American Red Cross, 1929); and the 
Redemptorists under the Southern Cross group, which described Catholic losses also caused by 
San Felipe in Puerto Rico, St. Thomas, St. Croix; and their short-lived relief interventions 
(Redemptorists under the Southern Cross, 1928). I did not find a specific institution addressing 
disasters during the New Deal, although many tackled projects reducing disasters. Moreover, 
only minor weather-related events happened, and they were included in larger policy-making 





Office of Civil Defense addressed several devastating events, such as Santa Clara (1956) and 
Donna (1960). Yet, for Santa Clara, I found one document making evaluations, the Governor´s 
yearly report to Congress (Luis  Muñoz Marín, 1957), which underplayed the crisis. Thus, 
critical documents inconvenient to circulate may be unclassified, lost or destroyed. 
 
Around the 1980s, post-hurricane evaluations increased in quantity, frequency and diversity. The 
Isabel storm floods and landslides of 1985 prompted federal agencies to make a comprehensive 
evaluation (Federal Interagency flood hazard mitigation team response report for Puerto Rico, 
1985). Following Hugo, multi-factorial assessments included impacts on historic resources 
(Bierce, 1989); a National Disaster Survey Report (US. Dept. of Commerce, 1990); comparison 
of intergovernmental disasters performances for Hugo in the Caribbean, South and North 
Carolina, and the Loma Prieta earthquake in San Francisco (Schneider, 1990); evaluation of its 
effects on water supplies in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico (Morris & Krishna, 1991); 
difficulties in technological transfers of U.S. disaster mitigation programs, comparing the 
successful Weather Service Forecasting Office and the computer model used to evacuate and 
shelter populations (SLOSH), the contentious coastal management program, and the problems 
experienced with sheltering, long-term emergency housing, and lifeline protection (Aguirre & 
Bush, 1992)¸ and a relatively comprehensive evaluation concerning North Carolina and Puerto 
Rico, which included meteorology, hydrology, emergency planning and response, surface winds 
and property losses, lifelines, coastal processes, conclusions and recommendations (Commission 






Following Georges in 1998, evaluations included a report on how public agencies and a 
composting company processing woody debris overcame challenges such as contamination and 
equipment wear (Myers, 1998), and the administrative report by the Red Cross (Cruz Roja 
Americana Puerto Rico, 1999). 
 
In sum, since the 1990s, comparative evaluations have increased, still focused at the island level. 
Technocratic and top-down approaches prevail, with little reflexivity of their validity. Another 
constant issue is the lack of coordination in terms of institutions, territories, disciplines and even 
approaches within disciplines. Although much can be learned from such diversity; it is difficult 
to advance longitudinal assessments. This literature needs in-depth critical analysis. Also, the 
immediate relief stage has received less attention than the preceding and subsequent stages. 
 
III.3.j) Prevention policy-making 
This literature has followed particularly destructive storms to shape long-term processes. As 
mentioned, New Deal institutions implemented disaster related projects; however, I could not 
find a specific entity in charge, which could be a reason for the lack of documents explicitly 
studying or preparing for disasters. During the early Commonwealth years, fastly produced 
documents highlight detailed island-wide planning of roles and procedures to follow, with 
growing leadership of the Commonwealth government. Several documents refer to the Cold War 
logic and express fears of nuclear destruction on the island
54
. For example, a Vigilante’s Manual 
outlines the organization of the Civil Defense volunteer base, regional coverage, hypothetical 
chains of command, detailed tasks to undertake and equipment to be used in case of hurricanes, 
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 Preparations in case of nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical attacks are a lasting concern on the island. 
For example, a private university just published related guidelines in its comprehensive security manual for the 





floods, storm surges, fire and radioactive bombs (Oficina de la Defensa Civil, 1954). The 
Commonwealth and Civil Defense created an Operational Survival Plan mapping evacuation 
scenarios throughout the island in case of nuclear fallouts, calculating population to be displaced 
from the main cities, specifying travel times and roads to the main shelters (Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico & Civil Defense, 1958). Around the same time, the Civil Defense Office prepared a 
basic citizens manual of guidelines to implement in case of hurricanes, floods and storm surges 
(Oficina de la Defensa Civil, 19?). After Santa Clara (1956), prevention guidelines targeted 
massive audiences through a series of educational materials, including a booklet, bulletin, 
documentary and posters to reach even illiterate citizens (DIVEDCO, 1965; Doniger, 1958). 
Those documents emphasize “self-help” and the landfall phase. After Donna (1960), there was a 
written clarification of the roles to be undertaken by the Office of Civil Defense and the 
American Red Cross in disaster operations (Oficina de la Defensa Civil, 1960). 
 
Concomitant literature concerning anthropocentric climate control policies to modulate storms 
through military bombing is unavailable. At the UPR libraries, a few 1960s black and white 
photographs of the ‘Stormfury Project’, show air force squadrons getting ready for their 
missions. Also unavailable are subsequent reflections about costs, achievements and failures of 
this approach, why Puerto Ricans could not engage the decision-making whilst they were 
actively working on local interventions, and the implications of diverting finite resources away 
from building and implementing knowledge about the social construction of disasters. 
 
Few proactive prevention documents were published between 1960s-1980s, as there were few 





(Agencia Estatal de Defensa Civil, 1977), a document on coastal flood hazards and responses 
(Puerto Rico Dept. of Natural Resources, 1980), and an M.Sc. planning thesis concerning a plan 
to coordinate natural disaster mitigation (Cortés Burgos, 1987). 
 
Post-Hugo prevention publications turned to multi-scalar decentralization, stakeholders acted 
without coordination yet incorporated new concepts such as strategic planning and vulnerability. 
For instance, the San Juan Metropolitan Area Hurricane Evacuation Study carried out by U.S. 
FEMA includes vulnerability analyses in the coastal municipalities of Loíza, Carolina, San Juan, 
Cataño, Toa Baja, and Dorado; but also inland, such as Guaynabo (FEMA, 1990). A mitigation 
plan for Natural Risks was done by the Puerto Rican Commonwealth and the Department of 
Natural Resources (Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico & Departamento de Recursos 
Naturales, 1991). The former institution also published an executive order to establish the 
coordination of executive functions for emergency and disasters (Estado Libre Asociado de 
Puerto Rico, 1993). However, none of those documents is available online, thus I cannot 
comment their content. 
 
Another hurricane evacuation study is focused on the southern coast of the island, indicating the 
higher vulnerability to inland storm tide penetration along the southeast and south coasts for 
Category 3- 5 storms (Departamento de Recursos Naturales, Agencia Estatal de Defensa Civil, & 
Servicio Nacional de Meteorología, 1993). An ambitious organizational analysis of disaster 
preparation and mitigation for the city of Mayagüez was proposed using surveys, quantitative 
data and network analysis to evaluate institutions involved locally (Rodríguez Rivera, Cólon 





results (H. Rodríguez & Troche, 1994). Seemingly around that time, the Planning Board 
sponsored an undergraduate study about floodplain population estimates and population density 
GIS maps for Bayamón, Cataño, and Guaynabo. It aimed to extrapolate population estimates for 
the rest of the island and improve efficiency in the allocation of resources for flood prevention 
and mitigation (Heckley, Mues, Reis, & Taylor, n.a). 
 
Before Georges (1998), the Puerto Rican counterpart of FEMA had circulated succinct 
guidelines, focused on family self-preparedness addressing food, water, documents, tools, first 
aid kit, clothes, hygiene and personal care items; planning a division of tasks -including 
evacuating children and people with special needs- and proper return to households (Agencia 
Estatal para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administración de Desastres, n.d. already in use in 
1998). Following Georges, a Presidential long-term recovery action plan for the island was 
prepared (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1999) and although is unavailable online or 
printed, the index points to a physicallist yet ample vision of changes. For instance, the plan lists 
mitigation through building codes, planning and coordination, and floodplain management; 
private and public housing repairs, shelter needs, technical training and assistance; agriculture 
interventions -including financial assistance, insurance expansion and anti-erosion and flooding 
measures-; non-agricultural community development planning interventions -new investment 
and small business encouragement, bolstering flood insurance, fiscal and unemployment 
assistance-; transportation interventions -including roads, bridges and harbor repairs-, and power 
for the urban train; and works in the energy sector that comprise reparation of generators, 





later, the U.S. Coast Guard prepared a plan to protect its units and port stakeholders from heavy 
weather in Puerto Rico and respond to damages (U. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office, 2000). 
 
Next works include a strategic plan for hurricane vulnerability reduction in the island of Vieques, 
written as an UPR planning M.Sc. thesis (Echevarría Rosas, 2006); the identification of 
population vulnerable to hydrological hazards in San Juan (Azar & Rain, 2007); and an island-
wide plan of emergency operations (Agencia Estatal de Manejo de Emergencias y 
Administración de Desastres, 2008). The latter is a long and unevenly finished document with 
official support, indicating institutional responsibilities for emergencies. Framed by the U.S. 
National Incident Management System, municipal, regional, island and federal institutions are 
listed for preparation, response and recuperation; along with procedures, tasks, and federal 
disaster aid programs. 
 
Finally, two radically different papers address flood risks at local scales. The first assesses flood 
risks in the metropolitan coastal municipalities of Carolina and Loíza to provide information to 
Civil Protection institutions (Seguinot Barbosa, Batista, & Sánchez Celada, 2008). After a 
spatial-temporal evaluation of hazards, vulnerability and floods risks in both municipalities based 
on cartographic analysis, researchers identify priority areas of special attention and investment 
before and after a major disaster. However, they warn that those areas may not coincide with real 
areas of high risk based on socio-economic factors. Such approach exemplifies mainstream 
research projects operating on technical assumptions without reaching out for people involved, 
which undermines the research. The second paper advances a grassroots approach for two flood-





emergency managers were guided to use participatory methods and techniques –including 
conceptual mapping, participatory mapping, and listing and ranking- to identify vulnerabilities in 
their respective areas, Maternillo and Mansión del Sapo. They concluded that enhancing 
resilience in those communities demands support for social learning developing upon existing 
knowledge, using a varied set of flood management options, and supporting collaborations and 
linkages between emergency managers and community members to motivate collective flood 
management, overcoming obstacles such as distrust. 
 
In sum, this literature shares commonalities with the post-hurricane evaluation writings, such as 
not being subject to in-depth critical analysis. Mostly technocratic and top-down approaches 
have been implemented, lacking reflexivity. Lack of coordination provided valuable diverse 
contributions yet blocks longitudinal and integrated policy assessments. 
 
III.3.k) Insurance 
The first insurance document set minimum insurance rates applicable to Puerto Rico for fire, 
hurricane, riot and civil commotion (Puerto Rico Board of Fire Underwriters, 1937). During a 
vast turmoil on the island following San Felipe (1928) and San Ciprián (1932), the Great 
Depression and the sugar economy collapse; this document exposes the early role private 
insurance companies had on the island to influence public policies concerning disaster 
prevention; particularly zoning, building codes and technology. Two research pieces cover 
Georges losses, one briefly (Lohse, 1998), the other one in-depth by comparing in five 
jurisdictions -Puerto Rico, California, Florida, North Carolina, and the U.S. Virgin Islands- cost 





government insurance mechanisms; and evaluating policies to improve insurance supply and risk 
management (M. F. Grace & Klein, 2002).  
 
In sum, the few insurance documents found are too limited to be considered the only existing 
literature; although I conducted iterative searches to provide a broader and better sample. Such 
difficulties point to a potential problem to be experienced by other scholars and policy-makers. 
Many questions should be addressed to improve hurricane management. For instance, insurance 
can be afforded usually by a limited population segment in developing economies. "The vast 
majority of the exposed risk from earthquakes is presently uninsured, even in those countries 
where government-supported schemes have been introduced. Most policies are on commercial 
and industrial property rather than residential property" (K. Smith, 1992) p.117. Besides, in the 
light of increasingly frequent and more destructive events, instability in the insurance sector may 
include inability to resource payouts, withdraw from highly urbanized areas at risk or increase 
premiums dramatically. What could be the options on the island? Could hurricane insurance 
target beyond conventional improvements in building design and construction – so-called 
“building back better”, to encompass a wider range of individual and collective disaster 
management actions? In other countries, insurance has led to disincentives for governments to 
fully enforce preventive policies, and it has caused lack of preparedness and complacency among 
residents at risk (Lamond et al. 2009 in (Abhas K, Bloch, & Lamond, 2012)). If there are similar 
dynamics on the island, what interventions could take place? Usually, lower income groups lack 
insurance, resulting in great difficulties during disasters and recovery. Which are the specific 
trends in different parts of Puerto Rico? Could micro-insurance schemes be implemented, with 






Available housing and hurricanes literature is very feeble. Governmental and private investment 
on social housing in the 1950s and 1960s remarkably reduced extreme vulnerability, but remains 
contentious among scholars. Yet, I could not find contemporary documents addressing housing 
and hurricanes, possibly due to classification or misplacement errors, or reflecting the 
epistemological separation of housing and disaster management. Post-Hugo, federal prevention 
documents targeted hurricane-resistant building guidelines (FEMA, 1989), an academic paper 
reviewed the performance of structures (Marshall, 1990), whilst another examined the wind 
uplift capacity of steel corrugated roof deck systems (Figueroa Diaz, 1996). Post-Georges, 
federal construction guidelines addressed one and two family dwellings in hurricane and seismic 
zones, according to Puerto Rican planning regulations and building codes (FEMA, 1999); and a 
UPR workshop designed permanent housing for homeless evacuees (E. Quiles Rodríguez, 1998). 
Next, UPR-Mayagüez researchers associated with counterparts in the U.S. or abroad examined 
the performance of typical roof structures usually vulnerable to wind, and other building parts. 
The results provide an engineering basis for establishing minimum construction standards mainly 
concerning residential roof structures in the CARICOM islands, and to a lesser extent, industrial 
roofs. Some examples include a methodology to analyze structural vulnerability to hurricane 
winds (Hurtado Astaiza, 1992), estimation of windstorm vulnerability of individual building 
types of Puerto Rico, hurricane hazards and consequent property losses in the region through 
mathematical modeling (Khanduri & Morrow, 2003), performance of wood-zinc roof systems 
(Avilés, 2006), development of hurricane based fragility curves for wood-zinc houses (R. G. 





Saffar, Ramos, & Garcia-Herrera, 2007), fragility wind curves for industrial metallic buildings 
(García-Palencia, Saffar, & Godoy, 2008). 
 
My findings are limited, possibly because when it comes to disasters housing remains seen as a 
technical problem, concerning construction materials and techniques. Such approach is limited, 
particularly if narrowed to research and education carried out at higher education levels -
excluding ample sectors of the population- and disregarding vernacular knowledge. Also, it 
prompts questions about the application of constructive knowledge, diffusion for different 
audiences, and enforcing mechanisms to promote updating and avoid manipulation or corruption. 
Ultimately, it blurs an understanding of housing as a social habitat that -in addition to physical 
hazards- must confront larger issues of affordability, location, tenure, and stigmatization to 
reduce vulnerability. 
 
III.3.m) Literary writings 
Since the 19
th
 century, writers have reflected on hurricanes with poignancy and depth. The oldest 
work preserved is the novel ‘Huracán. Leyenda Puertorriqueña’ (Hurricane. Puerto Rican 
Legend) based on the folktale of Roberto Cofresí (del Toro Soler, 1897). The latter was a 
southern pirate active during the turn of the 18
th
 century, who defied Spanish vigilance and 
storms to become a beloved emancipatory figure, a hurricane himself. In 1896, this novel 
received a literary award from the Ponce Press, which represented pro-independence intellectuals 
backing narratives of success against the two most feared blockages for the independence Puerto 
Rico, Spain and ‘the forces of nature’. Writings by Cayetano Coll y Toste, a wealthy pro-





contemporary ideas. He wrote two short stories concerning hurricanes, ‘The legend of the Virgin 
of Guadalupe’ (DIVEDCO, 1965) and ‘The San Ciriaco Hurricane’ (Coll y Toste, 1976). In the 
former, only divine intervention framed by Catholic beliefs helped the protagonists overcome a 
hurricane, which allegedly took place in 1568, when destructive hurricanes discouraged the early 
Spanish settlers. The story circulated widely in a book about Puerto Rican legends and, during 
the mid-1950s, the Commonwealth incorporated it into massive disaster prevention education 
materials. The latter piece described the vast post-San Ciriaco destruction in Ponce. Another 
short piece with a testimonial quality evaluating San Ciriaco’s devastation was written by Ramón 
Aráez y Ferrando, a former Spanish military official (Aráez y Ferrando, 1905), and it was 
incorporated in the Commonwealth materials (DIVEDCO, 1965). Post-San Ciriaco, male writers 
from an upper and middle class background captured in novels the profound ongoing societal 
changes, according to the article ‘Traces of San Ciriaco in early 20
th
 Century Literature’ 
(Centeno Añeses, 2000). Centeno summarizes that José Elias Levy addressed loss of rural 
livelihoods, increased urban unemployment, precarious housing, child mortality, bankruptcy, 
suicide and the first large migration wave towards Hawaii in his novels ‘Estercolero’ (1901) and 
‘Mancha de Lodo’ (1903), which respectively mean Dunghill and Stain of Mud. Matías López 
García published in 1905 the novel ‘Gestación’ (Gestation) depicting unemployment, loss of 
rural assets, starvation and social polarization to understand the gestation of a new order 
benefiting Americans. In the 1909 novel ‘El hijo de Carmen o Aventuras de un Obrero’ 
(Carmen’s son or Adventures of a worker), Eladio Ayala Moura described the hurricane landfall 
in Ponce and ensuing rough life. Ramón Julia Marín captured the desolation of inland tobacco 
workers in his 1911 novel, ‘Tierra Adentro’ (Inner Land). A year later, his novel ‘La Gleba’ (The 





coffee farmers vis-à-vis the expansion of American political power, land ownership and sugar 
cane. Remarkably, Centeno’s paper is the only literary overview of hurricanes and, although it 
lacks in-depth analysis, it presents key themes and how they intertwined with history. 
 
For San Felipe, contemporary writings were unavailable; yet, it remained central to musical, 
pictorial and literary works decades later. The novel ‘La Víspera del Hombre’ (The Eve of Man) 
by René Márques won the first price in a contest organized by the Ateneo Puertorriqueño, in 
1958. It initially unfolds in the highlands months before San Felipe, and it uses the subsequent 
crisis as a background to present a love and humanitarian tragedy affecting Puerto Rico 
(Márques, 1959). This piece received extensive positive reviews by the jury, and became 
standard text for secondary and high-school students. Santa Clara landfall in southwest Puerto 
Rico was narrated as the short testimony of a middle-low class teenager, who self-published it 
almost 50 years later, having lived abroad (Fernández Gordián, 2003). Unlike writings of the 
day, Fernández provided a vivid grass-root account that reflected structural changes such as 
urbanization, migration, political leadership, technological changes, popular beliefs, social 
hierarchies and institutional vacuums. ‘Despu s del Huracán’ (After the Hurricane), was a story 
by Edgardo Sanabria Santaliz combining realistic experiences and imaginary situations, marking 
for the first time the use of a hurricane to frame in Puerto Rico what is known as ‘Real 
Maravilloso’ (or Magical realism). It was published in Spanish with nine Puerto Rican authors 
(Edgardo  Sanabria Santaliz, 1983), then in English as a journal article and as part of a collection 
of short stories by Hispanic Caribbean authors (Edgardo Sanabria Santaliz, 1995). In the 90s, 
following Hugo, books for children and youngsters addressing hurricanes entered mainstream 





book that addressed Hugo’s impact in the northeast of Puerto Rico (Rodriguez Martinó, 
Hernández, & Lugo, 1993). It incorporated scientific advice about the Luquillo Experimental 
Forest, heavily damaged. Yet, the story also used magical elements, including the myth of 
Yuquiyú, the Taíno indigenous mountain spirit residing in El Yunque, able to save the island 
from storms. The short fictional story ‘Noche de Paz’ (Night of Peace) for youngsters, first 
published in the April 1995 edition of Cricket Magazine, used a young boy’s view of a family 
experiencing their home destruction by a hurricane (London, 1998). This account written was by 
a foreigner and the hurricane is not specified. In the children book ‘El último Coquí’ (The last 
Coquí), the main character Coquiki hears he is the only surviving Coquí –endemic frog 
emblematic for the island- after a devastating hurricane, and he searches the island for his peers 
(N. A. Pérez, 2002). 
 
In 2007, the Texan-based Puerto Rican dance company Angelito Borincano launched the musical 
‘Sembrando Herencia’ (Planting Inheritance), in which hurricanes San Ciriaco and Santa Clara 
have key historical roles. The former is deemed important because of the coffee industry crisis 
explicitly, and because of the political changes implicitly. The latter is deemed relevant because 
of its relationship with the 1950s Great Migration of islanders to the US. Light-skinned 
highlanders, Jíbaros, are given a Boricua angel after San Ciriaco (Angelito Borincano, 2007). 
The angel witnesses rough living conditions on the highlands, travels with humans to New York 
City during the mid 20
th
 century exodus -and back- searching for a heroic act that will earn him 
deluxe wings. According to the official website, the troupe aimed to bring awareness of often-
forgotten elements from Puerto Rico's rich heritage among diasporic Puerto Ricans and other 





US. Finally, a musical recording classified as testimonial, singing and guitar playing, and called 
‘The identity of words, an approach to testimonial literature´ mentions hurricanes as a source of 
deep local sorrow and display of courage and strength (Ralph Rivera & Rodríguez, n.a.). 
 
To conclude, more work is needed to learn from literature writings that record experiential 
knowledge, societal dramas, environmental and spatial transformation, economic processes, 
religious beliefs, superstitions, and potential areas of intervention. The cited writings may be a 
limited sample, they are understudied sources often closer to the everyday life than technical 
writings. Little is known of how storm narratives entered popular consciousness and how they 
could strengthen disaster management. 
 
 
III.4. Answers and Recommendations 
 
1) Is there a robust production of literature and policy-documents for Puerto Rican 
hurricanes? 
Yes, the field expanded in the last decades exponentially in quantity, complexity and diversity, 
yet, its dispersion remains a fundamental problem. I could not find websites or archives 
systematically storing multidisciplinary documents for public consultation. Thus, a 
recommendation is to start a shared collection available for review in physical and online forms. 
UPR would be the ideal institution to undertake the task, with cooperation from FEMA, Civil 





2) Which have been the main catalyst for advancing hurricane knowledge and policy 
production? 
Devastating hurricanes have been the top catalysts for advancing knowledge and policy 
production. Thus, research and policy decisions are usually based on the most extreme and 
isolated cases. Minor events such as mild storms and floods, and even daily practices are not 
examined. Such absence blurs how those circumstances enhance or diminish large-scale 
disasters, and it also blurs the understanding of disasters as long-term, interconnected processes. 
Thus, multi-storm studies, minor incident studies, and studies of the everyday life vis-à-vis 
disasters would be relevant areas of research and analysis. Potentially concurrent although less 
frequent events have not been catalysts for integrated multi-risk knowledge and policy 
production. For instance, earthquakes and tsunamis have a lower return period compared to 
yearly hurricane seasons. Disasters have been studied separately, in disciplinary terms; they are 
not systematically studied in confluence, though Puerto Rico has experienced concurrent 
disasters with crushing consequences. Moreover, new complex emergencies could derive from 
multi-risk circumstances, such as extreme weather events affecting brown fields, pharmaceutical 
industries, or Navy bombing sites in Vieques -where active mines remain underground-. Thus, 
multi-risk analysis and policy-making need further development. Another catalyst has been the 
martial use of meteorology in Puerto Rico; it began as a tactical endeavor before the island 
became U.S. territory, and it has kept transforming. This martial emphasis, its benefits and 
drawbacks need to be discussed, including its environmental impacts, financial costs, why Puerto 
Ricans were separate from decision-making, implications of diverting finite resources away from 
addressing the social construction of disasters, and what permeated into current disaster 





3) Which are the most and least developed disciplines?  
Physicalist, materially oriented sciences and technocratic approaches prevail, humanities and 
social sciences are weak; which points to a prevailing understanding of hurricanes as problems 
solvable through scientific, technical interventions in the physical environment, in opposition to 
an understanding of disasters as socially and culturally constructed processes that have material 
basis. For example, meteorological studies consolidated almost a century before social sciences 
studies; there are extensive contributions from biology and geology, some from epidemiology, 
and few from law and economics; whilst I did not find studies from anthropology, ethnography, 
archaeology and political science studies. For more than a century, understudied literary writings 
have captured significant processes; yet, they remain under examined. In contrast, technocratic 
studies and policies for hydrological modifications have received funding since the 1930s. In 
sum, without implying abandonment of traditional studies, the recommendation is to have 
multidisciplinary discussions on the need to set strategic priorities for disciplines and approaches 
that help to construct a more holistic, balanced understanding of disasters. 
 
4) Are there common threads for all the disciplines? 
Generally, there is no self-reflective criticism of the political, social and cultural foundations of 
science and the manipulations of scientific knowledge and policy-making. Other absent debates 
are the state of each discipline at the island and local levels, disciplinary impacts of local 
research into mainstream production of documents and policies, historical effects of technology, 
present and future priorities. It is hard to build inter-disciplinary connections, which hurricanes 
need. Even within the same discipline, methodologies, focuses and units of analysis vary, which 





longitudinal, retrospective and comparative studies; which if focused on the economic, socio-
cultural and spatial similarities and differences when facing the same peril help to denaturalize 
so-called ‘natural disasters’ and improve development policy-making. Even recently, most 
disciplines show top-down productions of knowledge and policies by experts, based on their 
technical expertise. Grass-roots perspectives are rarely captured, missing lived expertise of 
disasters. Also, the unquestioned figure of the expert leads to limited critical evaluations of 
which are the repercussions of knowledge and policy-making when disasters strike, what worked 
or not on the ground, and how unresolved tensions between experts vis-à-vis general public have 
undermined disaster management. 
 
5) Which are the main units of analysis? 
The most recurring unit of analysis is the island level, equivalent to the nation state. During the 
recent decades, several local scales are studied, even micro-territories; this move is part of a 
rescaling process taking place in multiple disciplines, which has brought relevant contributions 
for Puerto Rico. Simultaneously, the notion of the Circum-Caribbean as a unit of analysis has not 
been used, although recent research projects compared U.S. states or neighboring countries. 
Thus, even if hurricanes are a common link to understand the Circum-Caribbean region, studies 
reinforce colonial and geographical insularity, instead of searching for commonalities and 
divergences that would advance knowledge and policy-making. In sum, the choice of unit of 
analysis is an analytical matter that needs further consideration, having to do with changing 
emphasis on the local, national and global. Moreover, disasters should become a relevant topic 
for purposive intellectual crosspollination with countries in the region, in order to generate 





6) Who have been the main producers of research and policy documents?   
The first systematic producers of research and policy documents were male U.S. military 
meteorologists during the turn of the 20
th
 century, then civilian male U.S. meteorologist. Such 
tendency is a consequence of the U.S. dependent political status of the island since 1899, which 
has resulted in direct connections with U.S. institutions –including academia and armed forces-.  
It also reveals a persistent gender gap. Based on references, a few male Puerto Rican authors 
joined in the late 1950s and increased later; whilst women joined around the 1990s. There is no 
data on the authors’ ethnicity and class, but affirmative action for educating and hiring experts is 
a recent requirement to offset entrenched exclusionary biases, which could have shaped the 
researchers and policy makers’ epistemological and ontological frameworks. In fact, a 
substantial amount of policy documents share an upper class perspective, whilst the absent 
voices of socially disadvantaged groups reveal their long-term marginalization from 
memorializing their experiences and knowledge, and shaping public decisions. Researchers and 
policy-makers must recognize implicit biases in the co-production of knowledge and integrate 
the knowledge from affected but usually disenfranchised groups. Since the 1980s, masters and 
Ph.D. students, and academics of the University of Puerto Rico have built multidisciplinary in-
depth work about hurricanes; more than members of other local universities. Yet, when checking 
on the references of American documents, particularly policy-documents, they seem to be 
disengaged with the locally produced knowledge. It would be fruitful to explore how this issue 
can be addressed, including more availability of locally produced works, in Spanish and English. 
Another issue is the potential tensions between U.S. and Puerto Rican institutions and experts, 
which could undermine disaster management. At one level, tensions may reside in the different 





discussed when establishing projects. At a more fundamental level, there seem to be disciplinary 
and funding biases that shape priorities above the local scale, with contentious consequences. For 
instance, the NSF launched an extensive biology research project in the late 1980s, incorporating 
local scientists. It has yielded relevant findings about the protected tropical rainforest of 
Luquillo, the only one of its kind in U.S. territory. This seems to be a case of scientifically-
driven research that values environmental vulnerability and degradation per se, aside from their 
anthropocentric value, although it is unclear whether the underpinning assumption is based on 
intra-species justice arguments (Birkmann, 2006) or an ecocentric view that puts the earth first 
(Parton, 1993). Although relevant, it does not contemplate an understanding of how the eco-
sphere vulnerability (Turner et al., 2003) relates to human vulnerability. From the project 
description and main findings, it is hard to advance ecosystemic views and make policy-
recommendations. Moreover, this ecosystem is not representative of the island, where 
interactions between humans and environments have created a multiplicity of ecosystems 
understudied from the biological viewpoint. In other words, it is focused on ‘pristine’ nature, an 
extremely rare case in contrast to ‘second’ nature or areas with extensive anthropogenic 
transformations, where most population and investments are at risk, and which is essentially 
disregarded by biologists. Thus, it is valid to discuss the priority such kind of research, the 
possibilities to complement it with policy-driven results, and with transformed ecosystems that 
show other forms of fragility. 
 
To conclude, those knowledge vacuums are significant obstacles to gather and interpret data 
consistently, understand causal relationships, infer and compare spatial dynamics, build solid 





and build consensus so that policies become enacted. Therefore, those vacuums in knowledge 
reveal a danger for the future of the island, and my research is an opportunity to design and build 
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Chapter N.IV. Research Design 
 
IV.1. Research definition, strategy and methodology 
 My research defines disasters as socially and culturally constructed processes that have physical 
basis. I aim to denaturalize so-called ‘natural disasters’ using a political economy lens to expose 
the political nature of public decision-making related to disasters and grasp how politics 
impacted Puerto Rican society. In other words, the political economy lens unveils the muddled 
process of implicit or explicit struggles to gain or maintain power and authority (Lindblom, 
1977) and shape particular outcomes, in a societal setting with conflicting interests, extreme 
pressures, reduced resources and time. The societal setting may be understood as a country or 
other form of territorial jurisdiction, social groups, firms, or other organizations (Hanappi, n.a.). 
 
As  research strategy, I implemented a modified Grounded Theory Approach (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967), using both deductive and inductive thinking. In other words, my approach did not depart 
from a hypothesis or a fixed theoretical framework to apply to the phenomenon under 
observation. Instead, I started with preliminary guiding research questions, themes, 
methodological approaches, tentative cases and literature review; which were adjusted 
throughout data collection and interpretation phases. I examined iteratively the phenomenon of 
study through a flexible methodology, collected diverse empirical data, identified core questions, 
redeveloped tentative linkages between questions and data, summarized and substantiated 





‘truths’. Also, as a study of a qualitative nature, my research extracted some of the basic qualities 
of an intricate social phenomenon by asking “how” and “why”. Hurricanes involve complex 
webs of causes, effects, and dynamics. Qualitative research captures the essential characteristics 
of complex webs to explain what a phenomenon is like in practice, how it works, and how it is 
affected by other patterns or phenomena (Dougherty, 2005). Another epistemological assumption 
of this dissertation is that the phenomenon under study required a contextual immersion; living 
on the island would not only be useful for local archival research but it would help to acquaint 
myself with Puerto Rican culture; which, in turn, could inform the historical background of the 
research. In parallel, the research design had a phenomenological standpoint, also called 
interpretivist approach (Yanow, 2014), valuing people's experiences and interpretations of the 
world regardless of their position as experts or non-experts. People transform the meaning of the 
phenomenon under study through mutual interactions, which involves taken-for-granted 
understandings and practices (Dougherty, 2005) not explicitly captured by technical knowledge. 
Accordingly, I juxtaposed technical and non-technical works. Since this research is structured in 
distinctive historical periods, sources and data changed and required triangulation of methods to 
achieve validity. Thus, I combined in situ and online archival research, visual sociology and case 
study analysis. 
 
IV.1.1 Archival research 
Archival research suited my purposes as it comprises diverse activities to study mostly textual 
materials produced by and about organizations, and complements other research methods. 
Conventionally, archival research implies reviewing documents of a historical nature, allowing 





hurricanes. Yet, archival research can be used in non-historical studies of contemporary, non-
textual and even digital materials, such as musical scores and recordings, videos, web pages, 
electronic databases, emails and tweets (Ventresca & Mohr, 2005), part of which I also 
conducted. My archival research online and in-situ took place in U.S.
55
 and Puerto Rican 
libraries
56
 during four years. I contrasted technical and non-technical works to juxtapose diverse 
information sources, modes of data and viewpoints. The technical works include scholarly 
publications, medical records, policy documents, thesis, websites, exceptionally relevant 
unpublished materials (i.e. research papers, PowerPoint presentations, annual reports, notes, and 
manuscripts), graphic and audiovisual materials. The non-technical works include piecemeal 
available sources closer to the everyday life sphere such as literary works, songs, newspapers, 
cartoons, and graphic and audiovisual materials. 
 
IV.1.2. Visual sociology 
Visual sociology is a recent and miscellaneous field that unfolds around studies of the visual and 
visual studies (International Sociological Association Visual Sociology Thematic Group TG05, 
2012). I examined visual data produced as part of a culture, in order to analyze evidence and 
processes or present results (Becker, 1986; Suchar, 1997). My aim was to develop a dual 
interactive process. One process was between images and text, in which images could answer 
questions (Suchar, 1997) or provide nuanced layers of knowledge that no written answer can 
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offer. The other process was between the finished research and readers, who could find new 
meanings, questions or answers pertaining the images. My sampling had to be vast, multi-
sourced, and revealing of sufficient aspects of an extended story, in order to support a connected, 
convincing and coherent argument (Becker, 2002). I selected photographs mostly concerning 
persons, places or objects; with limited use of conceptual creations or abstract entities –in this 
case artistic works and caricatures-. My objective was to provide what is called an “existence 
proof”,  not a “compelling proof”, meaning that the topic under discussion is possible (Becker, 
2002, p.5). I examined technical and non-technical visual works, such as documentaries, 
photographs, websites, maps, graphs, tables, cartoons, postcards, posters, paintings, sketches and 
engravings. The only modification I did was cropping images. 
 
IV.1.3. Case Study 
I used the case study approach because it is advantageous for detailed and contextual research. 
When exploring “why” or “how” questions, I found a case study approach to be useful because it 
allowed me to emphasize profundity and background; it is suited to explore root causes, histories 
and open-ended processes (Yin, 1984), and to produce generalizations beyond the case(s) studied 
(Flyvbjerg, 2006). I also found it valuable as an empirical inquiry to investigate a phenomenon 
within its real-life context (Lofland, 1971), when context and phenomenon have unclear limits, 
when multi-sourced evidence is used (Yin, 2003), and when diverse data collection methods are 
implemented to help validate findings (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1984). I produced 
descriptive case studies (Thomas, 2011), in order to integrate a myriad of stakeholders, 






IV.2. Case Study Selection and Analysis 
The first selection to narrow down the cases was the potential region of study, the Hispanic 
Caribbean islands, based on the following criteria: geographical similarity and proximity, long-
term exposure to the same recurrent type of disaster, cultural resemblance, use of a known 
language, engagement of organizations and leaders with disaster management, planning, and 
development policy-making. After preliminary comparative research in Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic and Puerto Rico; I chose the latter based on the multiplicity of disasters to study, the 
cooperation of local institutions –particularly the University of Puerto Rico- and the advantages 
of conducting specialized archival research combined with personal safety. 
 
Among the disasters that affect Puerto Rico, hurricanes were more suitable due to higher 
recurrence, destructiveness, historical relevance, information availability and lack of previous in-
depth comparative studies as the one I proposed. Based on information availability, the island 
level was the optimal unit of analysis, although Circum-Caribbean and local processes are also 
summarized. Given the lack of comparative longitudinal hurricane studies, the first half of the 
20th century emerged as key to clarify the initial steps taken to create disaster management; and 
how the main contemporary economic, spatial and societal changes shaped disaster reduction 
and enhancement. Also, it was more suitable to conduct multiple case studies than a single case. 
It is valid to conduct research on a single case, particularly when it represents a unique condition. 
However, multiple cases enable comparisons of commonalities and divergences that shape 
processes or patterns, which in turn can substantiate conclusions and policy-recommendations. 
When seen collectively, replications and extensions among individual cases enable context-





Throughout the cases, I identify themes, sub-questions and variables corresponding to processes. 
Scholars and policy-makers could use and improve both the analytical framework developed for 
this research, and the findings. 
 
I chose extreme case studies based on information-oriented selection, not random selection. The 
statistical sampling logic is not applicable to information-oriented selection; there is no formula 
that defines how many cases must be used. Instead, the researcher’s criterion decides how many 
cases are needed to reach the point of saturation (Yin, 2003) and answer the questions. Extreme, 
deviant or atypical cases activate more mechanisms and actors than typical ones (Flyvbjerg, 
2006), yielding great amount of information relevant for this study. For the selected time-period, 
San Ciriaco (1899), San Felipe (1928) and Santa Clara (1956) represent extreme hydro-
meteorological events due to their physical characteristics, and their enhanced destructiveness by 
following a similar northwest path. Average cases, which in this situation would be minor events 
–i.e. mild storms and associated floods-  are briefly reviewed in each chapter, along with 
potentially concurrent although less frequent extreme seismic events –earthquakes and tsunamis-
. The aim is to provide a basic counterpoint to the prevailing emphasis to study and address only 
extreme hydro-meteorological events separately from minor storms and other hazards; regardless 
of ethical, practical and epistemological considerations.  Also, San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa 
Clara correspond respectively to the shift from Spanish to American domination, the preamble to 
the most violent years in modern times, and the early Commonwealth setup. Their historical 
contexts were volatile and expose relevant decisions and social dynamics. The cases reveal the 






As advanced in ‘Chapter II. Literature Review: What is a disaster? What caused it? How to 
tackle it?’, the themes characterization, causation, and relief structure the case studies; divided 
into six sub-questions, which in turn are unpacked into thirty-eight variables. Following my aim 
to de-naturalize “natural” disasters, I examined throughout the case studies coincidences and 
dissimilarities in social dynamics, not just physical and technical processes, to highlight political 
economy and human agency. 
 
IV.2.1 Theme 1. Characterization 
I chose the term characterization over definition, description, diagnosis and measuring in order 
to comprise a broad explanation of how a hurricane was captured in narratives, reports and 
studies in the immediate aftermath and until 2012, eventually shaping the 'public transcript’. 
Characterization is divided in two sub-questions concerning immediate hurricane profile and 
subsequent knowledge production. 
 
Sub-question 1.1 How are hurricanes San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara characterized? 
For the immediate hurricane profile, I looked for the following variables: Basic data; Context, 
Information producers; Excluded information producers; and Main biases. Basic data about 
disasters means both scientific information and conventionally endorsed parameters of impacts. 
The former capture the physical magnitude of the hurricane, including the category it reached 
according scientific convention popularly known as the Saffir-Simpson scale
57
. Estimates of 
human casualties, injured citizens and economic losses are presented as conventionally endorsed 
parameters of impacts. Both forms of data are useful to create a shared understanding of 
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hurricanes; yet, as I showed in Chapter II, they have been criticized for valid methodological and 
ontological reasons; in response I added qualitative data. Next, I summarized the basic context 
characteristics of each hurricane. Also, I highlighted the producers of information and excluded 
producers of information concerning hurricane narratives, and summarized the dominant biases 
in the depictions of each hurricane. I aimed to present an overview of who had power over the 
initial creation of the ‘public transcript’, which usually influences subsequent plans and decision-
making processes. 
 
Sub-question 1.2. What characterizes the production of knowledge around hurricanes San 
Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara in multidisciplinary, artistic, regional, local, multi-hazard, 
and multi-storm terms? 
I examined the ways in which hurricanes were treated as a knowledge topic until 2012 in 
Multidisciplinary Studies; Arts; Circum-Caribbean studies; Local studies; Multi-hazard studies; 
Multi-storm studies; as relevant information concerning the subsequent creation of the ‘public 
transcript’. I searched for prevailing emphasis in academic disciplines to characterize hurricanes 
-as meteorological, engineering, political, economic, environmental, cultural or social issues-. I 
finally compared when these forms of knowledge were produced, by whom, in which language 
and their circulation. Next, I examined depictions of the hurricanes in literary works, plastic arts, 
audio, audiovisual, dance and other cultural-related manifestations. I finally compared when and 
who authored artistic productions, in which language and their circulation; in order to advance 
how artists contributed to the ‘public transcript’. Although I focused on the island level as the 
main scale, I summarized which Circum-Caribbean territories experienced each hurricane, and if 





territories within the island. Next, I investigated if for each hurricane studied there were 
preceding or concurrent seismic disasters -earthquakes and tsunamis-; and I addressed if they 
were used as catalysts for integrated multi-risk knowledge and policy production. Finally, I 
presented a consolidated summary of storms and hurricanes preceding each case study, and I 
discussed if they were used as catalysts for integrated multi-storm knowledge and policy 
production. 
 
IV.2. Theme 2. Causation 
I studied the underlying structures and interactions of human life that prefigured vulnerability or 
resilience to each hurricane. The society and built environment exposed to risks are woven into 
complex, open-ended, interrelated systems that increase or reduce the impact of a hazard on 
different social sectors and spatial units. Based on the literature review, I grouped in two the 
main systems to study from a planning perspective. The first concerns the interplay between 
economy, urbanization and disasters; the second addresses the interplay between socio-cultural 
hierarchies, collective memory and knowledge production, and disasters. 
 
Sub-question 2.1. How did economic growth and urbanization cause vulnerability or resilience to 
San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
I synthesized the following variables: Growth engine; Territorial patterns; Planning and 
investment; Infrastructure; Urbanization of risk-prone areas; Urban growth patterns; Housing 
and land tenure provision; Architectural, planning and policy records. In other words, I 
reviewed first the main drivers for economic growth and who benefited most from access to and 





resources and people, my examination reaches until the mid 20
th
 century establishment of 
modern engines of growth. I also examined how the changing structure of economic growth 
related to multi-scalar patterns of spatial occupation and risk exposure for different stakeholders, 
translated to policy decisions related to the planning profession. In sum, I studied patterns of 
territorial occupation, broadly divided between coastal or mountainous zones where hazards 
differ. I summarized planning policies and large-scale investment priorities concerned with 
prioritized infrastructure and public works, in terms of location and assumptions behind. I 
reviewed the process of urbanization of risk-prone areas, with particular emphasis on formal 
purposive growth processes enabled by technological changes such as transformations of hydro-
meteorological systems, coastal and flood-prone urbanization. I examined the patterns of urban 
growth to unveil how inequitable access to and control over location and technology influenced 
the spatial distribution of hazardous activities, risks and exposed groups. I discussed the 
provision of housing and land tenure through policies and projects to assess public interventions 
to control exclusionary land and housing markets and diminish hazards. Finally, I summarized 
the types of built environment emphasized in architectural, planning and policy records until 
now, as part of public narratives that strengthen or weaken fair remembrance of how differently 
urban life and disasters were experienced. 
 
Sub-question 2.2. How did socio-cultural hierarchies, collective memory and knowledge 
production cause vulnerability or resilience to San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
I synthesized the following variables: Social hierarchy; Justification (for hierarchy); Public 
education and identitarian constructions; Beliefs and superstitions; Scientific knowledge. I 





distribution of rights and obligations, both aspects central to the application of political economy 
to disasters. I undertook a task rarely addressed by planning professionals, I reviewed if and how 
public education, identitarian constructions, grassroots systems of beliefs and superstitions made 
sense out of disasters; in tandem with the production of scientific knowledge. 
 
IV.3 Theme 3. Relief 
I examined short-term
58
 aftermath responses of the main stakeholders involved
59
. The literature 
has traditionally placed emphasis on long-term reconstruction dynamics and recently on the 
preceding processes that turned a hazard into a disaster. The immediate relief stage has received 
less attention; yet, it is a particular window to improvised and accelerated decision-making, 
which can crudely expose abrupt actions, persistent underlying assumptions and incipient long-
term policies and political life trends. Depending on the crisis and local response capacity, 
external stakeholders may exert great power without liability for their inappropriate actions. I 
examined relief in two parts, a preceding influential disaster or process and then the case study 
under scrutiny. 
 
Sub-question 3.1. How did a previous relief experience or process create influential conditions 
for the relief stage of San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
I reviewed a previous and significant disaster relief experience or process as a baseline to 
compare parties involved in relief provision, underlying assumptions of the roles of governments 
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and citizens, most relevant biases developed during relief provision, controversies and responses, 
policy-changes, and political consequences including the use of the disaster as an opportunity or 
challenge for leaders. The studied variables are: Disaster; Relief provider; Underlying 
paradigms; Biases in relief distribution; Controversies; Policy-changes; Political consequences. 
 
Sub-question 3.2. Which were the defining elements for hurricane relief and incipient policy 
trends concerning San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
I similarly studied: Main challenges; Relief provider; Underlying paradigms; Biases in relief 
distribution; Controversies; Policy-changes; Political consequences. 
 
After descriptive case analysis, some of the techniques used to further analyze data are cross-
case synthesis, time series analysis, pattern matching, logic models, and explanation building. I 
chose cross-case synthesis, presenting in tables aggregate data followed by argumentative 
interpretations, which helps to test internal validity (Yin, 2003). ‘Table N.1. Summary of Case 




















Hurricane profile  
Basic data Casualties, hurricane strength and destruction 
Context Historical crossroad 
Information producers Identify according to social vectors of difference 
Excluded information producers Identify according to social vectors of difference 
Main biases Dominant views of the event 
Knowledge production  
Multi-disciplinary  Studies in scientific disciplines 
Arts Artistic works 
Circum-Caribbean  Studies of regional impacts 
Local Studies of impacts on different island sites 
Multi-hazard Studies of seisms, tsunamis 









Economic growth and urbanization vis-à-vis risks  
Growth engines Economic base 
Territorial patterns Coastal versus mountainous urbanization 
Planning and investment Assessment of priorities and motivations 
Infrastructure Main projects and motivations 
Urbanization of risk-prone areas Formal growth through technological changes 
Urban growth patterns Concentration, polarization, suburbanization 
Housing and land tenure provision  Policies and projects 
Arch., planning and policy records Type of built environment emphasized 
Socio-cultural hierarchies, memories and knowledge of disasters 
Social hierarchies Main groups and vectors of difference 
Justification  Rationales used to establish hierarchies 
Public education, identity construction Education, culture and hurricane awareness 
Beliefs and superstitions Grass roots explanations 






Disaster  Critical event(s) that influenced the case study 
Relief provider Institutions and leaders engaged 
Underlying paradigms Roles of government and citizens 
Biases in relief distribution Effective discrimination 
Controversies  Leading conflicts and solutions 
Policy-changes Main transformations for disaster management 
Political consequences Main implications for political life 
Case study 
Main challenges Top political tests 
Relief provider Institutions and leaders engaged 
Underlying paradigms Roles of government and citizens 
Biases in relief distribution  Effective discrimination 
Controversies Leading conflicts and solutions 
Policy-changes Transformations for disaster management 
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Chapter N.V San Ciriaco 1899: colonial underdevelopment and 
dependency reconfirmed 
 
V.1. A tale of destructive landfall: Characterization of San Ciriaco 
“There only remains of this Antillean isle, once so celebrated for its beauty and fecundity, heaps 
of rubble spread everywhere, which represent a history full of tears, death, and misfortune for its 
inhabitants” (Partido Conservador, 1899, p. n.a.). 
 
With those bitter lines conveying the catastrophic passing of San Ciriaco, Puerto Rican merchant 
representatives departed from their usual rhetoric of pride and success luring investors. San 
Ciriaco was a Cape Verdean hurricane, the strongest storms that threaten the Circum-Caribbean. 
San Ciriaco traversed the Atlantic towards the Antilles, moved up towards the United States and 
then dissipated in the North Atlantic. According to a Catholic tradition, San Ciriaco was named 
after Saint Cyriacus, the corresponding saint to the day of its landfall, August 8
th
, 1899. Early 
that morning, the hurricane made landfall on southeast of Puerto Rico, near Arroyo; it traversed 
the island diagonally to the northwest, exiting nearby Aguadilla slightly after noon. Hurricanes 
that make landfall and cross the island are more destructive that those passing north or south in 
the Ocean, concentrating the strongest winds in opposing directions around the vortex, known as 
the eye. San Ciriaco reached a diameter of almost 60 miles and wind velocities approximations 
vary from 85 to 145 mph, so current estimates place it in Category 4 of the Saffir-Simpson scale 
(Puerto Rican Hurricane Center, 2011). Associated rains were copious and lasting, worsening the 





3,400 casualties. Moreover, its impacts were cataclysmic on export crops, food security, public 
health, and the built environment –particularly scarce infrastructure and widespread precarious 
housing-. Casualties and destruction reveal the precarious state of contemporary disaster 
management, planning and development processes. 
 
San Ciriaco happened at a historical and unstable point, vital to grasp the foundations of modern 
Puerto Rico; the U.S. had taken over the island from Spain months before. Four centuries of 
colonial detachment from the development of Puerto Rico, in tandem with extractive policies 
enforced by Spaniards and elite Creoles had created inequality, poverty, vulnerability and 
turmoil. San Ciriaco exposed the fault lines of this asymmetrical legacy; overlapped with the 
early U.S. interventions. Americans had just started an unprecedented documentation process 
and it was used to assess damages and monitor relief, which influenced how the crisis was 
addressed and memorialized. During the Spanish-American War (1898), President William 
McKinley
60
 (1897-1901) was said to fear hurricanes more than the Spanish Navy (Neely, 2006). 
After the war, the Army Signals Corp launched meteorology on the island with a military 
emphasis. Under the U.S. National Weather Service, the new Negociado del Tiempo -Weather 
Bureau- in San Juan collected detailed information about San Ciriaco used in political, military, 
fund-raising and scientific discussions.  
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 The 1896 Cedar Key storm that ravaged from Florida to Pennsylvania impressed him as a presidential candidate. 
Later, he urged Congress to pass legislation for a hurricane warning system to protect American military and 
merchant vessels. Thus, a Weather Forecasting Bureau was established in Jamaica, with stations in Cuba, Saint Kitts 




























For the first time on the island, hurricane path, timing and wind directions were mapped and used officially. Image: 
(Davis, 1902, p.612). 
 
 
Fig. 2 Hurricane San Ciriaco approximate track and diameter overlapped with rivers 
 
The shadowed area corresponds to most of the blasted coffee and tobacco planted highlands; flashfloods struck the 
lowlands along rivers and creeks, where most urban settlements and sugar plantations were located. Image: Military 






During 48 hours, an average of 10 inches of rain felt island-wide, equaling two months of rain. 
Some places experienced worse conditions, for example in Humacao, east coast, 23 inches of 
rain felt in 24 hours (E. B Garriott, 1899). Floods, landslides and coastal surges were brutal. Near 
Humacao, a 15 feet height storm surge entered one mile inland, wiping out homes and families 
(Rosado Bauza, 1997). Sábalos and Guanajibo, slums near a mangrove in Mayagüez, became 
reduced to fuel piles ready to feed steam engines, according to Ramón Aráez y Ferrando, a 
former Spanish military official (DIVEDCO, 1965). Windy rains for a month increased the 
trauma according to the mayor of Caguas, in the central highlands: 
“Everyone expected another hurricane[
61
]. Because of this, men, women, and children went into 
the streets praying with candles lit. Seen at a distance, they seemed to be skeletons leaving the 
grave. This view demanded respect and it caused pain and affliction to see those poor people 
walking and skipping among the debris” (Schwartz, 1992, p.310). 
 
A week later, almost 250,000 persons lacked shelter and food, whilst next year mortality rates 
increased from 30% to 41% (Schwartz, 1992). Property, infrastructure, livestock and crop losses 
totaled almost U$ 20 million; an amount that excludes losses in precarious settlements. The first 
librarian of the new San Juan Public Library summed such ruin: 
“one sees giant trees torn up by the roots and man’s proud construction of stone and iron broken 
and scattered like children’s toy” (Van Middeldyk, 1903Ch. XLI p.n.a.). 
 
Utuado and Adjuntas, small neighboring coffee highland towns, were most battered. Hunger, 
death, and suffering became dreadful according to the U.S. military Governor of Puerto Rico, 
Brigadier General and engineer George Whitefield Davis, suddenly in charge of relief provision. 
In the highlands, the path and strength of the hurricane overlapped with entrenched poverty and 
almost a decade of maintenance disinvestment in the coffee plantations, as their profitability had 
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fallen. Uprooted vegetation meant less rebuilding materials and food insecurity. Months later, 
reports mentioned people dying along the highland roads due to disease, starvation and 
unemployment (Schwartz, 1992). 
 
Yet, the worst immediate tragedy took place in the southern municipality of Ponce
62
 given its 
scale, primacy and location. Ponce was the second most important city in Puerto Rico because it 
was the top export hub of coffee and sugar. With a population larger than San Juan, it was seat of 
wealthy autonomists and intellectuals which aimed to transform their town into the island capital, 
and Puerto Rico into an independent country. This situation drastically changed. Hurricane winds 
and rain ravaged sugar mills and crops along the flatlands, particularly in the Portugués river 
delta; and hit hard the surrounding coffee highlands. In town, the Portugués river overflow 
caused most of the 500 registered deaths by drowning, but unaccounted corpses went missing at 
sea; and it destroyed homes, public buildings, bridges and peri-urban crops. Trolley, railroad, 
telegraph, telephone, water, sewage and electricity were disrupted. In the novel ‘Carmen’s Son 
or Adventures of a Worker
63
’, Eladio Ayala Moura described the landfall and aftermath: 
“The wind lashed furiously and most women on their knees raised a prayer to the Almighty 
begging for mercy, because they understood that was a punishment of the Supreme Being…Panic 
was indescriptible, misery spread everywhere as a final consequence of the 
catastrophe…Hundreds of corpses were all over town, and there were streets like Coto that 
could not be traversed, because of the many houses that the big flash flood [correntón] had 
agglomerated in the middle of the street” (Centeno Añeses, 2000, 91-92). 
 
In the nearby port Playa de Ponce, the storm surge wrecked businesses, ships, cargo, and port 
facilities. Emergency responses and long-term recovery slowed down in part due to 
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infrastructure collapse. Next year, Ponce had ‘an epidemic death rate without the epidemic’ 
according to Dr. W.W. King of the U.S. Marine-Hospital Services: 
“It is not the province of this report to discuss the hurricane disaster, business stagnation, relief 
measures, or other causes, why they were in such circumstances, suffice to say that many 
thousands during the past year have been living on a very meager diet and many have starved 
outright. Bananas and plantains, two of their great food staples, were almost entirely destroyed 
by the hurricane. They ate whatever could be got. Sugar cane, mangoes, and other fruit (often 
unripe), rice, beans, codfish, and various native tubers, all cooked together in strong grease until 
it would need the stomach of the proverbial goat to properly digest it. Much of the codfish, 
generally of the poorest quality, is eaten raw. A poor quality of rum is drunk in large quantities, 
though drunkenness is rare. This insufficiency of food was the final straw…[I diagnosed] 
irritative diarrheas resulting from eating indigestible and decomposing food. During July, 1900, 
there were distributed by the city authorities rations of codfish actually putrid and stinking. It 
was finally condemned and destroyed by the superior board of health…To sum up the chief 
predisposing causes, we have a class of people of no great endurance, badly infected with 
ankylostoma, living in unhygienic surroundings, always on the verge of sickness, so that it 
needed but a final straw”(King, 2006 (1900), p.40). 
 
 
Fig. 3 Playa de Ponce devastated by San Ciriaco Fig. 4 Playa de Ponce rebuilt 
  
Unknown street showing damages to businesses, institutions and 
infrastructure. Image: (Mercado Avila, 1997, p.35). 







Fig. 5 Flooded sugar factory roofs, surrounding city and valley, Arecibo 
 
 
Fig. 6 Life saving port station destroyed, Arecibo 
 
 
Fig.7 Floods in the railroad station and Guayabal quarter, Arecibo 
 
Wind bent and destroyed large metal pieces. Sturdy constructions of masonery and brick withstood wind damages, 






Fig. 8 A man horseback riding traverses flooded downtown Arecibo 
 
In parts of the northwest coast, where San Ciriaco left, the confluence of rain, flash flooding and sea surges 
surpassed 4 feet. Most buildings were one storey; thus, trapped inhabitants could not climb up to save themselves 
and their possessions. Image: (Alonso, 18-?, p.149). 
 
Fig. 9 Destruction after San Ciriaco 
 
 
Wind collapsed roofs and structures of middle and low-income housing made out of wood, tin and discarded 






Fig. 10 Ravaged Caguas, in the central highlands between Ponce and San Juan 
 
Uprooted vegetation in the central square. Image: (Puerto Rican Hurricane Center, 2011). 
 
Fig. 11 A large devastated section of Arroyo, where San Ciriaco made landfall 
 





The few available immediate accounts were written by the prominent Spanish Dean of the San 
Juan Dioceses (Perpiñá y Pibernat, 1899), a wealthy ex-military Spanish official (Aráez y 
Ferrando, 1905), a wealthy Creole pro-independence (Coll y Toste, 1976), and U.S. Governor 
Davis (Davis, 1902). The latter compiled a document that marks an official transition towards 
disaster secularization and vast assessments by Americans, including the integration of climatic 
records, images and maps, economic losses, and policy-recommendations. Noticeably, those 
writings and the following were done by wealthy, light-skinned, adult men in positions of power, 
such as top politicians, public officials, military, merchants, planters, religious authorities, 
doctors, scientists and intellectuals. The voices of marginalized citizens due to gender, class, race 
and age were silenced from entering their experiences in the public record, and from shaping 
policies according to their needs. An upper class, top-down view of the event prevailed. 
 
V.2 San Ciriaco characterized in multidisciplinary, artistic, Circum-Caribbean, local, 
multi-hazard, multi-storm terms 
In terms of a multidisciplinary production of knowledge, San Ciriaco is an incipiently developed 
opportunity; it has received academic attention as part of other topics or by itself. The initial 
studies were in meteorology (E.B Garriott, 1899) and epidemiology (King, 2006 (1900)). Nearly 
a century later, San Ciriaco was subject of the first in-depth historical analysis of how a 
hurricane influenced Puerto Rican society and politics, and vice versa (Schwartz, 1992). Almost 
ten years later and inspired by that seminal paper, an edited book by Puerto Rican scholars 
(Rosario Rivera, 2000b) continued a historical, multifocal discussion of San Ciriaco; including a 





U.S. military government (Santiago Caraballo, 2000) and the catholic church (Ortíz Díaz, 2000), 
traces in early 20th century literature (Centeno Añeses, 2000), a health perspective (Pabón 
Battle, 2000), and post-hurricane emigration (I. Fernández, 2000). Those writings epitomize a 
move towards the study of storms as a lens to grasp power relations and human-nature 
interactions (Schwartz, 2005). They could be qualified as nascent in terms of depth; other than 
historian Stuart Schwartz studying San Felipe (Schwartz, 2005), no other Puerto Rican hurricane 
has been similarly examined, and the absence of engaged planners is remarkable. 
 
In the arts there are several traces of San Ciriaco. Male middle-class workers, artists and 
journalists left their literary imprint along male intellectuals and members of the landed elite 
experiencing accelerated economic demise, according to the article ‘Traces of San Ciriaco in 
early 20
th
 Century Literature’(Centeno Añeses, 2000). For instance, José Elías Levy addressed 
topics such as loss of rural livelihoods, increased urban unemployment, precarious housing, child 
mortality, bankruptcy, suicide and the first emigration wave towards Hawaii in his novels 
‘Estercolero’ (1901) and ‘Mancha de Lodo’ (1903), whose titles already paint harsh conditions 
(Dunghill and Stain of Mud, respectively). Matías López García published in 1905 the novel 
‘Gestación’ (Gestation); in it he depicts loss of rural assets, unemployment, starvation and social 
polarization to understand the period of gestation of a new order, in which Americans benefited 
ruthlessly. In the 1909 novel ‘El hijo de Carmen o Aventuras de un Obrero’ (Carmen’s son or 
Adventures of a worker), Eladio Ayala Moura described the hurricane landfall in Ponce and 
ensuing rough life. Ramón Julia Marín captured the desolation of inland tobacco workers in his 
1911 novel ‘Tierra Adentro’ (Inner Land). A year later, his novel ‘La Gleba’ (The Glebe) 





vis-à-vis the expansion of U.S. power. In 2007, a Texan-based Puerto Rican dance company 
launched the musical ‘Sembrando Herencia’ (Planting Inheritance), in which San Ciriaco and 
Santa Clara have key historical roles (Angelito Borincano, 2007). The former was considered 
important because of the coffee industry crisis and political changes. 
 
 
San Ciriaco affected several territories in the Circum-Caribbean. It remains the longest-lived 
Atlantic storm tracked in history, it left a vast destruction; yet, it is under-examined 
comparatively. On August 7, it moved through the northern Lesser Antilles, passed over 
Guadeloupe and near to Saint Kitts. A day later, it made landfall in Puerto Rico. Then, San 
Ciriaco lowered to Category 3 and affected the north of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and the 
Bahamas. When it made landfall near Hatteras, on the Outer Banks of North Carolina, it could 
have reached Category 5, the worst in the Saffir-Simpson scale (Walsh, Corbett, & Siepert, 
2012). Fishing villages and islands were ruined, survivors relocated inland permanently. Over a 
dozen ships were lost out at sea; fishnets, docks and other assets were destroyed. Inland corn, 
tobacco and other crops and foodstuff were lost and farmers went broke; the experience was 
horrid: 
"Language is inadequate to express the conditions which prevailed. The howling wind, the 
rushing and roaring tide, and the awful sea which swept over the beach and thundered like a 
thousand pieces of artillery made a picture which was at once appalling and terrible and the like 











Next, San Ciriaco drifted erratically in the sea, becoming an extra-tropical cyclone, tropical 
storm and hurricane again when it hit the Azores, on September 3
rd
. A day later, it dissipated in 
the Atlantic; but on the 9
th
, remnants were felt in France. As part of North Carolina storms, 
historians have studied San Ciriaco (Barnes, 1995; Hairr, 2008; Walsh et al., 2012). Despite 
regional damages, there are no contemporary or retrospective Circum-Caribbean comparative 
studies. I only found the usual data of storm level, imprecise losses and images when looking for 
scholarship that transcended the paradigmatic vision of the region as a shattered cosmos due to 
geography, colonial legacies and ideological animosities. Also, local studies within Puerto Rico 
are missing. 
This manual map of San Ciriaco is an early U.S. effort to provide a regional scientific image of a hurricane, focusing 





The possibility of learning from San Ciriaco in multi-hazard terms remains unexplored. An 
expanded temporal frame would enable to study a relatively recent worst case scenario of almost 
contemporary multi-hazard exposure. In 1867, hurricane San Narciso damages were preceded by 
a drought and aggravated 20 days later by a devastating earthquake
64
, a large tsunami and 
aftershocks, as will be reviewed in section V.5. When San Ciriaco made landfall, physical and 
social consequences of this crisis were present in the collective memory and material 
environment of Puerto Ricans (Schwartz, 1992). Yet, this complex emergency remains 
understudied by disciplines such as history, economics, planning, preservation and disaster 
management, which reduces even further the possibilities of learning from it. 
 
The opportunity of learning from San Ciriaco in multi-storm terms has not been developed 
either. The worse 19
th
 century hurricanes for Puerto Rico were Santa Ana in 1825, San Narciso 
in 1867, and San Felipe in 1876. I only found the mainstream listing of events, physical 
characteristics and generic losses. 
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1946. The 1670 earthquake affected the southwest, near San Germán; and the 1787 earthquake hit the entire island, 
damaging El Rosario and La Concepción monasteries; churches at Bayamón, Toa Baja Arecibo and Mayagüez, and 






Box N.1 Summary of 19
th
 century storms in Puerto Rico: 1804-1837 
1804, September 4th; Hurricane Santa Rosalía passed north of the island causing trivial 
damages, then it hit Charleston, South Carolina. 
1806, September 11th, Hurricane San Vicente affected severely Dominica and left 131 
deaths, then passed south of Puerto Rico battering Ponce. 
1807, August 17-19; Hurricane San Jacinto hit the Leeward Islands, the Virgin Islands, 
Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. It traversed Puerto Rico from southeast to 
northwest during 50 hours, causing large floods, life and crop losses. 
1813, July 23rd; Tropical Storm San Liborio hit the southwest, affecting mainly coffee crops. 
1813, August 21st; Tropical Storm Santa Juana hit Dominica before passing close to southern 
Puerto Rico and damaging crops, it slammed South Carolina next. 
1814, July 23rd; Tropical Storm San Liborio a year after, a storm hit hard the south and was 
felt in San Juan. It destroyed crops surviving a 7 month drought. 
1816, September 18-20; Hurricane San José de Cupertino passed over Martinique and then 
close or over the south coast of Puerto Rico, affecting crops. 
1818, September 22nd, Tropical Storm San Mauricio caused minor damages in the south, 
particularly in Guayama. 
1819, September 21st-22nd, Hurricane San Mateo caused 101 deaths in the Virgin Islands; it 
sank ships, and vastly destroyed houses and crops in Puerto Rico. 
1824, September 9-10; Hurricane San Pedro passed near the south coast affecting the area 
from Juana Díaz to Cabo Rojo. 
1827, August 17th; Tropical Storm San Jacinto moved from southeast to north affecting 
crops. Ships were sunk in harbors surrounding the island. 
1835, August 13th; Hurricane San Hipólito crossed from southeast to north lasting around 6 
to 7 hours over land. It affected mainly the east and north of the island, then passed north of 
Hispaniola, over Cuba and hit Galveston, Texas. 
1837, August 2nd-3rd; Hurricane Nuestra Señora de los Angeles severely traversed the island 
from southeast to north during 10 to 12 hours. It is the first storm to have a barometric 
reading in Puerto Rico, a minimal pressure of 948 millibars in San Juan were 11 people died 







Box N.2 Summary of 19
th
 century storms in Puerto Rico: 1851-1891  
1851, August 18th; Hurricane San Agapito passed near the southwest but affected the entire 
island, damaging agriculture, with winds that could have reached 100 mph. The storm entered 
Apalachicola city, Florida, four days later. 
1852, September 5th; Hurricane San Lorenzo hit southwest Puerto Rico with winds averaging 
70 mph to 80 mph. Extensive damages to Guayanilla and Mayagüez. 
1867, October 29th; Hurricane San Narciso hit St. Thomas with estimated winds of 120 mph, 
the first scientifically recorded wind speed. It made landfall in Puerto Rico with diminished 
winds. It passed over Caguas, hit Ponce and left the island in the west, causing 211 deaths due 
to flooding and 600 deaths by drowning. In the San Juan bay 50 ships sunk. Despite 
extremely low pressure readings (1002 millibars in San Juan and 995 millibars in Arroyo); it 
caused human losses and vast damages to properties and agriculture. 
1871, August 21st; Hurricane Santa Juana passed over the Virgin Islands, St. Thomas and 
then north of San Juan. Its low pressure reading in Puerto Rico was comparable to San 
Narciso (29.53 in/hg or 1000 millibars). Yet, it did not traverse the island, only 27 deaths 
were reported and damage was relatively minimal. For the first time, a storm warning was 




; Hurricane San Felipe I took 10 hours to traverse Puerto Rico from east 
to west. The storm made landfall with estimated sustained winds of 100 mph, lowering to 60 
mph in San Juan. Pressure reports varied from 991 millibars to 988 millibars and rain totaled 
of 4.71 inches; 19 deaths. For the first time in Puerto Rico, rain measures and daily weather 
observations were recorded.  
1878, November 28th; Tropical Storm San Rufo passed over the south coast with estimated 
sustained winds of 70 mph. The storm affected lightly the east and south. In San Juan winds 
reached 20mph and pressure 1004 mb. Limited damage reported. 
1888, September 1st-2nd; Hurricane San Gil passed 100 to 150 nautical miles north of Puerto 
Rico as a category 1 hurricane. Foods caused over 100 deaths. 
1889, September 3rd-4th; Hurricane San Martín passed near St. Thomas, then passed at a 
distance of around 40 nm from the northeast end of Puerto Rico and at around 90 nm 
northeast of San Juan. Winds of 48 mph and a pressure of 996 mb were measured in San Juan. 
Mainly damages to banana crops were reported. 
1891, August 19th-20th; Hurricane San Magín hit Martinique, with more than 700 casualties 
reported, then it passed close to the southwest end of Puerto Rico with a west-northwest 
bound direction. Estimated sustained winds reached 100-105 mph, vast flooding was reported, 







Box N.3 Summary of 19
th
 century storms in Puerto Rico: 1893-1896 
1893, August 16th-17th; Hurricane San Roque entered Puerto Rico by Patillas at 7-8 pm and 
left by Isabela at 3am. The storm winds reached 115 mph approximately at time of landfall. 
San Juan got 987 mb pressure readings and winds of 55 mph with rains totaling 2.36 inches. 
Railroad damages were reported. For the first time, flags in governmental offices were 
deployed as storm warning signals. 
1896, August 31st-September 1st; Hurricane San Ramón crossed the southwest area of Puerto 
Rico. Nearby Ponce, winds reached 100 mph at landfall. 




V.3 Economic growth and urbanization vis-à-vis disasters 
Differentiated vulnerability or resilience to San Ciriaco was influenced by the specific overlap of 
economy, urbanization and disasters generated after quadri-centennial Spanish colonialism. 
Fig. 13. Strongest hurricanes of the 19th century in Puerto Rico 
 





Flooding caused most immediate casualties and damages because settlements were mainly 
located in coastal flatlands or valleys. Yet, widespread wind and rain destruction confirmed the 
accumulated feebleness of the export crop economy, built environment and society. 
 
Spaniards arrived to Puerto Rico in 1492, and the profitability of easy maritime access made 
coastal urbanization their main settlement pattern. First, gold extraction took place along the 
northern coast riverbanks, where the main deposits were located (R. Picó, 1974). In addition, the 
east-west Central Range and the Range of Cayey limited access to the steep interior. Thus, for 
fast shipping of riches to Spain, it was convenient to settle in plains close to water provision from 
creeks and rivers; particularly on the north coast. 
 





Although technically inaccurate, this map (Vingboons, 1639) registers the early pattern urbanization in accessible 
lowlands and coastal plains, which increased particular multi-hazard exposure. It also depicts the obstacle to 





Yet, coastal urbanization increased exposure to floods, hurricanes, tsunamis and other hazards; 
and soon hurricanes ravaged the countryside and new settlements. On September 8
th
, 1530, 
Governor Francisco Manuel de Lando reported to the King of Spain: 
"During the last six weeks there have been three storms of wind and rain on this island (July 26, 
August 23 and 31). They have destroyed all the plantations, drowned many cattle, and caused 
much hunger and misery in the land. In this city the half of the houses were entirely destroyed, 
and of the other half the least injured is without a roof. In the country and in the mines nothing 
has remained standing. Everybody is ruined and thinking of going away" (Lando 1530 in Van 
Middeldyk, 1903, p.n.a.). 
 
Those severe hurricanes undermined the prospects of settling on the island, as stated in the 1773 
notes of Fray Iñigo Abbad y Lasierra, traveler and priest, who magnificently wrote Puerto Rico's 
first general history: 
“inhabitants were evicted from their houses, their haciendas destroyed, they were deprived of 
their harvest, lost their cattle and goods, without the hope to recuperate them after withstanding 
the hardest efforts to acquire and keep them. If they turned their eyes to the mines, the saw them 
all underwater due to the river floods, their works lost and they were without the means or 
money to repair them. If they searched in their hacienda for produce to subsist, they only found 
sad residues of general rubbish, which could last for a very short time. In sum, they were 
surrounded by anguish and misery everywhere, without any hope to overcome it (Abbad y 
Lasierra, 1866, p.120). 
 
Simultaneously, mining became too difficult and costly to maintain after the 1540s, whilst news 
about endless riches in México and Perú prompted colonizers to emigrate: 
“the governor imposed the death penalty upon any one who should attempt to leave, but, 
notwithstanding threats and punishments, the inhabitants nearly all succeeded in getting away 
from the island” (Fowles, 1910, p.12). 
 
Puerto Rico became a failed economic endeavor and, in the following centuries, scarce records 






The oldest Spanish settlements in Puerto Rico –Caparra and its successor, nearby San Juan- 
exemplify the coastal urbanization pattern. Moreover, they embody how the founding of colonial 
cities started as an ad-hoc procedure in the entire continent. When colonization grew more 
complex and larger, the need for planning standardized urbanization became evident. By trial 
and error, a series of urban legislation commonly referred to as ‘Leyes de Indias’ -Laws of the 
Indies- was passed in the late 17
th
 century with varying degrees of circulation and execution. In 
Puerto Rico, the Laws of the Indies had limited implementation though (Sepúlveda Rivera, 
2004), mainly in central elitist areas. Overall, local development was undermined by exploitative 
policies, meager reinvestment, a strict trade monopoly dictated by the Merchants of Seville, 
mining collapse and recurrence of disasters that weakened the already ragged patterns of urban 
growth. By the mid-16
th
 century, Puerto Rico turned into an unprofitable colonial venture. It was 
isolated from commercial routes, with minimal population growth, mainly dedicated to 
subsistence agriculture (Abbad y Lasierra, 1866; López de Haro & Huerga, 1644; Matos 
Rodríguez, 1999). The remaining advantage of the island was the strategic location of San Juan, 
which became port and military garrison for vessels traveling between Spain, the Hispanic 
Colonies and Africa. From 1584 to 1809, intermitting large funding from México called El 
Situado Mexicano covered administrative costs in San Juan and built forts in Cuba, Puerto Rico, 
Florida and Hispaniola (González Vales, 2007). Public expenses went to build a pricey network 
of fortifications in San Juan and maintain the military to defend the city and treasure loaded fleet 
from foreign powers and pirates. That investment policy cemented a martial logic of organization 
and dominance; and backed underdevelopment by diverting external funding and local tributes 
from serving lay citizens, which cemented disaster vulnerability. In the mid-17
th
 century, vast 





meager money accumulation (López de Haro & Huerga, 1644). Even the capital and most 
developed city, San Juan, was poor and small compared to Havana, Bridgeport, Kingston, Port-
au-Prince and more so vis-à-vis the large mainland capitals, Lima and México (Matos 
Rodríguez, 1999). During the 17
th
 and most of the 18
th
 century, territorial development, planning 
and urbanization remained minimal due to economic depression, scarce investment by the 
Spanish crown, a primitive agriculture that required permanent field surveillance, and disasters. 
Slave trade and immigration were stalled because they were tied to the stagnant economy; 
mainly regional contraband flourished
65
. The major settlements were like Ponce: 
“a strange town, of melancholic character, because the homes are without inhabitants, those 
always live in the haciendas o grangerías [farms] and just go to the towns during festivities, 
when they hear Mass. Concluded Mass, they return to their haciendas leaving the towns with 
only the Priest and some poor landless neighbor” (Córdova, 1831a, p.110). 
 
Fig. 15 Urbanization in Puerto Rico by 1725 
 
     Existing settlements before 1650 
     Settlements founded between 1650-1725 
       Coastal urbanization consolidated during economic hardship (La Gaceta 1868 in A. G. Quintero Rivera, 2003, 
p.43).  
 
In the late 18
th
 century, an intensive export-led economy grew linked to global changes, 
including the opening of markets to the Spanish colonies and new countries after the 
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independence of Haiti (1804). Slaves and a free but landless population increased along the 
expansion of sugar and coffee plantations
66
. Meanwhile, wealthy Spanish and Creole 
businessmen and planters invested in their urban and rural built environment. Increased 
governmental planning and investment focused on export-oriented infrastructure, with the 
underlying assumption of protecting commodities -crops- not citizens. Examples were a tiny and 
partial railroad grid (Santamaría García, 1994), bridges, ports, roads, and lighthouses that yielded 
high returns to the Crown, investors and influential merchants and planters; but did not target the 
development and resilience of lay citizens. Private and public investment consolidated what can 
be described as “uneven geographical development” (N. Smith, 1984), with abysmal contrasts 
between what upper income groups enjoyed vis-à-vis the absolute destitution of the vast 
majority, increasing their vulnerability to disasters and everyday life hazards. The San Juan-
Ponce Carretera Militar (military motorway) was a rare case of territorial connectivity done 
fairly fast (1880-1888), exemplifying the logic of governmental planning and investment. Given 
the scarcity of transportation infrastructure, the motorway facilitated control to the authorities, 
trade to merchants and planters, and mobility to landless workers looking for cheap seasonal 
work or emigration to coastal towns and Hispanic countries. A U.S. correspondent, unclear about 
the motorway funding, reported its usefulness: 
“While the construction of the thoroughfare contemplated no philanthropic purpose and was 
perhaps, financially, an expensive gift to the inhabitants, it will, in the future, be of incalculable 
commercial value, for it gives to the country the only road within the confines of the island which 
is really passable at all seasons of the year—except short stretches of a proposed road to 
encircle the island” (Dinwiddie, 1898, 32). 
 
Most investment concentrated in the sugar-producing lowlands because of the preceding coastal 
urbanization pattern, accessibility, and diverse needs of sugar versus coffee crops. The highlands 
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were suitable for coffee shrubs, which unlike perennial cane grasses last years and require many 
workers during a brief yearly harvest period. Thus, highland towns grew slower, despite coffee 
booms. Private and public investment in coastal towns consolidated fast inequitable urban 
growth. Ponce, renamed ‘Pearl of the South’, exemplifies a polarization between a small, 
planned, wealthy center and a large, poor, informal counterpart. This urban growth process was 
endorsed by municipal, insular and Crown authorities funding amenities and infrastructure in the 
center, which increased the elite’s assets, quality of life and safety. Small public urban networks 
developed in Ponce earlier and quicker than in most towns: kerosene lightning (1864), the 
Aqueduct Alfonso 13
th
 (1873), hydrogen public illumination (1874), submarine cable (1895), 
telephone (1897), electrical trolley (1898), sewage (1898) (Gandía Córdova, 1899; Pubill, 1900). 
 
There is no data of purposive agricultural and urban growth on desiccated flood-prone areas, as 
contemporary technology did not enhance large hydraulic transformations. Formal beach 
urbanization was trivial, but few export or military constructions. Exclusionary land markets 
prompted low-income groups to occupy risk-prone areas such as hills, mangroves or creeks (A. 
G. Quintero Rivera, 2003). They mostly caused reversible ecosystemic changes due to the 
fragility of their constructions. 
 
After the 1820 fire in Ponce, an urban core called Zona de Piedra (Stone Zone) emerged and 
flourished with streets realigned and broadened by the Catalan Vidal D’Ors, humbly following 
Gaudí’s plan for Barcelona. By the late 19
th
 century, new buildings showed a preference for 





Arts (Vásquez Zapata, 2000), and reflected the integration of the most successful immigrants
67
. 
Novel aesthetic proposals were enabled by vanguard techniques and construction materials –i.e. 
reinforced concrete, iron and corrugated tin-. Interior decorations included imported stained glass 
panels, mosaic tile floors, jalousies, balconies, ornate moldings and cornices. In turn, new 
technologies usually reduced fire, hurricane, flooding and pests hazards. Housing was built 
individually or in small groups. Citing infrastructure, services and mansions; Creoles argued the 
superiority of Ponce over San Juan (Neumann Gandía, 1987). For example, famed local 
journalist Ramón Marín vehemently argued that hundreds of houses, regardless of their 
materials, often adjusted to the demands of a ‘cultivated population’ and were: 
“modern constructions, many attractingly and elegantly decorated internally and externally; 
some beautified with precious gardens, and almost all of them with spacious patios, in which 
there was no lack of stables, garages and dwells with pumping bombs, steam several of them, 
which elevate water to the higher family rooms” (Marín, 1877, p. 202). 
 
Fig.16 “           B        S               ” Fig.17 Las Delicias Square recently inaugurated 
  
“This view is a typical scene on one of the main business 
streets and gives an idea of the characteristic style of 
buildings. The city has wide, clean streets and attractive 
houses, besides an old church erected more than three 
hundred years ago” (Raphael Tuck and sons after 1899). 
This postcard generalized central Ponce. 
Opened in 1881 and renovated in 1889, Las Delicias 
Square and Boulevard modestly imitated expansions in 
Madrid, Barcelona, Buenos Aires and Havana. It was 
an exclusive leisure and consumption area, and with 
the cathedral to its side it was used as an iconic image 
for postcards. Image: (Gilot, n.d.). 
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 For example, the Buena Vista Hacienda was founded in 1851 by the Venezuelan Vives family to cultivate coffee, 
fruits and maize with the top technology available (Santana, 2000). The sugar mill Central Merceditas was 
inaugurated in 1861 by the Catalán Serrallés family (Cabrero Salcedo, 1991); decades later, it became the largest 






Fig.18 Las Delicias Square and Boulevard  Fig.19 Ponce Market 
Human powered tram construction circa 1898. Main 
institutions and prominent citizens were adjacent. Image: 
(A. G. Quintero Rivera, 2003, p.6). 
“This is the most noted market in the island” (José De 
Olivares and Joseph Wheeler 1898 in A. G. Quintero 
Rivera, 2003, p.49). 
 
 Fig.20 Elevation of Romaguera, Salud, Victoria and Isabel streets 1890s 
 
Increasing investment in construction materials, techniques and architectural complexity 





Meanwhile, provision of public housing and land tenure were unknown; sub-standard housing, 
uneven services, and rundown infrastructure prevailed island wide (J. Lizardi, 2013; J. L. P. 
Lizardi, 2008). Thus, most citizens experienced extreme precariousness during the everyday life 
and multi-hazard vulnerability. Some U.S. newcomers reported awful conditions, as they were 
free of the locals’ vested interests in promoting Ponce as the new capital. Poor surface drainage 
collected unhealthy rain ponds for days; the Portugués River overflowed, damaged lives and 
properties, and left harmful filth and mud deposits. Exclusive unfiltered water provision came 
from a small reservoir of the Portugués River; yet, it was polluted in the dry season because 
water could not settle in the reservoir before passing on into the mains. It was even worse after a 
storm or in the rainy season. Citizens without water provision gathered it from any river spot. 
Filtering water, boiling it, or combining both disinfecting methods was unfamiliar or 
unaffordable for most people. Two small sewers only served hospitals, the jail and a few private 
houses. A handful recent and fancy houses had flush closets and covered cesspools. Others had 
open cesspools inside the house flanking the kitchen or in the backyards; they were seldom 
cleaned resulting in diseases and a stench that reached the streets (Fowles, 1910; King, 2006 
(1900); Verrill, 1914). 
 
Moreover, precarious housing, bohíos, was made out of any cheap material available: 
“The frame work of these dwellings is square timber when it can be obtained, but more often 
poles answer the purpose. The siding is varied according to the ability of the owner to secure 
materials. Occasionally it is all made of new lumber. Oftener it is made up of old boards that 
have been picked up, store boxes that have been taken apart, tin cans that have been 
straightened out, advertising signs of either tin or wood, and, in many cases, the bark of the palm 
tree or the leaves of the sugar cane are used. For a roof, discarded pieces of corrugated iron or 
tin or boards are made to do service, but frequently thatch is used. When the ground is marshy, 
the buildings are elevated on posts and a floor is built as rapidly as boards enough can be 






Bohíos had no flush closet or cesspools and the overcrowding of urban slums, arrabales, 
worsened hygienic conditions. Furthermore, arrabales and isolated rural bohíos were usually 
located in cheap or free but risk-prone areas, which complicated emergency maneuvers, 
overpriced a posteriori service provision, and increased vulnerability to landslides, flooding, 
hurricanes, fire and pests such as mosquitoes, hookworm, moth, termites and flies. For Gov. 
Fernando de Norzagaray y Escudero (1852-1855), the San Juan bohíos were a pile of fuel ready 
to ignite soon, not houses in which to live really (E. R. Quiles Rodríguez, 2003); similar to 
precarious housing throughout the island. 
 
Fig.21 Caserío Cantera in Ponce before San Ciriaco 
 
The broken topography of areas available for precarious housing and their usual proximity to risks –including river 
banks, swamps and mangroves- magnified flash floods and landslides during San Ciriaco, such as Cantera slum. 
Image: (A. G. Quintero Rivera, 2003, p.12). In it, “all the houses in a radio of more than 200 meters disappeared, 
displaying a spectacle of dragged houses with more than twenty people out of which many died” (Aráerz Fernando 







Fig.22 "One of the happy homes of Ponce, Porto Rico"  Fig.23 “          S        - unloading Lighters 
at Playa - S               ” 
  
For the photographer  (Zahner, c.1899), the family represents 
a typical joyful way of life regardless their unsafe home 
made with palm leaves and discarded materials, and their 
precarious clothing. 
Public investment in gainful port facilities did not 
contemplate the welfare of dock workers and 
longshoremen. Image: (Strothmeyer & Wyman, 
c.1899).  
 
To conclude this section, I reviewed the built environment emphasized in architectural, planning 
and policy records until now, as part of public narratives that strengthen or weaken fair 
remembrance of how differently urban life and disasters were experienced. The case of Ponce is 
emblematic again, only its central area has been documented in the inventories made by the 
National Park Service (1976), the Architects Association (1984), the municipality of Ponce and 
the Spanish International Cooperation Agency (1988); and in academic publications e.g. 
(Cabanyas, 1986; Rigau, 1992b; Vivoni Farage & Alvarez-Curbelo, 1997; Vivoni Farage & 
Curbelo Alvarez, 1998). Such one-sided approach undermines a multi-layered and pro-equity 
learning process about everyday life and crises
68
. 
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V.4 Socio-cultural hierarchies, memory and knowledge of disasters 
Differentiated vulnerability or resilience to San Ciriaco was also shaped by the contemporary 
juxtaposition of socio-cultural hierarchies, memory and knowledge of disasters. In turn, socio-
cultural hierarchies were rooted in a cultural domination process that sustained the Spanish 
conquest and colonization of the continent, shortly overlapped with assumptions brought by 
Americans. Cultural domination was a key initial Ibero-American transnational practice that 
framed policy-making until it became engrained in everyday life, shaping notions of habitus 
(Bourdieu, 1977). In other words, cultural domination shaped durable structures or frameworks 
of thought, which influenced individuals and groups to pursue and justify particular paths of 
action. In this case, a dominant path of action was to use nation of origin, race, class, gender, 
language and religion to set up an exploitative hierarchy. In turn, that hierarchy shaped rights, 
resources and obligations. It also shaped notions of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006), 
which could be endorsed or destroyed. Both aspects influenced disasters. 
 
Discrimination based on nation of origin and race resulted in hispanophilia -a preference for 
Spain, Spaniards, and Spanish culture- and blanqueamiento -whitening-, two of the highest 
identity and power markers in Puerto Rico, as in the rest of Latin America (Fuente, 2001; Wade, 
1997). Peninsulares -European-born Spaniards-, also called hombres de la otra banda -men from 
the other side- were atop the conquering chain of command, controlling key colonial positions, 
access to profitable lands and production; and discriminating against criollos -Creoles, their 
fellows born in the Americas- and more so against people of color. In other words, 





color. They forced to work mostly indigenous peoples but also Blacks, who arrived to Puerto 
Rico in small numbers as slaves and free men with the first conquerors. Peninsulares and criollos 
imposed enslaving and exterminating practices through the encomienda system, harsher than 
medieval serfdom, which broke social tissues and justified denial of legal entitlements to 
indigenous peoples, such as land tenure, access to and control over means of production, and 
education. In other words, encomienda endorsed large scale, lasting vulnerability. Besides, 
Peninsulares accidentally spread diseases or implemented crushing reactions to revolts, 
debilitating and annihilating indigenous group
69
. By 1517, the indigenous Caribbean populations 
were collapsing. Fray Bartolomé de las Casas -Spanish Dominican priest, settler, writer and key 
source for the early Spanish colony- defended the rights of indigenous peoples in the Salamanca 
Courts, supported the introduction of African slaves to solve free labor depletion, and succeeded 
in the passage of the 1542 Leyes Nuevas (New Laws) to achieve both. Yet, he later regretted this 
initiative. Protective measures for the indigenous were rarely implemented, and exploitation of 
Africans and Afro-descendants became equally brutal, overexposing both to crises -including 
hurricanes, which he thought were the worst storms of all the world’s seas (Schwartz, 2015)-. 
 
Slave trade correlated to the economy, thus, it bloomed in the 18
th
 century when the intensive 
plantation economy took off. Moreover, in 1766, San Juan became a slave distribution center due 
to the strategic location of the island. Like in the other Hispanic colonies, population started to 
increase significantly because of higher birth rates and immigration (Matos Rodríguez, 1999). 
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 Puerto Rican Taínos developed counter-strategies like suicide, migrating to other islands, and hiding in the broken 
mountainous interior –later called las Indieras, Indian lands-. Crossbreeding also took place because most officials, 







 constituted the largest number of immigrants and the fastest growing population 
segment only due to their record arrival numbers
71
. From 1815 onwards, legislation known as 
Cédula de Gracias -Royal Decree of Graces- introduced further ethnic nuances and structural 
changes in the colonies, with repercussions on the built environment and vulnerability to 
disasters that lasted until the 20
th
 century. Specifically, it modified trade, property and 
immigration policies to reinvigorate loyalty to Spain, bolster commerce, agriculture and revenue 
extraction, and stop emancipation of Blacks as had happened in the Haitian Revolution (1791–
1804) and regional revolts. The decree enabled direct trade with nations other than Spain. Filling 
the Haitian vacuum, Puerto Rican coastal sugar cane exports soared, and the U.S. became a 
buyer eventually; later, coffee exports rocketed. Also, the decree changed land tenure policies, as 
White immigrants received land denied to enslaved and free Blacks, and seized from 
White/Mestizo Jíbaro small-scale farmers and hacendados underperforming in the new economy. 
The results were land concentration, and continued ethnic and class inequalities because some 
immigrants gained a comfortable socio-economic position and even joined the elites; whilst the 
landless population increased and kept experiencing exclusion, and detrimental working and 
living conditions (Ismael  García-Colón, 2006; Francisco A. Scarano, 1984; Schwartz, 1992) that 
overexposed them to everyday life hazards and extreme events. Lastly, the decree expanded 
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Enslaved Blacks were mainly of Bantu and Aka origins, although Yoruba, Luba, Bini, Kimbundu and Ewe-Fon 
groups are also registered. (Mills-Bocachica, 2003) 
71
 Their survival and reproductive rates were low due to overwork; deleterious conditions concerning food, clothing, 
shelter and medical care; and an imbalance between the sexes, with fewer women than men. There were also 
prisoners brought to work in military constructions, freed Black Caribbean refugees, French planters escaping or 
expulsed from Saint Domingue –later Haiti- and Louisiana, Spaniards escaping from independence turmoil in 
Hispaniola -later Dominican Republic-, Canary islanders and Irish migrants searching for work (F. Picó, 2006; E. R. 





immigration to increase the power of Whites
72
. Until then, the Puerto Rican African Diaspora 
was the largest population segment (Barreto, 2001; Matos Rodríguez, 1999). Yet, a distinctively 
racialized geography consolidated in the island due to accessibility, production, tenure, and 
internal migration policies. In the less populated mountainous interior, most inhabitants were 
Mestizo or White farmers; although escaped cimarrones (Maroons) intermingled. Instead of 
bringing enslaved or free Blacks from the lowlands using terrible roads when export crops 
demanded temporary workers, impoverished or landless White, Mestizo highlanders and some 
European immigrants
73
 were employed. In the more accessible lowlands and coastal plains, a 




 century, discrimination patterns had filtrated into nascent notions of proper local 
identity. Although hispanophilia and whitening are emphasized in this chapter; gender, creed and 
language were also used to discriminate
74
. Nation of origin still divided the light-skinned elite 
and it was discursively distorted to match race. Royal officials and wealthy Spanish families 
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 Light-skinned immigrants included Catalans, Corsicans, Mallorcans, Italians, French, British, Irish, Germans, 
Dutch, Danish, Lebanese (including Protestants and converted Jews -to a limited extent-), and also Spaniards and 
Creoles fleeing from independence struggles in the Caribbean Basin, namely from Venezuela, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic and Cuba. (F. Picó, 2006). 
73
 Canary islanders were often cited as cheap jornaleros (rural workers) that could substitute slaves when the trade 
became complicated. (Matos Rodríguez, 1999). 
74
 A patriarchal mind frame restricted the rights of women of all classes and ethnicities, with degrees of difference. 
(A. Colón, Mergal, Torres, & Serra Deliz, 1986; Findlay, 1999). An example of creed discrimination was the 
relative tolerance to Europeans and islanders practicing Protestantism since the mid-1800s; whilst Afro-descendants 
could be punished with torture and death if found practicing their religions. In terms of language, Spanish pro-
assimilation policies and everyday life practices pushed the linguistic integration of immigrants as compulsory. 
(Barreto, 2001). Consequently, even if Puerto Rico was a multicultural colony, Spanish linguistic homogeneity was 
the officially promoted norm; a few other European languages –namely English, German, French and Italian- were 





argued their superiority over increasingly powerful light-skinned Creoles
75
. Simultaneously, post 
1815 light-skinned immigrants challenged and transformed the traditional Creole landowner elite 
of hacendados o estancieros (cattle haciendas owners). Independence ideals emerged along a 
glorified islander identity (Brau, 1966). Like 18
th
 century nationalist movements forging nation-
states in Europe, urban Creole intellectuals selectively idealized rural folk traits, pristine nature, 
ancient local myths and folklore for their interests. The emerging identitarian rationale could not 
unify contending Creole factions; its dependency on divisive vectors undermined the chance to 
cement a shared pro-independence project (Barreto, 2001). Yet, it served to naturalize pre-
existing social exclusion (Francisco A.  Scarano, 1996), which enhanced selective disaster 
vulnerability. In other words, wealthy creoles established ‘invented traditions’ (Hobsbawm, 
1983) and versions of history that contradicted the past for their benefit. They voiced embryonic 
notions of nationalist identity in which being an islander was a necessary but also insufficient 
qualifier to be memorialized, ascend socially or gain access to and control over the economy, 
politics and ultimately a safer way of life. An incongruous figure of the rural plebeian, Jibaro, 
emerged in literary writings since the 1810s (Francisco A.  Scarano, 1996). In the most idealized 
versions, the imaginary founding culture remained in isolated mountainous areas –where 
supposedly only light-skinned jíbaros lived-; although the island conquest and colonization 
unfolded in the lowlands and coast. It was white affluent hacendados -ancestors of elite Creoles- 
who somehow embodied that founding culture of the jíbaros though. Thus, the Creole 
rationalization was to portray poor jíbaros -like other people of color- as lazy, ignorant, violent 
and needy of the moral example, control and leadership of the well-off descendants of 
hacendados, the ´true´ locals destined to rule. Based on racial discrimination, identity narratives 
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 Racial purity, morality, physiology, lazy attitudes towards work and even long-term exposure to a hot climate 





by Creoles disregarded that initially Taínos and later some mestizos and Maroons inhabited the 
highlands also, negating to people of color a role in the foundational myth. Moreover, Spanish 
officials and Creoles justified harsh living conditions for Afro-descendants due to fears of 
racially oriented uprisings. Spain officially abolished its slave trade in 1817, but in the Spanish 
Caribbean it was known that the Crown would not reduce the slave supply to its colonies (Matos 
Rodríguez, 1999). In Puerto Rico, the severe Reglamento de Esclavos -Rules for Slaves- was 
enacted by Gov. Miguel Luciano de la Torre y Pando during 1826 (Córdova, 1831a), reinforcing 
inequity and racism. Around the 1840s, international pressure and reduced profitability 
decreased the slave trade, but racial exploitation continued. In 1848, Gov. Juan Prim de Prats y 
González enacted the iniquitous Código Negro or Bando Contra la Raza Negra -Black Code or 
Orders against the Black Race-. The code severed the civil rights of Blacks even if they were 
freed, they could not leave their working haciendas; if they were carrying unauthorized weapons 
immediate death penalty could apply; cultural manifestations such as music, dancing and 
religious practices were physically punished –death included-. Slavery ended in 1873, later than 
in most former Hispanic colonies due to the Crown and elite’s resistance. 
 
As a result of such embedded discrimination, it was possible to justify and even naturalize to 
have a large ‘surplus’ population enduring precarious living and working conditions, job and 
food insecurity, lack of education and high health risks and, consequently, vulnerable to 
disasters. For instance, public investment in profitable port facilities had no redistributive effects; 
dock workers and longshoremen kept facing unstable jobs, low salaries, long hours and dangers 
which could lead to disease, injuries, permanent disabilities and death (Brau, 1966; Á. G. 





strikes since the 1890s. Yet, working and living conditions in sugar and coffee estates were 
likened to those during slavery (Fowles, 1910). Low wages were commonly paid with tokens and 
vouchers valid in the plantation store only, enabling abuses. In addition, global downturns of 
crop prices reflected in critical job insecurity for the poor. For instance, although the quality of 
Puerto Rican coffee made it a favorite import of the Vatican; Central American and Brazilian 
exports gained market share based on cheaper wages since the early 1890s. Consequently, in 
Puerto Rico plantation maintenance diminished, planters advocated even lower wages, and the 
growing precariousness of highlanders propelled their exodus towards new slums in urban areas 
or abroad
76
. Food insecurity was another pressing problem by the end of the 19
th
 century, as the 
crop export and livestock economy turned Puerto Rico into a food importing island. Around that 
time, almost a quarter of the island surface, 500,000 acres was cultivated; but only 100,000 acres 
produced foodstuff (Buitrago, 1976); which was insufficient for local demands, transported with 
difficulties or rotted on the way. Thus, the poor subsisted on a limited, unreliable and expensive 
diet. Public education levels were extremely low
77
, illiteracy remained a key barrier for social 
mobility; Spanish was the official language of public education and there was limited teaching of 
local history as the curriculum was pro-Spanish (Brau, 1966). Finally, the following diseases 
were widespread amongst the poor: smallpox, enteritis – e.g. dysentery, diarrhea, and typhoid 
fever-, lethal infantile tetanus from unhygienic midwife practices, inanition, tuberculosis, dengue 
fever, malaria, anemia, hookworm-anemia, precarious dental health, venereal diseases, and 
addiction to tobacco and alcohol - sometimes to minimize hunger- (Fowles, 1910). Malaria 
exemplified the link between vulnerability, poverty, precarious health and infrastructure. Lack of 
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potable water infrastructure was patched with domestic open storage -such as cisterns and 
barrels-, which in turn provided habitats for disease-carrying mosquitoes. Without a disaster, 
malaria ranked third in the mortality table; it was most prevalent in the lowlands and one-fourth 
of its inhabitants were estimated to have it (Espinosa, 2000). Poor islanders were often accused 
by Spaniards and Creoles -and later by Americans- of being lazy, predisposed to nap and elude 
efforts without any connection to their ill-prone, structural living and working conditions. In 
sum, pro-independence creoles promoted local culture and identity claims that endorsed 
exclusionary and vulnerability-enhancing conditions, and excluded the construction of hurricane 
memories and awareness. 
 
San Ciriaco happened months after the U.S. took over Puerto Rico from Spain, thus, it was a 
very short but revealing time period to foresee social hierarchy trends. U.S. military, reporters, 
missionaries, administrators, researchers, investors and lay citizens were building a data base 
through censuses, maps, diaries, letters, reports, photographs, drawings, postcards, cartoons and 
even silent black and white films. An imagined community of exotic inferior others was being 
sculpted and would influence regulatory frameworks, investment, planning and disaster relief: 
“When the Americans took possession of the island, Porto Rico was, like all true Spanish-
American countries, quaint, quiet, picturesque, and with an indefinable charm or "atmosphere” 
impossible to picture or describe. For 400 years the people had lived in more or less the same 
manner, their homes were of Spanish or Moorish style, their lives were simple, their wants few, 
business worries, financial reverses or competition troubled them not. No one gave a thought of 
tomorrow, and bullfights, cockfights, dances, and the lottery were the amusements of the 
populace”- Alpheus Hyatt Verrill, zoologist, explorer, inventor, illustrator and respected author 
of travel books (Verrill, 1914, p.12). 
 
“We have accepted these people as our share of the burden that the strong must bear for the 
weak; we will keep them alive; we will lead them slowly, gently toward the light, and finally in 
half a hundred years they will catch the first glimmering ray which will show them what our 
standards are and what we wish theirs to be”- Major John Van Hoff, San Ciriaco Relief Director 






“They [Porto Ricans] sin, but they sin only as animals, without shame, because there is no sense 
of doing wrong... They are innocently happy in the unconsciousness of the obligations of 
morality. They eat, drink, sleep, and smoke, and do the least in the way of work they can. They 
have no ideas of duty, and therefore are not made uneasy by neglecting it” (Gov. Davis 1902 in 
Findlay, 1999, p.n.a.). 
 
New rulers also questioned the higher standing of Creole elites, they had to: 
“be considered in an entirely different sense from European and North American whites. They 
represent a genus of their own, the Porto Rican whites” -Spokesperson of the Young People’s 
Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada (Fowles, 1910, p.22). 
 
Yet, poor Puerto Ricans of color got the worst brunt of discrimination, even from doctors: 
“These lower classes are a mixture of Spanish, Indian and negro blood, the latter predominant. 
Many are pure negroes. Generations of an unfed, unsanitary, and immoral life have produced a 
race short statured, flat chested, and physically weak, as a general rule. Like children, they have 
never been accustomed to think or do for themselves and have little stamina, becoming in the 
face of disease or misfortune passive and apathetic” –W.W. King, Assistant Surgeon of the U.S. 
Marine-Hospital Services making a post-San Ciriaco medical assessment (King, 2006 (1900), 
p.39). 
 
Constructive descriptions about underprivileged Puerto Ricans are rare. Yet, a Princeton 
University student, drafted in the Spanish-American War, depicted a positive viewpoint that 
would have been valuable if translated into policy-making: 
“While in Porto Rico I had a very fair opportunity to see a little of the country, and also of the 
people, and I was very favorably impressed with what I saw. We must not forget that for 400 
years the island has been under Spanish rule, and that the chance for internal improvement has 
been very small. The people are very intelligent, and seem very ready and willing to learn. We 
had working under us some 150 natives, and I was surprised at the amount of work one would do 
and at the spirit with which he would do it. Another thing which surprised me very much was the 
cleanliness of the people. I had been lead to believe that the reverse was true. It was the rule and 
not the exception for our natives to come to work every morning in clean white shirts and clean 
blue overalls. I may say that I never had such washing done as I had down there. Chemicals are 
unknown, and the dirt is removed in the primitive way — beating with a paddle”. W. Brokaw 
Bamford, Sergt. 1st U. S.  Volunteer Engineers Co.l. Third Battalion Peekskill N.Y. to Ponce, 






Moreover, newcomers endorsed the opposite view of hispanophilia, the islanders’ Spanish blood 
and legacy was a disqualifier for self-rule. They had only been exposed to Spanish superstition, 
corruption and tyranny -a bag of undesirable characteristics of the Spanish Empire, latter termed 
Black Legend-; thus, they were unable to shape their own destiny without years of education and 
guidance (R. Fernández, 1996). Other relevant hierarchies were creed and language. U.S. 
missionaries were encouraged to disseminate their evangelic faith, substituting what was seen as 
retrograde Catholicism allied to Spain (R. Fernández, 1996). A pro-US curriculum and the use of 
English as official medium of instruction were non-negotiable (Barreto, 2001). In terms of 
gender, most fundamental patriarchal assumptions and rights were maintained, though less 
blatantly (Findlay, 1999). In sum, the new regime imposed its version of hierarchy also based on 
country of origin, class, race, religion, language and gender. On the ground, policy views 
essentially oscillated between benevolent or protectionist paternalism overlapped with the new 
hierarchy, which called for educating the ignorant and abandoned populace in the ‘right 
American way’; or derogatory and supremacist assertions, which justified disciplining people 
prone to vagrancy. 
 
Other relevant social factors for disaster vulnerability were changes in the memorialization and 
knowledge of disasters. Since the early colony, multiple sources commented on climate data and 
storm impacts in Puerto Rico; with varying degrees of religiosity, accuracy, consistency and 
scalar coverage. Yet, cultural domination gave to Spaniards and Creoles the power to determine 
what is called the politics of remembrance and forgetting (Appadurai, 1996). They promoted a 
historical inability of subalterns to speak (Spivak, 1988), to be acknowledged and empowered in 





to marginalized people were systematically excluded from memorialization in discourses, 
representations and spatial interventions. A grave example was the destruction of indigenous 
grassroots knowledge to forecast the weather
78
. Hurricanes and storms were a common link 
among indigenous Caribbeans, who associated disasters with supernatural deities, as other 
cultures throughout history. Hurricanes were most prominent because of their frequency and 
destructiveness. Taínos, Arawak and Caribs worshiped and gave offerings to a mighty deity in 
control of hurricanes, which could be associated with chaos, weather and wind. Some groups 
even held that god as creator of the Antilles, another interpretation was that winds separated the 
islands and kept shaping their contours (Schwartz, 2015). The god was known as Ouragan, 
Hurakan, Harakan, Furacan, Furican, Haurachan, Herycano, Hurachano, Hurricano, Kulakani, 
Jurakan or Jun Raqan; and the origins of the name remain uncertain. For Mayans, Hurakán was 
a leading deity, along with Cabrakán –earthquake- and Chirakán –volcano- (Mulcahy, 2006). In 
Cuban and Dominican Republic Pre-Columbian mythology, an irate Cemí or goddess called 
Guabancex was the ‘Rider of the Winds’; she unleashed destruction along her twin male 
accomplices Guataubá -the announcing thunder - and Coatrisque -the ensuing flood- (Gutiérrez 
Calvache et al., n.d.). Archaeologists have found Cuban petro glyphs and ceramics representing 
hurricanes with a central rounded and angry head, like the vortex; and twisting outstretched “S” 
shaped arms protruding from its shoulders or temples, like opposing wind rotation. Such 
simplified imagery resembles what Sir William Reid confirmed in his 1838 seminal 
meteorological work ‘The Law of Storms’, to satellite and radar snapshots (Auld/Powhatan, 
2007; Schwartz, 2005), and to the current international symbol for hurricanes. 
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Fig.24 Cuban petro glyphs of Guabancex Fig.25 Guabancex riding over hurricane Katrina 
 
 
(Guarch & Querejeta, 1992). (Auld/Powhatan, 2007). 
 
Taínos preferred root crops such as malanga, yautía or yucca due to their resistance to storm 
damage; in some islands they marked the passing of time through ceremonial dances -arreitos-, 
singing about the worst hurricanes and the feats of their ancestors; and, later, their low built 
thatched roof huts seemed to withstand better wind forces than Spanish-built houses (Schwartz, 
2015). Puerto Rican Taínos believed that Hurakán, the evil outsider, had its local good 
counterpart, Yuquiyú, who protected the island using as a blockade his home, the sacred 
mountain of El Yunque. Later, broken topography and dense vegetation turned El Yunque into a 
refuge for indigenous and maroons escaping Spanish colonizers. In modern times, it became a 
National Park and a cherished identitarian symbol, sometimes seen as a mystic place with a 
reputation as an ancestral hurricane barrier. The implicit assumption that elevated topography 





hurricane Santa Clara (1956)
79
. After hurricane Hugo hit the northeast coast (1989), the notion of 
El Yunque as a storm barrier reemerged informally and in a book for children (Rodriguez 
Martinó et al., 1993). Also, indigenous in Puerto Rico and Caribbean region knew the signs of 
impending storms: 
“The Indians of this island predicted this sad catastrophe and they took it for granted whenever 
they observed the air perturbed, a red sun, a deaf noise underground, the stars halos darkened 
by a vapor that apparently enlarged them, the northeast horizons closed, a strong odor coming 
from the sea, the way in which the sea got up in the middle of tranquility, changing the wind 
from east to west suddenly. The experience of those fearful events had taught them to observe 
mutations in the stars and elements, and prognosticate such fatal phenomena”(Abbad y 
Lasierra, 1866, p. 430). 
 
Modern meteorologists would confirm a similar description of arriving hurricanes:  
“The physical features of hurricanes are well understood. The approach of a hurricane is usually 
indicated by a long swell on the ocean, propagated to great distances, and forewarning the 
observer by two or three days. A faint rise in the barometer occurs before the gradual fall, which 
becomes very pronounced at the center. Fine wisps of cirrus-clouds are first seen, which 
surround the center to a distance of 200 miles; the air is calm and sultry, but this is gradually 
supplanted by a gentle breeze, and later the wind increases to a gale, the clouds become matted, 
the sea rough, rain falls, and the winds are gusty and dangerous as the vortex comes on. Then 
comes the indescribable tempest, dealing destruction, impressing the imagination with the wild 
exhibition of the forces of nature, the flashes of lightning, the torrents of rain, the cold air, all the 
elements in an uproar, which indicate the close approach of the center. In the midst of this 
turmoil there is a sudden pause, the winds almost cease, the sky clears, the waves, however, rage 
in great turbulence. This is the eye of the storm, the core of the vortex, and it is, perhaps, 20 
miles in diameter, or one-thirtieth of the whole hurricane. The respite is brief, and is soon 
followed by the abrupt renewal of the violent wind and rain, but now coming from the opposite 
direction, and the storm passes off with the several features following each other in the reverse 
order" (Monte, n.d., p. 38). 
 
Hurricanes were a new ontological problem for Europeans settlers. They did not match classic or 
biblical understandings of the universe, leading to disagreements between theologians, natural 
philosophers and popular interpretations; for instance, until the 18
th
 century, they were associated 
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with earthquakes due to changes in the terrain or currents beneath the earth, based on Aristotelian 
meteorology (Schwartz, 2015). Moreover, during the 16
th
 century, divination and prognostication 
were perilous endeavors; assumptions based on stars, planets and celestial activity to assist 
human decision-making got in the way of God’s will or was directly related to diabolic powers. 
A papal bull of 1586 discredited and condemned magicians, palm readers, conjurers, seers, 
diviners and the like; although a relative tolerance applied to practical matters such as medicine, 
navigation or agriculture (Schwartz, 2015). 
 
The connections between hurricanes and religion were not completely straightforward; even in 
the 16th century, some observers believed that storms were natural phenomena and not 
specifically Godly punishments (Schwartz, 2015). However, a religious characterization 
prevailed. The typical explication of the early Spaniards colonizers was that the indigenous skill 
to forecast hurricanes showed witchcraft or, even worse, a pact with Satan that ought to be 
chastised. As early as 1550, not long after three hurricanes diluted the prospects of settling in 
Puerto Rico, the Governor ordered an Indian punished for sorcery because he had calculated the 
arrival of storms (Schwartz, 2005). Similar destruction of indigenous know-how leading to 
increased hurricane vulnerability were noted in Saint Christopher and Yucatan (Campos 
Goenaga, 2008; Schwartz, 2005). Under Catholicism, it became traditional to begin the rainy 
season with the prayer ‘Ad repellendas tempestates’, ‘For the repelling of Tempests’ (Neely, 
2006, p. 3), celebrate processions begging for God´s protection, and invoke God, the Virgin 
Mary and saints during a crisis. The Roman Catholic calendar provided storm names matching 
saint and day of landfall. Churches and chapels were improvised storm refuges and relief 





the prominent role of religion and the lack of public secular shelters. Priests brought to the 
Americas the idea that the Holy Sacrament and relics could overpower storms. For instance, in 
1645, the Synod of San Juan realized that the Blessed Sacrament had been removed from its 
monstrance and put outside the church to ward off storms (Schwartz, 2015); despite his 
prohibition, this action would be repeated during extreme emergencies. On Palm Sunday, palm 
fronds were blessed in church and then placed in porches and windows of homes to repel storms, 
or even burned so that the fumes would break up the skies; this tradition lasted in Puerto Rico 
and Cuba until the beginning of the early 20
th
 century (Schwartz, 2015). Rural colonizer –often 
illiterate- transplanted their world views also to forecast storms, including observations of 
changes in animal behavior, vegetation, weather and celestial bodies. Given the lack of 
alternative explanations, some of those ideas and practices metamorphosed and found their way 
to influence mainstream society until the 1950s, as chapter VII will examine. 
 
Moreover, there were manifold discursive manipulations by religious authorities and 
parishioners to explain disasters as God’s punishment for the sins of impious or degenerate 
people. On the island, the later usually meant impoverished highland jíbaros, among whom 
inbreeding was frequent due to geographical isolation. It also meant Africans and their 
descendants, practicing forbidden religions and traditions seen as satanic. When San Ciriaco hit, 
a new group people deserved God’s rage; the immoral and ungrateful traitors of Spain supporting 
the U.S., according to the influential pro-Spanish Dean of the Diocese of Puerto Rico, Don Juan 
Perpiña y Pábernat: 
“Nobody unaffected by the most repugnant Atheism, Materialism and Naturalism could deny to 
us that God has sent us the terrible lash on the 8
th
, as a punishment for our defections…and do 





affliction. We believe that it carries large sins, and very large ones since the day of nationality 
change” (Perpiña y Pábernat 1899 in Ortíz Díaz, 2000, p.85). 
 
In sum, Spanish beliefs and interpretations were superimposed over indigenous superstitions and 
empirical knowledge in the name of religion and civilization. Contrastingly, there are no records 
of Americans associating religion, sins and hurricanes. Since their arrival had taken place a few 
months before, their impact on the memorialization and knowledge of disasters is not chronicled, 
possibly because it was negligible compared to urgent priorities of the new regime setup. 
 
Meanwhile, meteorology as a modern field emerged in the 18th century; the increasing relevance 
of Caribbean exports and colonial struggles eventually motivated a pragmatic investment in 
scientific knowledge to prevent and mitigate losses, and dominate the region. The precursors of 
Caribbean climatological studies were located in Cuba, because of the earlier development of 
academic institutions
80
. In 1847, Desiderio Herrera Cabrera  published ‘Memory of the 
Hurricanes on the island of  Cuba’ (Lines Escardo, 1998); while the Cuban intellectual Andrés 
Poey y Aguirre was compiling in Paris the first, lengthy and meticulous bibliography and 
chronology of Caribbean hurricanes (Poey, 1862). Back in Havana, Poey embarqued on a 
frustrating quest for local data and public subsidies to establish an observatory; which he ended 
up self-funding briefly in his house. In 1856, the Spanish government appointed him to found the 
Observatorio Físico-Meteórico (Physical-Meteoric Observatory) of Havana; yet, the same 
government ceased him a few years later, and he moved abroad which slowed the development 
of meteorology on the island. Overall, the emerging discipline began to list chronologically the 
path and strength of hurricanes versus their timing; damages to life and property, technological 
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changes for storm measurement; without implications for disaster management or planning. 
Those records became the preferred format to remember hurricanes; they provide rustic, 
imprecise yet valuable glimpses to the extreme exposure of the Circum-Caribbean region. Yet, 
those records disregarded root causes of vulnerability or resilience, most affected or unscathed 
groups, tensions during relief and reconstruction. A grave flaw of this recordkeeping is that it 
built generic memories of hurricane impacts, when in fact different groups had diverse levels of 
resilience or vulnerability. Citizens appeared as a block, which hid injustice and distorted the 
information that leaders and policy-makers used; ultimately, generic accounts blurred the need 
for structural changes. 
 
The influence of Catholicism was present even in early meteorology, with the observatory 
established in 1857 at the Jesuit Real Colegio de Belén, Havana. In 1860, the Observatorio 
Físico-Meteórico was moved to the Royal Economic Society and later relocated to the 
Universidad de La Habana (Lines Escardo, 1998). In 1870, the Catalan Jesuit priest and 
meteorologist Benito Viñes Martorell (1837-1893) took over the decaying Belén Meteorological 
Observatory. Following the contemporary scientific emphasis on data that could be quantified or 
observed, he developed influential theories known as ‘The Laws of Viñes’ and other publications 
(Benito Viñes Martorell, 1877; Benito  Viñes Martorell, 1877; Viñes Martorell, 1877-78, 1886, 
1894). By 1873, he had established the first hurricane warning system in the world, integrating 
data sent by hundreds of volunteer observers on ships and on the ground, and announcing storms 
to neighboring islands via telegraph and to isolated Cuban villages via a “pony express” service 
(Arsenault, 2005). In 1875, Viñes´ accurate and free of charge forecast of an impending storm 





worldwide; and the U.S. government contracted to receive his daily cable reports to improve its 
precarious meteorological service. Viñes became a world authority on weather forecasting and 
his theories remained intact until WWII, when new technology enabled their refinement. His 
presentations at the Royal Academy of Medical, Physical and Natural Sciences of Havana 
included regional cutting-edge data, field observations and prognostics. Viñes first visited Puerto 
Rico months after hurricane San Felipe I, which made landfall on Sept. 13, 1876. He 
disembarqued in Mayagüez, where the hurricane had left; and he went on to study the vortex 
track (Lines Escardo, 1998). Next, he gave lectures, conducted detailed field research and 
worked on establishing an observatory in San Juan. His second and last visit was in 1882; he 
supervised the installation of the Observatorio del Colegio de los Jesuitas
81
 and trained assistants 
in the use of state of the art instruments. His goals were to refine data collection to forecast 
storms, distribute it locally to diminish losses and send it by cable to his observatory in Havana 
to build comparative regional knowledge. Yet, his observatory lasted four years only; Jesuits 
were expelled from Puerto Rico for political reasons and his instruments were shipped to a Jesuit 
school in Quito, Ecuador (López de Santa Anna, 1958). By 1899, his warning system remained 
mainly funded by private sources, such as insurance companies, merchant associations and 
shipping concerns; which reveals multinational governmental disengagement to protect citizens 
from storms (Arsenault, 2005). A day before San Ciriaco made landfall, marine flag signals for 
ships were ordered at Aguadilla, Arecibo, Arroyo, Fajardo, Humacao, Mayagüez, Ponce and San 
Juan (E.B Garriott, 1899). Those belated and meager precautions reconfirm the raw state of 
meteorology and warning, key components of disaster management, leaving Puerto Rico 
unprepared for a devastating storm. 
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V.5 The 1867 San Narciso hurricane-seismic crisis: flawed relief, Spanish decline 
Disaster management emergence and the value of San Ciriaco relief implemented by Americans 
are best understood vis-à-vis a baseline, the San Narciso hurricane-seismic crisis; which is the 
worst preceding emergency handled by Spanish colonial administrators; poorly recorded and 
understudied, but revealing. It took place in 1867, after a drought that affected crops, several 
storms (NOAA/AOML, n.a.), the devastating landfall of hurricane San Narciso
82





 and a large tsunami
84
 20 days later, and aftershocks that lasted roughly six 
months and worsened landslides and destruction. Interim Governor Lieutenant General José M. 
Marchesi y Oleaga wrote to the Ministerio de Ultramar (Ministry of Overseas): 
“Your Excellence Sr.: A terrible incident is filling with horror and desolation the unlucky 
inhabitants of this Island, barely recovered from the painful impression caused by the last 
hurricane. The [earthquake] shock was so energetic and terrible that the building of the Royal 
Fortress [La Fortaleza] in which I live, and that is perhaps the most solid in town, moved like a 
boat agitated by a thick sea, crashing furniture among themselves and balancing the walls with 
incredible violence. Immediately I threw myself into the street and I traversed the entire town, 
the most heartbreaking spectacle was offered to my sight. Men and women were on the streets 
and squares down on their knees begging with screams for divine clemency, while the earth, 
without ceasing its tremors agitated buildings, which threatened every instant to bury us under 
their ruins” (Marchesi y Oleaga 1867, slide a). 
 
The epicenter was located between Puerto Rico and St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands; thus, eastern 
Puerto Rico was most affected. However, reports from San Juan mentioned residents leaving 
town due to the extensive destruction of homes, infrastructure, official and religious buildings. In 
the south, the churches of Coamo, Gurabo and Juncos were rendered unusable; the church of 
Guayama was wrecked and its roof collapsed. Crevices opened in the countryside and nearly all 
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plantation smoke stacks were ruined (P. G. Miller, 1922; United States Geological Service, n.a.). 
Most of the buildings reported as damaged were made out of masonry or brick, expensive 
materials resistant to storms and hurricanes, unlike formal but flexible wood-framed housing or 
precarious bohíos. Yet, sturdy buildings could not withstand elastic demands posed by seisms, 
resulting in life-threatening collapses and weakening of scarce public institutions, infrastructure 
and services. I could not find parameters of human and economic losses but, in sum, a complex 
emergency took place; the unlikely worst case scenario of multi-hazard exposure happened in 
less than a month. People and the built environment were unprepared to deal almost 





 Century, the Spanish crown provided tax relief and other privileges in response to 
disasters, although relief was conceived of as a responsibility of the Church and charity 
(Schwartz, 2015). By the 18
th
 century, municipalities were the first line of relief providers in the 
Spanish Caribbean colonies (Johnson, 2005), given the asymmetry and disconnection between 
local institutions and either the distant administrators in Madrid or the alien insular governments. 
In the late 19
th
 century, handling disasters was a training-ground for local politicians; it promoted 
action and autonomy although plagued by structural biases and mainly centered on a posteriori 
patchy practices. The crises had become vehicles of municipal communication with the higher 
powers, including the metropolis, to negotiate support and power correlations (Schwartz, 2005). 
Effective or not, the municipalities were in place and the Spanish government was supposed to 
undertake at least reactive measures to assist them during critical situations. Second in the line of 





deserved help. Third were sporadic charity actions by wealthy citizens, whom by discursively 
naturalizing injustice often felt no duty to engage, and less so promote redistributive policies. In 
other words, the main assumptions of the roles of governments and citizens were that the island 
government and particularly the Spanish Crown should not intervene in what were understood as 
local natural crisis or God’s wrath towards sinful people. Municipalities had to undertake relief 
and reconstruction to compensate for governmental disengagement; whilst religious entities and 
charitable citizens could engage and impose their prejudices without oversee or accountability. 
Citizens had no right to relief provision, decisive for survival. 
 
The 1867 crisis revealed the Spanish colonial disconnection from local needs and lack of 
sensitivity during an extreme catastrophe. It also exposed that its extractive model enabled multi-
hazard vulnerability of the poor, who constituted the majority; and endangered even the 
prosperity of organized Creoles, which in political terms was more evidently menacing to the 
Crown. Some of them launched liberal reforms, pro-independence debates and associations since 
the 1820s; despite threats of repression, jail, exile or death. After losing several territories in the 
Americas, during 1865, the Crown established in Madrid a Junta Informativa de Reformas de 
Ultramar (Overseas Informative Reform Board) to collect and vote complaints from colonial 
representatives, as a mechanism to mitigate increasing discontent. Yet, the majority of men on 
the Board were Spanish-born delegates, who boycotted most measures suggested by colonial 
delegates, including Puerto Rican Creoles (Moscoso, 2003). Back on the island, delegates 
discussed their failed efforts with their peers, which ignited a call for armed rebellion led by Dr. 
Ramón Emeterio Betances and Segundo Ruiz Belvis. In 1867, the Crown representatives did not 





the militias continued their repressive policing. To make matters worse, in June, the Governor 
ordered the arrest of prominent liberals under the excuse of a soldier mutiny. Although they were 
subsequently released by popular demand, the incident left a bitter imprint. 
 
Just a few months later, the disasters left many Creole planters and merchants broke, frustrated 
and unable to pay their municipal taxes. Consequently, most municipalities were unable to pay 
their contributions to the island's treasury and launch successful post-disaster actions, which 
worsened human suffering and economic misfortune. A new and disaster-inexperienced 
Governor arrived in December, General Julián Juan Pavía Lacy. Adding insult to injury, Pavía 
demanded overdue municipal payments due to increasing expenses, which stirred protests; even 
some Spanish officials described Puerto Rico as an agonizing territory (Schwartz, 1992). He also 
demanded taxes and payments for the right to import goods for consumption. Both ideas were 
eliminated later; yet, tension remained on the air. I found no data concerning disaster relief, 
possibly because it was not systematized or records have been lost. 
 
Lack of planning and investment was evident even for a royal commission soon established to 
investigate the calamity. According to them, only about 3 percent of government expenditures in 
the preceding decade financed public works or infrastructure that would have minimized 
calamities. Miguel de Campo, a Spanish official, argued that lack of public utility works 
reinforced the Creoles’ perception of the administration as immoral, hostile and foreign. Such 
negative perception strengthened the Creoles’ reluctance to pay taxes for purposes unrelated to 
their needs (Schwartz, 1992). Also, it weakened their feeble loyalty, given the Spaniards 





ambitions. Ample grass-roots dissatisfaction was emerging also. Thousands of unemployed rural 
and urban workers could die of starvation, engage so-called subversives of the public order, or 
challenge norms and legislation that guarded private property and the better-off (Schwartz, 
1992). In that light, deplorable post-disaster conditions were a catalyzer to fight colonialism; it 
was time to save the regime and its prestige. For José Lianhes, an official writing to the Board of 
Public Works, policy changes should comprise extensive reconstruction of bridges, docks, roads 
and public services to: 
“demonstrate clearly to the country the interest which the government takes in it, leaving as 
permanent proof works that contribute to the wealth and well-being of its inhabitants” 
(Schwartz, 1992, p. 318). 
 
In September of 1868, before reconstruction policies were decided and implemented, the failed 
insurrection of the Grito de Lares (The Cry of Lares
85
) was launched in the highlands. The 
disaster crisis has been interpreted as an extra motivation to coalesce around a pro-independence 
armed struggle (Schwartz, 1992). Such claim needs further research, which could finally emerge 
after more than a century in which the chief historical narratives followed the seminal although 




After the Grito de Lares, the Spanish regime alternated political concessions and repression, and 
implemented new projects with a high degree of variability; all of which are difficult to correlate 
exactly to the disasters crisis, local political upheaval, changes in Spain or even the mood of the 
Governor in turn. For example, early in 1869, Governor José Laureano Sanz y Posse (1868-
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 The latter underreported the insurrection, popular support and subsequent skirmishes in places such as Utuado, 






1870) dictated a General Amnesty which saved the lives of Grito de Lares prisoners, granted 
their liberation and right to exile
87
. Also, the island obtained more political autonomy; Puerto 
Ricans regained the right to elect representatives to the Spanish Courts, and political parties were 
allowed, which resulted in the formal establishment of the Partido Conservador and Partido 
Liberal-Reformista (Conservative and Liberal-Reformist parties respectively). Free press and the 
right to meetings were granted, under light censorship. The Civil Guard was created whilst the 
feared militias were abolished in 1874. Infrastructure repairs and reconstruction included new 
metal bridges over the Portugués River in Ponce, the Yagüez River in Mayagüez, the Cagüitas 
River in Caguas; rebuilding city halls in several municipalities, and investment in the telegraph 
and mail systems (Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades, 2010).Yet, on his second term, 
Gov. Sanz y Posse (1874- 1875) eliminated the first article of the Spanish Constitution, which 
granted the individual rights of subjects; banned political associations, and reinforced tight 
censorship. He continued constructing highways and bridges, and rebuilding earthquake-struck 
churches. Under the brief rule of Gov. Romualdo Palacios González (1887), a commission 
proposed to cease the sugar export rights of Creoles, and declare exclusive shipping rights 
between Spain and the overseas colonies. Moreover, his persecution of the Autonomist Party 
members was so extreme that 1887 was known as ‘the terrible year’. Next Governor, Juan 
Contreras Martínez (1887-1888), reestablished guarantees of personal rights, put in effect the 
Regular Courts and relocated the Civil Guard (Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades, 
2010). The following Governor though, Pedro Ruiz Dana (1888-1890), increased censorship 
through the Ley de Imprenta (Print Law), which closed autonomists press such as El Agente  
(Cortes Zavala, 1997) and infuriated local leaders. Thus, after the San Narciso hurricane-seismic 
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crisis, the political scene was a roller-coaster for decades. Yet, none of the historical records 
consulted points to changes in the understanding of disasters as a governmental responsibility 
that required sustained investment and planning, to decrease hurricane vulnerability. The implicit 
message was that, severe destruction and political changes aside, the regime considered 
unnecessary to shift the equation of resource extraction towards proactive and systematic forms 
of planning and investment that protected the survival of Puerto Ricans as a basic right. 
 
Tellingly, two years before the U.S. invasion, the pro-independence and liberal Ponce Press 
organized a literary contest, won by the novel ‘Huracán. Leyenda Puertorriqueña’ (Hurricane. 
Puerto Rican Legend) (del Toro Soler, 1897). It was based on the folktale of Roberto Cofresí, a 
mythical southern Mulatto pirate active during the turn of the 18
th
 century; he resisted tight 
Spanish vigilance and iterative storm fury at sea, to the point of being considered a hurricane 
himself. According to the fable and the novel, Cofresí was caught and killed; yet, he became a 
popular emancipatory symbol. In other words, pro-independence journalists and intellectuals 
backed a narrative of respect to a local confronting Spain and hurricanes, the barriers impeding 
Puerto Rico to become a nation.  
 
The Spanish-American war erupted in 1898; predictably, few skirmishes broke in Puerto Rico to 
express alliance with the Spaniards and rejection to the Americans. Lay citizens and 
organizations expressed fear, disorganization but also approval of the U.S., which an American 
military correspondent attested: 
“We went to Porto Rico expecting battles. We arrived there and were invited to receptions. It 
was a somewhat incongruous situation, with a side which savored of the opera house. Such of 
our enemies had been stationed in the vicinity of our landing, made a hasty and undignified exit, 





and called down the blessings of Heaven upon our heads. Like all invading armies, we had 
carried with us a very large spirit of belligerency. We were much puzzled to know what to do 
with it when we got to Porto Rico”(Gardner Robinson, 1899, p.47). 
 
 
Fig. 26 "Please capture our town next"  
 
In this satire cartoon, Puerto Ricans welcome the invading army. The U.S. flag ascends, the Spanish flag descends, 
weapons are shot to celebrate; a hospitable procession is led by the mayor and officials wearing their regalia, and 
women in Spanish-like attire bringing gifts. City gate and walls show pleas: "Please capture our town next", “Don’t 
pass us by”, “This is our early Fall opening” (n.a. circa 1900 in EEPR 2011). 
  
The newcomers’ presence embodied contrasting meanings (Meléndez, 1993; Quintero, 1986; 
Silvestrini & Luque, 1991). Some locals saw it as a promising inclusion into the idealized, 
enlightened first democracy of the New World -the ‘Colossus of the North’- which would cut 
ties with oppressive Spaniards, replenish the war-stressed economy, generously open markets 
and launch progress. For others, it was a step towards independence. According to a third 
viewpoint, a new brand of colonialism was unfolding. After the Treaty of Paris, the renamed 






currency, customs administration, military service and defense, migration, citizenship, postal 
system, communications, voting rights, foreign affairs, commerce and taxation. Months later, 
San Ciriaco would pose extreme demands on such unstable socio-political landscape. 
 
V.6. San Ciriaco relief and incipient policy trends 
San Ciriaco happened at a historical turning point. It was a challenge to launch relief and speed 
up policy-making against a background of new and inexperienced authorities, multifaceted 
political tensions, cash-depleted Creoles and municipalities, meager U.S. federal engagement, 
entrenched poverty and widespread destruction, religion and superstitions trumpeting very 
incipient science and knowledge. 
 
For untested Americans, the hurricane also meant differentiated impacts; none died and their 
main losses were replaceable military equipment or facilities, some obtained from Spain. Yet, it 
was a shocking event, as attested by the San Juan librarian: 
“Whoever has witnessed the awful magnificence of what the primitive inhabitants of the West 
Indian island called Ou-ra-can will never forget the sense of his own utter nothingness and 
absolute helplessness. With the winds rushing at the rate of 65 or more miles an hour, amid the 
roar of waves lashed into furious rolling mountains of water, the incessant flash of lightning, the 










Spared from mourning, they had to launch efficient relief that confirmed to Porto Ricans the 
benefits of being under the wings of an enlightened and generous civilization (Van Hoff 1899 in 
(Schwartz, 1992). And relief came via military supplies, War Department funds; and food, 
clothing and monetary donations gathered in the U.S. from appeals made to mayors of cities with 
more than 150,000 inhabitants, charitable committees, private businesses and general public 
(Schwartz, 1992). 
 
Yet, relief came with strings attached. In the history of U.S. disaster relief, two lasting precedents 
were set before the Civil War; general Congress bills were more successful if presented as 
"disaster narratives" of sudden, unpredictable losses for which claimants were morally 
blameless; and they were often administered through temporary federal bureaucracies located 
within the executive -particularly the War Department- (Landis, 2005). In the late nineteenth 
century, relief measures started to increase and there were several initiatives to expand in scope. 
Yet, they were essentially minimal improvised actions underpinned by three assumptions: 1) 
Images of San Ciriaco damages inflicted upon U.S. citizens and property are scarce, in comparison to those 






federal involvement in state and local affairs had to be limited, locals were to provide for 
themselves; 2) charity and entrepreneurial entities were endorsed to undertake relief and 
reconstruction; 3) aid was stigmatized as vagrancy indulgence, recipients had to earn it. Those 
assumptions were sustained by federal politicians but also by local officials. For example, after 
the devastating fire of 1871, Chicago officials questioned the little federal assistance offered as 
interventionist. Following droughts in Texas during 1887, President Grover Cleveland vetoed 
$10,000 for relief arguing that the Constitution did not contemplate the use of public funds to 
pamper charitable and benevolent sentiments. After the 1889 Johnston Floods in Pennsylvania, 
President Benjamin Harrison did not offer a governmental compromise; instead, he made a 
modest public plea for charitable donations to the newly created American Red Cross, in charge 
of relief (Barry, 1998; McClure, 2011). The Army stepped in only in very large disasters, if local 
authorities and relief organizations lacked means and capacity (Foster, 1983). 
 
When San Ciriaco struck, the military government was building links with local authorities and 
elites who were cash strapped, and there were no U.S. or local emergency organizations. Relief 
became a top-down army operation led by Gov. Davis, who offered biased help to the 
municipalities, elite creoles and impoverished masses. Davis endorsed discriminatory 
frameworks, like many of his compatriots and prior travelers to the island. Those frameworks 
shared notions of welfare as advanced by reformers and planners of the Progressive Era, and also 
shared similarities with those supported by Spaniards and Creoles. The combined approach of 
protectionist or benevolent paternalism, with old and novel social hierarchies essentially targeted 





during disaster relief, deprecating and bigot assertions emerged and endorsed a tight disciplinary 




, the government issued the first of several General Orders denying or 
conditioning relief to robust and unemployed men unwilling to work in cleaning and 
reconstruction tasks demanded by the military inspector in charge of the area (Aráez y Fernando 
1905 in (Santiago Caraballo, 2000). Gov. Davis appointed Major John Van Hoff as relief 
director and president of the newly created San Juan Charity Board. Under the motto of “No one 
shall die of starvation, and no able-bodied man shall eat the bread of idleness” (Schwartz, 1992, 
p.328); the Board became a reference for boards in each town, an advisory board on insular 
policies and military inspection zones that covered the island, all part of Davis’ improvised relief 
plan. Such makeshift institutional setup multiplied and strengthened the logic of martial relief 
concerning the poor, as evident in a message to the Charity Board by Eben Swift, military 
division inspector of Humacao: 
"the whole barefoot population is indigent; that is, they are idle, shiftless, without ambition, and 
will not work except under the prospect of starvation. This does not mean that they ought to be 
fed" (Schwartz, 1992, p.313). 
 
Davis also requested the cooperation of municipal administrations, which the war and occupation 
left broke, politically at odds and unprepared for a sweeping disaster. After providing damage 
reports, municipal demands included tax breaks, immediate relief donations, long-term 
reconstruction funds or loans, crop insurance and free trade restrictions with the U.S. Davis and 
the Board approved tax breaks to municipalities but also to planters and entrepreneurs, even if 












Fig.29 “A            ” 
Photography and post mail were gaining wide use around San Ciriaco, thus these black and white/hand-painted 
images (postcard on top, photo below) illustrate the contrast between powerful Americans and disenfranchised Porto 
Ricans of color. Top, unhappy barefoot  ‘native’ children against exuberant vegetation are cast powerless, the title 
centers on their dire needs (Waldrop Photographic Co., n.d.-b). Below, properly equipped white male military rulers 





Concomitantly, merchants and planters claimed that universal relief provision would prompt a 
costly and unstable supply of labor or beggars. Davis, Van Hoff and other officials agreed. 
Therefore, the relief scheme essentially appointed planters to distribute food among their 
workers, with few obligations including a tight grip so that the aid would not create vagabonds. 
Coffee planters used more that scheme than sugar planters. Their battered plantations took longer 
to recover, delaying their investment returns; profits had reduced in the previous years and 
markets contracted as Spain stopped buying. Thus, the relief program was beneficial even if it 
lasted only a year (Schwartz, 1992). Yet, it co-opted the planters’ thinking of potential 
relationships with the new government and created reliance on foreign capital. Ultimately, 
Americans did not favor Puerto Rican coffee over Hawaiian or Latin American cheaper offers; 
such choice sent the industry and highlands into a downward spiral and increased vulnerability 
during the next disasters. In the interim, mortgage laws favoring local farmers were suspended, 
sugar became the main crop, and increasing competition from American capital altered the 
equation of power and territorial decision-making. Cane benefited from flood deposits, whilst 
ruined mills gave way to hefty modern ones, owned by large U.S. corporations; soon, sugar 
Creole planters were displaced. 
 
Unsurprisingly, San Ciriaco further propelled widespread diseases due to poor healthcare, 
working and living conditions, including malaria, uncinariasis-caused anemia, smallpox, enteritis 
- dysentery, diarrhea, and typhoid fever-, tuberculosis and anemia (Espinosa, 2000). The 
hurricane deluge, housing and field destruction facilitated excellent breeding grounds for 
sickening pests, including mosquitoes. Consequently, malaria bouts escalated even further 





the Medical Corps of the U.S. Army, was puzzled by the extreme ¨debilitating condition of the 
jíbaros¨ (Espinosa, 2000, p.10); highlanders were matching in record numbers the depictions of 
islanders being lazy, prone to napping, eluding efforts, and dying massively. Ashford obtained 
permission and war tents to open a hospital in Ponce; within months, he found out that it was 
uncinariasis-caused anemia, a parasitic disease which caused lethargy and deaths considered 
natural (Ashford, 1934). San Ciriaco left ubiquitous damp shady soils, ideal for hookworm to 
grow until it pierced the skin of barefoot pedestrians, reached their intestines through the 
bloodstream or lymph, and weakened them to death. Ashford’s rural fieldwork, clinics and 
efforts in the Puerto Rican Commission for the Study and Treatment of Anemia transformed the 
disease cure worldwide. Yet, with slow improvements on public health, it took decades to 
eradicate it on the island and dismiss the associated detrimental stereotype of laziness of the 
poor. One year after San Ciriaco, its disjointed health impacts due to class were summarized in a 
report about the exponential death rate in Ponce: 
“The class of people among whom this high mortality exists are the lower classes. The better 
classes have not furnished more than their normal quota, and these from the usual causes” (King, 
2006 (1900), p.39). 
 
Meanwhile, U.S. Congress discussions were addressing substantive controversies concerning the 
island; it was unclear if they were legislating for U.S. citizens to begin with. On December 15, 
1899, the Committee on Pacific Islands and Porto Rico was established, with Senator Joseph 
Foraker (R-Ohio) as chair. Contentious post-disaster actions emerged framed by his revealing 
statement that Porto Rico was not the U.S. or a part of it, but a belonging. For example, since 
direct taxation was impossible given the crisis, Foraker envisioned a bill according to which 





governmental bonds payable as soon as prosperity flourished again in the promising possession. 
Senator Edmund Pettus (D-Alabama) opposed the bill because it put the U.S.: 
“in the unseemly attitude of generously relieving the sufferings of some of its citizens... and then 
taxing those people to get back a generous donation. That is a thing which this government never 
did before and I hope Senators will not allow such thing to be done. It is illegal and hardly 
decent” (Congressional Record 1900 in R. Fernández, 1996, p.1).  
 
The decision was to follow Pettus’ advice, and eventually return 2 million dollars from taxes 
generated on the island since occupation (Schwartz, 1992). Though insufficient to palliate the 
crisis, part of those funds went to infrastructure repairs, a key activity that also validated ‘aid’ to 
those willing and able to earn it the hard way. 
 
On the ground, injustices stemming from relief provision included rotting food that was finally 
condemned, as Dr. King stated. More gravely, workers, the unemployed and poor in general -
although saved from immediate famine and death- were placed in a dreadful dependency at a 
time of dire need, with no options but migration. Coastal towns, mainly San Juan after its 
primacy validation over Ponce, received impoverished migrants who patched their housing needs 
creating slums. The first organized exodus of Puerto Rican peasants left for Hawaii, bearing 
conditions similar to indentured labor; others went to Cuba, Ecuador and the Dominican 
Republic (I. Fernández, 2000). Davis successor was Gov. Charles Herbert Allen (1900-1901), 
who would soon rule a vast sugar empire based on his tainted Puerto Rican investments and 
connections
88
. He wrote on his Annual Report: 
“These islanders are essentially a home-loving people, and are remarkably attached to their 
native land. But particularly since the hurricane of San Ciriaco some of the poorer classes have 
found it difficult to procure the means of a livelihood…Many of them would prefer to remain in 
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idleness until someone solicited their services. A few potatoes and bananas will sustain life, and 
clothing is a luxury in this climate. In this state of affairs the emigration agent found an excellent 
field for his enterprise. He penetrated the rural districts and offered golden inducements to these 
simple folk to travel and see foreign lands. Laborers are wanted in Hawaii to work in the sugar 
fields and in Cuba for the iron mines” (Allen 1901 in Martinez, 1984, p.61). 
 
Contrastingly, on July 19th of 1900, the newspaper La Correspondencia de Puerto Rico 
published a critical view on migration, and a call to the U.S. authorities: 
“What are the reasons behind the emigration that has been going on in Puerto Rico for several 
months?...Puerto Rican agriculturists have been forced to emigrate as a result of the damages 
caused by the August 8th hurricane, the suspension of the mortgage laws that favored the native 
farmer and the increasing competition from American capital now taking hold of existing 
industries and exploiting the island's natural resources…Wise governments prevent emigration 
at all costs since it usually causes a country's ruin. There is still time to adopt sound economic 
measures that will save Puerto Rico” (Martinez, 1984, p.62). 
 
In the following decades, particularly after disasters or political repression, the migratory 
survival strategy would be repeated as an improvised action by citizens, until it became massive 
and organized by the Commonwealth government in the 1950s. Overall, the incipient actions by 
the new rulers, particularly those concerning the neediest ones, implied a pathetic vision of what 
constituted development and how to achieve it. 
 
In a nutshell, San Ciriaco was instrumental to weaken the option of independence and laid the 
ground for another form of underdevelopment. On the one hand, politicians in Washington were 
convinced to keep the recently acquired colony, based on its strategic location and the promising 
profitability of sugar. Persuasive documentation and personal testimonies -such as the one 
provided by Gov. Davis in congressional debates- strengthened the decision to reject 
independence. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine most Puerto Ricans opting for 





hurricane, they were unable to launch a successful insurrection against a powerful army, had they 
wanted to. Urgent priorities met lack of choices: the Creole elites needed capital and a new 
market to resurrect their businesses, the poor needed food and clothes to survive, and returning to 
oppressive Spanish domination was unimaginable. Hence, those islanders in a position to 
negotiate rapidly tried to make the most out of the impasse, without confronting U.S. rule. After 
talks, on April 12, 1900, Washington responded with the Foraker Act, which conceded Puerto 
Ricans some control over a civilian government, an elected House of Representatives, a judicial 
system shadowing the American one and a non-voting member of U.S. Congress. Puerto Rico 




Through San Ciriaco, disaster management in Puerto Rico can be evaluated as essentially non-
existent. Systematic local knowledge construction had started a few months before, with the 
establishment of the Weather Bureau. Moreover, Gov. Davis was responsible for a post-
hurricane report that launched official secular disaster evaluations and policy-recommendations. 
Both changes deserve recognition for advancing one meaningful facet of disaster management; 
but they were value laden in ways that would be limiting. They were influenced by military aims 
and procedures –including bellicosity, secrecy and undemocratic decision-making- and by the 
contemporary ethos of meteorological recordkeeping, meaning generic listing of casualties and 
damages, and storm descriptions with emerging technology. In other words, this time was vital 





hurricanes, understand their causes and propose actions. Those foundations would solidly make 
their way well into the mid 20
th
 century, as my dissertation shows. 
 
Throughout the studied time period, it is possible to establish the correlation between social 
hierarchy and disaster vulnerability, despite generalized limited technical knowledge, awareness 
and means of communication. During the deadliest hurricane recorded in Puerto Rico, there were 
no American casualties and their material losses were minimal. Also, when arguing a year later 
that hurricane-ravaged Ponce had an epidemic death rate without the epidemic, Assistant 
Surgeon of the U.S. Marine-Hospital Dr. King explained that the poor were the ones dying 
massively. Death rates of higher income groups remained unchanged and were attributed to 
customary causes. Thus, there was nothing ‘natural’ about the dissimilar impacts of San Ciriaco 
on diverse social groups. Differences in selective vulnerability were caused by purposive lack of 
preventive planning and investment in hard and soft infrastructure
89
 on the one hand; and on the 
other hand, the combined effects of permanent precariousness -present in working conditions, 
healthcare, food security and education for example-, and harmful side effects of hurricane relief. 
Selective disaster vulnerability was engrained in the Spanish legacy of planning decisions that 
defined urban life, as even Spaniard officials criticized post-San Narciso. Examples were 
locating settlements on the coast, acceptance of ‘uneven geographical development’ as the 
standard of urban growth, implementation of the ‘Leyes de Indias’, plans and modern technology 
only in central elitist areas, simultaneous occupation of risk-prone areas by the poor due to 
exclusionary land markets, investment in infrastructure and service provisions just for the upper 
echelons and extraction of exports, extremely precarious housing, and insecure land tenure. Pre-
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Columbian empirical knowledge and superstitions concerning hurricanes seemed to have been 
systematically dismantled during the Spanish colony. I could not find evidence of the 
contemporary secular popular superstitions, as religion had a profound influence. Catholic 
practices included calling hurricanes depending on the corresponding saint day, preventive 
processions, using churches as shelters, praying for divine protection, using objects deemed as 
blessed to ward off storms, and public discourses of religious leaders explaining disasters as 
God’s punishment for sins. 
 
Organized disaster relief in Puerto Rico saw its infancy in the turn of the 20
th
 century. As my 
research of the 1967 San Narciso hurricane-seismic crisis demonstrated, Spain left an extremely 
crude form of reactive, improvised disaster relief that completely dismissed the survival of 
Puerto Ricans as a basic right, and neglected hurricanes as a governmental responsibility 
demanding systematic investment and planning to increase resilience. Compared to that baseline, 
the highly questionable military relief scheme suddenly organized and implemented by Gov. 
Davis was an improvement; it averted an even worse humanitarian catastrophe, it provided some 
benefits to the local elites and set the island for an economic transition instead of a total collapse. 
For the first time, the highest figure of governmental authority stepped up to a challenge usually 
left for the municipal scale, in which religious authorities, volunteering groups and individuals 
had gained influence by offering short-term, biased, unaccountable charity. 
 
 
In the next chapter, I will assess long-term changes made by the U.S. administrators concerning 





transitional background to it. Months after San Ciriaco, Creole intellectual Manuel Fernández 
Juncos told Gov. Allen: 
“the coffee agriculture is desperate, the weakest jornaleros [farmers] succumb of starvation and 
misery, and the ones that still have some spirit flee for the first time from their cherished land, 
threatened by hunger” (Fernández Juncos 1901 in Espinosa, 2000, p.3). 
 
During the initial years of American occupation, living conditions declined for multiple reasons 
including the Spanish neglect legacy, costs of the Spanish-American War, San Ciriaco impacts, 
U.S. inexperience as an imperial power (Espinosa, 2000), and changes in the socio-economic 
structure that benefited Americans at the expense of hurting Puerto Ricans. Consistently, U.S. 
authorities impugned overpopulation -not unequal power relations- for unemployment and 
precarious housing, healthcare, nutrition, and education. Their public policy initiatives were 
shaped by such assumption, planning included although not necessarily executed under that 
name. Soon, elite creoles were increasingly disenchanted with the new regime, even if they were 
spared from the worse sufferings. Almost a decade after San Ciriaco and despite censorship, such 
frustration was captured in political satire cartoons by Mario Brau de Zuzuárregui, wealthy and 








By the late 1920s, U.S. detachment from the development of Puerto Rico in tandem with 
exploitative policies had cemented inequality, poverty, vulnerability and turmoil. Hurricanes San 
Felipe (1928) and San Ciprián (1932) harshly exposed the fault lines of this lopsided 
relationship. Besides, pitiable federal relief response would add to the bonfire of economic, 








Fig.30 “I           ” Fig.31 “Y  k           ” 
 
Uncle Sam violently closes the mouth of politician 
Luis Muñoz Rivera (father of future Governor Luis 
Muñoz Marín), silencing his cry for independence 
(Brau 1915). 
 
In front of the U.S. Bureau of Insular Affairs, Uncle Sam is 
comfortably seated. By his side, a guardian mastiff wears a 
collar saying Foraker and a roaring lion nearby wears a collar 
saying Olmsted (current Governor of the island). He severely 
looks down at two leading Puerto Rican politicians; Luis 
Muñoz Rivera and Cayetano Coll y Toste, who speechlessly 
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Chapter N.VI. Hurricane San Felipe (1928): Imperialism by neglect 
 
 
VI.1. A tale of destructive landfall: Characterization of San Felipe 
“¿Qué será de Puerto Rico, cuando pase el temporal
90
? 
San Felipe, San Felipe, ¡Qué tremendo temporal! 
 
What will be of Puerto Rico, when the temporal passes? 
San Felipe, San Felipe, What a tremendous temporal! 
 
 
Rafael Hernández Marín (1892-1965), beloved Puerto Rican composer and musician, 
immortalized San Felipe in those Plena
91
 lyrics, popular until today. His song ‘Temporal’ asks 
what will be of municipalities at risk, such as Arecibo on the north coast towards the west, Aguas 
Buenas and Barranquitas in the central mountain range, Bayamón adjacent to San Juan. 
Ultimately, his concern was the fate of Puerto Rico after the dreadful hurricane landfall on 
September 13
th
, day of Saint Philippus according to the Roman Catholic calendar, in which 
hurricane San Felipe I had made landfall 53 years before. 
 
San Felipe was a Cape Verdean hurricane like San Ciriaco, and it followed a similar path 
although with the highest strength ever registered on the island, Category 5 in the Saffir-Simpson 
Scale. Around 2 pm, the hurricane made landfall near Guayama and Arroyo, in the southeast, 
                                                 
90
 Temporal means bad weather conditions equally associated with hurricanes or storms. 
91
 The grass-roots rhythm Plena emerged in during turn of the 20th century, and served to communicate local 





where pressure reached 931 millibars and winds 160 mph, although eye wall winds might have 
reached 180-200 mph (Fassig, 1928). The San Juan Weather Bureau registered 160 mph winds 
until the anemometer was shattered, the roof collapsed and the building was wrecked. San Felipe 
left by the northwest, close to Aguadilla, at around 10-11 pm. The accompanying deluge lasted 
18 hours in Guayama and 12 hours in San Juan; whilst rainfall in the central mountain region 
reached 30 inches in 48 hours. The Weather Bureau documented San Felipe through 
sophisticated maps and statistical charts, unlike understudied hurricanes and storms of the 
previous three decades. 
 
Fig. 32 San Felipe path, isohyethal curves and river map 
 
This new analytical tool (Fassig, 1928, p.352) mapped the hurricane path, record  rain amounts over El Yunque on 










Fig. 33 San Felipe chart      Fig. 34 San Felipe mapped along storms of the year 
 
Hurricane reports increasingly gathered scientific data about wind velocity and directions, temperature, barometric 
pressure, rainfall amounts, track and timing. Both images by (Fassig, 1928, p.351). 
 
Widespread destruction ensued, yet the worse happened in the path of the eye and strongest part 
of the eye wall. Guayama, Arroyo, and towns on the way north to Naguabo and westward 
became rubble. Casualties amounted to 312, a great progress compared to San Ciriaco. Police 
districts were warned and radio broadcasts provided constant warnings to ships 36 hours in 
advance (Mújica-Baker, n.d. after 1998). Radio, telegraph, telephone, flags, door-to-door police 
and neighbor communications were credited with lowering casualties (Beverley, 1933). Another 
factor could have been the use of churches and chapels as refuges, and rural self-built shelters 
called tormenteras or barracas, according to two documentaries addressing hurricanes (Doniger, 
1958; Molina Casanova, 1988). Tormenteras were small semi-underground structures made out 
of wood, palm thatch or discarded materials reinforced with knots or nails to withstand strong 
winds and rain. Even if cheap and often unsafe, they were unaffordable for destitute peasants
92
. 
Oddly, documents for San Ciriaco do not mention tormenteras blurring their origins until San 
Felipe, and there is no subsequent research on their effectiveness. 
                                                 
92
 One of the documentaries reenacts a scene of a poor family welcoming their even poorer neighbors to survive San 





Fig. 35 Drawing and photograph of a tormentera or barraca 
  
A large tormentera fitted people, pets, some livestock and a few belongings, images by (DIVEDCO, 1965, p.43) 
p.43. (Gingerich, 1946-1948). It became temporary shelter when the house or bohío was destroyed. 
 
Fig. 36 Initial news of hurricane damage on the island and the U.S. spread alarmingly 
 
This Mid-West newspaper cover attributed the storm to God’s rage, image by (The Omaha Bee-News, 1928). 
 
Three days later, President Calvin Coolidge (1923-1929) called all executive departments to 
cooperate, appointed the American National Red Cross for relief, and published an appeal to the 
nation: 
“An overwhelming disaster has overtaken our fellow-citizens in Porto Rico and the Virgin 





available, but several hundred thousand are known to be homeless and in instant need of food, 
shelter and emergency relief. Governor Towner of Porto Rico has appealed for immediate aid… 
As President of the United States and as President of the American Red Cross, I am therefore 
urging our people to contribute promptly and most generously, so that sufficient funds may be 
received to alleviate the suffering among so many thousands” (Coolidge, 1928). 
 
Coolidge was correct, devastation was widespread (American Red Cross, 1929; Miner Solá, 
1996; Schwartz, 2005). Preliminary property losses reached almost U$ 4 million, twice the 
island’s annual budget. Subsequent estimates of urban losses reached U$ 6,242,790, less than 
one tenth of rural losses according to the Central Survey Committee created by Gov. Horace 
Mann Towner to evaluate the situation. Later, property damages were estimated at $50 million, 
$641 million 2011 USD (Mújica-Baker, n.d. after 1998), which does not include precarious 
housing losses. Even modern and large American sugar mills became rubble and their harvest 
was badly affected; like tobacco, citrus and coconuts; and urban and forest vegetation (C. G. 
Bates, 1930; C. Z. Bates, 1929). Coffee ruin was worse; more than half of the plantations were 
destroyed. Puerto Rico, formerly a top producer of high quality coffee, became an importer to 
satisfy local consumption and the industry never recovered. Since San Ciriaco, planters faced 
heavy mortgages and unstable sales; in 1928 though, they finally expected a promising crop and 
had borrowed on it to pay for labor. Thus, losing that harvest meant bankruptcy; some planters 
became destitute and had to ask for food donations. Even worse was the situation of rural 
workers who subsisted on a meager pay, could not save cash reserves for emergencies and had 
been buying on credit from overpriced local stores to pay after the harvest. Moreover, according 
to the Department of Education, 2,308 schools out of 4,198 were wrecked or damaged; public 
buildings, bridges and roads were in a state of dismay and the bonds with which they had been 
funded were still outstanding (American Red Cross, 1929). Most poor housing, likened by 





40,000 homes had to be rebuilt for the 250,000 rural homeless; when adding urban losses, almost 
a third of the 1.5 million Puerto Ricans was homeless; relief became vital for survival: 
“The cabins of the poor [bohíos] were everywhere damaged or destroyed. With the winter 
prospect of employment reduced to a fraction of the customary, with no reserves of cash or 
credit left for the purchase of food, clothes, shelter, these people became totally dependent upon 
the available relief funds” (American Red Cross, 1929, p.12). 
 
Senator Hiram Bingham, Chair of the Committee on Territories and Insular Possessions, made a 
tour to advice Congress about relief, months later. To him, San Felipe was: 
“a hurricane of greater intensity than was ever before reached in any West Indian Hurricane we 
know about (R. Fernández, 1996, p.99). 
 
 
Fig. 37 Untitled view of San Felipe damage  
 











Fig. 38 Housing destruction in Guayama 
 
The hurricane razed a concrete and brick house to its foundations, image by (Anonymous, 1928c). 
 
Fig. 39 Housing destruction in Guayama 
 
 
Remnants of roofs and walls made out of wood and tin are scattered among damaged coconuts, another devastated 












































San Felipe tore apart this wooden house from its stilts and left it down a hill, among uprooted trees, another 
destroyed  house and debris, image by (Anonymous, 1928b). 
In a modest urban setting, this engraving (Rafael  Tufiño, 1954?) depicts how San Felipe blows away a 





Fig. 42 ‘        ’                                 H       z   í      w  k               ñ  
 
An Indian-like flying giant blows people, homes, poles and lines into chaos (Rafael  Tufiño, 1954?).  
 































Temporal, temporal,  
What a terrible temporal! 
San Felipe, San Felipe,  
What a terrible temporal! 
 
What will be of Puerto Rico,  
When the temporal passes? 
San Felipe, San Felipe,  
What a tremendous temporal! 
 
What will be of Bayamón, 
When the temporal passes? 
What will be of Barranquitas, 
When the temporal passes? 
 
Temporal, temporal,  
What a tremendous temporal! 
What will be of Aguas Buenas,  
When the temporal passes? 
 
San Felipe, San Felipe,  
What a terrible temporal! 
What will be of Arecibo, 
When the temporal passes? 
 
Temporal, temporal,  








 Fig. 44  A cross formed by a palm tree traversed by a metal pole 
 
This anonymous image has been interpreted as a symbol of Puerto Rico left in 













Contextually, this time period is key; it corresponds to a turbulent era before the most violent 
years on the island. Three decades of U.S. detachment from the development of Puerto Rico and 
extractive policies had cemented inequality, poverty, vulnerability and turmoil; and San Felipe 
exposed the fault lines of this asymmetrical relationship. Original writings reflect that 
information producers were White, wealthy adult men in positions of power, such as U.S. and 
Puerto Rican politicians, relief providers, elite members, and intellectuals. The U.S. Red Cross 
reported its relief provision in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Florida (American Red Cross, 
1929). Also, a Catholic group reported losses in Puerto Rico, St. Thomas, St. Croix; their brief 
relief interventions and benefactors (Redemptorists under the Southern Cross, 1928). The voices 
of marginalized citizens due to gender
93
, class, race, and age remained silenced from entering 
their experiences in the public record, and from shaping policies according to their needs. An 
upper class, top-down view of the event prevails. 
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 A rare testimonial newspaper article in English, by a U.S. woman, narrates hurricane San Ciprián landfall (1932), 





VI.2 San Felipe characterized in multidisciplinary, artistic, Circum-Caribbean, local, 
multi-hazard, multi-storm terms 
The multidisciplinary production of knowledge is very incipient for San Felipe. Compared to San 
Ciriaco, it is less studied as part of other topics or in itself
.
. I found that few disciplines have 
examined it, including forest biology (C. G. Bates, 1930; C. Z. Bates, 1929), meteorology 
(Fassig, 1928) and history (Schwartz, 2005). The latter reviews it in Puerto Rico and Florida 
without comparisons, focusing the discussion on Caribbean hurricanes; which has been useful 
for this research. 
 
Although contemporary artistic works or literary writings were unavailable, San Felipe remained 
relevant decades later. For instance, Ren  Márques’ novel ‘La Víspera del Hombre’ (The Eve of 
Man) won the first price in a contest organized by the Ateneo Puertorriqueño, in 1958. It initially 
unfolds in the highlands months before San Felipe made landfall, and it uses the hurricane crisis 
as a crucial background to represent a love and humanitarian tragedy affecting Puerto Rico 
(Márques, 1959). The novel became standard text for secondary and high-school students. Also, 
the Commonwealth commissioned Master Rafael Tufiño to paint ‘Temporal’ in a mural 
dedicated to Plena music, between 1952 and 1954. The song has been rearranged and performed 
by many, including pop superstar Ricky Martin who introduced it to new generations. The 
award-winning hurricanes documentary ‘Allá viene el Temporal’ (There comes the Temporal) is 








San Ciriaco affected several territories 
in the Circum-Caribbean. It hit first 
Dominica, Guadeloupe –where circa 
1,200 deaths were registered- and the 
Virgin Islands. The hurricane gained 
strength in the warm sea to slam Puerto 
Rico. Next, the northern part of the 
Dominican Republic was moderately 
affected by its passing, and when it 
reached the Bahamas Islands it had 
lowered to Category 4. West Palm 
Beach, Florida, was the following 
landfall site with estimated sustained 
winds of 150 mph, close to Category 5 
again. After heading west and north, its 
passing over Lake Okeechobee was 
disastrous; a 6-9 foot storm surge killed around two thousand people -mostly Bahamian migrant 
workers of color-. San Felipe hit inland Florida and the eastern coast, Savannah and Charleston 
suffered rains, and it finally dissipated near the Great Lakes on the 20th. 
 
Together with the Mississippi floods of 1927, Okeechobee marks a turning point in flood control 
management by the Corps of Engineers
94
, state and federal legislation that would reach Puerto 
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 In 1917, the first Flood Control Act had authorized the Army Corps of Engineers to be involved with flood 
protection and damage reduction. Yet, as most institutions, the Corps considered disasters essentially as a 
Fig. 45 Regional track and timing of San Felipe 
 





Rico in the following decades. The Okeechobee catastrophe was captured in Nora Zeale’s 
celebrated book ‘Their eyes were watching God’ (1937). It has been the subject of academic 
research, popular songs and publications. Yet, despite regional damages, there are no 
contemporary or retrospective Circum-Caribbean comparative studies. I only found the usual 
data of storm level, imprecise losses and images when looking for scholarship that transcended 
the paradigmatic vision of the region as a broken cosmos due to geography, colonial legacies and 
ideological animosities. Also, local studies within Puerto Rico are missing. 
 
The possibility of learning from San Ciriaco in multi-hazard terms remains unexplored. An 
expanded temporal frame would enable to study another recent and influential complex 
emergency, because the unlikely worst case scenario of multi-risk exposure happened within a 
few years gap. Destruction by hurricane San Hipólito (1916) was magnified by the San Fermín 
earthquake in 1918 and subsequent seismic activities, in 1918. On October 11, the earthquake -
approximately 7.5 on the Richter scale- originated northwest of Aguadilla in the Mona Canyon, 
between Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. In that region, the ocean withdrew and 
exposed reefs and stretches of seafloor unseen during low tide. About 4–7 minutes after the main 
shock, the first tsunami wave crest broke upon the shore reaching up to 20 feet high. It slammed 
coastal homes and villages, and tide gauges were noticed as far as Galveston, Texas. Seismic-
triggered mudslides exceeded Level VII in the worst areas and damaged infrastructure, although 
they were not considered catastrophic for human life. Reported casualties ranged between 91-
116 deaths, of which almost 40 were attributed to the tsunami. The worse aftershocks, Oct. 24 
and Nov. 12, increased damages. Most affected settlements and infrastructure were on the west 
                                                                                                                                                             
responsibility of municipalities and states. In addition to the limited flood control activities by the Corps of 
Engineers, the federal government’s roles on disaster included data collection by the Weather bureau and either law 





and north coast, particularly if located on alluvium -loose soils eroded by water-, built out of 
expensive yet rigid materials, such as masonry, and lacking structural reinforcement. In Aguada, 
the church built before 1876 was destroyed, masonry buildings had to be razed whilst frame 
buildings were not damaged appreciably. In Añasco, all brick buildings were wrecked or had to 
be condemned; concrete structures without reinforcement were destroyed instantly or during 
aftershocks; wood frame buildings collapsed if the structure had rotted. In Aguadilla, most 
masonry structures on the alluvium were badly cracked. Mayagüez, the third largest city on the 
island, was left in shambles. The brick Catholic Church had to be demolished, like numerous 
factories, public buildings and homes. Sugar mills in the area were virtually destroyed, tall brick 
chimneys were scattered on the floor. Railroad tracks were bent and displaced; pipelines and 
flumes were wrecked; bridges and roads were severely damaged like the strategic west port 
facilities. In Mona Passage, two cable links were broken. The earthquake caused destruction as 
far as Ponce. For example, the wrecked cathedral and theater La Perla were not reconstructed 
until 1938 and 1941 respectively, as municipal finances were bankrupted. Agriculture, 
commerce, exports and everyday life entered a crisis (Online Puerto Rico Seismic Network, 
2005; R. Picó, 1974; Reid & Taber, 1919a). The resulting palimpsest of chaos and losses paved 
the road for a hurricane as San Felipe to devastate the island. Yet, I did not find changes in 
construction and urbanization patterns and in the way in which disasters entered mainstream 
historical narratives. Moreover, I did not find studies about this complex emergency from 
disciplines such as history, economics, planning, preservation and disaster management; which 






Fig. 46 Earthquake destruction in Mayagüez 
 
The streets of Mayagüez were full of debris from collapsed buildings made out of masonry, brick, with weak 
structural reinforcement such as rotted wood, image by (Cifuentes, 1928). 
 
 
Fig. 47 House dragged by the 1918 tsunami 
 
A house washes away along the west coast shore, image by (Online Puerto Rico Seismic Network, 2005). 
 
The opportunity of learning from San Felipe in multi-storm terms has not been developed. The 
worse hurricanes after San Ciriaco were San Hipólito, in 1916, and San Liborio, in 1926; but 
when looking for information, mainly the mainstream listing of events, physical characteristics 





Box N.4 Summary of 20
th
 century storms in Puerto Rico: 1901-1926  
 
  
1901, July 7th; Tropical Storm San Cirilo the storm eye moved over the southwest in a 
northwesterly direction with estimated sustained winds of 70 mph. In San Juan, the wind 
reached 52 mph and pressure 29.60 in/hg. Rain reached 5-6 inches in 72 hours in Caguas, 
Humacao and Barranquitas. 
 
1901, September 11th-12th; Tropical Storm San Vicente moved over the north coast in a 
westerly direction with estimated sustained winds of 60 mph. The wind report from San Juan 
was of 52 mph and a pressure of 29.89 (1012 mb). The storm affected all the crops, but 
particularly citrus. 
  
1910, September 6th-7th; Hurricane San Zacarías passed around 20 miles south of southern 
Puerto Rico with sustained winds reaching 100 mph in a westerly direction. However, the 
worst conditions were experienced in the northeast. In San Juan winds reached 72 mph with a 
pressure of 29.66 in/hg (1004 mb). 
 
1915, August 11th; Hurricane San Tiburcio passed around 100 miles south of Puerto Rico in 
a westerly direction with winds estimated in 100 mph near the center. Two persons drowned 
in Cabo Rojo due to the sea swell. The minimal pressure in San Juan was of 29.77 in/hg 
(1008 mb) and winds of 62 mph. The strongest winds hit the south and central mountain 
range affecting coffee and tobacco crops. 
 
1916, August 22nd; Hurricane San Hipólito reached 90 mph sustained winds at time of 
landfall and weakened as it crossed the island from east to west. San Juan reported winds of 
92 mph and a pressure of 29.82 in/hg (1010 mb). One death was attributed to the storm and 
the worst damage was reported in the east and north, especially Santurce. Losses amount to 
$1,000,000 dollars. 
 
1921, September 9th-10th; Hurricane San Pedro passed south of Puerto Rico in a west-
northwesterly direction as a category one storm, it headed north towards eastern Hispaniola, 
then it re-curved into the open Atlantic and passed nearby Bermuda. The winds measured 60 
mph in Cabo Rojo and 44 mph in San Juan; pressure reached 29.68 in/hg (1005 mb) and 
29.82 in/hg (1010 mb) respectively. The main effect of the storm was heavy swell in the 
south coast and damage was minimal, one death was reported. 
  
1926, July 23rd-24th; Hurricane San Liborio entered the Caribbean Sea by Martinique and 
made landfall in southwest Puerto Rico with estimated sustained winds of 80 mph. The winds 
in San Juan were measured of 66 mph and a pressure of 29.62 in/hg (1003 mb). The 
hurricane killed 25 people and damage estimates are of $5,000,000 dollars. Many houses 
were destroyed around the island. 
 







VI.3 Economic growth and urbanization vis-à-vis disasters 
Differentiated vulnerability or resilience to San Felipe was influenced by the overlap of 
economy, urbanization and disasters generated in a time period called ‘imperialism by neglect’ 
(Matthews 1960 in (M. R. Rodríguez, 2002); post-San Ciriaco, the U.S. mode of domination 
emphasized extractive policies whilst neglecting lay Puerto Ricans -elite Creoles were 
increasingly frustrated also-. As Gov. Davis advised and Gov. Allen used for his benefit, 
government funding went to the sugar industry. It recovered fast after storms due to easiness to 
replant -which meant safer and quicker investment returns compared to coffee-, increased soil 
fertility caused by flood sediments, dominant participation of large American agro-corporations 
and growing U.S. market demands (Schwartz, 1992). The U.S. imported 86 percent of its sugar 
needs before 1898 (R. A. Martínez, 1984). In the first decade of the 20
th
 century, a U.S. 
controlled sugar-based export economy was set and endorsed by peak prices during and 
immediately after World War I. By 1932, the U.S. imported less than 1 percent of its sugar needs 
(R. A. Martínez, 1984). 
 
U.S. corporations had vast sway on territorial decisions; they intensified deforestation, water and 
land rights changes, and soil degradation to increase profits. Sugar was planted even in the steep 
slopes of Jayuya and Adjuntas, former coffee bastions where small and medium-scale planters 
had lost their properties (Ortiz Colom, 2005). A glimpse of such transformation is expressed by a 
jíbaro descending for the first time to the lowlands near Ponce in the awarded novel ‘Ballad of 
another Time’, by Jos  Luis González -famed writer, university professor, and journalist-, and in 





“Sugar cane everywhere, the man notices, as far as the eyesight reaches, covering the land like 
an inundation, he tells himself. Have there been trees here ever? Not like the ones he sees now, 
scattered, one here near and another one further away, were a blow with a stone would reach, 
lonely, orphans, he thinks; but like those far up there [in the mountains], abundant, leafy, 
custodians of all that grows and fructifies under the shelter of their shadow. And this absence of 
birds, he confirms it with his accustomed ear” (González, 1990, p.109). 
 
 
Fig. 48 "Planting sugar cane in Porto Rico" 
 
(A.C. Bosselman & Co., n.a.). 
Fig. 49 “             -                  ” 
 
Sugar planting and harvesting remained manual, providing hard, abundant and brief employment; and long 
unemployment periods called ‘tiempo muerto’ (dead time). Only processing stages were mechanized (Waldrop 
Photographic Co., 1913). Among the intensified ecological transformations were loss of native fauna and flora, soil 





Fig. 50 “A  O       -                  ” Fig. 51 “O   S              q        ” Postcard 
  
Animal and even human traction served to grind cane in the 
oldest moscovado Spanish mills. For Americans, this quaint 
image was part of the repertoire of outdated curiosities 
worth sharing as postcards (Waldrop Photographic Co., 
n.d.-a) 
“The machinery is most primitive, the propelling 
power being an immense water wheel. Many of the 
mills in Porto Rico are of the old fashioned type, 
although there are some fine ones worked by steam” 
(Raphael Tuck and Sons "Oilette", n.d.) 
Fig. 52 “G            S         ” Fig. 53 “                G      ” 
  
The largest and most modern mill on the island included a 
boarding house and the American Club  (n.a., 1903). 
U.S. corporations modern processing rapidly 
increased profits (Moscioni, Between 1898-1917d). 
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Americans also invested in tobacco, the second export crop grown in Cayey, Aibonito, Cidra and 
municipalities in the east central mountains (J. L. Dietz, 1989). Yet, jobs were scarce, including 
underpaid domestic cigar packaging. Other ventures controlled by Americans were coastal fruit 
plantations –citrus, pineapple, banana- and coconuts, attracting the unemployed. Needle work 
and straw hat making were top domestic feminine and child jobs, even less paid than average 
adult male jobs (Findlay, 1999). 
 
 
Fig. 55 'String tobacco in curing barn' Fig. 56 “  k        w     ” 
  
Barefoot male jíbaro workers prepare tobacco leaves in the island interior 
(Moscioni, Between 1898-1917f). 
Women in Cabo Rojo sell hats (Moscioni, 
Between 1898-1917f). 
 
Coffee controlled by creoles was on a roller coaster trajectory towards the bottom. Exports never 
reached late 1880s levels due to San Ciriaco, limited credit options with high interest rates, high 
taxes, and the U.S. preference for cheaper Hawaiian, Brazilian and Central American imports. 
Puerto Rican sales to Europe and Cuba grew when prices stabilized after 1900, and increased 
from 1904 until to World War I. European exports felt during the war; they hit a high record for 





Meanwhile, territorial choices for settlement location confirmed the Spanish colonial pattern, 
concentrating investments and urbanization on the coast over mountainous areas, which 
reinforced previous hazards. Before San Ciriaco, San Juan was less populated than the main 
export hub, Ponce. In less than thirty years, San Juan became the top growth pole, doubling 
Ponce’s population. Coffee stagnation, disasters, joblessness, and the Mayagüez crisis pulled 
people into the capital. In parallel, planning and investment in infrastructure by governmental 
authorities and U.S. corporations increased compared to Spanish levels, but shared core 
assumption. The priority was to protect commodities, which were crops; not citizens. Often 
financed through bonds, the bulk of public works were transportation and export-oriented 
infrastructure including motorways, bridges, railroads, waterworks and docks like the ones at 
Aguirre and Ensenada (R. Picó, 1974). Driven by private interests, such projects followed a 
trickle-down logic, disregarding lay citizens’ development and resilience. Favoring exports over 
passengers, U.S. and Canadian investors built over 90% of the railroad network between 1900-
1920; partly circling the coast but leaving the highlands isolated due to topography and 
unprofitability (Santamaría García, 1994). 
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Other influential public works started in 1908, through hydraulic changes that protected the 
investment of corporations, marginally improved potable water provision and would influence 
disaster management. Insular legislature created the Puerto Rican Irrigation Services (R. Picó, 
1974) to build reservoirs for irrigation canals and energy production, the latter given to private 
enterprises. In 1917, tasks of the new Department of Interior included buildings, public roads and 
bridges, hydraulic forces, non-navigable rivers, underground waters, mines, public archives and 
lands (Departamento de Transportación y Obras Públicas, 2010). In 1925, the Bureau for the Use 
of Water Resources was created, and it kept transforming the hydraulic regime through dykes, 
irrigation canals and dams -Carite #1, Carite #2 and Toro Negro-; but also filter beds, mains, and 
pipes that usually served better-off urban areas. Large-scale engineering interventions to control 
floods became a desirable disaster management and planning strategy. Paradoxically, technology 
enabled new forms of vulnerability. Purposive agricultural and urban growth on desiccated 
flood-prone areas would be affected by extreme events or the failure of hydraulic systems 
(López-Marrero & Tschakert, 2011). 
 
Fig. 58  Tanamá River Damn,  Arecibo  
  
An example of early 
small-scale 
hydrological 
modifications near the 






Private and public investment cemented uneven urban growth also, a trickle-down logic 
increased inequality. High-end coastal urbanization outside of Old San Juan started in El 
Condado, between the ocean and Condado lagoon, and Miramar, bordering the lagoon. 
 
Fig.59 Condado seashore, Santurce, late 1890s 
 
In the pristine Condado beach, (Alonso, 18-?, p.32) a solitary person walks on the sand, close to thick short 
vegetation, habitat of native fauna and stabilizer of dunes from erosion. The large coral reef on the lower right hand 
side, dunes and vegetation on the left absorbed shocks from severe weather events. The entire ecosystem would be 
aggressively transformed by permanent high-end urbanization in the next decades. 
, 
The lavish Condado Vanderbilt Hotel
95
, the first of its kind, was built in 1919, with U.S. capital 
and by U.S. architects in a Mission/Spanish Revival style. It heralded privatized beach access 
and permanent transformations of ecosystems such as sand dunes, mangroves, coconuts and 
coral reefs, increasing vulnerability to storm and surges. 
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 Later known as Grand Hotel Condado Vanderbilt, The Condado Hotel, Hotel Condado, Condado Beach Hotel, 





Fig. 60 and Fig. 61 Hotel Condado Vanderbilt and Condado Lagoon  
  
Photos taken from Santurce and lagoon border (González Padín Co. Inc., c. 1920's; Real Photo Post Card, c. 
1930's) respectively show palm trees and a thick mangrove, which buffered storms and coastal surges. 
 
Fig. 62 “        V          H    ” Fig. 63 “H            ” 
  
Original view (Real Photo, early 1920s) of the 
exclusive hotel guests boat landing, initial changes of 
the lagoon and surrounding vegetation. 
The building scale and manicured landscape contrast 
with the mangrove (González Padín Co. Inc., 1930-
1945). 
Fig. 64 “V          H    ”             Fig. 65 Vanderbilt beach front verandah 
  
Private beach access up to a reef (n.a., c. 1920s-a). Most of the San Juan seashore towards the east is 
undeveloped. (n.a., c. 1920s-b). 
 
Luxurious buildings in concrete, masonry, wood and brick ranged from neoclassical, neo-
vernacular, Art Deco, ginger-bread, Spanish Revival to modernism; and catalogues of clap-on-
imported pine constructions were available. Housing for the better-off could be essentially 





“Within the Porto Rican’s homes one glimpses shady, flower filled patios, tinkling fountains, 
charcoal braziers, cool corridors, and huge open, unglazed windows. Within the American 
homes are all the surroundings of Northern life, absolutely unsuited to tropical comfort. The 
walls extend unbroken from ceiling to door, allowing no free circulation of air; the windows are 
small, there are no charming patios, gas ranges are used for cooking, and canned goods, 
American dishes…Of course there are exceptions” (Verrill, 1914, p.17). 
 
 
Fig. 66 Residence in Miramar, SJ Fig. 67 Presbyterian hospital in Condado, SJ 
  
Czech architect Antonin Nechodoma’s legacy in the 
Caribbean includes this house, inspired in Frank Lloyd 
Wright’s work (Moscioni, Between 1898-1917i). 
 
A private hospital in prime real estate land close to the 
sea (Moscioni, Between 1898-1917h). 
Fig. 68 Residences in Santurce, SJ Fig. 69 Apartment complex in Miramar, SJ 
  
Beach front houses, including Mr. Charl Hartell’s 
(Moscioni, Between 1898-1917k). 
Property of American citizens Axmayer and Son 
(Moscioni, Between 1898-1917a). 
 
The U.S. government timidly launched housing and land tenure provision. Yet, exclusionary land 





citizens to occupy marginal risk-prone areas and build precarious dwellings. In 1903, the 
Homestead Act enabled agregados
96
 to own the land they tilled; yet, U.S. agribusinesses and 
local elites remained the main land owners (Ayala & Bergad, 2002). The 1903 Act signaled 
affordable, low-density, individual ownership housing for the formally employed; yet, it 
excluded rural and urban unemployed, self-employed or informally employed. It was endorsed 
by laws in 1906 and 1920; however, it was dented by the disregard of the 1917 Jones-Shafroth 
Law -also called Jones Act-, which limited private corporations to own until 500 acres, unlike 
private individuals.  
 
In 1923, the law Hogares Seguros de Puerto Rico -Secure Homes of Puerto Rico- created the 
Homestead Commission to “guide urban development, guarantee an orderly fashion, supply 
adequate housing by providing parcels or housing for urban workers” (Dinzey-Flores, 2007) p. 
471. The Commission bought land and built three Barrios Obreros -urban workers districts- in 
San Juan, Arecibo and Salinas. “More than five hundred model houses were erected…which 
were sold to worthy applicants at very moderate prices, divided into easy payments…but in 
Puerta de Tierra, in 1921, a fire [had] destroyed the homes of five thousand people” (Mixer, 
1926, p.202-206).  In other words, new provisions could not cope with housing deficits, multi-
hazard exposure and migrants lacking formal jobs, access to the Commission’s few slots or 
stable income to buy from the private sector. By 1916, the ill-reputed San Juan slums Sal si 
puedes (Exit if you can), Hoyo Frío (Cold Hole) and Gandulito (Small Pea) thrived in Puerta de 
Tierra and Santurce mangroves. Their constructions remained fragile and easy to dismantle, but 
their increasing density caused ecosystemic damages such as deforestation, pollution, and 
reduced mangrove capacity to minimize storm damages. 
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Fig. 70 Hato Rey neighborhood, SJ Fig. 71 Ponce neighborhood 
  
Consolidated working class housing 
 (Moscioni, Between 1898-1917m). 
Consolidated working class housing (Phipps, 
c.1907). 
Fig. 72 W  k   ’                              k  
in Puerta de Tierra, Old San Juan 
Fig. 73 El Fanguito slum partially over a 
mangrove, SJ 
  
Formal low income housing (Moscioni, Between 
1898-1917n). 
Slum under consolidation (Moscioni, Between 
1898-1917e). 
Fig. 74 ¨Native house, Carolina¨ Fig. 75 ¨Typical huts of Porto Rico¨ 
  
Isolated precarious rural household near San Juan 
(Moscioni, Between 1898-1917g). 
Unlocated precarious housing considered usual by 
the photographer (Moscioni, Between 1898-1917l). 
 
To conclude this section, I reviewed the built environment emphasized in architectural, planning 





remembrance of how differently urban life and disasters were experienced. Again, the focus is 
the formal well-off built environment (Marvel, 1994; Rigau, 1992a; Rivera Ruiz & Llanes 
Santos, 2008; Vivoni, 1989), with emphasis on exceptional architects -such as Nechodoma- and 
the protection of contemporary elitist areas
97
. Such one-sided approach undermines a multi-
layered and pro-equity learning process about everyday life and crises. 
 
VI.4 Socio-cultural hierarchies, memory and knowledge of disasters 
Differentiated vulnerability or resilience to San Felipe was also shaped by the contemporary 
juxtaposition of socio-cultural hierarchies, memory and knowledge of disasters. A novel 
manipulation of country of origin, language, class, race, gender and religion justified social 
integration or exclusion; which reflected on rights, resources and obligations. New and old social 
hierarchies coexisted, competed and permeated into collective memory-making processes and 
degrees of hazard exposure. For example, racism, country of origin and the Black Legend
98
 (R. 
Fernández, 1996) justified occupation of top positions by white English-speaking Americans, 
dissemination of anti-Puerto Ricans stereotypes, and legal vacuum of citizenship since 1898. 
Second in rank were white, male, rich Creoles. Yet, entrepreneurial and landed elites or those 
working in public administrations could be discriminated by foreigners as unreliable and sub-par; 
and some were accumulating sourness for their displacement from economic and social 
preeminence. Poor Puerto Ricans were at the bottom of the social ladder; especially if jíbaros, 
black, women, children and elderly. Poor and working class citizens were characterized as lazy, 
ignorant and stubborn. In response, some of them joined unions and launched strikes to fight for 
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 An exception is the book focused on the neighborhood of Santurce, San Juan: (E. Quiles Rodríguez, 2009) 
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their rights (Ayala & Bergad, 2002; R. Fernández, 1996; A. G. Quintero Rivera, 2003). The 
Serrall s family epitomized the landed elite’s crisis. Their Central Merceditas mill was a 
company town in Ponce, with its own rail line, workers' housing, transportation fleet, police, and 
airport. Merceditas superseded traditional small moscovado sugar factories. Yet, it could not 
keep up with the new extra-large U.S. mills such as Guánica, Aguirre and Fajardo; which 
attracted migratory workers and business. Circa 1910, famed Ponceño historian Eduardo 
Neumann conveyed the overpowering of his peers, territorial and urban changes: 
“agricultural property was highly divided in Ponce and it was the cause of the relative comfort 
that social classes enjoyed there. Meanwhile, now it is concentrated under the power of two 
large mills, Guánica and Aguirre, monstrous octopuses that with their suckling tentacles have 
ruined commerce in Ponce through direct exports, and have reduced to the minimal expression 
the movement, animation and joy that prevailed before; to the point that now Ponce is like a 
Semi-Pompeian city given its silence and quietness” (Neumann Gandía in J. L. P. Lizardi, 2008, 
p. 12). 
 










Physically imposing Uncle Sam runs a shop full of essential import goods, such as food, tools, machinery, garments 
and hygiene products. Moreover, Uncle Sam controls shipping and is the only trader for a small coffee bag offered 
by a petite barefoot jíbaro representing Puerto Rico, image by (Brau de Zuzuárregui, 1915c). 
 
Other frictions overcame social boundaries. Pro-Americanization policies continued censorship, 
and equated affirmations of cultural identity with subversion and separatism to be punished; even 
displaying the Puerto Rican flag was illegal (Paralitici, 2004). English remained imposed as the 
official language and medium of instruction in public schools (Barreto 2001), which further 
undermined limited investment on education. A representative of the Young People’s Missionary 
Movement of the United States and Canada endorsed linguistic dominance as part of a larger 
assimilationist goal: 
“Children ought to receive their education in the language of the country of which they form 
a part. If more is desired, it should be paid for privately. The Porto Ricans do not understand 
American ideals and American ways because they have had almost all of their associations 
with Spaniards…It is imperative that the new generation shall absorb the real spirit of 
American life… we believe that English alone should be the language of the schools” 





English was highly unpopular and made Spanish a basic element to delineate Puerto Ricaness 
(Barreto, 2001; Dávila, 1997; Jorge  Duany, 2005; Verrill, 1914): 
“Although English is,—according to theory,—the "official language” yet those who speak it are 
few and far between. English may be "official”, but the officials do not speak it, save in a few 
instances or where they happen to be of American birth or education. Even the policemen in San 
Juan cannot speak the "official language”, and a visit to the offices of the Interior Department or 
to many other Federal and Insular offices will demonstrate that the officiousness of the English 
tongue has scarcely gone beyond the theoretical stage. … American though Porto Rico may be, 
yet it is merely on the surface; at heart the Porto Rican is a Porto Rican first, last, and all the 
time” (Verrill, 1914, p.13, 14). 
 
Among the few open critiques to the new regime were the satire cartoons by pro-independence 
intellectual Mario Salvador Brau de Zuzuárregui. He was relatively protected being heir of 
Salvador Brau -writer, historian and liberal autonomist Creole politician- and himself a famed 
journalist, poet, cartoonist and newspaper artistic director. 
Fig. 77 “H                 I   ”           Fig. 78 “W     w W     ” Fig. 79 ¨The last Straw¨ 
   
In an urban area, Uncle Sam hits a nail -
Americanization- with a hammer -English 
Language-. Yet, the bent nail has not 
entered the pavement. Puerto Ricans are 
embodied by a barefoot disdaining man 
resembling Creole autonomist Luis Muñoz 
Rivera, father of future Gov. Muñoz Marín 
(Brau de Zuzuárregui, 1915b).  
U.S. President Thomas Woodrow 
Wilson (1913-1921) wears the 
Spanish conquerors regalia and 
checks the only missing piece, a 
helmet (Brau de Zuzuárregui, 
1915d). The author exploits the 
symbolism of Old San Juan placing 
the scene in La Fortaleza, the 
Governor’s palace. 
A cornered, emaciated and 
suffering cow named Puerto 
Rico incarnates rural 
decadence during the 1910s. 
A pensive Uncle Sam 
ruminates the final possible 
exploitation to the cow (Brau 





Male writers, artists and journalists from an upper and middle class background captured post 
San Ciriaco accelerated economic demise, social turmoil, political and cultural changes. Ramón 
Juliá Marín, José Elias Levy, Matías González García, Eladio Ayala Moura and Manuel Zeno 
Gandía addressed misery, hunger, overcrowding, children mortality, Hawaii emigration, coffee 
losses, impoverished Creole businessmen and planters, return to semi-feudal conditions on the 
coffee highlands and tobacco plantations, bankruptcy, suicide and the establishment of American 
power, land ownership and sugar cultivation (Centeno Añeses, 2000). Intertwined with those 
themes was a sense of longing for an idealized time before the advent of American rule, which 
grew in the following decades through a refreshed version of hispanophilia. 
 
Poor Puerto Ricans still withstood the worst forms of exclusion and disaster vulnerability, 
especially if black, women, children and elderly. Their exposure to disasters remained high 
because of precarious living and working conditions, healthcare, food security and education. 
Employment figures are hard to grasp, seasonal unemployment was so prevalent that annual 
averages are not trusty; but according to governmental data, unemployment rose steadily 17.9% 
in 1910, 20% in 1920; 30.2% in 1926, over 36% in 1929 (Ayala, 1996), 60-70%  by the late 
1930s (Ismael  García-Colón, 2006). Cutting sugar -men’s most widely available job- was 
seasonal, underpaid, rudimentary, exhausting, and risky. Mastering a machete implied hand 
bleeding and acute pain, until becoming callous. Workers had to overdress withstanding intense 
heat and humidity to avoid leaf cuts, insect bites and sunburns. If distracted, their eyes could be 
poked out by cane fragments. Plantation life was comparable to slavery: 
“A few of the large plantations, the lot of the poor is hard. They are not much better than 
slaves…At some of these estates, the people are herded together like cattle. A long, narrow, 
shed-like building is constructed, divided into small rooms, each of which is rented to a family. 





For poor women, burdensome and exploitative paid occupations included needle work, laundry, 
cooking and serving, sewing, cigar packing, coffee picking, hat weaving and sex work. Legal 
divorce was a new and empowering policy; yet, attempted moral reforms by men -American 
officials supported by local liberals- were colored by double standards and had contentious 
effects on women’s living prospects (Findlay, 1999). The experiences of the poor and excluded 
entered historical narratives limitedly, through the lens of others. In the absence of their written 
testimonials of everyday life and life changing events, such as disasters, their opinions did not 
shape backbone identitarian or political discourses. For instance, I only found one published 
testimony about differentiated hurricane vulnerability between Americans and lay Puerto Ricans, 
written by an American woman in a relatively privileged position after San Ciprián. Although it 
corresponds to 1932, it shows the frustration of islanders affected by a disaster vis-à-vis the 
seemingly unperturbed lifestyle of Americans: 
“Three men are approaching. One hacks fiercely at branches with his swift machete. Another 
supports, almost carries, the third—a middle-aged man painfully hopping on one leg, his other 
leg in a bulky bloodstained bandage, his head blood smeared, a coarse burlap sack across his 
half-clothed shoulders, his face haggard with worn-out eyes. A man assists a limping woman 
using boards as crutches. A native policeman hurries along, dispatched to rescue.  
"Are many hurt?" we ask. 
"Many," he gravely answers. “Just around that corner is a leap of concrete blocks. Yesterday it 
was a house. Three people were crushed to death there."  
A native soldier comes up as we talk. 
"Look!" says the policeman, greeting him, his face distorted into a sour ironic grin as he points 
to our standing house. "The house of the Americans! With the roof still on! The lucky devils!" 
(Kairns Champlin, 1933, p. 69). 
 
In sum, the disparities of the new regime had different impacts over different peoples; yet they 
contributed to create collective imaginaries of a frail Puerto Rican way of life against that of 
powerful foreigners. Independence ideals reemerged before the 1920s, for more people there 





“people without an address, suspects, running away from justice, children fugitives from their 
homes, agregados evicted because of repetitive stealing or because they protested injustices with 
enough vehemence, migrant rural workers climbing up and down the mountain range in search 
of a seasonal job, a rustler circling the juicy pastures of the countryside, watching here and 





Fig. 80 “Plantation Joe. Ponce P.R.”  Fig. 81. Laundresses of color in Ponce 
  
The old sugar worker’s extreme penury is evident in 
his ragged clothing, scarred skin, and deformed and 
callous bare feet (Kilburn, 1898-1899). 
Barefoot laundresses withstood polluted waters, sun, 
abrasive detergents, rain, insects, weights on their head 
and damaging postures (Zahner, 1899). 
Fig. 82 Barefoot children carry tobacco leaves Fig. 83 Barefoot child carries wood 
  
Child workers endured hard conditions, and very low pay or none (Moscioni, Between 1898-1917b; Waldrop 





Fig. 84 U.S. labor federation leader in Ponce Fig. 85 San Juan dock workers on a strike  
  
Samuel Gompers traveled to organize workers in 1904 
(CDOSIP, 1904). 
Large strike on Sept. 25, 1918 (CDOSIP, 1918). 
 
 
After mounting pressure on the island and debates in Washington, the 1917 Jones-Shafroth Act 
brought cautious power redistribution and benefits to neutralize resistance. It established a bill of 
rights that included the local election of a four year term Resident Commissioner and a Senate to 
complete a bicameral Legislative Assembly; which integrated more elite creoles in the colonial 
administration. It finally provided U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. Yet, it also brought 
contentious obligations, such as drafting from World War I onwards while the draft was 
effective, which later would be criticized for over-exposing islanders (Paralitici, 2004; Rodríguez 
Beruff, 1988). Essentially, the foundations of an imperialist scheme remained unaltered, without 
economic reforms or anti-discriminatory policies that reflected in daily life or extreme crisis. To 
make matters worse, all crop prices went down in the early 1920s and the Puerto Rican economy 
entered a recession. Mainly foreign stakeholders of the large sugar mills could withstand the 
situation, transferring the burden to workers. Social fractures intensified due to migration, crime 
and violence. In sum, unemployment, drop in average salaries, higher living costs yet degraded 
living conditions radicalized the forms of resistance that the poor had, including strikes (García 
Colón, 2000; Paralitici, 2004). It also radicalized patriotic movements and discourses. In the 





agglomerated contending elite, worker and peasant factions. Fast rural decay vis-à-vis American 
oppression were central themes of merged identitarian and political assertions. Since the 1920s, 
coffee became a reference to Puerto Ricaness in the arts, literature and other cultural expressions 
(Rodríguez Centeno, 2000). Moreover, along the founding figure of the hacendado, the hard 
working and supposedly light-skinned jíbaro was added to an idealized harmonious Puerto Rican 
family, unlike afro-Puerto Ricans. Young politicians Pedro Albizú Campos and Luis Muñoz 
Marín, partially educated in the U.S., used identity and colonialism as political magnets 
differently (García Colón, 2000). Albizú Campos was an out of wedlock son of a wealthy 
Spaniard and a mixed-race domestic worker, raised modestly in Ponce. Excelling Harvard Law 
School graduate and multilingual, he gained power in the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party. He 
correlated his ideological and pro-independence views to a cultural identity that had catholic, 
agrarian, hispanophilic and patriarchal roots, without strong open emphasis on race. His 
constituencies were sugar workers and autonomists (Santiago-Valles, 2007). Muñoz Marín was a 
light-skinned son of the famous highland politician Luis Muñoz Rivera, who did not finish his 
journalism studies at Georgetown University. As a militant of the Socialist Party, he criticized 
large U.S. corporations and lauded suffering jíbaros (Cordova, 2005) and the Spanish language, 
without emphasis on religion. He attracted poor peasants, workers and his elite peers. 
Divergences between them ensued, and Muñoz Marín changed his stance to found a party that 
did not campaign for socialism or independence, getting U.S. support. Yet, their shared appeal to 
a peaceful rural and patriarchal hispanophilic past contrasted with the imposing American 
identity became a significant identity theme (Dávila, 1997), and both disregarded disasters as a 
core political topic. Their commonalities would contentiously impact future decisions of 





Months before San Felipe, political tensions were mounting. For example, editorials in El 
Agricultor Puertorriqueño accused insular and federal administrators -particularly Gov. Towner- 
of being unethical, uncaring, abusive, and eager to sell out farmers when politically opportune 
(Levy, 2010). Aviator Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh visited the island on February, and local 
dignitaries asked him to bring a message to President Coolidge questioning the underdeveloped 
state of the island and demanding the freedom and autonomy that they lacked as a mere colony. 
Starkly, Coolidge answered that the Treaty of Paris contained no promise to the people of Porto 
Rico; yet Americans had generously provided means for economic growth and even a very 
liberal organic law that enabled local elections. Problems were caused by elected representatives; 
Porto Ricans were unprepared to govern themselves and should not insist on trying his patience 
(R. Fernández, 1996). Thus, the background preceding San Felipe was sour and stingy; the 
American dominance model had consolidated economic, spatial and social conditions that would 
turn even minor hazards into disasters. 
 
Concerning the grassroots remembrance of hurricanes, I found limited data. Basically, prevailing 
lack of education reflected on superstitions and religious beliefs. Highlanders believed that 
hurricanes could be forecasted in advance based on avocado crops; and in the short-term noticing 
spider webs falling from structures, animals in distress -chickens, crickets, frogs, and lizards-, 
and the presence of a coastal bird flying inland to avoid storms, summarized in the proverb 
“Rabojunco en tierra, tormenta en la mar” (coastal bird Rabojunco inland, storm at the sea) 
(DIVEDCO, 1965). Protestant branches gained feligresy, thanks to Americans who coupled 
Catholicism to Spain and backwardness. Yet, Catholicism was widespread, and some traditions 





improvised refuges due to their sturdiness and lack of options; people begged for God’s 
protection when in danger and even put palm branches blessed during Palm Sunday on their 
entrance door against storms (Schwartz, 2015). However, there were no recorded public diatribes 




Meteorology was less important in military terms, as the U.S. was not at war. Yet, S.J. Weather 
Bureau equipment improved and adjacent WKAQ radio station rapidly broadcasted. Formal 
knowledge limitedly advanced secularization. For instance, San Felipe relief workers noticed 
lists of hurricanes and dates printed on the back of school history books (American Red Cross, 
1929). This could have helped to remember a critical condition from an early age, despite narrow 
teaching of local history and pro-American public school curriculum (McCoy & Scarano, 2009). 
Yet, the approach followed simplistic mainstream assumptions of data about hurricanes. The 
social dynamics that sustained the construction of disasters throughout history and the ways in 
which Puerto Rican society was reshaped by disasters remained unaddressed. 
 
VI.5 Mississippi floods 1927 relief: the presidential rise of Herbert Hoover 
The development of San Felipe relief in Puerto Rico can be properly understood examining first 
its template, the 1927 Great Mississippi River flood relief. A disaster so vast, called “the Flood 
of the Century” (Arsenault, 2005), prompted more than the usual response of Congress to pass a 
bill to aid victims; and, the relief stage paradoxically became the propelling opportunity for a 
U.S. president candidate and his subsequent challenge. On New Year's Day of 1927, after a 
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Catholic Bishop Giddens and the Redemptorists under the Southern Cross limitedly engaged in San Felipe relief, 





semester of copious rains accumulating in the central basin of the Mississippi River, the levee 
system had multiple break downs. Vague estimates of the death toll reach the thousands. More 
than 700,000 persons, almost one percent of the U.S. population, became homeless; and losses 
equaled a third of the national budget (Slivka 2005 in J. D. Rivera & Miller, 2007)). The tragedy 
happened during a period of Republican preeminence, since the end of Wilson’s presidency in 
1921, all through which taxation and domestic spending reduced. Moreover, it happened in a 
lasting context of pervasive assumptions towards societal crises, governmental roles and victims’ 
portrayals. Disaster management was growing in funding and number of cases (Landis, 2005); 
yet essentially meant minimalistic relief reactions by the government, including passing 
Congress Acts and sending the Army if havoc exposed insufficient means and capacities of local 
authorities and relief organizations. The implicit consensus was that the government, particularly 
the federal, should not intervene in what were understood as local ‘natural’ crisis (Barry, 1998, 
2005; Foster, 1983; McClure, 2011; Mills, 2006). For example, in 1907, the federal government 
asked New Orleans banks to put up front $250,000 as a condition for the Surgeon General to join 
in a yellow fever epidemic. The rejection of federal intervention came from below also. In 1922, 
Louisiana Governor John Parker refused all aid, including the Red Cross, after a flood left 
35,000 homeless. Likewise, Tennessee Governor Austin Peay initially rejected aid after the 1927 
Mississippi floods; he argued locals were to provide for themselves. President Coolidge 
confirmed those views when commenting on the Mississippi floods, which he never saw for 
himself although the seven-state flooded zone equaled the size of New England: 
“The Government is not the insurer of its citizens against the hazards of the elements. We shall 
always have flood and drought, heat and cold, earthquake and wind, lightning and tidal wave, 
which are all too constant in their afflictions. The Government does not undertake to reimburse 





the rebuilding of public works and the humanitarian duty of relieving its citizens of distress” 
(Coolidge 1927 in Kosar, 2005, p.7). 
 
Another assumption was that charitable and private entities should undertake relief and 
reconstruction, instead of the government. The American Red Cross, created in 1889, gained 
prominence in relief provision by trial and error, gathering professionals and volunteers. It could 
have incorporated experiences from San Ciriaco relief through Brigadier General George W. 
Davis, the first U.S. Governor of Puerto Rico, the Central Committee Chairman (1907-1915). 
After World War I, the Red Cross became the closest to a federal disaster-response agency. As a 
congressionally-chartered quasigovernmental organization, its mandate was to establish: 
“a system of national and international relief in time of peace, and to apply the same in 
mitigating the suffering caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great national 
calamities, and to devise and carry out measures for preventing the same” (Kosar, 2005, p.4). 
 
Contemporarily, Congress withdrew its support for Army relief engagement; thus, the Army 
reduced its field interventions, including medical personnel (Foster, 1983).  
 
Yet, the scale of the Mississippi River floods demanded a new approach. The federal government 
opted for a centralized response policy that was decentralized in its execution, a ‘governing by 
network’ scheme (Kosar, 2005). Coolidge created a quasi-governmental commission that 
included five appointed cabinet secretaries and the Red Cross. This commission appealed for 
public donations; and it coordinated relief with local, state and federal resources, Red Cross 
personnel and volunteers, and the private sector. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce and 
elected member of the Red Cross Central Committee, was appointed to direct the relief 





occupied Belgium before the U.S. joined World War I, and for running post-war food programs 
for Europe. Hoover used the media to spread the paradigm of minimalist government 
intervention; insisted on volunteerism, self-sufficiency and entrepreneurialism as values to 
confront the aftermath (McClure, 2011); and the onus of aid recipients to earn it as soon as 
possible. A dominant figure like Hoover clarified the chain of command to federal, state, and 
local officials and the public. Quick inter-institutional coordination included free railroad 
transportation for victims, Coast Guard and Navy boat rescue, and delivery of urgent Army 
supplies to the Red Cross. Yet, those services were loaded with class and race prejudices that 
Hoover and other authorities overlooked. For instance, complains noted poor African-Americans 
being allowed to take supplies or boats only after Whites did, sometimes even animals received 
priority for rescue (J. D. Rivera & Miller, 2007). 
 
Meanwhile, the Red Cross launched a national campaign for donations and activated a web of 
thousands of experienced volunteers with connections on the ground. They sent information to 
Hoover’s headquarters for tailoring the effort; and distributed food, clothing, blankets and 
supplies. Also, the Red Cross created 154 refugee camps, which were a key but contentious 
mechanism for the survival of almost 330,000 persons, mainly African-Americans (Anthony 
Oliver-Smith, 2006). The camps usually provided shelter in tents donated by the Department of 
War, rustic shared bathing and toilet facilities, food, rudimentary medical care, clothing, tobacco, 
some even provided entertainment and home economic courses. Yet, the underpinning 
assumption was that aid indulged vagrancy, recipients had to earn it. Thus, in some camps Black 
evacuees were brutalized, obliged to work at gunpoint or barred from leaving. Also, the Red 





the evacuees’ allotment and conditioned or charged distribution though. Other complains 
included denial of supplies to Black farmers and workers not interned in camps, arbitrary support 
for housing rebuilding and essential furnishing distribution, and insufficient funds to reestablish 
a life
100
. Yet, decentralized execution implied minimal federal supervision and lax accountability 
of relief workers; and Hoover purportedly disregarded race and class-based abuses, controversies 
and criticism (J. D. Rivera & Miller, 2007). 
 
The Mississippi tragedy triggered several policy changes. One was a credit provision plan to help 
disaster victims. Private and state reconstruction corporations established by Hoover were to lend 
money to farmers, sell these loans to the Federal Intermediate Credit Corporation, and continue 
making loans based on the proceeds. Hoover stimulated industrials, merchants and banks in 
affected areas to provide working capital for the corporations by buying stock in them (Kosar, 
2005). Yet, the corporations failed to make loans to those who needed them and ended up being 
a fiasco. Also relevant were the passing of the Mississippi Flood Control Act, in 1928, the most 
expensive governmental undertaking besides participating in World War I (Barry, 1998), 
reinforced by the River and Harbor Act (1930). Both set a precedent for federal involvement into 
spheres traditionally left to state and local authorities and contributed to reshape the role of 
government in the public eye (Arsenault, 2005; Barry, 1998); pivotal to endorse post-
Okeechobee flood control projects –including the path breaking Hoover Dam- and the New Deal. 
An unforeseen policy change was a template of disaster relief, which included social engineering 
in times of dire need, and was used in Puerto Rico months later. 
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 From citizens’ donations to the Red Cross, not governmental contributions, an amount of U$ 77.42 ought to 





In terms of political consequences, at first a few editorials complained that federal expenses did 
not translate into direct aid to flood victims, in a year with record budget surplus. Essentially, 
rescue supplies and salaries for military personnel were covered. Yet, Hoover was in charge of 
reporting relief with no oversee, which enabled his manipulation. Besides, he gained vast sway 
over the media (Kosar, 2005; McClure, 2011), which projected him as a national hero who had 
enough efficiency, intelligence and humanitarianism to become president in the 1928 elections. 
Disaster relief was the opportunity to quickly launch a non-contender into the presidency and, 
paradoxically, it also became his challenge four years later. Abuses in the camps and Hoover’s 
failed promises to African-Americans contributed to alienate Black voters in his re-election 
campaign (J. D. Rivera & Miller, 2007) against Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
 
VI.6. San Felipe relief and incipient policy trends 
San Felipe relief preceded the turning point in the development of disaster management as a U.S. 
federally funded professional endeavor. It also happened at critical moment in history for Puerto 
Rico. It was a challenge to launch effective relief in a background of multifaceted political 
tensions, meager federal engagement, top-down oppression, bottom-up frustration, entrenched 




 of September, 1928, the Red Cross dispatched men experienced in Midwest tornados 
and mostly in the Mississippi floods; they gathered in Charleston S.C. by train, and sailed for 
Puerto Rico the next day on a Navy destroyer. The Red Cross became the administrative office 





Bayonet Díaz, ex-member of the House of Representatives, asked Gov. Towner to steer clear of 
relying on external aid because recovery was a duty of the Puerto Ricans (Schwartz, 2005). 
Deprived of federal funds or a buoyant local economy, U.S. Red Cross chapters launched a 
national campaign to collect cash and in kind donations, which would add to the supplies bought 
with their savings. Although well-meant, gathering and shipping in kind donations became costly 
and inefficient. Once on the island, used clothing was insufficient and inadequate for the tropical 
weather, and the Red Cross hired insular factories for production. Initial relief funds essentially 
came from Red Cross reserves, public donations, improvised grants from governmental 
institutions –particularly the diversion of military stores such as tents and blankets - and free or 
below rate concessions made by public entities and commercial firms on the island and mainland 
(American Red Cross, 1929). The priorities were to avoid food and health crises, provide basic 
shelter and tend to the worst agricultural damages -which became a coffee clean-up program- 
whilst avoiding rebellion. 
 
The fear of famine was well-founded, given the deep-rooted dependency on food imports and 
sudden ruin of foodstuff. Thus, the first step was to distribute mainly rice, beans and dry codfish; 
small amounts of lard, sugar, coffee, salted pork and condensed milk; and direct donations of 
fruits and vegetable from mainland packers or the Dominican Republic. The aim was to provide 
rationing only to children and women tending families or unable to work, but reduce it steadily 
as work opportunities emerged; food would pay for reconstruction works (American Red Cross, 
1929). In other words, the underlying assumption remained that selected aid recipients had to 
earn it as soon as possible. This turned out to be a noxious compensation scheme for workers, as 





2005), and put under the strict supervision of municipal committees, relief workers and planters 
interested in deterring ‘vagrancy’. Borrowing a lesson from the Mississippi flood relief, 
vegetable seeds were distributed to promote quick and acclimated crops. Months later, an 
agricultural expert and member of the Insular Department of Agriculture noted in press better 
produce provision and quality in markets, and lauded the quick avoidance of malnutrition 
(American Red Cross, 1929). Yet, the opening flaw of this initiative emerged soon; seed 
distribution was not neutral. During the first phase, school kitchens feeding the triple amount of 
poor children and farmers in general were said to benefit (American Red Cross, 1929). During 
the next phase, coffee planters received seeds assuming that they would share seeds, produce and 
profits made from sales with their workers. Neither the Red Cross nor any institution reported 
how the latter dynamic unfolded, seemingly trusting the planters’ good will. The next and grave 
flaw of this plan was vented a year later by the new Governor, Theodore Roosevelt Jr. In his 
compelling article for the New York Herald Tribune titled ‘Children of Famine’, December 8
th
; 
Roosevelt’s objective was to extract money from charitable U.S. citizens, not the federal 
government (R. Fernández, 1996). He often saw mothers carrying skeletons, pitiable groups of 
people carrying home-made coffins, around 60% of children being malnourished and many 
starving towards a slow death; all of them Americans he insisted (Roosevelt Jr., 1929). 
 
Fear of a health crisis had a solid foundation also. The Department of Health had established 
hospitals and clinics in the previous decades; yet, average public health before San Felipe was 
precarious. For example, bed capacity was insufficient throughout the island. In order to get 
basic attention, sick isolated highlanders depended on family and neighbors to carry them on 





the aftermath of the hurricane. Insular health inspectors conducted searches on foot for remote 
patients and distributed basic medicines among those unable to move. The Department of Health 
and Red Cross coordinated opening 14 emergency stations in schools, dwellings, tents and clubs; 
whilst the Red Cross extended assistance to 14 established hospitals. Their joint campaigns of 
multiple inoculations and potable water monitoring limited epidemic bouts and leveled general 
health conditions in the short-term. Emergency stations closed by late November and reported 
only a typhoid fever epidemic in Aguadilla, controlled by February (American Red Cross, 1929). 
The Army contributed with hospital supplies, including two field hospitals of 1,000 beds each 
and five medical corps. Following Congress guidelines though, it reduced its engagement 
compared to San Ciriaco regardless of the crisis. 
 
Concerning shelter, as in the Mississippi case, provision divided into refugee camps and 
materials for housing construction or repairs. Information about the Red Cross camps is scarce, 
noting that a few cities like Yabucoa and Arecibo provided land (American Red Cross, 1929). 
Yet, the post-San Ciprián newspaper article by the mentioned American woman provides a 
glimpse to life in the camps. In a primitive location, teepee-like tents of canvas donated by the 
military are the background for refugees on the grass, including naked children, elderly, 





Fig. 86 “S                             H                          ”       S           
 
Destitute refugees carry-on basic activities in a rustic setting  (Wide World photo on (Kairns Champlin, 1933, p. 10). 
 
The Red Cross vaguely reported giving to San Felipe refugees a small sum to start a new 
existence, in which they would somehow replace the tent with a home and provide for 
themselves, as in the Mississippi case. In the absence of support for transitioning, life prospects 
were bleak giving the prevailing conditions of poverty, unaffordable housing, unemployment and 
competition among migrants. They could join slums or create new ones, but violent eviction was 
a reality. Some unauthorized post-hurricane camps or slums “menaced the health and morals of 
their inmates and accordingly had to be broken up” (American Red Cross, 1929, p. 33). 
 
Meanwhile, the distribution of materials for housing repair and construction took longer. 





Red Cross had to import all materials. Moreover, the aim to stop rural exodus from the coffee 
highlands translated to rebuilding negotiations with titled planters, not peasants. Addressing 
agricultural damages evolved from an immediate relief task to a reconstruction priority, 
influenced by the planters’ lobby. Repeating the Mississippi experience, the Red Cross first 
distributed pruning implements and cash for seedling among coffee planters, not workers. Yet, 
those actions failed to cope with the extensive damages and make use of unemployed pauper 
peons. The latter were excluded from cash advances, seed and pruning implements donation; 
they were tightly conditioned to receive food rations; and, as importantly if not more, on the 
brink of unleashing a social crisis as agreed by Red Cross administrators, the local political class 
and U.S. government officials (Schwartz, 2005). In response, a coffee clean-up program 
calculated to have 10,000 workers on payroll, but it started with 25,000 and reached a peak of 
67,000. Those high numbers expose the extent of the destruction, unemployment and the 
workers’ willingness to earn a living, even if low paid and under a tight grip. It also helped that 
the Red Cross arranged insurance given the primitive and hazardous manual work, when the 
Workmen Compensation Act was loosely enforced and non-for profit entities were not required 
to comply (American Red Cross, 1929). 
 
Contemporarily, planters proposed a plan targeting the urban working poor, small planters and 
rural workers -either arrimados or migrants staying in barracks-; in which landowners’ 
supremacy was non-negotiable. Guillermo Esteves, Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico, 
promoted the plan arguing that those groups were entitled to different levels of trust; small 
proprietors were morally reliable but untenured workers should be controlled and deterred from 





properties; the workers’ needs could be addressed later by distributing small parcels and 
rebuilding houses. As a veiled threat, he affirmed that the Red Cross had to face consequences if 
that process was to be accelerated (Schwartz, 2005). Bayonet Díaz favored “solving once and for 
all the problem of hygienic dwelling for our laboring men, and causing to disappear from the 
countryside the wretched sight of the hut [bohío] which is a stigma upon our civilization" 
(Schwartz, 2005, p.44). He proposed an idealized repopulated mountainous landscape where 
eyesore bohíos would give way to orderly cottages inhabited by dedicated small farmers; in other 
words, the materialization of the ancient rural lore of the enduring jíbaro (Schwartz, 2005), but 
without land redistribution. Finally, allocation of materials took place without tenure changes. 
Workers were to build or fix their homes with imported Southern pine boards, roofing of fluted 
galvanized iron, nails and hinges provided by the Red Cross and their meager salary, under the 
vigilant eyes of planters, municipal committees and relief workers. 
 
Meanwhile, U.S. Congress controversies about relief aid resembled San Ciriaco debates; the core 
proposition was to request for interest on funds expended and for third mortgages on destroyed 
properties. Should there be complete or partial waiver of payment of interest on deferred 
payments? Senator Bingham, eyewitness of the devastation and who affirmed that San Felipe 
was the worst hurricane experienced in the West Indies, suggested that the waiver should target 
only those truly bankrupted; and that repayments could start in a year or two. Worse, Minnesota 
representative (R) Harold Knutson pressed for cutting all U.S. involvement; it was time to 
answer autonomy calls: 
“How about Porto Rican resources?....I do not see anything that gives any idea of the capacity 
of the Porto Ricans to take care of themselves…I say that if Porto Rico can independently handle 
the difficulty, she should be given that degree of autonomy” (Join Committee on Insular Affairs 






Kentucky representative (D) Ralph Gilbert was unwilling to help undeserving people. In person, 
Gov. Towner responded clarifying his class-race based argument for aid: 
“It is vastly important that these coffee growers should be helped in this dire necessity because 
we want them to remain in Porto Rico. They are white people. They are good, dependable, 
meritorious class of people. They need more help than anyone else” (Joint Committee on Insular 
Affairs 1928 in R. Fernández, 1996, p. 101). 
 
As a result of those negotiations, the Puerto Rican Hurricane Relief Commission (PRHRC)
101
 
was established by joint Congress resolution on December 21, 1928. It was administered in 
Puerto Rico by the Department of Agriculture, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and Collector 
of Customs at San Juan (National Archives, 2011). Essentially, it was delinked from 
redevelopment, planning, or disaster management goals; its mission was limited to offer credits 
to farmers who reunited tenure, assets or other economic conditions; as Hoover proposed for the 
Mississippi floods. After being the relief torch bearer and main sponsor, the Red Cross left on 
February 28
th
, 1929, expecting arrival of federal funds for reconstruction. Yet, the Wall Street 
Crash in the fall and ensuing Great Recession further reduced federal involvement whilst 
worsening the Puerto Rican crisis. For example, the PRHRC meager options of agricultural 
credits weakened even more when banks with large investments in the sector went bankrupted, 
such as the Banco Territorial Agrícola de Puerto Rico, the American Colonial Bank and the 
Banco Masónico (Sanz 1969 in (Rodríguez Centeno, 2000)). Moreover, a succession of 
hurricanes worsened the situation. In 1930, hurricane San Zenón -also known as Dominican 
Republic- caused minor to moderate wind damage to southern plantations, whilst rainfall was 
dispersed across the island. In 1931, Category 1 hurricane San Nicolás affected the north coast 
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 In 1935, it became the Puerto Rican Hurricane Relief Loan Section (PRHRLS), which essentially continued the 





(Hartwell, 1931), resulting in agricultural losses. Worse was hurricane San Ciprián in 1932; it 
affected a smaller and different area than San Felipe and with less strength -Category 3- yet 
damages were comparable (National Climatic Data Center, 1932; Weightman et al., 1932). 
Again, the American woman´s notes provide judicious knowledge, this time about the poor’s 
vulnerability in the face of San Ciprián. She lived in Carolina but took refuge at her workplace, 
an exclusive private hospital in which damages concentrated on the fifth floor. Whilst she feared 
death, she confused the order in which towns would be hit; but her testimony echoes the lament 
of ‘Temporal’: 
“That first phase of the storm is moving on westward. It is in Carolina now. Then Luiza, Rio 
Grande, Arecibo. What will it do to those poor towns? To all the tumble-down houses near 
Luquillo? To thatched bohíos up in the mountains? So flimsy. Houses on frail-looking pikes. Tiny 
huts jammed full of people. How will people manage to live? Babies? Children? Heaven help all 
those naked children. What's happening even now back in San Juan? Perhaps the second half of 
the storm is already there. Crushing down the hundreds of poor little shacks in Puerta de Tierra, 




Fig. 87 Tracks of Hurricanes San Felipe, San Nicolás and San Ciprián 
 
In four years, three hurricanes devastated the island, map (Miner Solá, 1996, p.50). 
 
Acting Governor James R. Beverly, who held that post in 1929 between Towner and Roosevelt 





emergency committees and created a plain relief fund. Also, he had asked to publicize a warning 
plan of signaling flags flying from city halls and churches, which he credited with lowering 
casualties to 257 (Beverley, 1933). Yet, no other source confirms the effectiveness of these 
signals, unevenly implemented since hurricane San Roque (1893) and useless to isolated people. 
In parallel, police districts were warned 36 hours in advance and radio broadcasts provided 
constant warnings to ships (Mújica-Baker, n.d. after 1998). Although human casualties lowered, 
damages demonstrate extensive vulnerability, 25,000 were homeless, 76,925 families in distress, 
49 municipalities gravely affected, and damages to citrus, one of the few surviving export crops 
(Beverley, 1933). Losses reached U.S. $30-40 millions. In the absence of a disaster management 
institution, Beverly directed the National Guard and Insular Police to launch immediate rescue 
tasks, prisoners and volunteers went to clear streets, local officials activated relief committees 
focused on collecting cash and in kind donations, whilst the Red Cross established feeding 
stations and distributed medical supplies. 
Fig. 88 "Ruins at Central 'Carmen', San Ciprián Hurricane, Porto Rico" 
 






Fig. 89 San Ciprián devastation probably in San Juan 
 
 
Beverley received condolences and instructions from President Hoover; when radio station 
WKAQ reopened, he announced them along an appeal for civic participation and the news of 
reduced federal support compared to San Felipe relief: 
“due to the difficult economic situation in the continental United States, we must not and could 
not expect to receive such generous aid as we had received after the disaster in 1928” (Beverley, 
1933, p. 4). 
 
 
During the previous month of July, Hoover had signed the Emergency Relief and Construction 
Act (ERCA) and created the Emergency Relief Administration (ERA) to launch public works 
and operate relief programs via loans given to states. Those initiatives should come into play 
urgently, as destruction by the recent hurricanes was undeniable even for conservative ex-
Governor Theodore Roosevelt Jr.: 
  
According to Gov. Beverley, 
in San Juan, Hato Rey and 
Río Piedras hundreds of 
houses were totally 
destroyed, debris took over 
roads and streets, all light 
and telephone poles and 
wires were down and trees 
were uprooted everywhere 
(Wide World photo on 






“At periodic intervals the Island is swept by violent hurricanes. These are bad enough when they 
merely destroy the crop, as in the case of sugar; but with citrus fruits and coffee they often 
destroy the trees, which means that the damage can only be repaired by an entirely new planting 
and after a long period of growth. In recent years these disasters have been unusually common. 
Thus there was an exceedingly bad hurricane in 1928 and another in 1932; while in between was 
a somewhat slighter one which, however, did destroy a large percentage of the crops on the 
north coast”.  (Roosevelt Jr., 1934, p. 274). 
 
Yet, Puerto Rico should anticipate even less federal support than before, as communicated by 
Beverley on Hoover’s behalf.
 
Another mechanism of federal relief disengagement during San 
Ciprián was the Army’s negligible contributions; namely the use of barracks, limited supplies 
and rescue personnel. Such abandon given the catastrophe stirred arguments on the island and 
mainland; thus, the War Department asked to clarify the situation and reevaluate the Army's role 
in disaster relief. General Douglas MacArthur, at that time Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, 
attributed the decision to a reduced budget and congressional refusal to reimburse the institution. 
A report endorsed by MacArthur suggested waiting for the ‘repercussions of the Porto Rican 
controversy’ to water down, before announcing further relief restrictions. The argument was that 
stocks left after World War I were reduced to a minimum, forcing the Army to cease its 
generosity: 
"The time has arrived when the War Department must cease to be regarded as an eleemosynary 
institution and insist upon a strict observance of the law regarding the use of public property" 
(Foster, 1983, p. 116). 
 
Politically, Puerto Rico was heading for havoc without safety breaks. Again, the incipient plans 
and actions by the not so new rulers, particularly those concerning the neediest ones, implied a 
pathetic vision of what constituted development and how to achieve it. In brief, disaster relief 
extended the foundations for more underdevelopment and fueled demands for independence. On 





but in terms of cutting U.S. involvement to overcome San Felipe mayhem. Although this 
proposition did not materialize, meager federal relief and reconstruction funds were insufficient 
to confront the catastrophe. Even worse, they were meant to diminish in the aftermath of San 
Ciprián, irrespective of the aggravated situation. On the other hand, the expanding crisis, neglect 
and injustices motivated more Puerto Ricans to join armed pro-independence platforms. 
 
VI.7. Conclusions 
San Felipe -and San Ciprián- preceded the turning point in the development of disaster 
management as a U.S. federally funded professional endeavor. Some facets of disaster 
management show improvement; others were extremely backward, in correspondence with a 
feeble understanding of human rights, development policy-making and planning. Systematic 
local knowledge construction became more sophisticated in technological terms; still shaped by 
military aims and procedures, and standard recordkeeping that neglected the political economy 
of disasters and unscientific characterizations. Better means of communication preventively 
informed citizens according to official sources, which could partially explain why there were 
significantly less casualties even if San Felipe is the strongest hurricane recorded locally. 
Moreover, a few new agencies had undertaken initial and uncoordinated actions that would have 
spatial consequences on disaster management. For instance, the Puerto Rican Irrigation Services, 
substituted by the Department of Interior and next by the Bureau for the Use of Water Resources, 
started to change the hydraulic regime to secure water and electricity provision. During the late 
1920s in the U.S., there was a new understanding of engineering interventions controlling floods 





canals and the like were launched; desiccated flood-prone areas started to be used for agriculture 
and urbanization, which extreme events or systemic failures would put at risk decades later. 
Also, urbanization of coastal ecosystems for high-end tourism and housing started in San Juan. 
In parallel, several acts and the Homestead Commission launched housing and land tenure 
provision without improving large deficits. 
 
Social hierarchy and disaster vulnerability remained correlated as implied in qualitative 
information. Insufficient planning and investment in hard and soft infrastructure augmented 
selective vulnerability; combined with structural precariousness -reflected in appalling working 
conditions, healthcare, food security and education-, and with the deleterious impacts of 
questionable relief. Once more, at the core of causing selective disaster vulnerability were 
planning decisions, including coastal urbanization, ‘uneven geographical development’ as the 
standard of urban growth, limited use of modern technology in exclusive areas, discriminatory 
land markets that left risk-prone areas for the poor to settle in, infrastructure and service 
provision investment for the upper echelons and extraction of exports, extremely precarious 
housing, and land tenure insecurity. Self protection in tormenteras was the only protection 
mechanism that some of the rural poor could plan and implement. Besides, low investment in 
education reflected on superstitions concerning hurricanes, whilst some religious practices 
remained solid. Highlanders forecasted based on avocado crops and odd animal behaviors. 
Catholic practices included naming storms according to saints, using churches as refuges, 
praying and putting branches or burning them to ward off storms. Noticeably, there are no traces 





accelerated economic downfall, social fractures, political and cultural changes; independence 
ideals and rhetorical constructs emerged disregarding disasters as a core political topic. 
 
After San Felipe and San Ciprián, direct communications from the respective U.S. presidents in 
office showed the visibility of the Puerto Rican crises, in a national appeal for donations in the 
first case and in a message broadcasted by a local radio as soon as it was possible in the second 
case. Yet, such visibility did not imply commitment because relief was not a governmental 
responsibility and the survival of Puerto Ricans was not a basic right. Correspondingly, there was 
no governmental leadership in that critical phase of the disaster cycle; only because the situation 
was extremely terrible the Army intervened, but with increasing limitations. For San Felipe, the 
U.S. Red Cross stepped up in the absence of federal institutions, local Red Cross chapters, 
analogous entities, or strong municipal authorities. Without the accountability, funding and full 
professional staff of a federal disaster-response agency, the U.S. Red Cross played such role for a 
couple of months, depending on volunteers and professionals, donations and its experience in the 
mainland –specifically the controversial 1927 Mississippi floods-. In sum, relief was 
characterized by inequality, minimal improvised procedures, and lack of stable, liable 
institutions. Again, an ad hoc and highly debatable relief scheme was better than nothing; it 
avoided an even worse humanitarian catastrophe and it granted some benefits to the local elites. 
Yet, its power scope was too limited and short to set the island for an economic transition instead 
of the ensuing collapse, accompanied by violence.  
 
The next chapter will examine what happened after F.D. Roosevelt defeated H. Hoover in the 





precedent set by the Flood Control Act and launched the New Deal, which on the island started 
with the Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Administration, in 1933, turned into the Puerto Rican 
Reconstruction Administration, in 1935. This strategic move would be accompanied by other 
vast developmental efforts, not free from controversy, when political effervescence and 
governmental repression exploded. Tensions escalated to the civilian massacre of Río Piedras 
(1935), and news about the critical situation reached Vito Marcantonio, progressive New York 
Congressman and spokesman for the island. During his first Congress intervention concerning 
Puerto Rico, in 1935, he asked to rethink the U.S. relationship noticing how land grabs by large 
sugar corporations and the hurricanes had desperately cornered people in welfare and urban 
slums (Marcantonio 1935 in Meyer, n.d.). Yet, his singular voice did not find echo, whilst 
pressure on the ground was intensifying. A year later, Colonel Francis Riggs was assassinated on 
the island by two nationalists, which led to retaliation through the Massacre of Ponce in 1937, 
considered the worst bloodbath in recent Puerto Rican history. 
Fig. 90 Ponce Massacre 
 
 
On Marina and Aurora streets, 
eighteen armed policemen exhibit 
brutality and some prepare to 
shoot not “at the uniformed 
nationalists [on the right] but at a 
terrorized crowd in full flight” 
(Muñoz Marín 1937 in Rosario 
Natal, n.d., p. 6) on the left. Image: 






Next hurricane, Santa Clara (1956), would take place at a different historical crossroad because 
Puerto Rico had become a U.S. Commonwealth in 1952. Santa Clara posed a multifaceted 
challenge because the island experienced structural reforms without a disaster crisis. Thus, Santa 
Clara would be a test to the Governor and the Commonwealth’s capacities; the connections 
between the President, Governor and local opposition; new disaster legislative and institutional 
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Chapter N.VII Hurricane Santa Clara (1956): the New Deal legacies 
and the Commonwealth, between avocado forecasting or storm 
bombing 
 
VII.1. A tale of destructive landfall: Characterization of Santa Clara 
“we heard sounds of ripping wood, tearing down neighboring shacks, only one hundred yards to 
our right. Then, the zinc plates started to fly shooting, as when a croupier cuts cards in a casino. 
Horrified, we saw how neighboring shacks became roofless, naked, whilst others started to 
collapse. First was Mr. Ramírez, then Miss Jackson and they continued like domino pieces, full 
speed. Very soon, the entire façade of that block seemed completely destroyed. And all had 
happened in fractions of seconds. “My God! This looks like an atomic bomb!” my father 
exclaimed. The lashing kept merciless. My little town continued under that unforgiving attack for 
at least two more hours. Then, the much mentioned virazón
102
 started hitting from the other 
side…the final blow, as our grandparents said happened during San Felipe or San Ciprián” 
(Fernández Gordián, 2003, p.31). 
 
That was the landfall of hurricane Santa Clara in the city of Yabucoa, southwest Puerto Rico, 
according to a 16 year-old middle-low income boy. The testimony is written in a short but 
revealing story self-published almost 50 years later by a diasporic Puerto Rican, and it usefully 
frames the initial discussion of Santa Clara. Unlike typical writings of the day, it is a vivid grass-
root experiential account that also reflects an updated perspective of contextual changes such as 
urbanization, social hierarchies, migration, religious beliefs and superstitions, technology, 
leadership, and institutional vacuums concerning disasters. 
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Octavio, the protagonist boy, and his family of jíbaros safely witnessed the hurricane because 
they had fled the decaying countryside. They had sold their small property to rent an apartment 
in a new and dense public housing project, caserío, outside the historical center: 
“the latest in social justice in Puerto Rico at that time, where Muñoz Marín had given an 
opportunity to live in an ‘optimal’ house to those from the slums and poor neighborhoods” 




 of August started as a cloudless day and some locals did not believe a storm 
was approaching; one argued that television meteorologist ‘Mackdowell’
103
 had not given 
certainty. Also, only minor storms occurred after San Felipe and San Ciprián, 28 and 24 years 
before respectively; and such time lapse debilitated the perception of danger to inexperienced 
generations. Octavio’s mother heard the warning from an American pilot; and his father believed 
him because “those Americans know more than the devil” (Fernández Gordián, 2003, p. 11) p. 
11. In other words, they thought there was a relevant knowledge gap between them and 
Americans. In the afternoon, they bought supplies such as canned food, kerosene, matches and 
candles; but they carried on as usual. Octavio went playing and swimming in the river with his 
friends; eventually they noticed a sudden perturbing silence of birds and general quietness, and 
hurried back in the midst of light rain. Still, meteorological conditions were not menacing, and 
Octavio went on to spy an exclusive Black-tie ball at the local casino. He headed home when the 
rain increased, although people at the ball kept partying with the band singing a Plena jingle “Al 
son de la virazón” (To the rhythm of the virazón). 
 
After midnight, a civilian woman improvised a hurricane alert call from her car, equipped with 
loudspeakers for her business. She urged people to wake up, get ready and search for refuge. 
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 Professor Dr. Dawson Clay McDowell presented the daily weather news on Telenoticias del Mundo (WKAQ-TV 





Thus, Octavio’s father went to pick up his mother, who had left her old house searching for 
refuge at her neighbors’ basement; he also brought along family friends. Meanwhile, Octavio’s 
mother started to prepare coffee and an extra-large pot of rice fearing an electrical blackout. 
When the winds and rain worsened, women started praying the rosary and men were busy 
sealing windows and doors inside the house. After the virazón, people rushed to bare handedly 
rescue neighbors trapped under collapsed structures. According to Octavio, there were no 
helicopters, walkie-talkies, Civil Defense or federal agency to rely on. He compared the 
aftermath destruction to Hiroshima, his grandmother lost her mind when she saw her little house 
had vanished, and they spent six months without electricity and school. The woman who 
launched the alert was celebrated as a national heroine by newspapers and Governor José Luis 
Alberto Muñoz Marín. 
 
Fig. 91 "Yabucoa is a ghost town, like Okinawa" 
 
As Octavio’s story, the daily newspaper 
El Mundo compared the extensive 
destruction in Yabucoa to WWII  
destruction in Japan, image by (Tooker, 
1956). Federal and island agencies 
addressed together nuclear fallout, 
hurricanes and other disasters; as part of 





Contemporary non-literary accounts show coincidences with Octavio’s story and other data that 
expands the characterization of Santa Clara. For instance, the secularization of disaster 
management was advancing, and one reflection was the dual naming of Santa Clara. In Puerto 
Rico, it was named after the saint day of landfall, according to Catholic tradition. Meanwhile, 
American scientists called it Betsy
104
, based on their proposition to name hurricanes according to 
alphabetical order, which was standardized a few years later. Also, the newly launched National 
Hurricane Research Project was funding novel air borne and land-based radar observations, 
combined with upper air soundings and other techniques to improve forecasting. As part of the 
project and just a few days before Santa Clara landed, a storm detection radar had been installed 
in the San Juan Weather Bureau at the Airport. It was one of the three earliest radar stations in 
U.S. territory
105
; and these radars could cover approximately 250 miles, which limited their 
precision. The Ramey Air Force Base on the northwest of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Naval Base 




, surface ships sent storm warnings to Puerto Rico; a day later an aircraft 
penetrated the storm and confirmed the need to announce hurricane watch, changed and televised 
as hurricane warning on the 11
th
. In the early hours of the 12
th
, Santa Clara bounced 2-3 times off 
the southeast coast and made landfall in Maunabo as a Category 1 hurricane in the Saffir-
Simpson scale, with sustained wind speeds over 90 mph. It moved towards Yabucoa, and then 
towards Guayama and Patillas. It traversed the island in a northwesterly direction, passing over 
Cayey, Aibonito, Barranquitas, Orocovis, Morovis and Ciales. Yet, the eye of the hurricane 
deteriorated as the central mountain range slowed the lower part of the system and the upper part 
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continued its forward displacement; altogether wind velocity decreased
106
. When leaving the 
mountains, the eye recuperated its structure and widened, passing over Manatí, Arecibo and 
leaving by Camuy between three and four hours after landfall. Overall, Santa Clara was a rather 
small, weak and fast Cape Verdean hurricane, with an average speed of 17 mph. It followed an 
erratic course and the rainfall average was also modest, 3.16 inches, with extremes of half an 
inch on the southwest, and 8 inches in the central range, southeast and northeast. The worst 
damages took place approximately 20 miles north and south of the eye track, in lower southeast 
areas (J. A. Colón, 1959; Dunn et al., 1956; R. J. Grace, 1956). 
 
Fig. 92 Santa Clara track, rainfall, and island topography 
 
 
The heavy line indicates the hurricane track based on the San Juan Radar. The map also shows contours in 1000 ft 
intervals and distribution of total recorded rainfall, image by (J. A. Colón, 1959, p. 79). This information was a new 
analytical tool to understand the interaction between topography, hurricane track and rain. 
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Fig. 93 Santa Clara track and worse destruction 
 
The central line is the hurricane path, plotted numbers give aircraft and land radar fixes in GTM and stippled area is 
where the greatest damage occurred, image by (R. J. Grace, 1956, p. 312). 
 
Fig. 94 Radar scope images of Santa Clara  
 
After WWII, reduced security constrains on military technology enabled the use of radars to gather meteorological 
data. Santa Clara radar scopes (J. A. Colón, 1959, p. 78) were used by the Puerto Rican media to communicate the 
event and by U.S. and Puerto Rican scientists to expand crucial knowledge 
 
Santa Clara caused between 9 and 16 casualties, which have been credited to its weakness, little 





meteorological knowledge, warnings and built environment; and use of rural self-built refuges 
called ‘tormenteras’. Yet, destruction was widespread. In the following days, the devastation in 
the southeast came to the forefront news, including public health concerns of epidemic outbreaks 
in places such as Yabucoa and Maunabo (UP, 1956), and vast impacts over the economy and 
built environment -infrastructure, industries but mostly precarious housing-. Initially, mainstream 
media published that three percent of the housing stock was destroyed -approximately 15,000 
homes- (Tooker, 1956). Yet, those numbers could indicate underestimation hard to track in 
scarce official contemporary data. For instance, in Yabucoa alone between 12,000 and 15,000 
homeless were reported at the outset. Another proxy of housing ruin was the improvised 
widespread use of public schools as shelters, not churches, as it had been traditional. Almost fifty 
thousand students found their schools occupied as shelters (undetermined number), destroyed 
(156) or severely damaged (315), and hastily interrupted their lessons, a situation lasting months; 
as a result, the hurricane affected the education of a generation (Bluedorn & Cascio, 2005). 
Damages totaled over U$40 million, approximately 5% of annual GDP, with large losses in 
agriculture -export crops and foodstuff-, which had impacts on food security. For example, in the 
fertile lower valleys southwest of Cayey, an eyewitness account reported complete destruction of 
vegetation; whilst in the mountain ridges -where no crops were planted- trees seemed unharmed 
(R. J. Grace, 1956). An evaluation by forestry professionals confirmed far-reaching vegetation 





Fig. 95 Devastation in the Central Mountain Range, Rabanal, Cidra 
 
 




Puerto Rican newspapers El Mundo, El Imparcial, and the Puerto Rican World Journal focused 
on Santa Clara in the following weeks. My review of El Mundo reveals that as the days passed 
data, flaws and contradictions emerged, changing the characterization of this hurricane. Initially, 
On a razed house ruins, a man laments Santa Clara passing (Brandenberry, 1956). 





Gov. Muñoz Marín was projected as a benevolent leader in control. For example, the next day 
headline was “Muñoz will give funds, another help for the people” (El Mundo, 1956g, p. 1).  
 
Hours after Santa Clara left, two El Mundo journalists travelled on separate inspection flights. 
According to their reports, San Juan experienced relatively few damages, mostly fallen 
vegetation and minor flooding. However, to the east of San Juan, Río Grande de Loíza had 
caused extensive flooding in Carolina and Loíza; to the west, Bayamón and Trujillo Alto and 
industrial facilities in Barceloneta were flooded. Outside the metropolitan area, damages 
increased. For example, sugar, pineapple, bananas, plantains, minor crops and dwellings were 
devastated in the northwest of the island; and descriptions of ruin grew sharper as flights 
approached the path of Santa Clara: 
“When the plane moved over the course of La Plata River, we were seeing the destruction 
caused by hurricane winds; numerous houses, big and small, were scattered over the hills. When 
we flew over the municipality of Naranjito, we realized that we were over the area where the 
hurricane vortex passed. All plantain areas seemed destroyed and at least seven out of ten 
ranchos [rural homes, bohíos] had been totally wrecked and the rest were damaged. In some 
places, only empty plots remained, wood and zinc plates were scattered all over the 
mountains….[when flying over the Central Range] we saw again scenes of destroyed houses and 
by the side of a bunch of rubble or empty lot, the tormentera, salvation table of the jíbaros from 
our mountains, through which many lives are saved when a hurricane hits us”(Uffret, 1956, p. 
38). 
 
Another debated topic was the forecasting practiced by farmers from the interior called 
aguacateros, because they used aguacate -avocado- crops for their predictions. On July 26
th
, El 
Mundo had published an interview with two aguacateros, who announced a hurricane. Based on 
this article, the Coffee Planters Association recommended to its members buying insurance for 
crops and plantations ( Margenat, 1956). Two days after Santa Clara landed, the same 





Island confirms the Avocado Forecasting’. Businessman Segismundo Galinanes did not work on 
agriculture, yet he was treated as a forecasting authority: 
“Really the meteorological forecast of the avocado trees has been disliked by everybody, 
because when it became a reality last Sunday, it caused anxiety, intranquility and fears; and in 
addition, it caused considerable agricultural losses and interrupted vital services such as 
electricity and telephone. However, those who joked about the avocado tree forecast are thinking 
right now that there must be some truth in the theory sustained by thousands of persons in cities 
and countryside of Puerto Rico: that when the avocado trees do not flourish and the crop is 
meager, there are great probabilities of being hit by a hurricane” (Galinanes 1956 in Margenat, 
1956, p. n. a.). 
 
The other avocado forecasting expert interviewed, Mr. Herminio Rodríguez Alvarez, affirmed 
that his technique went beyond his simple experiences; he was based on his ancestors’ expertise, 
they had always considered the avocado trees seriously. Another factor validating his knowledge 
was the observation of his poultry. Hens, roosters and chickens got down from tree branches and 
upper racks of the henhouse to hide underneath his house, running nervously and making noises 
around 5 am. Based on his animals’ behavior, he figured out the hurricane was making landfall 
soon, half an hour before the next Weather Bureau radio bulletin confirmed it (Margenat, 1956). 
 
Contextually, Santa Clara happened at a historical crossroad, after the New Deal and the most 
violent years the island had become a U.S. Commonwealth (1952), which technically meant self-
governing powers bound by U.S. federal jurisdiction. Almost two decades of U.S. rule over 
Puerto Rico since San Felipe had contradictory aims and effects. Continuous extractive policies 
created inequality, poverty, vulnerability and turmoil (J. L. Dietz, 1989). As this chapter 
discusses, the New Deal overcame havoc moving from scant relief aid to a comprehensive 
planning paradigm, integrated in the island economic growth equation; later bolstered by the 





pro-independence sector represented by the Nationalist Party (M. R. Rodríguez, 2002). Santa 
Clara showed inconsistencies of this asymmetrical relationship. Using a new style of political 
leadership, the first elected Puerto Rican Governor carved his leading role during relief, 
reassuring his government’s capacities. Oddly, I did not find any post-hurricane evaluation; the 
proxy used has been the yearly Governor´s speech to Congress, who underplayed Santa Clara 
and his administration failures. Perhaps documents of a critical nature were not widely 
circulated, have been lost, or remain uncatalogued in the archives consulted. The experiential and 
unfiltered testimony by the man from Yabucoa, used to begin this chapter, was not the type of 
printed information circulating at that time. The two male aguacateros’ are an unusual presence 
of grassroots interpretations about hurricanes in the media, but they only made headlines because 
of their correct guessing. In 1958, the Commonwealth Division of Community Education 
(DIVEDCO) finished pedagogic materials, including a movie called ‘Huracán’, two posters, a 
booklet and bulletin. The U.S. director of ‘Huracán’, filming crew, narrator and most empowered 
actors are men. The booklet writers, editor, illustrators and printers were men (except one). All 
original writings consulted reflect the views of influential men although not necessarily in top 
positions of power, such as U.S. and Puerto Rican politicians, elite members, intellectuals; but 
also middle-income journalists, artists, and scientists. Such change could point to increased 
access to education
107
 and media outlets. Thus, in the reporting of Santa Clara the voices of 
marginalized citizens due to gender, class, race and age remained silenced from entering their 
experiences in the public record, and from shaping policies accordingly. An upper class, top-
down view of the event prevails. 
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VII.2 Santa Clara characterized in multidisciplinary, artistic, Circum-Caribbean, local, 
multi-hazard, multi-storm terms 
In terms of a multidisciplinary production of knowledge, Santa Clara can be characterized as a 
lost opportunity. Compared to San Ciriaco and even San Felipe, Santa Clara has been essentially 
understudied as part of other topics or in itself. I found that few disciplines have examined it, 
including meteorology (J. A. Colón, 1959; Dunn et al., 1956; R. J. Grace, 1956), forest biology 
(Wadsworth & Englerth, 1959), epidemiology (Masi et al., 1958), and economics (Bluedorn & 
Cascio, 2005) more akin to social science due to its focus on education. 
 
In the arts, there are several traces of Santa Clara that are under examined. DIVEDCO film 
‘Huracán’, related posters, booklet and bulletin involved known and upcoming multi-disciplinary 
artists, as I show later. It is the only Commonwealth cultural project concerning hurricane 
awareness, and it was meant to have ample circulation even in remote locations through official 
initiatives. In 2007, a Texan-based Puerto Rican dance company launched the musical 
‘Sembrando Herencia’ (Planting Inheritance), attributing to San Ciriaco and Santa Clara key 
historical roles (Angelito Borincano, 2007); the latter because of its connection to the 1950s 
‘Great Migration’ of Puerto Ricans to the U.S. 
 
Santa Clara affected several territories in the Circum-Caribbean. It was detected as tropical wave 
when moving through the eastern tropical Atlantic on August 6th. The system organized quickly, 
and on August 10
th
, Santa Clara changed from a tropical storm to a Category 3 hurricane on the 
Saffir-Simpson scale, with sustained winds between 111-130 miles per hour. On August 11
th
, it 





and Guadeloupe, where 18 persons died. After emerging into the northeast Caribbean Sea, the 
hurricane turned to the northwest, passing close to the Leeward Islands and south of the Virgin 
Islands. It left Puerto Rico as a Category 1 hurricane yet Santa Clara regained strength in the 
ocean due to warmer temperature and humidity. From August 13
th
 to August 16
th
, it was 
designated a Category 2 hurricane; it recurved across the southeast Bahamas, causing damages in 
Salvador and Turks. Then, it followed an erratic path north, threatening the eastern part of 
Florida. It moved between the East coast and Bermuda before becoming an extra tropical 
cyclone on the 18
th
, and dissipating off the coast of Nantucket (Dunn et al., 1956), although it 
sunk a ship in the Grand Banks offshore Canada (Government of Canada, 2009). Santa Clara 
caused less regional damages than San Felipe or San Ciriaco; but the Lesser Antilles –chiefly 
Guadeloupe-, San Salvador and Turks were battered. Regional damages notwithstanding, I found 







Fig. 97 Tracks of Santa Clara (Betsy), tropical storms and hurricanes during 1956 
 
Hurricane tracking reflects an improvement in precision and an understanding of the need to visualize hurricanes in 
a hemispheric perspective  (Dunn et al., 1956, p. 437) . 
 
The possibility of learning from San Ciriaco in multi-hazard terms is not feasible; two minor 
seisms and one associated tsunami happened (1943 and 1946) and their damages were negligible 
(Gobierno de Puerto Rico, 2009-2012). 
 
The opportunity of learning from Santa Clara in multi-storm terms has not been developed. 
Exceptionally, only two hurricanes affected the island lightly with no casualties but extensive 
flooding. Minor and medium storms and floods damages are not evident in the mainstream 
information, which maintains the profile of a static and imprecise listing of track, physical 









VII.3 Economic growth and urbanization vis-à-vis disasters  
Differentiated vulnerability or resilience to Santa Clara was partially shaped by the New Deal 
and –to shorter extent- Commonwealth policies that changed the interplay between economic 
growth, urbanization and risks, with long-term improvements but also flaws. In the 1932 U.S. 
presidential elections, Franklin Delano Roosevelt defeated Herbert Hoover; a different vision of 
government was endorsed. During the start of four consecutive terms (1933-1945), the Roosevelt 
administration New Deal centered on the “3 Rs" -relief, recovery, and reform- and would 
directly address vulnerability and disasters as discussed in section VII.5. In Puerto Rico, the New 
Deal (1933-1948) eventually created the platform to launch key changes, including the 
Commonwealth status (Estado Libre Associado or Free Associated State) and Muñoz Marín 
becoming its first and lasting Governor
108
. In 1933, the Federal Emergency Relief Act was 
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the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD), Popular Democratic Party banner, without his socialist pro-independence 
goals. In 1948, he became Governor and was re-elected three consecutive terms (16 years). 
Box N.5 Summary of 20
th




, Hurricane San Calixto initially passed far south of Puerto Rico in a 
westerly direction. Abruptly, the storm took a northward direction and passed 70 miles west of 
Puerto Rico; 60 mph winds caused housing destruction from Cabo Rojo to Aguadilla. Rainfall 
reached 12 to 18 inches and caused flooding throughout the island. San Calixto also hit the 




, Hurricane San Mateo caused damages in Saint Croix before passing 
approximately 40-60 nautical miles south of Puerto Rico. The winds reached 80 mph near the 
center and caused minor damages in the south and southwest of the island; however, flooding 
damages were widespread. 
 









, and with its funds Roosevelt’s administration reconstituted the Emergency Relief 
Administration (ERA)
110
 into the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA)
111
. As a 
counterpart, the Puerto Rican Emergency Relief Administration (PRERA) was created to 
distribute food, create jobs, stimulate the economy and build infrastructure. All tasks required 
planning skills as understood now; yet, only the latter was part of the urban planning profession 
then
112
. Soon, three outstanding U.S. figures visited the island and advanced plans and changes. 
Lady Ann Eleanor Roosevelt, economist Rexford Guy Tugwell –then part of the New Deal 
‘Brain Trust’, later New York City's Planning Commissioner, Puerto Rican Governor and 
prominent pioneering figure of ‘blueprint’ or “rational’ model of planning (Friedmann, 1981)
113
 
that under his aegis would mark the island-, and President Roosevelt. In parallel, political 
effervescence was rising. 
 
In March of 1934, Eleanor Roosevelt traveled to Haiti, the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. In 
San Juan, she visited areas devastated by San Ciprián such as ‘El Fanguito’ (The Little Mud 
hole) and ‘La Perla’ (The Pearl) slums, much to the chagrin of local elites and tourism boosters 
(Ducas, 1934). She was accompanied by Rexford Guy Tugwell and Luis Muñoz Marín, then a 
rising politician who capitalized on his links to the U.S. administration. Eleanor’s compelling 
                                                 
109 This act superseded the Emergency Relief and Construction Act (ERCA) signed by Hoover, in 1932. 
110 ERA was created during Hoover’s presidency based on ERCA, to launch public works and operate relief 
programs via loans given to states. 
111 FERA was replaced by the Work Progress Administration (WPA) in 1935. 
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 Centered on spatial regional planning, zoning, ordinances and covenants, and city beautification projects. 
113
 In theory, it emphasized extensive quantitative assessments, predictive modeling, and design to improve the built 
environment, particularly through spatial factors. It relied on specialists such as architects, urban designers, and 
engineers; it incorporated public officials and private developers, yet disregarded public participation. Such choice 





report of the hurricane aftermath, poverty and exploitation; and the media coverage of her trip 
paved the road for the New Deal. For instance, next October, she published an editorial directed 
to U.S. women titled “Our Island Possessions”, in the monthly magazine Woman's Home 
Companion, which at that time reached a circulation peak around four million: 
“Puerto Rico has a better rainfall than the Virgin Islands and we hope that the frequent 
hurricanes of the past three years are not going to continue for hitherto she has only suffered 
occasionally from these. They have done a great deal of harm, practically ruining the coffee 
plantations and citrus and coconut groves. 
On this account many Puerto Ricans have gone from the rural districts into the outskirts of the 
cities where dangerous slums have been formed. The population of about 1,600,000 people 
cannot be fed by what is produced on the land no matter what improved methods of agriculture 
are instituted. We are at last waking up to the fact that a long term plan must be made for this 
island and it is at present being worked out, including all the government departments concerned 
and a committee of Puerto Ricans themselves…the standards of living in Puerto Rico are low. 
The population is increasing rapidly. This island is closely tied to our country the people are 
constantly coming here to establish themselves and we are sending some of our own people to 
Puerto Rico to work and live on the island. Therefore, let us take a more intelligent interest in 
our beautiful possession with its possibilities for a happy people who unfortunately have been 
buffeted by nature and exploited by man. So women let us think a little about our future citizens 
in all these islands and try to bring about wherever our flag lies conditions of which we can be 
proud”(E. Roosevelt, 1934). 
 
President Roosevelt visited the island next July 6–7. He arrived to Mayagüez on board the USS 
Houston (CA 30), traveled to Ponce and San Juan, where he made a farewell radio speech in 
which he also emphasized the need for planning: 
“I was here thirty years ago and it seems to me than in those years a great deal of progress has 
been made, but I believe also that the progress that you have made in the past is very small 
compared with the progress that you are going to make in the future…We cannot accomplish 
everything in one year. In fact, we must look ahead for a great many years, and that is why we 
have all come to an agreement in principle for the rehabilitation of Puerto Rico. That plan, of 
course, will take a great many years to accomplish, but I hope and I am confident that all of you 












Fig. 98 Eleanor Roosevelt (wearing a white hat) visits 
La Perla slum, San Juan 
Fig. 99 Franklin D. Roosevelt with Sen. Valdés 
Cobián in Mayagüez, Puerto Rico (n.a., 1934) 
 
 
“During her inspection trip through this section of town 
Mrs. Roosevelt came upon this pool and asked the 
photographer to take a picture of it, "to show really what it 
is like". During her shocking journey in squalor and 
disease, the First Lady was followed by members of the 
populace clad in rags, naked children and barking dogs. 
She was deeply touched by the desolate scene and 
conferred with local welfare workers regarding possible 
remedies” (Bettmann/CORBIS, 1934). 
“I believe in better homes -that means bringing back a 
better family life, better living conditions, a better 
chance for education, and a better chance for every 
person to earn their livelihood…I am looking forward 
to the solving of these problems just as fast here on the 
island as we will solve them in the continental part of 
the United States …I know that you will cooperate in 
what we are trying to do for the United States, not only 
here but in all parts of the nation ” (F. D. Roosevelt, 
1934). 
 
In 1935, based on Executive Order 7057, PRERA became the Puerto Rican Reconstruction 
Administration (PRRA) and channeled the New Deal. The same year, the Puerto Rican 
Hurricane Relief Commission (PRHRC)
114  
became the Puerto Rican Hurricane Relief Loan 
Section (PRHRLS) and essentially continued loan adjustments
115
. Those institutional shifts 
signaled how the New Deal economic development equation integrated more than scant relief aid 
during emergencies, but a comprehensive planning paradigm that transcended the contemporary 
planning profession. PRRA developed scientific programs to address socioeconomic issues and 
                                                 
114 PRHRC was established by joint Congress resolution in 1928, to undertake San Felipe reconstruction 
emphasizing credit to farmers who reunited tenure, assets or other economic conditions; as Hoover did after the 
1927 Mississippi floods. Essentially, it was not linked to development, planning, or disaster management goals. Its 
success was very limited, and options of agricultural credits weakened even more when banks with large 
investments in the sector went bankrupted after the 1929 stock crash. 
115





deficits of the built environment, protecting commodities and eventually lay citizens also; while 
preserving the U.S. interests and other questionable aims by force if needed. Such inconsistent 
goals had a lasting sway. Since then, influential studies
116
 sustaining rational planning were 
produced with two aims: a) gather and produce knowledge including economics, development, 
healthcare, agriculture, meteorology, mining, calorie intake, geographic and photographic works; 
b) justify policies in areas such as birth control, medicine testing, nutrition, agriculture, social 
work, industrialization and public works –i.e. electrification, dams, highways, housing and 
schools-. In sum, PRRA promoted the image of the U.S. as a modern state engaged with daily 
life during chaos (M. R. Rodríguez, 2002), whilst introducing a supposedly scientific yet 
questionable logic of domination over people, nature and the built environment. For instance, 
since 1898, U.S. authorities blamed overpopulation for unemployment and precarious housing, 
healthcare, nutrition, and education; instead of focusing on extreme power asymmetries. In 1937, 
the passage of Law 116 institutionalized a population control program created by the Eugenics 
Board, known in Puerto Rico as ‘La Operación’ (The Operation). Sponsored by private 
foundations first and later by federal and island governments, the program officially targeted 
economic depression-related unemployment to prompt economic growth. In practice, it promoted 
uninformed and coercive permanent sterilization of individuals; loaded with class, race and 
gender biases (Rodríguez-Trias, 1994). For decades, surgery subsidies, industrial employer 
preferentialism toward sterilized women, and selective domestic visits by health workers pushed 
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 E.g. The Brookings Institute Report “Porto Rico and its Problems” (1930), the ´Chardon´ Plan (1936, led by Dr. 
Carlos E. Chardón, chancellor of the University of Puerto Rico, and supported by Muñoz Marín), the ´Zimmerman´ 
report (1940, led by Dr. Eric W. Zimmerman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Puerto Rico), the ´Dorfman´ 





economically disadvantaged and unapprised Puerto Rican women towards La Operación; 




Similarly, contentious aims buttressed PRRA economic growth plans, which reshaped the island 
and its people. Next I discuss how in the following two decades planning and investment shifted 
from agriculture to a modernization formula that merged industrialization, institutional reform, 
emigration, tourism, and construction –mainly public works and housing-; with corporations 
reaping major gains and mixed results on lay citizens. 
 
Concerning agriculture, sugar remained the main export crop, controlled by a few large U.S. 
stakeholders profiting from cheap costs, public investment, tax exemptions and subsidies. The 
sugar economy remained susceptible to unstable market cycles and hurricanes, and its 
monopolistic and exploitative organization was a cause of growing local discontent (Polk, 1942). 
Public discourses contradictorily articulated the links between underdevelopment, the unfair 
structure of the industry and U.S. rule; which in turn reflected polarized ideologies concerning 
Puerto Rico. For instance, prominent ex-Governor Theodore Roosevelt Jr. lauded the U.S. 
benevolence towards the island via the sugar industry, underdevelopment notwithstanding: 
“In one fashion or another the United States has been contributing to the support of Puerto Rico. 
In the first place, a considerable part of the sums expended for governmental purposes in the 
Island comes from the federal treasury. In addition, of course, Puerto Rican sugar, which is by 
far the biggest cash crop of the Island, literally depends for its existence upon the tariff wall of 
the United States within which its stands. In spite of this, misery is great. There is insufficient 
work, and poverty, sickness and hunger stalk the island”(Roosevelt Jr., 1934). 
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 In 1968, research on Puerto Rican women of childbearing age showed that they were over ten times more likely 
to be sterilized than U.S. women, and more than one-third of those Puerto Rican women ignored they had gone 
through a permanent form of contraception. In the 1970s, local women’s groups and the movement for 





Contrastingly, New York Congressman Vito Marcantonio
118
, allied with pro-independence 
leaders and less known than Roosevelt Jr., argued that Puerto Rico was: 
“reduced to a monoculture, a sugar colony of the United States. To the people of Latin America, 
Puerto Rico has a diabetic economy. Its main industry is sugar, and 70 percent of the arable 
land is owned by four large Wall Street corporations” (Marcantonio 1935 in Meyer, n.d.). 
 
First, the New Deal promoted subsistence and experimental crops. Yet, sugar lobbyists, cheap 
U.S. imports, low salaries and land scarcity blocked local farmers. Light industrialization became 
a goal of Gov. Tugwell (1941-1946) and Sen. Muñoz Marín. Moreover, fears of a German 
blockade during WWII motivated federal funding for enterprises around San Juan; reinforcing its 
urban primacy vis-à-vis the decline of southern Puerto Rico initiated after San Ciriaco. By 1953, 
44.7% of all industrial jobs would be located in an area of 507 km
2
 comprising San Juan and 
nearby municipalities, almost 6% of the island surface (Severino, 1999). After WWII, Puerto 
Rico became the first example of the rise of export processing zones and special economic zones 
as a major rearrangement of the global political economy of capitalism; this strategy attracted 
foreign-direct investment to manufacturing in underdeveloped nation-states or territories by 
offering extremely advantageous conditions to corporations. When visualizing the future of the 
island, increasingly powerful Senate President Muñoz Marín endorsed modern economic 
development through industrialization (Perloff, 1950), like contemporary populist figures in 
Latin America. First, light industries were prioritized, including garments, machinery, canned 
food and electronics. Yet, the radical leap happened when Muñoz Marín became Governor; he 
endorsed heavy industries, such as oil refining and petrochemicals, based on imminent import 
restrictions to the U.S. by a system of quotas -implemented from 1959 to 1973-. Operación 
Manos a la Obra -Operation Bootstraps- was a large-scale project to redirect investment from 
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 He was the only member of the American Labor Party in Congress, representing East Harlem (1934-1936, 1938-





decaying agriculture towards labor-intensive manufacturing and export-led industries. Bootstraps 
responded to the decline of southern Puerto Rico through petrochemical industries; the 
Commonwealth Oil Refining Company (CORCO) was established by the sea in Peñuelas and 
Guayanilla, municipalities adjacent to Ponce. The first CORCO unit was built in 1954 and the 
company started operations in 1956. CORCO represented a large investment at that time, $25 
million, in an 800-acre site (3.2 km
2
). It could refine 23,500 oil barrels daily, which added to 
storage and waste treatment facilities attracted giants like Union Carbide, Rico Chemical, Caribe 
Nitrogen, and Gulf Caribbean. Yet, Bootstraps metamorphosed the dependency of the island 
framed by U.S. interests (E. Pantojas-García, 1990). It cemented a modern brand of ‘corporate 
welfare’ sustained by cheap production costs - wages and rent-, pre-built industrial infrastructure 
and tax exemptions that made the island “the greatest tax haven for U.S. transnational 
corporations” (Emilio  Pantojas-García, 2007, p.218). Besides, lax environmental controls 
created vast brown fields and risk-prone areas, needing large public investment to mildly palliate 
the worst impacts (R. Pérez, 2002). 
 
Fig. 100 “S                   G                           
                     S                   ” 
 
Fig. 101 Playa de Ponce dock  
workers on a strike 
 
CORCO lured industries with subsidies and tax exemptions; it left 
destruction, waste and poverty, image (El Mundo, 1954b). 
Poor salaries and working conditions sparked 






Institutional reform was another pillar of modern economic growth. A myriad of new institutions 
reveals changing conceptions of governmental responsibilities towards citizens. It also reveals 
increasing disciplinary separations that often reflected on specialized and uncoordinated public 
policy. In the 1940s, large public entities were setup to shape planning and investment, such as 
the Land Authority, Economic Development Administration, Development Bank (Banco de 
Fomento), Industrial Development Company (PRIDCO), Water Resources Authority, Transport 
Authority, Agricultural Corporation, Communications Authority, Housing Authority, and 
Planning, Zoning and Urbanizing Board (R. Picó, 1974; Sepúlveda, 2009). Those agencies 
integrated elite members and emerging technocrats, increasing support for Muñoz Marín. For 
example, Gov. Tugwell consolidated the Puerto Rico Planning, Zoning and Urbanizing Board in 
1942, derived from the Project Analysis Office for the War Emergency Program (Tugwell, 1945) 
and backed by Act 213. The Board chairman was Dr. Rafael Picó, a U.S.-trained economic 
geographer who cultivated a prominent career
119
. Based on five technical divisions
120
, the Board 
would steer development through a) master plans, b) inter-agency co-ordination, and c) advice to 
the Governor on public works, economic and social development, and fiscal policy (R. Picó, 
1953). In practice, the Board copied U.S. zoning frameworks, adhering to a rational planning 
model and modernist ideas of separating activities; moreover, it neglected municipal decision-
making by being centered in San Juan (Sepúlveda, 2009). Noticeably, the Board excluded 
disaster management; as was the contemporary norm of the planning profession. Instead, disaster 
management was mentioned in larger policy-making reports (Information Research Section 
PRRA, 1938); I could not find a subdivision or institution that addressed them specifically. On 
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 Picó taught at the Universidad de Puerto Rico and was a trusted PDD member. He became President of the 
Government Development Bank, Secretary of Treasury, Senator, international development adviser, visiting 
professor and director of the American Society of Planning Officials. 
120





the one hand side, only minor weather-related events happened, not requiring a particular entity 
to step up. On the other hand side, societal and environmental crisis were merged for practical 
purposes under the three “R’s”. For instance, the first available example of the insurance sector 
literature on the island set minimum rates in case of fire, hurricane, riot and civil commotion 
alike (Puerto Rico Board of Fire Underwriters, 1937). As section VII.5 examines, WWII and the 
Cold War strengthened a bond between war and disasters. Thus, in 1950, the new U.S. Federal 
Civil Defense Administration was in charge of both. Marking a turning point in disaster 
management, a matching Puerto Rican Civil Defense Office was created to produce prevention 
and mitigation policy documents, setup local and inter-institutional committees, conduct public 
meetings, and define island-wide roles and procedures to follow. Also during this decade, new 
agencies related to investment, planning, and the built environment included the Water 
Resources Authority, Department of Public Works and Institute of Puerto Rican Culture (ICP). 
  
Another pillar of modernization was large-scale planned emigration with vast economic, spatial, 
social and cultural impacts. Economic growth trends repositioned local elites and American 
firms; and although some middle and low-income segments gained strength, others were 
excluded
121
. Since San Ciriaco, migration had been an escape valve for the growing jobless rural 
and urban population, and for political opponents. In the late 1940s, its pace exploded. San 
Juan
122
 remained the top magnet for education, integration to labor markets, and healthcare; 
increasing the housing deficit which in turn expanded disaster vulnerability. Soon, Puerto 
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 Unemployment figures are problematic to interpret due to seasonal jobs, ranging from 75% in 1934 (Information 
Research Section PRRA, 1938) to 60-70% by the late 1930s (Ismael  García-Colón, 2006). In the 1950s, around two 
thirds of employed men worked in decaying agriculture (Bluedorn & Cascio, 2005), often temporarily; women had 
fewer chances in their main paid occupation, domestic needle work (Ayala, 1996). Both were not provided with the 
skills and opportunities to enter new jobs. 
122
 Nearby growth poles were Bayamón, Carolina, Cataño, Guaynabo, Trujillo Alto and Río Piedras; distantly 





Ricans. migrated massively to the U.S., mostly looking for unskilled work. From 1900 to 1940, 
roughly 70,000 persons emigrated; by the late 1940s, the annual average of migrants reached 
35,000 (R. Picó, 1969).  
 
Following Neo-Malthusianism, the influential 1946 U.S. Tariff Commission Report -the so-
called ‘Dorfman’ report- affirmed that one million inhabitants had to leave to launch growth (A. 
W.  Maldonado, 2006). Instead of reconfiguring exclusionary trends to avoid emigration, in the 
early 1950s, the Commonwealth endorsed it by promoting low-cost airfares
123
. From 1950 to 
1955, the yearly average reached 49,000 persons; from 1955 to 1959, it reduced to 40,000 
persons yearly (R. Picó, 1969). In other words, emigration absorbed 3% and 85% of the 
population increase in 1942 and 1951 respectively (Senior, 1953). In a process known as la Gran 
Migración (the Great Migration), Puerto Ricans took cheap agricultural, manufacturing and 
service jobs arranged by the island administration, private agents, friends and family. The 
manifold and irreversible effects of migration changed parts of the U.S. (Maldonado-Denis, 
1980)
124
 and the island (Maldonado-Denis, 1987) through micro-decisions. Remittances 
supported modernization and the Commonwealth. Moreover, they were a key financing 
mechanism to reduce poverty and vulnerability via household investment in housing projects, 
education and healthcare. Again, a trend tested in Puerto Rico became the norm decades later, 
with trans-continental labor migration and the catalyzing role of their remittances. 
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 To New York mainly, but also to Chicago, Massachusetts, Miami and Philadelphia. 
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 For example, during a welcoming party in New York, in 1946, Puerto Rican Gov. Jesús Piñero listed among his 
top concerns to address the conditions of almost 350,000 Puerto Ricans there. The ‘problems’ created by their 
massive entrance worried decision-makers on both sides (Meléndez Vélez, 2005) Islanders endured subordinate 





Post WWII, U.S. and local officials endorsed tourism given its links to construction; its allegedly 
benign nature without factories, pollutants and disruptive labor; and the beautiful and underused 
coast. Such decision endorsed beachfront urbanization, thus increased disaster vulnerability. 
PRIDCO was in charge of upgrading the tourist infrastructure and attracting investors and 
travelers. Its emblematic project was a luxurious hotel in Old San Juan islet, which would 
overpower the Condado Beach Hotel -formerly Condado Vanderbilt-; yet it met open criticism in 
the media from skeptics about the potential of tourism
125
. The government paid 7.4 million 
dollars for it and leased it to Hilton, the operator offering the best bid (Mings, 1968). The weight 
of the Caribe Hilton Hotel was evident in the involvement of top PPD politicians
126
, an 
international advertising campaign by McCann Erickson, a pompous inauguration in 1949 
compared by the local press to the recent first swearing in of Gov. Muñoz Marín, and the 
building style. The latter was the result of an international competition won by young local 
architects Toro, Ferrer and Torregrosa. It fitted the aesthetic vocabulary of PPD projects as an 
avant-garde leap, matching the idealization of modernism in Latin America as a paradigm of 
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 In 1948, the fate of the Caribe Hilton was in doubt, “one columnist speculated that it would become a hospital, 
while another suggested that it would be turned into a prison” (A.W. Maldonado, 1997, p.111) . Critics called it 
“white elephant”, “Coca-Cola box” or “Moscoso’s madness”. (Vivoni Farage & Gallart, 2003, p. 12) . 
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 Fig. 102  Media publicity Fig. 103 Private Publicity  Fig. 104  Government Publicity  
 
  
Contemporary tourism campaigns used images of the Caribe Hilton (Hilton Hotels, n.d.; n.a., n.d.) or folksy 
characters and landscape (Rafael Tufiño, n.d.). Puerto Rico was the ‘Island of Enchantment’, ‘Switzerland of the 
Americas’, an idyllic Caribbean destination for the growing U.S. middle-class and elites in the Americas, with an 
exotic but tamed twist compared to volatile parts of the continent. 
 
Fig. 105 Caribe Hilton Postcard publicity Fig. 106 San Gerónimo fort/Hilton 
  
“The gem of the Caribbean, at the crossroads of the Americas. 
Magnificent setting overlooking the ocean, beach, pool and gardens. 300 
Air Conditioned rooms”, image (n.a., 1953). 
The beach, an archaeological site and 
artificial reef added to the hotel´s allure, 




 would be the next luxury hotel though private; inaugurated in 1958 and by the 
same designers of the Caribe Hilton. It symbolizes the extreme urban contradictions taking place, 
in tandem with purposive environmental destruction that would become the norm. La Concha 
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 It took its name from a seashell-shaped restaurant structure facing the Atlantic Ocean, projected by the famed 





was located in El Condado, an area adjacent to Old San Juan islet, between a lagoon and beach 
front that had been a thick and large mangrove, where low-density exclusive coastal urbanization 
included the Condado Beach Hotel and housing during the previous three decades. High-density 
exclusive urbanization crystalized in the 1950s, and La Concha sparked a debate to stop the 
growth of a so-called tourist ‘wall’ between Puerto Ricans and their sea -as Condado Beach 
Hotel had pioneered-, resulting in denial of permission for other luxury hotels (Mings, 1968). 
Yet, high-rise condominium apartments for wealthy locals and foreigners were allowed; which 
prompted throughout the island the urbanizing trends of coastal ecosystem annihilation and 
privatized beach access, until then used for military or export purposes. On the other side of the 
Condado lagoon, going inland, slums were growing in a flood-prone, insalubrious area left out of 
formal land markets to lower income groups; as in previous decades, this was common practice 
and worsened the mounting housing crisis and disaster vulnerability. When slum clearance and 
urban renewal became public policy priorities, as I explain below, the lagoon slums were 
demolished and residents were forcefully evicted. The objective was not to restore the 
environment but to free the area for high-end urbanization enabled by new technologies. In other 
words, this is the decade when ecosystems that evolved boosting resilience to storms and 
tsunamis -such as wetlands, coral reefs, sand dunes, mangroves, lagoons and estuaries- started to 
be systematically destroyed for urbanization purposes with the support of novel technology. 
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fringe locations, 
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Castro, image by 
(Rahola Photo 
Supply, n.d.-b). 



























The concurrent Condado Beach hotel 
makeover included a change of private 
owners and image, which alluded in the 
1930s to its multi-million dollar 
reconstruction and proximity to Old San Juan 
(Mathias Photo Shop, c. 1930's); in the 1950s 
to its focus on rest, comfort and pleasure 
through exclusive facilities for tennis, 
dancing, swimming, casino gambling, sailing 
and fishing (Peerles Litho Co., c. 1950s); and 
in the 1960s to its ‘Spanish’ atmosphere and 
location in the re-named ‘Gold Coast’ of 
Puerto Rico (n.a., c. 1960s). Even more 
drastic was the conversion of its 
surroundings. As the two photos below show, 
taller buildings, roads, water-sealed areas and 
a lastingly altered coastline affected buffering 
vegetation, open spaces, beach and lagoon 
access, sand dunes, and coral reefs. 
 
Infrastructure was another modernization 
element that fed territorial and economic 






The hotel and surroundings changes included La Concha, 
Av. Baldorioty de Castro bordering the lagoon, and multi-
story exclusive housing, images by (Mathias Photo Shop, 
c. 1930's; n.a., c. 1960s; Peerles Litho Co., c. 1950s; 





changes, prioritizing water projects and transport. In 1935, PRRA and island legislature 
expanded the Utilization of Water Resources System institution to increase hydroelectric power. 
Initial funds went to enlarge hydroelectric plant Toro Negro #1, build Toro Negro #2 and Carite 
#3, and plan Dos Bocas and Las Grazes (Information Research Section PRRA, 1938). In 1937, 
the Insular Government acquired the Ponce Electric Company, as the first move to publically 
centralize electricity production and distribution (R. Picó, 1974). Water management and disaster 
prevention merged in Puerto Rico, following U.S. trends after Congress passed the Flood Control 
Act, in 1936. Moreover, physical flood control became the focus of disaster planning, shaped by 
federal management and legislation relying on hydro modifications as the key structural 
measures (López-Marrero & Tschakert, 2011). In 1941, the newly created Puerto Rican Water 
Resources Authority aimed to provide irrigation -mainly to large sugar plantations-, serve 
domestic and industrial uses, and protect against floods (R. Picó, 1974). In other words, it was a 
preeminent institution and had direct influence on disasters. Wartime and post-war difficulties 
delayed the construction of hydroelectric plants; but ensuing large-scale engineering projects 
comprised river channel modifications, canals, levees, dykes, and flood walls. Paradoxically, 
flood control both mitigated and created vulnerability. In the short term, hydraulic systems coped 
with minor and moderate hazards, and flash floods. Yet, flood control promoted a false sense of 
security increasing the use of flood-prone areas through agriculture, housing, industrialization 
and tourism. Artificial waterways, paved riverbeds and fields, and desiccated wetlands meant 
less soil capacity to absorb and filter rainwater, besides wildlife habitat reduction. Such changes 
increased danger during unusual weather-events, when systems failed or became outdated; they 
also hardened recovery. Floods became the most recurrent disaster associated with the highest 





Fig. 112 Projected Caonilla Dam near Utuado Fig. 113 Caonilla Dam in progress 
  
Lines draw the vast project scale over the 
landscape and the old dam (Delano, 1946). 
Fast construction required intense shifts (El 
Mundo, 1948). 
Fig. 114 Finished Caonilla Dam  Fig. 115 Toro Negro 2 overflow canal in progress 
  
Impressively, the dam was finished in three years 
(El Mundo, 1949); it was part of an epic story of  
progress. 
Cemented canals were also used to control urban 
floods mixed with untreated sewage (PRRA, 
193?-c). 
Fig. 116 Governor Luis Muñoz Marín tours a dam Fig. 117  Small-scale agricultural drainage 
  
Muñoz Marín and technician discuss the isolation of 
barrio Jaguas, Gurabo, by the dam (Torres, 1954?). 
A minor pump to desiccate wetlands (Puerto Rico 





Investment in transport shifted when the traditional economy stagnated; private railroad 
companies lost their profitability and they could not easily reconvert due to technical limitations, 
such as track narrowness and incompleteness. Moreover, PRRA sponsored a competitive 
network of motorways which in essence ran parallel, completed the coastal circuit, and 
connected to the interior. The railroad lines of lesser extension stopped operations in the 1930s-
1940s; fuel shortages during WWII briefly reinvigorated them, yet, by the end of the 1950s, the 
large American Railroad was the last to close (Santamaría García, 1994). During WWII, the 
federal government established a road construction program to connect military bases and, 
correspondingly, a local cement plant was built (Ayala, 1996). In July of 1952, the newly created 
Department of Public Works undertook tasks of the former Department of Interior; particularly 
highway construction (Departamento de Transportación y Obras Públicas, 2010), which became 
its priority after the passing of the powerful 1956 American Highway and Defense Act. Six-lane 
Av. Baldorioty de Castro built in the mid-1950s epitomizes contemporary major roads. Without 
value-capture instruments, those roads aided private owners and developers, individual car 









Housing and land tenure provision completed the modernization formula. Elites kept using 
vanguard designs and technologies; yet, the housing crisis was severe. In his first Congress 
intervention about the island, Congressman Marcantonio blamed the rural exodus to burgeoning 
slums on the recent hurricanes -like Mrs. Roosevelt-, but also on corporate land grabs: 
“The people, through the taking over of the lands and as a result of the hurricanes, have been 
driven from pillar to post, into the slums of the city, and on relief” (Marcantonio 1935 in Meyer, 
n.d.). 
Fig. 118 Santurce slum demolished for Av. Baldorioty 
de Castro 
Fig. 119  Formal housing demolished for Av. 
Baldorioty de Castro 
  
(M. Rodríguez, 1954a). (Torres, 1955). 
Fig. 120   Av. Baldorioty de Castro in Santurce, from tram 
stop N.24 until Condado Lagoon 
Fig. 121  Av. Baldorioty de Castro in Isla 
Verde, near Llorens Torres housing 
  






Fig. 122 Slum Berlin,  Ponce,  1935 Fig. 123 Slum La Playita, Condado, San Juan 
  
Morell Campos housing project was planned to 
substitute this slum (PRRA, 1935). 
El Mundo published that demolishing 42 houses of 
this slum would beautify the area, which was prime 
housing and tourism real estate (M. Rodríguez, 
1955). 
  
In response, “PRRA undertook to point the way toward a new standard of living for under-
privileged families by constructing sanitary, comfortable and low-cost houses in a healthy and 
decent environment” (Information Research Section PRRA, 1938, pp., p. 9). PRRA bought land 
for housing development and improvement, and creatively worked on rural and urban schemes of 
diverse density and materials. Between 1935 and 1938, PRRA built six large projects for workers 
in four cities, reaching 1,244 units; in addition to rural isolated or collective dwellings, habitually 







Fig. 124 Model house and subsistence garden for 
rural workers and homesteader, Arroyo 
Fig. 125 Experimental concrete house for 
homesteaders with wooden windows and doors 
   
(PRRA, 193?-a). (PRRA, 193?-e). 
 
Fig. 126 Land and utility municipal housing 
project, Ponce 
Fig. 127 Suburban low-density housing in San 
Juan 
  
(Delano, 1941). (PRRA, 193?-g). 




Fig. 129 Falansterio  apartment complex, Old 




Until then housing was built individually or in small groups; thus PRRA projects increased 





urban projects of higher density illustrated a transitional solution; the goal was that slum families 
would make their way out of poverty into ‘proper’ single detached units (Dinzey-Flores, 2007), 
and that goal filtrated into the upcoming Commonwealth ambitions. In 1937, the Wagner-Steagal 
Housing Act established the U.S. Housing Authority. In 1938, the Puerto Rican Housing 
Authority was created, with five local entities–San Juan, Mayagüez, Ponce, Arecibo and Río 
Piedras-. Concomitantly, land concentration was fervently debated, and Sen. Muñoz Marín 
harvested followers based on his land reform promise, as his slogan announced -Bread, Land and 
Liberty-. During the 1940s, almost 80 percent of the rural population was landless, lived in abject 
poverty on their employers’ property and were subject to arbitrary power relations (Ismael 
García-Colón, 2006), including evictions. In reply, the newly created Land Authority finally 
enacted the 1917 Jones-Shafroth Law, which specified that private corporations could not own 
more than 500 acres. Title V of the 1941 Land Law enabled public expropriation for resettlement 
communities, targeting landless families; which was speculatively used by large landowners 
envisioning rural decline. The means, ends and overall success of land reform has received 














Eleanor Roosevelt was the most influential New 
Deal urban project and it presaged suburbanization, 
unlike the denser Art Deco Falansterio apartments. 
Plans included a central square, parks, schools, 
churches, police and firemen stations, prison, post 
and phone office, clinic, community market and a 
transport system; which were underdeveloped (J. 
Lizardi, 2013). Other projects were Mirapalmeras 
(San Juan), Morel Campos (Ponce), and La Granja 
(Caguas). Behind was Tugwell transplanting his 
experience, including living in Greenbelt Maryland: 
“My idea was to go just outside centers of 
population, pick up cheap land, build a whole community, and entice people to there. Then go 
back into the cities and tear down whole slums and make parks of them” (Ghirardo 1989 in 
Sepúlveda, 2009, p. 4). 
 
Tugwell left an ambitious yet contentious imprint on urban planning and design. He appointed a 
committee for the Design of Public Works and hired as architects and consultants of the 
committee two renowned international figures, Richard Neutra first, and Heinrich (Henry) 
Klumb next. Between the autumn of 1943 and early 1945, the Austrian-born U.S.-naturalized 
Neutra worked on an ample design and construction program for public health and education. 
Mixing progressive and colonialists opinions; Neutra saw the program as a helpful transition in 
socio-economic, political and technical terms; but also a “mental reconditioning of tribesmen” in 
“a friendly manner” (Richard Neutra, 1948, pp. 122, 159), which would: 
Fig.130 Eleanor Roosevelt Project, San Juan 
The project (PRRA, 193?-d) was low-density, 
with quality connections and layout, mixed uses, 





“make the villagers – who for centuries had not much cause to trust a distant government – feel 
these buildings as their own community property, where in the evenings they can play their 
domino, strum a guitar for dancers on the community porch, and incidentally, learn by suitable 
programs something on many things such as child care, diet, cloth making, and more practical 
housekeeping” (Richard  Neutra, 1944, p.4). 
 
Neutra’s local team included young professionals who would cultivate notable careers, including 
Osvaldo Toro, Miguel Ferrer
128
, Antonio Calderón and Raul Reichard. The team planned and 
designed open air schools for more than 150 villages, 128 rural health sub-stations, four district 
hospitals, several milk dispensaries, cisterns, village fountains, storage buildings, community 
centers with dance halls, stages, speakers’ platforms and broadcast equipment for varied 
purposes –including political, educational, assistance, and leisure uses (Correia de Lira, 2010). 
To overcome basic shortages, those projects were prioritized over higher professional training 
institutions, such as Industrial Arts schools, Medical College and Nurses’ Training Centers. 
Prototypes were developed and deemed formative by Neutra and the team (Correia de Lira, 
2010; Richard Neutra, 1948); yet, few were built as construction underwent a halt due to WWII. 
Since Neutra planned to embark on an international consulting career, Tugwell invited Henry 
Klumb to join the Public Works Design Committee in 1944. Klumb, a German émigré, was an 
apprentice of Frank Lloyd Wright in Taliesin North and later contributed to the design of 
Greenbelt, New Jersey (Vivoni Farage, 2006). On the island, he started governmental projects, 
joined the Housing Authority (1945), and sculpted a leading public and private practice for the 
rest of his life (Vázquez-Pérez, 2006; Vivoni Farage, 2006). Following modernist planning, for 
Klumb the built environment crisis would only be solved developing basic modules with 
standard pieces easily assembled in situ; which usually happened in peri-urban agricultural areas 
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whose speculative value was rocketing, with feeble connections among them and to urban 
centers (J. Lizardi, 2013). 
 
In 1940, the construction industry contributed to 4% of the GNP, in 1945 its contribution was 
close to none, in 1952, it surpassed 10% of the GNP (De Jesús Toro, 1982). Besides, after 
WWII, housing dominated the construction industry; as a proxy, it amounted to 70% of the total 
value concerning permits for private purposes (De Jesús Toro, 1982). Between 1937 and 1948, 
27 housing developments -for 5,768 families- were built; in other words, Puerto Rico competed 
with the states receiving top per capita housing investment (Dinzey-Flores, 2007). Consistent 
with the prevalent ethos and funding, the resumption of affordable private and public housing 
programs shifted to massive slum clearance and urban renewal. Between 1948 and 1949, the 
Farmers Home Administration, Veterans Administration and the Banco de Fomento financed 
Puerto Nuevo (New Port), then the largest worldwide low-cost social housing program. Located 
in Hato Rey, it included 6,000 housing units each at a cost of U$1,750, totaling U$10.5 million 
(Alameda & Rivera Galindo, 2005). Leonard Darlington Long, who built it in record time, 
embodied a new figure in the production of space in Puerto Rico, the large-scale private 
developer who funneled abundant public funds and captured the public imagination through 
novel marketing techniques endorsing suburban dreams (Sepúlveda, 2009). The project scale 
changed production, organization and financing methods (De Jesús Toro, 1982). Besides, it 
epitomized a recurrent formula for housing: disjointed, car-dependent, low-density individual 
homeownership with minimal collective facilities, and insufficient vision to foresee enhanced 
risk scenarios leading to expensive retrofitting often carried out by public institutions and not the 





enabled risk-prone urbanization. A storm was enough to flood sections, as a result of aggressive 
deforestation, massive topographical changes, sealed infiltration areas, transformation of a 
nearby water body and poorly calculated drainage capacity. It would take decades for preventive 
mechanisms such as Environmental Impact Assessments –launched by the federal government- 
to evaluate hazards posed by new developments and requests palliative changes or deny permits. 
 
Fig. 131 Puerto Nuevo project Fig. 132 Flooded section H of Puerto Nuevo 
 N.a in (Alameda & Rivera Galindo, 2005). (Trías, 1953). 
 
In 1949, HUD and the Housing Act were established in the U.S., along with the National Law of 
Homes; and they cemented that demolition and new construction were the governmental 
synonyms of progress
129
. On the island, those ideas were highly influential. Just in a year (1949-
1950), combined Puerto Rican and federal funds built projects to resettle 4,700 families from 
demolished slums (R. Picó, 1955). Based on Title I of the 1949 Housing Act, removing 
precarious housing became a priority. The 1950 census counted 929,000 residents in the 76 
urban centers of the island, out of which 45 per cent lived in slums (R. Picó, 1955), and at least 
2,000 families joined yearly (Alameda & Rivera Galindo, 2005). Hence, the projection was to 
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build in a six year period thirty thousand units of dense urban public housing, ‘caseríos’, to 
replace an equal number of cleared dwellings (Dinzey-Flores, 2007). Thus, unprecedented 
housing investment was planned as a defining element of modernity and would become a symbol 
of the Commonwealth. Suburban middle and low-income housing construction and systematic 
slum destruction took place, chiefly affecting communities of color (Fuste, 2010) located in San 
Juan prime real estate (Cotto Morales, 2006); but also in Ponce, Mayagüez and a few other 
towns. In the 1950s, the reverberating effects of the construction industry included jobs, demands 
for transport, qualified professionals, local and imported construction supplies, domestic 
appliances and service provision. In early 1954, new public developments housed almost 5,047 
families, out of a total of 10,334 targeted. By late 1955, the remaining 5,287 targeted slum 
families were anticipated to resettle in 27 new projects. Other 20 projects would relocate 17,000 
slum families, and the new target was to build 6,000 dwellings yearly. Meanwhile, 43,000 
squatter rural families were relocated to rural villages and, within the next five years, 65,000 
families were planned to be resettled (R. Picó, 1955). Despite large investment in housing, 
uneven urban growth trends and the most extreme physical vulnerability were questionably 
reduced when Santa Clara made landfall. For instance, most houses lacked indoor toilets and 






Fig. 133 Corea slum, Cantera peninsula in San Juan, under demolition  
 
Named after islanders drafted in the Korea War, this lively community was flood prone (Casenave, 1954b). 
Fig. 134 Hoare slum ruins after demolition by the 
Housing Authority, San Juan  
Fig. 135 Planning Board workers destroy huts close 
to Israel School, San Juan 
  
(El Mundo, 1954a) (M. Rodríguez, 1956). 
 Fig. 136 Workers finishing demolition of Condado 
Lagoon huts on stilts 
Fig. 137 A commission from Bella Vista slum in 
San Juan protests its impending demolition 
  






































To conclude this section, I reviewed the built environment emphasized in architectural, planning 
and policy records until now, as part of discursive frameworks that strengthen or weaken fair 
remembrance of how differently urban life and disasters were experienced. Emphasis on formal 
Fig. 138 Public officials buy the first house to 
eliminate a slum in Ponce 
Fig. 139 Irrizarry family in their new housing 
project unit, Pedro Juan Rosaly, Ponce 
  
(Mariani, 1953b). (Mariani, 1953a). 




Fig. 141 Inauguration of the Public Housing Project Caserío Llorens Torres 
 





well-off built environments, exceptional authors and the protection of elitist areas and buildings 
remain in place (J. A. Fernández, 1965; Oficina Estatal de Conservación Histórica de Puerto 
Rico, n.d.; Tarr, 1977). Yet, non-elitists projects of high quality made by famed architects -such 
as Neutra, Toro, Ferrer, Klumb, Jesús Amaral or Santiago Iglesias hijo- have received attention 
(Correia de Lira, 2010; Richard Neutra, 1948; Vivoni Farage, 2006; Vivoni Farage & Gallart, 
2003). Contemporary specialized and governmental publications addressed the ongoing urban 
transformation from their top-down viewpoint, without incorporation of grassroots viewpoints 
and experiences (Information Research Section PRRA, 1938; R. Picó, 1955). Recently, the 
informal and precarious built environment has been the subject of critical articles (Alameda & 
Rivera Galindo, 2005; De Jesús Toro, 1982; Dinzey-Flores, 2007; Esterrich, 2009; Fuste, 2010) 
and even books (Cotto Morales, 2006; E. Quiles Rodríguez, 2009), which provide multilayered 
approaches to the urban past, capable of strengthening fair remembrance of how differently 




VII.4 Socio-cultural hierarchies, memory and knowledge of disasters 
Differentiated vulnerability or resilience to Santa Clara was also shaped by the juxtaposition of 
socio-cultural hierarchies, memory and knowledge of disasters. There were changes in the 
contemporary manipulation of traditional vectors of difference such as country of origin, 
language, class, race, religion, and gender to justify social integration or exclusion; which 
reflected on rights, resources and obligations. The most quarrelsome social divergences were 





background shaped the Commonwealth; it is vital to examine its emergence because -after armed 
clashes- it became the official framework in which new and old hierarchies coexisted, competed 
and permeated into varying degrees of risk exposure, and also processes of collective memory-
making and formal knowledge development -including disasters-, reshaping the island. 
 
During the 1930s, poverty, social injustices and increasing frustration were recorded by 
respected external and local voices. In 1939, Roosevelt mandated Gov. Admiral William D. 
Leahy to reinforce the island's defenses, in the advent of WWII. Leahy reported to Congress that 
something ought to be done about the terrible economic and social conditions pertaining most 
Puerto Ricans because a frustrated, starving, and poor population was a threat to military strength 
(Polk, 1942). For geographer Picó, in 1940 "there was exploitation of the working classes, 
unequal distribution of wealth, chronic unemployment and apathy towards the future" ((R. Picó, 
1955, p. 114). Journalist John Gunther, who authored a series of famed ‘Inside’ continental 
surveys since the late 1930s, highlighted in 1941 the vast developmental gap between the island 
and the U.S. on his ‘Inside Latin America’ book
130
: 
“I saw, in short, misery, disease, squalor, filth. It would be lamentable enough to see this 
anywhere. It would be shocking enough in the remote uplands of Peru or the stinking valleys of 
the Ganges. But to see it on American territory, among people whom the United States has 
governed since 1898, in a region for which our federal responsibility has been complete for 43 
years, is a paralyzing jolt to anyone who believes in American standards of progress and 
civilization. The picture seen by the eye is bad enough. The story heard by the ear is even 
worse…I found that in some villages a flat 100 per cent of the population has malaria. I found 
that infant mortality in Puerto Rico is the highest in the world, four times that of the United 
States. I found that the average income of the jibaro (peasant) is about $135 per year, or less 
than 40 cents a day. I found that a pound of meat costs 30 cents in Puerto Rico, whereas in Santo 
Domingo 45 miles away it is 6 cents. I found that there is no milk fit to drink, and that even the 
public water supply-on American territory!-is not safe, because the island cannot afford proper 
sanitation methods” (Gunther 1941 in Polk, 1942, p.484). 
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As frictions and rebellion grew, New Deal responses included developmental projects but also 
surveillance, harassment, persecution, imprisonment, tortures to prisoners and the civilian 
massacres of Río Piedras (1935), and Ponce
131
 (1937). By the 1940s, new political relationship 
formulas between the U.S. and Puerto Rico were under discussion: dominion state, statehood or 
independence. Roosevelt’s death would slow down the process, as his successor Harry S. 





Next, governmental responses to undermine separatism oscillated in a two-fold, non-mutually 
exclusive strategy; their results would silence left-wing voices in the political spectrum and 
direct public life and policy-making towards conservativism, including planning, disaster 
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 Considered the worst bloodbath in recent Puerto Rican history, it took place during Palm Sunday, to avenge the 
murder of Colonel Francis Riggs. Gov. Winship ordered to ambush authorized unarmed demonstrators who 
commemorated the ending of slavery, demanded independence and protested Albizú’s incarceration. A girl, one 
woman, seventeen men, and two policemen were killed; almost 235 protesters were wounded, whilst hundreds were 
arrested and charged with breaking the law without proof. Next, “hysteria and near civil war swept the island. 
Nationalists were hunted and arrested on sight. Some headed for exile in New York City or Havana” (J. González, 2007) 
Fig. 142 "Puerto Rico will choose" A cartoon from The Pittsburgh 
Courier (Holloway 1945 in 
(Almaguer, 2012) shows a curvy, 
smiling young woman representing 
Puerto Rico,  dressed in a 
supposedly traditional, bare 
shouldered and ruffled costume, 
wearing a cross necklace and head 
attire. Independence, Statehood and 
Dominion States are options linked 
to wedding bands that she is 
checking on a tray, offered by U.S. 
Congress, represented by an elderly 
obese man from beyond the dark sea. 
Completing tropical allusions are 
palm trees, waves, and a woman 







management and culture. One strategy was to continue repression
132
; the other was to negotiate 
autonomy. In 1949, Gov. Muñoz Marín and Congress worked on a Constitution to turn Puerto 
Rico into a Commonwealth, a political form: 
“developed to fit the economic facts, the cultural realities, the free and yet non-nationalistic 
ideals of the [Puerto Rican] people. It also had to meet the legitimate economic and military 
interests of the United States” (Luis  Muñoz Marín, 1954, p. 546). 
 
In 1950, understanding the Commonwealth as a betrayal of the dream of independence and 
despite reinforced punishments, nationalists led by Dr. Pedro Albizú Campos launched an armed 
revolt
133
. Muñoz Marín declared martial law, ordered the arrest of hundreds of nationalists 
including Albizú and called for the U.S. National Guard to crush the uprisings, leading to the 
Utuado and Jayuya massacres, heightening of island-wide militarization and emigration of 
thousands of independence and left-wing supporters (J. González, 2007). The challenge to 
American and Muñoz Marín’s rule met stark repression
134
, marking the decline of the most 
popular separatist option and rejection to ideologies that emphasized redistribution, collective 
organization and communitarian development
135
; which in due course increased pro-Statehood 
adherence and narrowed governmental roles for welfare and development with incongruities. 
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 During 1948, the last U.S. appointed Governor and the first Puerto Rican to have such position, Jesús Piñero, 
approved Law 53, infamously known as Ley de la Mordaza (Gag Law). It enabled captivity for displaying the 
Puerto Rican flag, expressing pro-independence ideals or attending left-wing political rallies –even without proof of 
engagement in revolutionary activities-  (Paralitici, 2004). 
133
 They attacked La Fortaleza -the Governor's mansion-, failed to murder President Truman in D.C., and staged 
uprisings in Ponce, Peñuelas, Naranjito, Mayagüez, Arecibo, San Juan, Jayuya and Utuado. 
134
 The most symbolic example was Dr. Albizú Campos, who during an incarceration period was subject to painful 
unconsented radiation experiments that caused him fatal cancer. 
135
 In the 1940s, U.S. and Puerto Rican conservatives often disqualified Gov. Tugwell and his New Deal plans, 





 Fig. 143 National Guard troops marching in Jayuya after the uprising, October of 1950  
 
After rebellion was violently extinguished, surveillance in everyday life increased , photo  (n.a., 1950). 
 
The suppressed uprisings re-exposed the need to address cultural sensibilities, attached to 
patriotic sentiments. The Gag law established a durable repressive framework
136
; yet, a more 
tolerant compromise could hinder separatism and channel the profound transformations 
experienced by Puerto Ricans. Vast population segments quickly went from being rural peasants 
to urban, industrial, diasporic and transnational communities. Some traditional gender roles were 
challenged by the incorporation of women to paid employment, migration (Simpson, 2006) and 
reduction of extended families. The island became a tourism spot, medicine and birth control 
testing laboratory, and unequal tax heaven. Also, it became a weapon testing site of U.S. Navy 
bases and a recipient of conservative Cuban migrants before the Cuban Revolution (1959). As 
Cold War tensions escalated, Puerto Rico became a paradigmatic showcase of U.S. ‘foreign’ 
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 The Gag law was repealed in 1957, but political harassment subsisted. The 1994 Electronic Freedom of 
Information Act Amendments made federal agencies disclose that, from 1950s-1970s, forced radiation experiments 
were conducted on prisoners, including Albizú. The FBI and island government had a network of informers feeding 
the Carpetas (dossiers), used to deny employment, college admission and child custody or back punitive actions 
such as unlawful arrests until the 1980s. (Paralitici, 2004). 
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In a period marked by turmoil, mobility and rapid change, Gov. Muñoz Marín visualized that 
defining shared history and cultural identity would maintain ‘ontological security’; that is a sense 
of order and stability in regard to people’s experiences (Giddens, 1986). Muñoz Marín adhered 
to the paradigm that preserving parts of the traditional built environment, practices, history and 
values provided continuity and a sense of normality (Blake, 2000); helpful to withstand 
modernity, social chaos, crises and violence: 
“The people of Puerto Rico eagerly wait to continue being kind and tranquil in their 
understanding, in their attitudes, while they utilize fully and vigorously all the complex resources 
of modern civilization. They do not want that the complexity of those work instruments upsets 
them”(Luis Muñoz Marín, n.d.). 
 
“As Puerto Rico grows in its cities and diminishes in its fields, shall the preservation of the basic 
good knowledge be one of the first achievements of urbanization instead of being one of its first 
victims” (Mu oz Marín 19 2 in Sep lveda Rivera, 2004, p. 52). 
 
Those thoughts crystallized in the cultural counterpart to Operation Bootstraps, called 
Operación Serenidad - Operation Serenity-, a project to advance education, appreciation of 
the arts, identity promotion and preservation of cultural heritage. The Instituto de Cultura 
Puertorriqueña (ICP) was thought as the cornerstone, with a relative local autonomy and 
centralized mandate for setting cultural policies -including historic preservation-. The 
proposition to create the ICP sparked debates because it implied recognition of a validated 
island identity by commanding foreign rulers and contending Puerto Rican representatives in 
the Senate. The later disputed that a) since Puerto Rican culture was a Western hybrid, at 
best, it was more suitable to promote a universalistic culture to facilitate Statehood; b) 
preserving a local culture would instigate separatist belligerency; c) the scope of culture 






In 1955, Law 89 created the ICP to set the tone for institutions dealing with cultural 
affairs
138
; a doctrinally moderate archaeologist and anthropologist, Dr. Ricardo Alegría, was 
appointed as director. In political terms, the resulting compromise to create the ICP had 
limitations because it could not confront colonial rule. Also, the ICP had epistemological 
limitations, because its essentialized vision of culture selectively turned traditional objects, 
buildings and practices into its means and ends to preserve, according to the overlap of 
mainstream paradigms developed in the U.S. and Europe, and local power struggles with 
historical backgrounds. As contemporary institutional benchmarks abroad, the ICP did not 
frame culture as a changing everyday life process linked to justice, human development, 
environmental sustainability or political agency. On the contrary, the ICP understanding of 
culture comprised biases that perpetuated certain injustices. For example, following notions 
of habitus established during the Spanish colony, the official definition of cultural heritage 
was embodied by Hispanophilia and the myth of harmonious mestizaje which privileged 
blanqueamiento ideals, Jíbaro, Spanish, and even Taíno heritage over African heritage (Jorge  
Duany, 2005). Early examples of ICP hispanophilic and elitists biases in preservation were 
the restoration of the Spanish Fort San Gerónimo (adjacent to the Caribe Hilton), Caparra 
ruins, and the house and mausoleum of Luis Muñoz Rivera –Creole politician and father of 
Gov. Muñoz Marín-, also honored with a yearly festival in his highland hometown and an 
exhibit traveling throughout the island. Meanwhile, there were no efforts to preserve the built 
heritage of Afro-descendants. Also, preservation discursively emphasized an imagined 
pristine, peaceful and static colonial history, mainly in the agrarian highlands, populated by 
white jíbaros (Cordova, 2005). Such choice minimized the violent patterns of coastal, multi-
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 Including the Pablo Casals Festival (1957), Symphony Orchestra (1959), Music Conservatory (1958), Free Music 





racial Spanish colonization and American domination (González, 1990); and was out of 
synch with current social trends, since most Puerto Ricans were becoming urban citizens on 
the island or the U.S. In addition, a private, for-profits logic filtered into preservation from its 
inception. For instance, Alegría quickly undertook Old San Juan, the most visible urban case 
menaced by speculative pressures, decay and modernist assumptions. Old San Juan became a 
seminal Latin American model of preservation (Rigol, 2005) that circumvented collective 
rights and benefits to favor a pro-market trickle-down approach, paving the road to 
gentrification, commodification and tourism. In sum, incipient cultural heritage preservation 
endorsed exclusionary memorializations of marginalized citizens in discourses, 
representations and urban interventions; and an unfair appropriation of profits. The choice 
between the politics of remembrance and forgetting (Appadurai, 1996) reinforced the 
historical inability of subalterns to speak (Spivak, 1988), be acknowledged and empowered 
in the public sphere of culture. Besides, in my view, emphasizing an idealized rural past 
(Esterrich, 2009) blurred the role of culture in challenging previous and current unjust 
distribution of resources and power, which had consequences on risk-prone urbanization and 
disaster management. Those ideas were barely sketched out when Santa Clara made landfall, 
questioning how the Commonwealth should address hurricane memorialization. 
 
Meanwhile, grassroots remembrance of disasters was similar to the days of San Felipe, in the 
sense that superstitions remained well entrenched although religious beliefs were less important. 
The continued precarious state of education was a decisive factor for superstitions to remain 
solid on collective imaginaries about how to understand hurricanes. Initially, PRRA funded the 





goals; yet its pace was insufficient. Moreover, English as the official language of public 
education remained a detested obstacle, most Puerto Ricans could not speak it and even teachers 
lacked a solid command of it (Barreto 2001); which did not deter U.S. leaders from pushing it. 
For instance, in 1937, President Roosevelt appointed Jos  M. Gallardo as Puerto Rico’s 
Commissioner of Instruction; he denied intending to diminish the rich Spanish cultural legacy, 
including language. Yet, English had to be promoted to achieve bilingualism so that Puerto 
Ricans could master the language of the country they were part of, know its principles, and also 
gain economic opportunities (Kerry Picket, 2012). By 1940, almost 56 per cent of the children of 
school age -between 350,000 and 400,000- did not attend to school due to insufficient 
schoolrooms (Gunther 1940 in  Polk, 1942, p. 484); and that data did not mention those skipping 
education due to child work.  In 1949, Gov. Muñoz Marín was invested with the authority to 
designate the Commissioner of Education, for which he chose a Puerto Rican. In parallel, Muñoz 
Marín instituted Spanish as the official language of public education through a decree. In the 
same year, a far-reaching approach to overcome education deficits started with the establishment 
of the División de Educación a la Comunidad (DIVEDCO, Division of Community Education), 
under the Department of Instruction. DIVEDCO would help to guide the transition envisioned by 
Muñoz Marín and his team from a rural backward past into the modernity promised by the 
Commonwealth, linking governmental policies to peaceful democracy (Smithsonian Institution, 
2001-2004). Officially, DIVEDCO was an instrument to address the especial needs of the 
community. However, the agenda was set by the Commonwealth creators to advance their 
political needs, not free from contradictions (Esterrich, 2009). Emulating the U.S. Farm Security 
Administration and the Works Progress Administration, and with the help of renowned artists
139
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 Composer Amaury Veray; writers Pedro Juan Soto, Emilio Díaz Valcárcel, René Marqués, José Luis Vivas 





DIVEDCO produced a wide range of pedagogic materials such as booklets, bulletins, pamphlets, 
posters, short and long films. DIVEDCO focused its work in rural areas, although Law N. 372 
which authorized its establishment did not specify it (Esterrich, 2009). DIVEDCO combined 
work on community meetings -mainly targeting adults- and children classrooms. Among the 
topics addressed were illiteracy, housing, healthcare, infrastructure, agriculture, and political 
corruption. Some of those topics related to disaster management, without making explicit ties. 
 
In spite of all the investment, the median level of completed schooling was roughly three years 
when Santa Clara struck (Bluedorn & Cascio, 2005). Moreover, Santa Clara exposed the 
widespread belief in short-term forecasting noticing spider webs falling from structures, animals 
in distress - chickens, crickets, frogs, and lizards -, the presence of a coastal bird flying inland to 
avoid storms, summarized in the proverb “Rabojunco en tierra, tormenta en la mar” (coastal bird 
Rabojunco in land, storm in the sea) (DIVEDCO, 1965), and even feelings pain in callus feet 
(Margenat 1956). Another dominant social and media dynamic, allegedly rooted on ancestral 
heritage, was the hurricane forecasting based on avocado crops. It was trusted by professional 
associations to advice their members, as the Coffee Planters Association did for storm insurance. 
Thus, education deficits, superstitions and the impacts of Santa Clara would also call for a 
pedagogic role of the Commonwealth in disaster memorialization and management. 
 
The decline of religious beliefs to explain hurricanes needs further research, but it can be rapidly 
assessed as an irregular process in which meteorological advances and media communications 
had a relevant counterbalancing role. Catholicism was widespread, although Protestant religions 
were gaining space; and people still begged for God’s protection when in danger, as explained in 
                                                                                                                                                             





the experiential story used to begin this chapter. Yet, by the time Santa Clara hit, naming of 
hurricanes according to saint day was under challenge mainly by U.S. scientist; there were more 
sturdy buildings other than churches that could be used as improvised refuges, particularly public 
schools; and there were no recorded public diatribes by religious leaders explaining disasters as 
God’s wrath towards deserving sinful people. 
 
Moreover, scientific knowledge advanced secularization of disasters in the previous decades, 
with mutable impulses obeying martial U.S. objectives. First, PRRA included launching 
academic weather studies to complement the military. A small building at the Universidad de 
Puerto Rico-Río Piedras became a hurricane relief facility and laboratory, in close consultation 
with the San Juan Weather Bureau. 
 
Fig. 144 Hurricane Relief building at Universidad de 
Puerto Rico-Río Piedras     
Fig. 145 University hurricane researchers Mr. 
Kenninck and his assistant 
(Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration 1936). (Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, 1936). 
 
During World War II, modest weather studies in Puerto Rico underwent a radical change 
because aviation was vulnerable to weather-related events. Again, understanding meteorology 





island had a strategic location which eased funding disbursement for bellicose purposes
140
. In 
1943, the U.S. Air Corps -later the Air Force- teamed up with the University of Chicago to 
establish the Institute of Tropical Meteorology at the Universidad de Puerto Rico-Río Piedras, as 
part of a larger project that also included Pacific Ocean studies. Meteorologist Herbert Riehl, 
appointed director of the institute, pioneered hurricane research and used wartime technology, 
such as radar. He also used emerging technology such as storm flying, improvised that year by a 
military plane that departed from Puerto Rico to penetrate a storm. On August 1944, the War 
Department created the Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, a military team with an instrument 
equipped aircraft originally conducting military missions. After WWII, reduced security 
constrains on military technology enabled the use of radars to gather data such as wind force and 
direction, key to build theoretical interpretations concerning hurricanes, showers, squall lines, 
typhoons, tornadoes, thunderstorms, cold fronts, warm fronts, and occluded fronts (Maynard 
1945). Riehl and colleagues got on board to collect new reliable data of hurricane intensity and 
position, enabling longitudinal sets of regional records. Their refined layers of knowledge over 
the ´Viñes laws´ and other discoveries changed the understanding of hurricanes, tracking, 
warning alerts and technology. For example, Riehl confirmed the thermodynamic nature of 
hurricanes, with the evaporation of warm seawater as the main energy source; which would 
influence climate change theories. Gradually, radar and storm flying data increased the time 
window to launch warnings before hurricanes were too close. 
 
During the Cold War, meteorological studies in Puerto Rico remained relevant for two reasons. 
One was that ‘weather control’ became a top military concern for the federal government. The 
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military aimed to engineer storms, hurricanes and clouds as weapons for an all-weather air force 
(Mooney, 2007). The other validating reason was the impact of two continuous Atlantic 
hurricane seasons. In 1954, hurricanes Carol, Edna and particularly Hazel left a path of 
destruction in several countries and states. Soon, the Weather Bureau in Florida launched the 
National Hurricane Research Project to advance ‘tropical cyclone science and forecasting’, with 
a base in Puerto Rico (Mooney, 2007). A year later, devastating hurricanes Connie, Diane and 
Ione justified more applied research and policies, also related to Puerto Rico. Resultantly, public 
policies to address hurricanes on the island were consolidating as top-down measures in the 
hands of the military, bureaucrats and technical scientists; essentially delinked from 
professionals in the social sciences and humanities, or participatory grass-roots approaches. 
According to contemporary news, the Commonwealth government kept a close communication 
with the recently established Puerto Rican Civil Defense Office, and a sometimes stiff interaction 
with the Red Cross, traditional leader in emergency relief. Puerto Rican Civil Defense 
documents referred to the Cold War logic unfolding in the U.S. and expressed concerns about 
nuclear bombing
141
. For instance, its first available document preceded Santa Clara, and it was a 
Vigilante’s Manual (Oficina de la Defensa Civil, 1954) that outlined the organization of the Civil 
Defense volunteer base, regional coverage, chains of command, detailed tasks to undertake –
such as communications and evacuation-, and equipment to be used in case of hurricanes, floods, 
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 Provisions for nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical attacks remain a worry. A private university recently 
published related guidelines in its security manual for the Metropolitan Campus. (Universidad Interamericana de 





Fig. 146 Inter-institutional meeting to discuss a 
hurricane season plan 
Fig. 147 Ralph Higgs, Weather Bureau 
Director, points to hurricane Connie (San 
Agapito) in the most dangerous point for PR 
  
(M. Rodríguez, 1954b). (Martí, 1955). 
Fig. 148 Mr. Higgs and Mr. Rosemblatt track 
hurricane Hazel 
Fig. 149 Dr. McDowell demonstrates an 
instrument to visiting students and officials 
  
(Casenave, 1954a). (Official Navy Photo, 1951). 
 
Meanwhile, Riehl invited his former meteorology student from the University of Chicago, Dr. 
Dawson Clay McDowell, to join his project. McDowell became a professor and eventually the 
director of the Institute of Tropical Meteorology. As importantly if not more, he improvised a 
fundamental change in the public understanding of hurricanes since the mid-1950s, with the 
advent of television. He presented the daily weather news on Telenoticias del Mundo (WKAQ-
TV Canal 2) for almost three decades, initially at 6.15 pm then after the evening news. In a 1988 





lay people interested. He noticed that aguacateros were famous and trusted, although they lied -
like the Weather Bureau he jokes-. Thus he thought: 
“Why don’t I search for an avocado to interview? Because they know so much about storms, 
they are the storm authority” (McDowell circa late 1970s in Molina Casanova, 1988). 
 
His initial thinking was to buy one avocado from a market. Subsequently, he came up with a 
more elaborated idea to give it a ‘high-tone’; he created Alberto el Aguacate (Albert the 
Avocado), an avocado-like puppet that every night forecasted the weather news with him. In his 
own words, he got a reputation of being a slightly crazy comedian that spoke Spanish poorly, not 
really a scientist. Yet, in a column published in the newspaper San Juan Star, April 28, 1973, 
reprinted in a book, respected historian Fernando Picó wrote a tribute to McDowell as an inter-
generational family figure that protected Puerto Rico. People all over the island would stay up 
late and stop what they were doing to hear him and follow his advice (F. Picó, 2008). 
 
Fig. 150 Tribute to Prof. McDowell on Alberto El Aguacate facebook fan page 
 
He became a reliable public figure on the island; in the company of his friend Albert the Avocado, he daily 





He was trustworthy, as mentioned in the story used to start this chapter. Besides, using his 
intuition and reasoning, he spread technical knowledge inimitably appropriating a popular jíbaro 
superstition, with a respectful sense of humor that resonated among his viewers. McDowell 
overlooked beliefs of coastal people- such as shell forecasting- in line with the mainstream idea 
that ancestral knowledge and Puerto Rican identity were rooted in the highlands.  
 
In sum, when Santa Clara made landfall, religion had a reduced societal role, novel expensive 
technology and modernity paradigms were gaining weight, albeit their lack of certainty; whilst 
traditional forecasting beliefs were considered equally if not more valid. 
 
V.II. 5 The New Deal, WWII, the Cold War and hurricanes: U.S. disaster management 
towards a bellicose approach 
The framing of Santa Clara relief is best understood when examining first how the U.S. 
mechanisms to address disasters considerably changed from the 1930s- to the mid-1950s. Instead 
of reviewing a specific preceding disaster, reviewing the process shows how executive power 
significantly increased and adjusted crisis management through diverse cases, with repercussions 
fully experienced in Puerto Rico until Santa Clara. 
 
During the New Deal, the federal government expanded its role in disaster assistance through old 
and new institutions such as the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation, Federal Civilian Works Administration, Works Progress Administration, 





instance, the Army Corps of Engineers helped communities to prevent and recover from floods, 
and the Department of Agriculture offered aid to farmers who sustained economic losses in 
disasters. The federal government initiated low-interest loans and outright grants for disaster 
relief —features of subsequent disaster laws. In 1933, President Roosevelt created the National 
Emergency Council to coordinate emergency programs among all agencies involved in 
preparedness and develop programs unrelated to civil defense. Contemporarily, Congress 
considered turning the American Red Cross a government agency, but Red Cross officials chose 
to keep it private. Also, Congress passed the Flood Control Act, motivated by a large inundation 
in New England during 1936; which built upon the 1928 Flood Control Act, Mississippi floods 
and Okeechobee experiences. Water management and disaster prevention official merged, and 
the federal government -particularly the Army Corps of Engineers- engaged in flood control at a 
vast, unprecedented scale. The management of so-called ‘natural’ catastrophes consolidated as a 
technocratic endeavor concerned with the spatial implementation of science and engineering 
solutions, with implicit connections to economic growth and allegedly separate from politics and 
culture. Moreover, in the late 1930s, using novel arguments, evidence, and historical 
precedents
142
, New Deal Congressmen casted the Great Depression as a national disaster and 
won the Supreme Court approval for increased governmental powers of taxation and 
expenditures on ‘general welfare’
143
 (Landis, 2005). 
 
The political climate of 1940 added strong military biases to disaster management. Responding 
to the beginning of WWII, Roosevelt reestablished the Council of National Defense to handle 
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 Such as the 1893 Depression, for which Congress debates firstly viewed mass unemployment as a national 
catastrophe, instead of a personal failure, that merited federal aid. 
143
 Following that line of argument, the New Deal could have been the result of reframing disasters (Landis, 2005), 





crisis, which grouped war and disasters. Federal funding targeted attack preparedness, whilst 
non-bellicose crisis preparedness had to be afforded by states; which created disincentives and 
conflicts among federal, state and local authorities concerning resources and power (McClure, 
2011; U.S. Homeland Security, 2006). A year later, Roosevelt established the Office of Civilian 
Defense (OCD) to answer increasing concerns about civilian bombing, as experienced in Europe. 
OCD tasks comprised protective services, such as attack preparedness generally carried out by 
men; and non-protective activities –also called social welfare services-, usually carried out by 
women. The latter included nutrition and physical education, morale upholding and the 
promotion of volunteerism. Non-protective activities sparked critics; they were labeled ‘sissy 
stuff’ by the first OCD appointed director, Fiorello LaGuardia, and ‘pink’ by leading politicians 
(U.S. Homeland Security, 2006). Moreover, non-protective activities were criticized by congress 
members and public despising the program’s social aims, and questioning what they saw as an 
inflated budget and encroaching governmental intervention in everyday life. In fact, the OCD fell 
short from its goals; it basically established civil defense plans, including black outs, air raid 
drills, and sand bag stockpiling (U.S. Homeland Security, 2006). After the war, calls for 
dissolving the OCD were based on the emerging consensus that attacks on the U.S. homeland 
were unlikely. The National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council and 
National Security Resources Board, with diminished funding and goals concerning civil defense. 
 
However, the Cold War, nuclear fallout and the Korea War soon became a worry for politicians 
and lay citizens, strengthening again a bellicose bias in meteorology and civil defense. ‘Weather 
control’ became a military priority. Already in WWI, Germans used poison gas to exterminate 





enemies´ bodily functions-, towards the attack of the environmental conditions that sustained 
life, an approach also called ´terror from the air’ (Sloterdijk, 2009). During the Cold War, such 
approach would be used in wartime as well as in peacetime, in an attempt to create and direct 
storms, clouds and hurricanes as weapons of an all-weather arsenal. In 1946, Nobel Laureate 
Irving Langmuir led a team at General Electric Corporation to control weather, they used silver 
iodide and dry ice as cloud seeding agents. A member of the General Electric team, Vincent 
Schaefer, bombed a cloud near New York with dry ice causing snow. Resultantly, ‘Project Cirrus’ 
was launched a year later with the backup of the U.S. military, and it tried to deflect a hurricane 
threatening Florida by dropping almost 200 pounds of dry ice into the storm’s eye. The hurricane 
diverted to Savannah (Georgia) due to natural steering currents, not seedling; and it caused more 
than U$5 million in local damages (Scarpino, 2009). Nevertheless, the cause of the path change 
was confirmed years later; at that time the experiment was believed to be successful 
notwithstanding losses. Thus, it motivated further attempts to generate large-scale climatic 
effects for combative and civilian purposes. When the race with the Soviet Union started, 
President Dwight David "Ike" Eisenhower’s weather advisor -Harold T. Orville- was convinced 
that the country controlling the weather would control the planet (Fleming, 2009). The project 
‘Complete Weather Control’ was approved in 1954 by Orville, disguised as drought relief. Cloud 
seedling became a popular commercial venture, with estimates of 15% of the U.S. surface being 
bombed to mitigate droughts (Scarpino, 2009). The rationale of chemical modifications to 
hurricanes by the military would extend through the ‘Stormfury Project’ (1962-1983), for which 






Concomitantly, the perception of risks across the nation changed due to the advent of television. 
News about the arms race with the Soviet Bloc and vivid imagery of distant fellow citizens 
suffering created public anxiety and required governmental leadership (Eisenhower 1955 in 
McClure, 2011, p. 5). The turning point was August of 1949, when the Soviets successfully 
tested a nuclear weapon, shattering the U.S. monopoly. President Truman was criticized by 
Congress, officials and citizens for the lack of headship during a potential crisis (U.S. Homeland 
Security, 2006). In December of 1950, Truman’s executive order created the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration, undertaking responsibilities of civil defense from the National Security 
Resources Board (W. J. Cohen & Boyer, 1951), including the mix of war and disasters. A month 
later, the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 was passed; it established that the Federal Civil 
Defense Administration would guide state and local governments on the implementation of 
programs to face nuclear threats and disasters that included education, training, creation of 
shelters and evacuation scenarios. The underlying assumption was that individual preparedness –
called ‘self-help’- was optimal to reduce federal spending and citizen’s dependency on 
government, avoid creating a garrison state, and satisfy skepticism towards the actual need to 
invest in physical and social programs. The result was a civil defense policy that depended on 
educating citizens to protect themselves separately, until the government could respond. 
Following the WWII British Civil Defense scheme, the aim was to establish a local, 
decentralized, volunteer based structure (U.S. Homeland Security, 2006). In theory, state and 
local governments were able to request federal funds to launch precautionary and post-attack 
programs –mainly reconstruction and healthcare-. In practice, the Federal Civil Defense Act 
provided minimal resources during Truman and Eisenhower’s administrations. Most investment 





used its limited resources to store supplies, guide shelter building programs, enhance multi-scalar 
coordination, institute an attack warning system, and launch a famous education campaign (U.S. 
Homeland Security, 2006). The campaign produced pedagogic materials such as pamphlets, 
posters and films –including children classroom movies ‘Duck and Cover’-, that taught 
Americans to prepare themselves constructing domestic shelters and stocking food and supplies 
for family consumption. Those materials also included anti-communist propaganda, weakening 
collective grass-roots actions to handle crisis. Subsequent debates basically oscillated between 
shelter construction and evacuation plans, further distancing civil defense from non-protective 
activities and cultural interventions. Complementarily, the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 
established a bureaucratic process for federal emergency response and relief. After an official 
request from state governors, the President had the authority to designate federal disaster areas 
and provide assistance to complement local and state resources, excluding private losses to 
individuals or businesses. 
 
The combined effects of those influential pieces of legislation framed civil defense and disasters 
executive orders, ordinances, and institutional reorganizations that persisted in the following 
decades and had an influence on Puerto Rico. In the short term, those acts also shaped 
improvised federal choices concerning infrastructure, housing and loans. In 1951, Truman 
designated as federal disaster an area catastrophically flooded in Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Missouri (Comerío, 1998 in (J. D. Rivera & Miller, 2006)). Losses reached over U$870 millions, 
including private homes, businesses and farms. The federal government stepped in to 





legislative vacuum. In 1953, Eisenhower partially filled such vacuum with the Small Business 
Administration, which provided disaster relief loans to private owners. 
 
The powerful 1954 Atlantic hurricane season included hurricanes Carol, Edna and Hazel; they 
affected Haiti, Jamaica, Mid-Atlantic States, New England and Canada. In response, Congress 
authorized funding for the seminal National Hurricane Research Project, comprising surveys and 
protection works –such as floodwalls and levees-, and for emergency responses -including 
evacuation, legally defined then as volunteer or mandatory-. The Army Corps of Engineers and 
the Weather Bureau developed the concept of a Standard Project Hurricane (SPH) to classify a 
hurricane, which was used until the early 1970s, when the Saffir-Simpson scale was developed. 
The SPH would influence building and zoning codes, and urban growth along states at risk; and 
it served to define hurricane flooding protection systems, such as the levees of New Orleans 
(Louisiana)
144
. Deplorably, the SPH concept was methodologically faulty (ASCE Hurricane 
Katrina External Review Panel, 2005). The database excluded worst storms to characterize a 
representative one; crucial infrastructure designed accordingly was flawed, remained 
unretrofitted against National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
145
 advice and 
failed during an extreme event such as hurricane Katrina. Besides, cost-benefit ratio calculations 
neglected the greater economic and social costs of failure in urban areas compared to rural ones.  
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In 1955, the Atlantic hurricane season included hurricanes Connie, Diane and Ione, which caused 
widespread flooding, casualties, and property damages along the Middle Atlantic and New 
England coasts. During two brief radio and television speeches broadcasted nation-wide, 
Eisenhower projected himself as a compassionate man of action, established key elements of 
presidential disaster discourses (McClure, 2011) and set the tone for federal engagement in 
hurricane relief and reconstruction. He summarized the events and damages, valued Red Cross, 
private and governmental rescue and relief efforts, confirmed the country and his empathy, 
offered support in rescue and relief stages, urged for charitable contributions and individual 
volunteer engagement, and listed future actions such as mitigation of potential disasters. In line 
with the Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Eisenhower skipped reconstruction support. It remained a 
local and state governments task, which would express the soul and temperament of communities 
and individuals (McClure, 2011). He mentioned increased prevention and endorsed private 
entrepreneurialship, focusing on insurance companies, as the government would evaluate: 
“whether we can prevent these floods in the future on a long-range basis, whether we can get 
insurance through some cooperation between insurance companies and State and Federal 
governments to prevent the kind of losses that have been suffered by our industries” (McClure, 
2011, p. 5). 
 
 
Succeeding federal administrations added agencies, programs and legislation to manage disasters 
ad-hoc and reactively, such as the Emergency Flood Control Work Act (1955), the Flood Peril 
Act (1956), and the Flood Insurance Act (1956). As a result, affected areas increasingly received 
federal disaster assistance funds (J. D. Rivera & Miller, 2006). Noticeably, all federal 
administrations skipped cultural interventions to manage disasters, but the education campaign 






VII.6. Santa Clara relief and incipient policy trends 
Santa Clara relief was a multifaceted challenge because the island underwent structural reforms 
during the New Deal and early Commonwealth years, without experiencing a hurricane since 
San Ciprián (1932). Thus, the crisis tested the Governor and the Commonwealth’s capacities; the 
linkages between the President, Governor and Puerto Rican opposition; novel disaster legislative 
and institutional frameworks; emerging technology and modernity paradigms confronted with 
traditional beliefs; entrenched poverty and widespread destruction in a context of pervasive 
deficits in housing, healthcare, education, and food security. Uniquely, Santa Clara had an 
official cultural response finished two years later, which needs a thorough separate analysis. 
 
Gov. Muñoz Marín followed Eisenhower when launching relief, using his experience as a 
journalist and writer –nicknamed ‘the poet in La Fortaleza’- in addition to a seasoned politician. 
His prose and image projected him as a compassionate man of action through radio message 
broadcasted island-wide hours after Santa Clara passed, and his frequent declarations to the 
newspapers, radio and television speeches. For example, in his initial communications to El 
Mundo newspaper, he evaluated damages in San Juan as mildly after a car tour, endorsed Red 
Cross and governmental efforts, confirmed his personal empathy and commitment, urged 
individual volunteer engagement, and offered support in rescue and relief stages specifying his 
orders to use emergency funds for road clearing, increased police force, and food for shelter 
refugees in schools distributed by the Red Cross and the Department of Instruction (Santiago 
Sosa, 1956b). After visiting the Weather Bureau, he met chief representatives of Public Works, 
Planning, Agriculture, Police, Firemen, Water and Sanitation Department, Treasure, Instruction, 





but also exceptional chance to exhibit the soul and temperament of the newly launched 
Commonwealth, and the Governor’s leadership. 
 
 
Fig. 151 Gov. Muñoz Marín and his wife greet 
people affected by Santa Clara 
Fig. 152 Gov. Muñoz Marín talks to a survivor, 
along the Caguas-Cayey highway 
  
Having been a journalist, he was keen on 
solidifying his image in the media (Orduña 1956). 
As San Felipe, Santa Clara almost torn a wooden 
house from its stills (El Mundo, 1956e). 
 
Right during the aftermath, Muñoz Marín rejected requesting to Eisenhower the designation of 
Puerto Rico as a federal disaster area. He emphatically denied the possibility of calling for a 
special session of the Legislative Assembly in order to discuss asking for federal help (Santiago 
Sosa, 1956a). According to him, the Commonwealth emergency funds and extra resources from 
insular departments would suffice (Santiago Sosa, 1956a). He implicitly framed disaster relief as 
a question of political sovereignty; thus, he behaved like U.S. state governors refusing federal aid 
since the late 19
th
 century and 1920s Puerto Rican politicians after San Felipe. Also, being a key 
player in development policy-making since the New Deal and architect of the Commonwealth 
status, he seemed to judge that admitting dependency and underdevelopment vis-à-vis a 
hurricane was a political peril. Soon, a White House speaker confirmed that the President could 





by the Disaster Relief Act (1950). Son the right-wing opposition fought back, as Sen. Luis A. 
Ferré contacted Eisenhower. Ferré, industrialist, newspaper owner, founding leader of the new 
oppositional Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP New Progressive Party) and endorsing a pro-
Statehood and Republican-like stance, hit the news writing to Eisenhower about the need to 
declare the island a federal emergency area (UP, 1956)
146
. Thus, he used Santa Clara to challenge 
the Governor and disaster protocol whilst publically building ties with the President, and 
hardening Muñoz Marín’s position against federal help (Combas, 1956). 
 
The crisis was mild compared to San Ciriaco, San Felipe, and San Ciprián aftermaths. Yet, it was 
still a crisis and entrenched vulnerability was re-exposed as historical post-disaster issues 
reemerged critically. For instance, there were scarce construction materials; housing, food and 
clothes deficits; medical emergencies; towns and rural areas completely isolated, and vast 
agricultural damages. Soon economic losses reached US$ 25,500,000 and kept increasing. 
Diverse organizations joined impromptu given the dire situation and deficient Commonwealth 
responses. For instance, the U.S. Red Cross offered help for 18,000 families; the U.S. 
Department of Children and Families provided equipment, medicine and personnel; the 
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union and the American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations-which had Puerto Rican members on the island and New 
York- donated a mobile hospital to Yabucoa and US$ 25,000 to disaster victims; the Evangelic 
Council distributed  donations from several Christian denominations in ten towns; higher 
education institutions such as the Engineering College of Mayagüez and the Metropolitan 
Vocational School engaged; the U.S. Army donated 1,300 shelters for refugees, and even modest 
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migrant workers in the U.S. flew back to see their relatives, help with money and unpaid work 
(El Mundo, 1956c, 1956i; Mundo, 1956b; R Rivera, 1956; B Santana, 1956). Fears of epidemic 
outbreaks arose in Maunabo and Yabucoa (Sanchez Cappa, 1956); in Aibonito, Comerío and 
Naranjito there were flu outbreaks (El Mundo, 1956a); soon more than 3,000 persons in Yabucoa 
and 4,297 in Patillas alone had to be vaccinated against typhoid fever (Hernández, 1956d). Lack 
of construction materials was slowing down recovery (El Mundo, 1956b; R. Santiago, 1956a). 
Hunger became another increasing menace; in response, one thousand tons of food would be 
freely distributed each week amongst 100,000 families in need (El Mundo, 1956h). Public 
education was overburdened (Hernández, 1956c). Over 43,860 students were unable to attend 
damaged schools in 52 out of 72 municipalities (Hernández, 1956b), and since the crisis went on 
for months, the island government launched basic literacy lessons to refugees in schools (J. 
Martínez, 1956). In total, the education of a generation resulted compromised; children aged 4 to 
7 living in high-wind regions seem to have finished less years of schooling as adults than their 




, news advanced another of Ferr ’s critical appeals to the Governor for a rectification 
in order to get federal help, implicitly advancing his pro-Statehood position (El Mundo, 1956f). 
Concomitantly, El Mundo did not publish critiques by pro-independence or left-wing sectors; 
which exposed their weakening after decades of persecution. In truth, El Mundo followed long-
term conventional media and public policy biases to allow conservative, wealthy white men to 
characterize and respond to a hurricane although spared from suffering it, unlike grassroots 
representatives. A day later, the Governor capitulated, and made his official request to 
Eisenhower on the 18
th





federal envoys to define relief; whilst touring the island on his car, giving away tools to clear 
roads, and talking to survivors in situ and refugees in shelters. Muñoz Marín was determined to 
impose his presence on top political meetings and everyday situations alike, which served to 
keep control and shield the Commonwealth from criticism. Nevertheless, even Teodoro 
Moscoso, proud brain behind Bootstraps and in charge of overseeing relief, publically accepted 
that it would take the help from everybody on the island to achieve reconstruction (R. Santiago, 
1956b). Next, more spontaneous funding was gathered from private donors in Puerto Rico and 
the Dominican Republic, enterprises -such as the Rum Institute- and civil society organizations –
including the Federation of Catholic University Women and the Civic Club of Ladies-. In the 
light of incoming federal compensations and credits, ensuing debates focused on distribution, 
revealing priorities and vacuums. For example, the countryside had been central in the news 
concerning destruction, with articles about the losses of small-scale Puerto Rican farmers 
growing export crops such as pineapple, tobacco, plantains and bananas, or foodstuff for local 
consumption. Yet, news vented that federal credits and compensations to rehabilitate agricultural 
properties went to sugar and coffee planters (Cunningham & Ramos, 1956; El Mundo, 1956d), 
both sectors traditionally successful at advancing their post-disaster requests during San Ciriaco 
and San Felipe. Other debates concerned the S.J. Weather Bureau’s hurricane tracking 
imprecision and dependence from the Florida Center to launch warnings, which allegedly slowed 
decisions by local institutions (Mundo, 1956a). In response, Weather Bureau Director, Ralph 
Higgs, gave public statements and lectures (El Mundo, 1957b; B. Santana, 1956) to clear the 
image of the Weather Bureau. Also, the local Red Cross Director, Carlos Patterne, announced the 





preceding construction of cement public housing for low-income citizens, using federal funds (El 
Mundo, 1956j). 
 
By next January, most federal relief funds had been received (El Mundo, 1957a), although help 
from other sources kept pouring. It was time for the annual report of the Governor to the Puerto 
Rican Congress and, predictably given his underplaying of the crisis, he told a success story in 
which Santa Clara only deserved two brief mentions concerning agriculture and housing. For 
him, school enrolment had surpassed the goals. Registered students reached 94% instead of 91% 
of all elementary school children; 84% instead of 75% intermediate school students, and 43% 
instead of 41% high school students (Luis  Muñoz Marín, 1957). Economic growth, external 
trade, public health, industrial development, employment and average family income also had 
reached remarkable achievements in his view. He advised funding a plan of modest public works 
adding to the existing basic public works, in order to alleviate the human suffering of seasonal 
unemployment; without mentioning the need to rebuild hurricane damaged infrastructure. His 
framing of agricultural calamity was ambiguous at best: 
“We are worried that agriculture, despite the great progress in some branches, has not been up 
to the level of other factors of our economy in its contribution to the general progress of Puerto 
Rico. Excepting coffee and cattle raising, agricultural expansion has been relatively small. 
Coffee withstood damages of some consideration due to hurricane Santa Clara” (Luis  Muñoz 
Marín, 1957). 
 
Concerning housing, the Governor avoided mentioning hurricane and flooding destruction of 
slums, and their residents’ distress. San Juan was not on the hurricane path, which probably 
reduced damages in local slums; suspiciously though, there is no data available. Precarious urban 
housing “was against the legitimate aspirations of a good home that each Puerto Rican family 





anyway. Thus, his exit was to briefly reinstate that the Planning Board was addressing housing 
through studies and the Commonwealth through projects. He did acknowledge vast partial or 
complete damages to rural housing, which affected a significant part of his hardcore 
constituency. His answers were to build using wind resistant materials, such as concrete; 
continue the cooperative and directed self-help scheme in which the government provided 
construction materials; promote individual ownership reducing apartments costs in semi-urban 
housing projects or establishing plots and services projects; provide an exemption on payments 
and arrears for some years; and restrict the right to sale for some years also, to avoid speculation. 
However, he skewed how to manage existing and future urbanization of flood-prone areas to 
stop increasingly perilous trends. In order to achieve such aim, institutions created in the 
preceding or contemporary decade could have intervened in land markets, property rights and 
private developers’ roles; yet, that decision implied an anathema to pro-market dynamics 
solidifying on the island and the U.S. Noteworthy public policy changes include Law #8 of next 
June, which established the Administración de Renovación Urbana y Vivienda (ARUV- Urban 
Renewal and Housing Administration) and the Corporación de Renovación Urbana y Vivienda 
(CRUV- Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation). Both institutions intensified work in rural 
and urban housing. They were accompanied by the Administración de Fomento Cooperativo 
(Cooperative Promotion Administration) which aimed to organize cooperatives for housing 
acquisition, as mandated by 1957 Law N.4. 
 
Post-Santa Clara, McDowell kept attracting lay citizens to his daily weather news with his style; 
and the media publicized scientific findings and technological changes, such as watching 





they worsened (Rojas Daporta, 1958), along the lines of the ‘Complete Weather Control’ project. 
Although there is no available evaluation if the 1954 Civil Defense Manual was used and useful 
during Santa Clara; the military, Civil Defense and Red Cross continued preparing and 
circulating similar documents to face disasters and atomic threats jointly; including training, 
shelters and evacuation. Soon, an Operational Survival Plan mapped evacuation scenarios in case 
of nuclear fallouts and calculated the population to be displaced from the main cities, specifying 
travel times and roads to the main shelters (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico & Civil Defense, 
1958). Also, the Civil Defense prepared a basic citizens manual of guidelines to implement in 
case of hurricanes, floods and storm surges (Oficina de la Defensa Civil, 19?). 
 
Yet, grassroots beliefs concerning hurricanes would remain prominent until the end of the decade 
at least, as shown in the following El Mundo headlines: 
“Experts interpret avocado blossoming, they say there will not be a hurricane” (Margenat, 
1957, p. 2). 
 
“Will there be hurricanes? Avocado trees keep forecasters perplex” (Margenat, 1958a, p. 16). 
 
“Sixth sense of aguacateros: they affirm that they already knew Hurricane Fifí would not blow 
here”(Margenat, 1958b, p. 13). 
 
“Sequels of [hurricane] Edith, pointed out that calluses, avocados and thunder timely said that 
there would not be a temporal” (Rojas, 1959, p. 1). 
 
“Splendorous blossoming. Avocado meteorologists say that there will not be a hurricane this 
year” (Margenat, 1959b, p. 14). 
 
“Confirming forecast. Avocado meteorologists say there will not be a hurricane”(Margenat, 
1959a, p. 4). 
 
“Avocado meteorologists sing victory concerning hurricane forecasting of this year”(Margenat, 






Thus, there was an evident need to launch a cultural project capable of disseminating awareness 
in the light of superstitions, illiteracy, poor schooling and isolation. It turned out to be 
DIVEDCO –not ICP- the institution that would tell Puerto Ricans how hurricanes should be 
understood, remembered and managed; along the Civil Defense, military and scientist. ICP was 
in charge of recording and promoting the shared history and cultural heritage of Puerto Ricans. 
Although disasters were a structural feature of life on the island throughout history leaving 
numerous imprints on culture, they were not included in ICP tasks. Seen in retrospective, such 
choice was aligned with mainstream paradigms of cultural heritage. What is more controversial 
is the possibility that a frank effort to memorialize and disseminate what had happened before, 
during and after San Ciriaco, San Felipe, San Ciprián and Santa Clara would have included a 
critique to U.S. rule. Arguably also, if done in conjunction with the Planning Board, it would 
have challenged urbanization processes promoted by the Commonwealth and private 
entrepreneurs; and it could have legitimized social justice claims in order to promote a holistic 
culture of safety. Ultimately, a progressive and in-depth examination of how disasters had been 
triggered and poorly addressed could have questioned the serene and free yet non-nationalistic 
ideals that Muñoz Marín ascribed to Puerto Ricans, and could have challenged the legitimacy of 
U.S. military and economic interests. Instead, DIVEDCO followed the Federal Civil Defense 
Administration in producing four interrelated educational materials to address hurricanes, 
lacking pragmatic critiques or politicized allusions. A movie, two posters, a booklet and a 
bulletin were a remarkable investment that involved talented artists and scientists to rapidly 






The movie ‘Huracán’ was finished in 1958, under U.S. director Benjamin Doniger, with the 
participation of an all-male film crew. The movie combined acting scenes with Santa Clara 
footage; it was meant to be widely screened along the distribution of booklet, posters and 
bulletin, all of which were planned to be central topics of discussion in organized pedagogic 
groups and classrooms. 
Fig. 153 Huracán Poster 1958 
 
Fig. 154 Huracán Poster 1965 
 
Both posters emphasize the fragility of one storey stilt houses. The left one (Figueroa, 1958), contemporary with 
the movie, depicts a rural scenario. The right one (Vera Cortés 1965) was done when Muñoz Marín was no longer 
governor and had lost his grip on the PDD party; it portrays a dense urban slum but also an urban solution to the 
problem, a five storey, white, modernist building behind. In both, the human suffering of frontal family figures and 
their precarious exodus is caused by hurricanes associated to anthropomorphic imagery. 
 
The movie can be divided into four parts: introduction, preparations for an impending hurricane, 
passing of Santa Clara -although it is never mentioned by its name but follows its path-, and 





hurricane eye rotates and the letters Huracán fly away. A male narrator impersonates children 
playing outdoors before a storm hits, they watch the clouded sky and say a famous riddle: 
“El cielo está encancaranublado. ¿Quién lo encancaranublaría? Aquel que lo encancaranubló, 
¡Gran encancaranublador sería!”(Doniger, 1958) 
 
(The sky is clouded. Who clouded the sky? Whoever clouded it, a great clouder must have been!). 
 
The narrator states that children might continue playing, but there might be signs of something 
worse. Then, a poor and backward countryman looks up to the sky searching for birds and fruits. 
Contrastingly, the next images show professionals, mostly men, working for institutions engaged 
with weather monitoring during the hurricane season, such as the Civil Defense, military, Red 
Cross and particularly the Weather Bureau. The narrator explains that the latter institution does 
not rely on birds or avocados; but on efficient personnel, communications with other 
meteorological stations, modern instruments such as radar, thermometer, radio sonde, barometer, 
anemometer, etc. Using their hands, meteorologists map an impending storm, “that capricious 
vermin, monstrosity in the shape of a hurricane that snakes through Africa and the Caribbean 
feeding itself until dying of indigestion” (Doniger, 1958). A brief scientific definition of the 
hurricane follows, made out of two masses of cold and hot air, empty on its center around which 
rotate “all-consuming unstoppable and inevitable winds” (Doniger, 1958). 
 
When preparing for an impending storm, men at the Weather Bureau are actively producing 
scientific knowledge, printouts, tables, and graphs; whilst women pass messages, type, answer 
the telephone or operate phone lines. Subsequently, a family gathers in their living room near a 
radio, listening to a male meteorologist’s advice to be aware of surges, floods, winds and rains; 





news as the hurricane may suddenly change. The radio man keeps explaining tasks to do, whilst 
women in rural homes watching the clouds hear him and start implementing his suggested tasks. 
A countryside family clears objects near their house; men use wood to secure doors and windows 
against the “strong hoofs of the shaking wind” (Doniger, 1958), reinforce the house structure and 
roofs, others leave insecure homes and go to a solid refuge -a tormentera -. Parallel preparations 
include getting food that does not need refrigeration because electricity may fail, and gathering 
potable water because aqueducts and pipes could be ruined and the rivers could be infected. 
After all precautions, nothing is left but “to wait with all hope” (Doniger, 1958); children, 
women and supplies are shown tightly fit inside a tormentera. 
 
In the third part, Santa Clara footage shows first a well-built urban area being lashed and then it 
moves to rural locations, completely avoiding urban slums. During “the confabulation of wind 
and rain” (Doniger, 1958), the advice is to stay away from rivers and the sea, since flooding kills 
the most. The hurricane comes from the southeast, between Arroyo and Patillas, passes by 
Cayey, Aibonito and Ciales, and leaves by Arecibo “to get lost inside the sea, where the 
suffering it has collected feeds it up and undoes it” (Doniger, 1958). A map of the island is 
shown with an animation of a hurricane arriving and moving, a voice saying “it is here the gran 
encancaranublador” (Doniger, 1958), and recording of shaking branches and landscapes. The 
narrator admonishes that sudden calmness should not be confused with the end; it is the passing 
of the eye and avoiding exiting is an imperative because more violence is coming in the opposite 
direction (virazón). The value of preventive supplies is highlighted by mentioning gas or portable 





with the moving hurricane animation is shown, explaining that its small size did not enable great 
damage between Arroyo and Arecibo. 
 
The hurricane aftermath part starts with a change of music, fast aerial and land footage show 
devastated areas. In proper urban areas, people are picking up things and cleaning debris; and 
whilst lamenting that human efforts were undone by the blows of the wind and rain, the narrator 
tells that all is reparable. Public services ought to be restored, yet there are no casualties which is 
very important he states. Everything else, “while there is faith, will be recuperated one way or 
the other” (Doniger, 1958). Further precautions include avoiding fallen electrical cables. A 
researcher interviews a local man who apparently gesticulates how his house was destroyed, but 
his voice has been silenced. Provisionally, the Red Cross has been installed in a public school. 
The narrator advices to heal wounds and get vaccinated against possible infections; whilst 
images show long lines of seemingly poor people getting vaccinated, and also waiting and 
receiving food -mainly children and women-. Food is available in each town refuge, and beds are 
shown with children, babies and their tending mothers. According to the narrator, remaining in 
good health is necessary to face difficult tasks ahead, which include burying dead animals to 
avoid epidemics, confronting rural damages in destroyed fields, clearing roads to restore 
communications, fixing electricity and communications and retrofitting homes. Men are shown 
on top of roofs hammering wood, picking up wood in a port, and ultimately building a compact 
geometric wooden house whilst an elderly lady gives them indications. The narrator admonishes 
that using “the old warmness and the ancestral faith, we can rebuild on the shadow of the fallen 
home an egregious building where we will continue taking care of our endless willingness to 





A final review of key things to remember includes not confusing the passing of the hurricane eye 
with the ceasing of danger, attention to radio and TV messages by the Weather Bureau, buying 
food that does not need refrigeration, filling recipients with clean water, filling cars with fuel, 
and moving to the nearest refuge available such as schools, churches or tormenteras. Images 
inside the tormentera review basic items such as canned food, stoves, materials and tools for 
rebuilding, matches, lanterns, and candles. The last scene focuses on a new 4-5 story suburban 
housing project, one of the growing caseríos throughout the island. The narrator says that when 
returning to normalcy –implied to be the new life in the caseríos-, it will be time to teach the 
children the riddle: 
“El cielo está desencancaranublado, ¿Quién lo desencancaranublaría?”(Doniger, 1958) 
 
(The sky is unclouded. Who unclouded the sky?). 
 
 
In sum, the film used a mixed language concerning science, religion, and storms being 
monstrous and uncontrollable creatures. It portrayed a calming yet unrealistic integration of 
assorted institutions into a coordinated disaster management ‘system’. All information was top-
down; only one person affected by the hurricane spoke to the camera, yet the narrator’s voice 
was superimposed on the scene. Gender assumptions included men as capable of constructing 
information and fixing destroyed homes, infrastructure and fields; whilst women were 
secretaries, caretakers and main food recipients along children in shelters. Previous hurricanes or 
other potentially concurring disasters were unmentioned. The very short time-span covered did 
not intend to analyze root causes of vulnerability; it focused on the emergency phase and self-
help. Rural housing, formal parts of towns and public housing projects were shown; unlike 





Congress. The final scene indicates public housing projects as the solution, also backing the 
Governor’s report; although reconstruction was vaguely addressed pointing to ancestral faith or 
sheer willingness to live. The acknowledgement of flooding as the worst danger had no 
repercussions for advice concerning permanent post-hurricane relocations or avoidance of future 
urbanization of flood-prone areas. The core message was that individuals and their families had 
to prepare for the emergency. 
 
Meanwhile, the related 48 page booklet ‘What do we know about the Hurricane’ was meant to be 
a family property. It included works by famous illustrators Rafael Tufiño and Eduardo Vera, 
along five other men and a woman. After a brief introduction of the topic relevance, the booklet 
summarizes a historical overview of hurricanes in a plain language, with black and white 
illustrations, and some conceptual mistakes, unsubstantiated claims, and fabricated facts. The 
overview starts with indigenous populations and beliefs, it continues to the hurricane challenges 
faced by Christopher Columbus and colonizers, and it makes a hiatus to tell a short story by 
Cayetano Toll y Toste, in which Catholic faith is the decisive factor to avoid death. Next, an 
account of hurricanes in Puerto Rico is followed by a testimonial narrative of San Ciriaco by 
Ramón Arráez y Ferrando, former Spanish official, and a poem about a tempest, by Cuban 
author José María de Heredia. Subsequently, the booklet discusses the four main superstitions 
concerning hurricane forecasting, followed by scientific explanations of how hurricanes 
originate, latest technologies to evaluate them, and role of the Weather Bureau. Finally, it 








Fig. 155 Indigenous ritual for 
Hurakán or Yuquiyú 
The historical overview narrates 
that for the nomadic Asian tribes 
which crossed the Bering Strait 
to populate the Americas, used 
to snow storms, the first 
Caribbean hurricane would have 
been an otherworldly surprise. 
After serial experiences, they 
attributed the unknown 
phenomena to a new God, 
Jurakan; which eventually had a 
benign rival, Yuquiyú  
(DIVEDCO, 1965, p. 6). 
 
 
Fig. 156 “G               ” 
References to religion include 
depending on God, miracles and 
faith to survive, given limited 
human agency. For instance, a 
little girl was miraculously 
saved by the Virgin of 
Guadalupe in a story supposedly 
taking place during a 16
th
 
century hurricane (San 
Bartolomé), written by famous 
19
th
 century Creole writer 
Cayetano Toll y Toste 
(DIVEDCO, 1965, p. 15). 
 
 
Fig. 157 “H             
           ”  
Influenced by a subtle 
hispanophilic bias, the historic 
writings tend to portray 
Spaniards as heroic. During 
colonization, Spaniards were 
said to incorporate indigenous 
knowledge about storms, despite 
religious and cultural clashes 






Fig. 158 “E                   ”  
 
 
A goal was to introduce scientific 
knowledge to overcome forecasting 
beliefs based on avocado crops, nervous 
animals, spider webs falling, and coastal 
birds flying inland. In order to validate 
the scientific explanations of hurricane 
origins, the calmness of the eye passing, 
and the opposing winds afterwards –
virazón- the booklet explains ‘hurricane 
hunter’ planes penetrated storms since 
1943; without mentioning their military 
origins (DIVEDCO, 1965, p.35). 
Fig. 159 A hurricane near Puerto Rico  
 
Another objective was to provide basic 
geographic information combined with 
artistic renderings, in order to help 
people visualize a hurricane approaching 
the island, even if illiterate (DIVEDCO, 
1965, p. 37).  
 
Fig. 160 Sealing windows Fig. 161 Rebuilding  
  
 
Graphics emphasized urgent individuals 
and family tasks before and after a 
hurricane (DIVEDCO, 1965, p. 21, 46). 
Official agencies would organize relief 
subsequently. Relocation from flood-






Fig. 162 Fruit Forecasting Fig. 163 Animal Forecasting  
  
 
Forecasting based on avocado crops, 
erratic animal behavior and earth 
tremors was dubiously  addressed ; 
saying that it still needed to be proven 
wrong or right (DIVEDCO, 1965, p. 
31, 32) . 
 
The one-page bulletin includes sections corresponding to the booklet: Our Enemy the Hurricane, 
the Weather Bureau, brief hurricane history, fragments of the poem “In a Tempest”, and the 
booklet cover, table of contents and graphics.  It was meant to motivate people´s attendance to an 
ensuing community meeting, where the ‘book’ –booklet- would be read and discussed. 
 
Fig. 164 N            B                  ‘O             H        ’ 
 





In sum, the crisis of Santa Clara unveiled iterative disaster issues. Puerto Rico was heading for a 
comparatively stable political future, vis-à-vis the previous historical periods. Still, that stability 
was fragile because it was based on a novel economic model and political status amalgamation 
that brought tangible benefits; but also implied sacrifices and repression, kept and created some 
forms of underdevelopment. I could not find post-hurricane debates in Washington about fund 
cuts or forcing Puerto Rican independence, which could indicate the recognition of the status 
change per se, and its benefits for the U.S. However questionable and limited by U.S. 
frameworks, autonomy transfer empowered local leaders, such as the Governor and his nemesis 
on the right-wing spectrum; but it also undermined pro-independence or left-wing options, since 
leaders were killed, in prison, exiled or silenced-. The public exchanges of the first two about 
relief were the results of a scuffle, not of mechanisms of transparent accountability. Implicitly, 
the Governor deliberated that admitting dependency and underdevelopment vis-à-vis the 
catastrophe was a too dangerous political risk. He opted for the risk of denial. Although opposing 
Sen. Ferré was increasingly powerful, Muñoz Marín still controlled his party, most media and 
the Commonwealth. The incipient relief plans and actions, especially those concerning the 
neediest ones, implied contradictory visions of what constituted development and how to achieve 
it. Yet, dismantled left-wing and pro-independence platforms could not denounce neglect and 
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 In October of 1956, the Federación de Universitarios Pro-Independencia (FUPI Pro-Independence University 
Federation) emerged as an advocacy group supporting progressive causes, including housing. Almost a decade later, 
a large urban movement called rescatadores (rescuers) consolidated to fight for land and housing, in the light of 






Modern disaster management emerged as a professionalized, identifiable field of practice during 
the New Deal; and it would be further developed by the Commonwealth. As an important point 
in the modern history of Puerto Rico; the New Deal surmounted the crisis that ensued hurricanes 
San Felipe, San Zenón, San Nicolás and San Ciprián and the Great Depression, moving from 
negligible relief aid to a comprehensive planning paradigm embodied in PRERA, PRRA, 
PRHRC, PRHRLS and other institutions, within a larger economic growth equation that favored 
the U.S. and brought some benefits to lay Puerto Ricans. In two decades, increasingly secular 
disaster management was taken up by diverse institutions, which reveals expanding disciplinary 
complexity and accountability, but also lack of critical coordination; and Santa Clara exposed 
inadequate preparations. The Weather Bureau, the Army and academia were concerned with 
meteorology. The advent of television in the 1950s and the daily weather news creatively 
provided by Professor McDowell disseminated vital information. The Utilization of Water 
Resources System and more so its successor, the Puerto Rican Water Resources Authority, 
jointly addressed water provision and flood control –central to disaster management- based on 
ever growing hydro modifications that increased access to potable water and electricity, 
diminished some risks, and simultaneously increased others. By Santa Clara, the local Civil 
Defense and the Commonwealth were in charge of hurricane relief. After Santa Clara, 
DIVEDCO came to the forefront on the pedagogy of hurricane awareness. 
 
Meanwhile, the urban planning profession was also under redefinition, its actions -and lack of- 
were related to disaster management without an official integration. Before the New Deal, it was 





‘rational’ or ‘blueprint’ planning would become mainstream, and it was promoted in Puerto Rico 
by one of its main adherents, Gov. Tugwell. Under his leadership, in 1942 the new Planning, 
Zoning and Urbanizing Board expanded the scope of the profession and its power; but avoided 
disaster management, as was the contemporary norm. Overall, the New Deal put to the forefront 
the relevance of a particular set of top-down, technical planning skills to guide the myriad of new 
institutions addressing development policy-making, investments, and large-scale territorial 
transformations. Such choice was controversial, as it incorporated the voices of powerful 
stakeholders –for instance industrialists, developers, investors- but it ignored participatory 
processes that incorporated those most affected by the decisions. Moreover, many choices were 
not ‘rational’; they were justified by an unfounded belief in science and modernity that would be  
socially controversial, environmentally degrading, costly and disaster-enhancing. 
 
Consequences of the vast 1930s-1950s changes by federal and island institutions included 
industrialization, more coastal urbanization vis-à-vis countryside depopulation, extensive growth 
in and around San Juan, urbanization of risk-prone areas enabled by technology, land reform, 
and vast emigration to the U.S. that eventually reduced poverty and vulnerability thanks to 
remittances. Also, tourism, prime real estate residential development, slum clearance, caseríos, 
low-density public and private housing projects and car-oriented mobility rose. Among the 
negative consequences were burgeoning slums, displaced low-income communities, privatized 
beach fronts, and highways; often damaging ecosystems that buffered storms and tsunamis. 
 
Social hierarchies were reaccommodating with spatial consequences, as on its way to becoming a 





industrial, diasporic and transnational one. The correlation between social hierarchy and disaster 
vulnerability prevailed less blatantly than before, as shown in the ways in which formal and 
informal urbanization differently occupied risk-prone areas. For lower income groups residing 
near mangroves and floodable plains for example, it was still the result of lack of safe affordable 
options provided by formal markets. For higher income groups recently relocated to transformed 
coastal ecosystems for instance, it was a pricey lifestyle choice enabled by technology. Other 
social processes influential for disaster management were decreased power of religion in real 
politik, official trust on technology uncertainty notwithstanding, popular unrelenting use of 
traditional forecasting beliefs and precarious education. Cold War geopolitics reflected on the 
crushing of the left and narrowing of communitarian values endorsed by the New Deal, as part of 
increasing conservativism in public life and policy-making, with contradictions. 
 
Disaster relief advanced compared to San Felipe and San Ciprián, but it also exhibited an 
unprepared and ineffective character. The first elected Puerto Rican Governor undertook a 
leading manipulative position, without a clear role for the municipal scale. Furthermore, he 
refused federal aid in a poorly calculated gesture of sufficiency based on underestimated losses, 
overconfidence in local institutions, and unwillingness to open his administration to criticism. 
The local right-wing opposition and a White House spokesperson clarified that federal funds 
were available, only the unfulfilled legal protocol was stopping them. In other words, even 
republicans in Washington and Puerto Rico had internalized the understanding of federal disaster 
relief as a citizens’ right, which was a considerable transformation in the ethos of public policy. 
For the first time, the island government was compelled to provide shelters shifting from 





consequences for the education of a generation. Also noticeable is the absence of rhetorical 
constructs that framed relief as a concession conditioned by the receivers’ worthiness. Thus, 
food, vaccines and other valuable items were provided by the government and a plethora of 
public, private, local, external, permanent and improvised entities that jumped on board to patch 
large voids in the Commonwealth’s response. 
 
During WWII in the U.S., war and disasters were addressed together; public education played a 
role in preparing citizens through a massive campaign that generated pedagogic materials. 
Influenced by a prevailing anti-communist ideology, those materials undermined collective 
grass-roots organization and emphasized atomized family and individual level preparations for 
the emergency stage, particularly self-construction of domestic shelters and provision of goods 
for consumption. The Commonwealth essentially mimicked such process in its cultural response 
to Santa Clara, providing basic knowledge and practical advice. This educational mission was 
taken up by DIVEDCO, not the planning board or the ICP, which highlights how planning and 
preservation were not contributors to disaster management and even less so leaders. DIVEDCO’s 
exceptional materials were quickly produced and must have been widely circulated, especially 
through the channels used by that institution –television, schools and organized group 
discussions-. Simultaneously, those materials show inconsistencies and vacuums in the 
Commonwealth’s proposition to address disasters. Some contents remain valid now; others had 
no foundations or depended on technology that was incorrect. The studied time period is too 
short to evaluate DIVEDCO’s work on the ground. It would be relevant to find out whether in 
practice it went beyond emergency preparations to encompass more stages of the disaster cycle; 





sense of security based on erroneous assumptions, flawed procedures and technology, and 
disregard for collective organization. 
 
Noticeably, just four years after Santa Clara, hurricane Donna dramatically re-exposed the vast 
vulnerability experienced by many Puerto Ricans. The Commonwealth had kept addressing 
disasters using scientific and military approaches, refining the roles of the Civil Defense and Red 
Cross, and supporting the leading role of the Governor.  
 
Fig. 165 New Weather Bureau Radar, San Juan 
Airport 
 
Fig. 166 U.S. NAVY Hurricane Recognition Squad 
pose in front of their mission airplane 
 
(El Mundo, 1960b).                                                             (El Mundo, 1952). 
Fig. 167 Gov. Muñoz Marín signs an agreement 
between Civil Defense and Red Cross 
 
Fig. 168 Gov. Muñoz Marín using the Civil 
Defense communication equipment 
 







Ironically, after plans and investment to improve disaster management, only aguacateros 
guessed the arrival of a potent storm as El Mundo published months before the hurricane season: 
“Forecaster says: The avocado flower indicates a serious threat of cyclone this year” 
(Margenat, 1960, p. 29). Hurricane Donna –also named San Lorenzo- passed almost 60 miles 
north of the island on September. Its torrential rains caused 109-116 deaths, mainly due to 
flooding. 
 
Fig. 169 Donna flooding Fig. 170 Donna destruction in La Vega  
  
Contradictorily, flooded peri-urban agricultural flatlands 
became targets of urban developers (British Pathé, 
1960). 
Humacao river and winds torn precarious wooden 
structures (El Imparcial photo 1960 in Rivera Quiñones, 
2010). 
 
Again, Governor Muñoz Marín insisted on the Commonwealth abilities to overcome the disaster 
without federal support, receiving ample criticism from Sen. Luis A. Ferré (Padilla, 1960), who 
became Governor in 1967. Subsequent policies distanced from non-protective activities, 
targeting shelter construction and evacuation plans, and combining disasters and bellicose 
attacks. An example was Project Stormfury, an ambitious experimental research program on 
hurricane modification through bombing (Willoughby, Jorgensen, Black, & Rosenthal, 1985). In 





Declaration every two years, mainly due to floods, among the top frequencies in any U.S. 





A.C. Bosselman & Co. (n.a.). Planting Sugar Cane in Puerto Rico. In Colección de Tarjetas 
Postales n.178 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: col.; 9 x 14 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Abbad y Lasierra, I. (1866). Historia geográfica civil y natural de la isla de San Juan Bautista 
de Puerto Rico. Puerto-Rico: Imprenta y Librería de Acosta. 
Aberson, S., Gamache, J., Leighton, P., Black, P., & Popstefanija, I. (1998). Mission summary 
Hurricane Georges 980919h Aircraft N42RF  Retrieved 10 Jan, 2012, from 
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/HFP98/980919h_sum.pdf 
Abhas K, J., Bloch, R., & Lamond, J. (2012). Cities and Flooding: A Guide to Integrated Urban 
Flood Risk Management for the 21st Century. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Adger, W. N., Hughes, T. P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R., & Rockström, J. (2005). Social-
Ecological Resilience to Coastal Disasters. Science, 309, 1036-1039.  
Agencia Estatal de Defensa Civil. (1977). Plan de búsqueda y rescate. San Juan P.R.: Agencia 
Estatal de la Defensa Civil. 
Agencia Estatal de Manejo de Emergencias y Administración de Desastres. (2008). Plan de 
Operaciones de Emergencia (pp. 268). San Juan PR. 
Agencia Estatal para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administración de Desastres. (n.d. already in 
use in 1998). Guía de preparación ciudadana ante una emergencia.  San Juan PR:  
Retrieved from http://www.gobierno.pr/NR/rdonlyres/F5E33033-CCFC-441A-BB51-
4B6805E0836F/0/Guiadepreparacionciudadanaanteunaemergenciacorregida.pdf. 
Aguirre, B., & Bush, D. (1992). Disaster Programs as Technology Transfers: The Case of Puerto 
Rico in the Aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. International Journal of Mass Emergencies 
and Disasters, 10(1), 161-178.  
Alameda-Lozada, J. I. (1997). Hurricane Marilyn economic recovery plan for the Municipality of 
Carolina (pp. 39 ). Mayagüez, P.R: Economic Development University Center, 
University of Puerto Rico. 
Alameda-Lozada, J. I. (1997). Hurricane Marilyn economic recovery plan for the Municipality of 
Naguabo (pp. 38). Mayagüez, P.R Economic Development University Center, University 
of Puerto Rico. 
Alameda, L., J.I., & Rivera Galindo, C. A. (2005). La vivienda de interés social en Puerto Rico.  
San Juan: Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. 







Alcalá, J. L. (1967). Desastres naturales, huracanes, marejadas, inundaciones. Mayaguez P.R.: 
Servicio de Extensión Agrícola, Recinto de Mayaguez, UPR. 
Alcira Kreimer, & Mohan Munasinghe. (1992). Environmental Management and Urban 
Vulnerability. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 
Alexander, W. H. (1902). Hurricanes: especially those of Porto Rico and St. Kitts. Weather 
Bureau Bulletin, n.32/268, 79p.  
Almaguer, T. (2012). The Latin Americanization of Race Relations in the United States. Du Bois 
Review, Social Science Research on Race(9), 227-233. doi: 
10.1017/S1742058X1200001X 
Alonso, F. (18-?). Album de Puerto Rico, fotografías. San Juan, P.R.: Talleres Tipográficos A. 
Lynn e Hijos de Perez-Moris. 
Alvarez-Curbelo, S. (1997). Despedidas. Revista de Indias, LVII(211), 783-799.  
Alvarez, L. A., & Deseda, C. (1998). Deaths associated with Hurricane Georges Puerto Rico 
September 1998. Morbidity & Mortality Weekly Report, 47(42), 897-898.  
American Red Cross. (1929). West Indies Hurricane Disaster: Official Report of Relief Work in 
Porto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and Florida. Washington, D.C. 
Anderson, B. R. O. G. (2006). Imagined communities reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism. In A. C. o. L. Societies (Series Ed.) (pp. xv, 240 p.).  Retrieved from 
http://www.columbia.edu/cgi-bin/cul/resolve?clio6986711  
Angelito Borincano. (2007). Sembrando Herencia  Retrieved July 18, 2011, from 
http://www.prfdance.org/sembrando2007.htm 
Anonymous. (1928a). Damage from 1928 San Felipe Hurricane. In Archivo Histórico y 
Fotográfico de Puerto Rico photostream Natural Disasters-Hurricanes unnumbered (Ed.). 
Anonymous. (1928b). Guayama. Homes Damaged during the 1928 San Felipe Hurricane. In 
Archivo Histórico y Fotográfico de Puerto Rico photostream Natural Disasters-
Hurricanes unnumbered (Ed.). 
Anonymous. (1928c). Guayama. People gathered at scene of 1928 San Felipe Hurricane damage. 
In Archivo Histórico y Fotográfico de Puerto Rico photostream Natural Disasters-
Hurricanes unnumbered (Ed.). 
Aponte Ortiz, F. I. (2011, Martes 13 de septiembre). Vulnerabilidad y desastre en Puerto Rico, 
Claridad. Retrieved from 
http://www.claridadpuertorico.com/content.html?news=63C592E1C1D69E8D8D244282
7F2DE3FD  
Appadurai, A. (1996). Modernity at large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Aráez y Ferrando, R. (1905). Historia General del ciclón del día de San Ciriaco. San Juan PR: 
Imprenta Heraldo Español. 
Arroyo de Jesus, G. M. (1993). Estudio comparativo de patrones de conducta de un grupo de 
niños afectados por el huracan Hugo versus un grupo de niños no afectados: por el 
huracán Hugo. (n.a.), Centro Caribeño de Estudios Postgraduados, San Juan.    
Arsenault, R. (2005). The Public Storm. Hurricanes and the State in 20th Century America. In J. 
E. Davis & R. Arsenault (Eds.), Paradise Lost?: The Environmental History of Florida 
(pp. 201- 232). Gainsville: University Press of Florida. 
ASCE Hurricane Katrina External Review Panel. (2005). The New Orleans Hurricane 
Protection System: What Went Wrong and Why: A Report. Reston VA: American Society 





Ashford, B. K. (1934). A Soldier in Science. New York: William Morrow and Company. 
Auld/Powhatan. (2007). The Caribbean Hurricane  Retrieved November 20, 2011, from 
http://www.powhatanmuseum.com/Hurricane.html 
Aviles, D., Saffar, A., Ramos, R., & Garcia-Herrera, R. (2007). Fatigue strength of wood-zinc 
roof systems under hurricanes winds. Revista Internacional de desatres Naturales, 
Accidentes e Infraestructura Civil, 7(1), 93-102.  
Avilés, N. (2006). On improving the performance of wood-zinc roof systems. (Ph.D.), University 
of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez.    
Ayala-Silva, T., & Twumasi, Y. A. (2004). Hurricane Georges and vegetation change in Puerto 
Rico using AVHRR satellite data. International Journal of Remote Sensing 25(9), 1629-
1640.  
Ayala, C. J. (1996). The Decline of the Plantation Economy and the Puerto Rican Migration of 
the 1950s. Latino Studies Joural, 7(1 Winter), 62-90.  
Ayala, C. J., & Bergad, L. W. (2002). Rural Puerto Rico in the Early Twentieth Century 
Reconsidered: Land and Society, 1899-1915. Latin American Research Review, 37(2), 
65-97.  
Azar, D., & Rain, D. (2007). Identifying population vulnerable to hydrological hazards in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico. GeoJournal, 69, 23-43.  
Badillo-Veiga, A. (1981). Bread (foreign), land (wasted), liberty (denied). NACLA Report on the 
Americas, XV(2 March- April), 2-21.  
Barnes, J. (1995). North Carolina's Hurricane History: UNC Press Online. 
Barreto, A. A. (2001). Constructing Identities: Ethnic Boundaries and Elite Preferences in Puerto 
Rico. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 7(1), 21-40.  
Barry, J. M. (1998). Rising Tide: The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and How It Changed 
America. New York: Simon & Schuster/Touchstone. 
Barry, J. M. (2005). After the Deluge. Smithsonian Magazine Online, November 1-3.  
Bates, C. G. (1930). Hurricane damage to Porto Rican forests. Journal of Forestry 28(772-774).  
Bates, C. Z. (1929). Efectos del Huracán del 13 de septiembre de 1928 en distintos árboles. 
Revista de Agricultura de Puerto Rico, 23, 113-117.  
Beck, E. C. (1979). The Love Canal Tragedy. EPA Journal  Retrieved Jan 25, 2010, from 
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/lovecanal/01.html 
Beck, U. (1992). Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity. London: Sage Publications. 
Becker, H. S. (1986). Doing Things Together. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Becker, H. S. (2002). Visual Evidence: A Seventh Man, the Specified Generalization, and the 
Work of the Reader. Visual Studies, 17(1), 3-11.  
Belasen, A., & Polacheck. (2008). How Disasters Affect Local Labor Markets: The Effects of 
Hurricanes in Florida. Journal of Human Resources, forthcoming.  
Bencloski, J. W. (1981). The use of weather satellite imagery in teaching the characteristics of 
tropical cyclones: The example of Hurricane David. Journal of Geography, 80(6), 204-
216.  
Bennett, S. P., & Mojica, R. (1998, 10/01/2012). Hurricane Georges Preliminary Storm Report. 
From the Tropical Atlantic to the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, from 
http://web.archive.org/web/20070625160907/http://www.srh.noaa.gov/sju/public_report.
html 
Bettmann/CORBIS. (1934). Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, wife of the President, standing at the 





San Juan. (Vol. 9 MB - 2808px × 3646px • 22,86cm × 30,48cm @ 300 ppp). San Juan 
PR: Colección: Bettmann. 
Beverley, J. R. (1933). Excerpts from the Thirty-Third Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto 
Rico. In The New Deal Network (Ed.), (pp. 1-159). New York: Institute for Learning 
Technologies, Columbia University. 
Bierce, C. R. (1989). In Search of Huracán Hugo: An Assessment of Hurricane Damages to 
Historic Resources in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. n.a.: C.R. Bierce? 
Birkmann, J. (2006). Measuring vulnerability to promote disaster-resilient societies: Conceptual 
frameworks and definitions. In J. Birkmann (Ed.), Measuring vulnerability to natural 
hazards: Towards disaster resilient societies (pp. 9-54). New Delhi: TERI Press. 
Blaikie, P. M., Cannon, T., Davis, I., & Wisner, B. (1994). At Risk:Natural Hazards, People's 
Vulnerability, and Disasters. London: Routledge. 
Blake, J. (2000). On defining the Cultural Heritage. International Comparative Law Quarterly, 
49(1), 61-85.  
Blakely, E. J., & Carbonell, A. (2012). Introduction. In E. J. Blakely & A. Carbonell (Eds.), 
Resilient coastal city regions: planning for climate change in the United States and 
Australia. Hollis, New Hampshire: Puritan Press. 
Bluedorn, J. C., & Cascio, E. U. (2005). Education and Intergenerational Mobility: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment in Puerto Rico. Economics Papers University of Oxford, 
2005-W21, 1-66.  
Blum, E. D. (2008). Love Canal revisited: Race, Class, and Gender in Environmental Activism. 
Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas. 
Bogardi, J., & Birkmann, J. (2004). Vulnerability Assessment: The First Step Towards 
Sustainable Risk Reduction. In D. Malzahn & T. Plapp (Eds.), Disaster and Society - 
From Hazard Assessment to Risk Reduction (pp. 75-82). Berlin: Logos Verlag Berlin. 
Boletín Mercantil. (1899). Campamento Americano (pp. Reproducción digital de la tarjeta postal 
núm. 253., de la Colección de Tarjetas Postales). San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Bommer, J. (1996). Terremotos, urbanización y riesgo sísmico en San Salvador. Boletin de 
Prisma, 18.  
Boose, E. R., Serrano, M. I., & Foster, D. R. (2004). Landscape and Regional Impacts of 
Hurricanes in Puerto Rico. Ecological Monographs, 74(2), 335-352.  
Bourdieu, P. (1977). Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brandenberry, J. (1956). Inspecting Hurricane Betsy damage at Rabanal. n.a.: n.a. 
Brantley, S., White, A., White, T. S., Sparks, D., Richter, D., Pregitzer, K., . . . Amundson, R. 
(2006). Frontiers in Exploration of the Critical Zone: Report of a Workshop organized by 
the National Science Foundation (NSF), Oct 24-26, 2005. Newark, DE: National Science 
Foundation. 
Brau de Zuzuárregui, M. (1915a). El colmo. In Colección de Dibujos de Mario Brau Dib-Bra 
194 (Ed.), (pp. 1 dibujo en tinta: byn; 32.35x23.35 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Brau de Zuzuárregui, M. (1915b). Machacando en hierro frío. In Colección de Dibujos de Mario 
Brau Dib-Bra 201 (Ed.), (pp. 1 dibujo en tinta: byn; 34.35 x 22.35 cm). San Juan P.R.: 





Brau de Zuzuárregui, M. (1915c). U.S. Porto Rico's only purveyor. In Colección de Dibujos de 
Mario Brau Dib-Bra 203 (Ed.), (pp. 1 dibujo en tinta: byn;24 x 34.25 cm). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Brau de Zuzuárregui, M. (1915d). Woodrow Wilson. In Colección de Dibujos de Mario Brau 
Dib-Bra 161 (Ed.), (pp. 1 dibujo en tinta: byn; 34.35x25 cm.). San Juan P.R.: Universidad 
de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Brau, S. (1966). Historia de Puerto Rico. San Juan de Puerto Rico,: Editorial Coquí. 
Bravo Vick, M. (1989). Las redes de apoyo social y las situaciones de desastre: estudio de la 
población adulta en Puerto Rico. (PhD), Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan P.R.    
Brennan, J. W. (1991). Meteorological summary of Hurricane Hugo. Journal of Costal Research, 
SI(8), 1-12.  
British Pathé (Writer). (1960). Puerto Rico Suffers aftermath of Hurricane 'Donna', BBC 4. UK: 
BBC. 
Bryant, R., & Bailey, S. (1997). Third World Political Ecology. London: Routledge. 
Buitrago, A. (1976). Los orígenes históricos de la sociedad pre-capitalista en Puerto rico. Río 
Piedras: Ediciones Huracán. 
Bull-Kamanga, L., Diagne, K., Lavell, A., Leon, E., Lerise, F., MacGregor, H., . . . Yitambe, A. 
(2003). From everyday hazards to disasters: the accumulation of risk in urban areas. 
Environment and Urbanization, 15(1 April), 193-203.  
Burton, I., Kates, R. W., & White, G. F. (1978). The environment as a hazard. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Bush, D. M., Richmond, B. M., & Neal, W. J. (2001). Coastal-Zone Hazard Maps and 
Recommendations: Eastern Puerto Rico  Environmental Geosciences, 8(1), 38-60.  
Cabanyas, A. M. (1986, Sunday October 19 1986). Opening Seignorial Gates. Puerto Rico 
Ilustrado, 10-13. 
Cabrero Salcedo, L. (1991, May). Museo abre sus puertas en Castillo Serrallés, Diálogo, p. 48.  
Calame, J., & Sechler, K. (2004). Is Preservation missing the point? Cultural Heritage in the 
Service of Social Development. Future anterior: Journal of historic preservation history, 
theory and criticism, 1(1), 57-63.  
Calvesbert, R. J. (1970). Climate of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands Climatography of 
the States (pp. 29): U. S. Deparment of Commerce. 
Campbell, R. H., Herd, D. G., & Alonso, R. M. (1985). Preliminary response activities and 
recommendations of the USGS landslide hazard research team to the Puerto Rico 
landslide disaster of October 7, 1985 (Vol. Open-File Report, pp. 85-719): U. S. 
Geological Survey  
Campos Goenaga, M. I. (2008). Cuando estaban enojados los dioses. El huracán de 1561: 
vulnerabilidad ideológica y prevención en la sociedad maya yucateca. In V. García 
Acosta (Ed.), Historia y desastres en América Latina Volumen III (pp. 165-186). México 
Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social 
Red de Estudios Sociales en Prevención de Desastres en América Latina (La Red). 
Cannon, T. (1994). Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of 'Natural' Disasters. In A. 
Varley (Ed.), Disasters, Development and Environment. Chichester, England; New York: 
J. Wiley. 
Case, R. (1986). Annual Summary. Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1985. Monthly Weather 





Casenave, L. d. (1953). Nuevo caserío público de Carolina. In I. B. 1046403 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 
fotografía : b y n ; 13 x 25 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). San Juan 
PR: El Mundo, 07/feb./1953/ Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Casenave, L. d. (1954a). Oficiales del Negociado del Tiempo observando mapa con trayectoria 
de Huracán Hazel. In I. B. 1078698 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 fotografía : b y n ; 21 x 26 cm, pp. 
Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo.). San Juan PR: El Mundo, 7/oct./1954/ 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Casenave, L. d. (1954b). Vista del arrabal Corea en La Cantera. In I. B. 1039026 (Ed.),   (Vol. 
1 fotografía: b y n; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). San 
Juan PR: El Mundo, 1/jun/1954/ Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Casenave, L. d. (1961). Vista aérea de la Avenida Baldorioty de Castro en Santurce, desde el 
sector de la Parada 24 hasta la Laguna del Condado. In I. B. 1045000 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 
fotografía : b y n ; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo.). San 
Juan PR: El Mundo,  22/mayo/1961/ Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Casenave, L. d. (1961?). Gobernador Luis Muñoz Marín con equipo de comunicación de la 
Defensa Civil. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo PRDH01401385 (Ed.), 
(Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Catton, W. R. J., & Dunlap, R. E. (1978). Environmental Sociology: A New Paradigm. The 
American Sociologist, 13(1 Feb), 41-44.  
CDOSIP. (1904). Llegada al Teatro en Ponce de Samuel Gompers, Presidente de la American 
Federation of Labor. In n. Fotografía, Fondo: Santiago Iglesias Pantín, Legajo 6, Carpeta 
1 (Ed.), (pp. 1 fotografía : b & n ; 26 x 26 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras/ Centro de Documentación Obrera Santiago Iglesias Pantín. 
CDOSIP. (1918). 1918 dock workers strike. In C. d. l. C. S. Fotografía núm. 528 (Ed.), (pp. 1 
fotografía : sepia ; 24 x 26 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de 
Río Piedras/ Centro de Documentación Obrera Santiago Iglesias Pantín. 
Centeno Añeses, C. (2000). Huellas de San Ciriaco en la literatura puertorriqueña a comienzos 
de siglo In R. Rosario Rivera (Ed.), La llegada del Cíclope: percepciones de San Ciriaco 
a cien años de su visita. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. 
Centro de Desarrollo Económico UPR. (1997). Hurricane Marilyn economic recovery plan for 
the Municipality of Juncos (pp. 23). Mayagüez, P.R.: Economic Development University 
Center, University of Puerto Rico. 
Change, G. A. C. o. G. (2005). World in Transition: Fighting Poverty through Environmental 
Policy. London: Earthscan. 
Chernobyl Forum Expert Group Environment. (2006). Environmental consequences of the 
Chernobyl accident and their remediation: Twenty years of experience (pp. 180). Vienna: 
International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Cifuentes. (1928). Residencia de Adrián Gonzáles afectado por el terremoto In Colección de 
Tarjetas Postales n.807 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: byn; 8.7 x 13.17 cm. de la Colección 
de Tarjetas Postales). Universidad de Puerto Rico: Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Cohen, M. J. (Ed.). (2000). Risk in the Modern Age:  Social Theory, Science and Environmental 
Decision-Making. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire/New York: Macmillan Press/St. 






Cohen, W. J., & Boyer, E. F. (1951). Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950: Summary and 
Legislative History. In Social Security Administration (Ed.), (pp. 11-16). Washington 
D.C. 
Coll Ferrer, A. (1928). Untitled view of 1928 Hurricane Damage. In Archivo Histórico y 
Fotográfico de Puerto Rico photostream Natural Disasters-Hurricanes unnumbered (Ed.). 
Coll y Toste, C. (1976). El Huracán de San Ciriaco. In M. Ledesma (Ed.), Cuentos de Puerto 
Rico. New York: Plus Ultra. 
Colón, A., Mergal, M., Torres, N., & Serra Deliz, W. (1986). Participación de la mujer en la 
historia de Puerto Rico : (las primeras décadas del siglo veinte). [Río Piedras]: Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociales Centro Coordinador de Estudios, Recursos y Servicios a la 
Mujer (CERES). 
Colón, J. A. (1959). Meteorological Conditions over Puerto Rico during Hurricane Betsy 1956. 
Monthly Weather Review, 87(2), 69-80.  
Combas, E. (1956). En torno a La Fortaleza actitud original adoptada por Muñoz de rechazar 
ayuda de afuera se hizo más fuerte en momento Ferré se dirigió a Pres. Eisenhower 
sugiriendo P.R. fuera declarado zona de emergencia, El Mundo.  
Comité Central de Socorros a Martinica. (1903). San Juan Puerto Rico ante la catástrofe de 
Martinica (pp. 33). San Juan P.R.: Tip El País. 
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems. (1994). Hurricane Hugo, Puerto Rico, the 
Virgin Islands, and Charleston, South Carolina, September 17-22, 1989 (Vol. Six). 
Washington, D.C. : National Academy of Sciences. 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, & Civil Defense. (1958). Operational Survival Plan. Annex X 
Evacuation.  San Juan P.R. 
Coolidge, C. (1928). Appeal to Nation To Relieve Hurricane Victims in the West Indies.  











Cordova, N. I. (2005). In his image and likeness: The Puerto Rican jíbaro as political icon. 
Centro Journal, XVII(2 Fall), 170-191.  
Córdova, P. T. s. d. (1831a). Memorias geográficas, históricas, económicas y estadisticas de la 
isla de Puerto Rico escritas por D. Pedro Tomás de Córdoba (Vol. Tomo I). Puerto Rico: 
En la oficina del gobierno, a cargo de D. Balriano de Sanmillan. 
Córdova, P. T. s. d. (1831b). Memorias geográficas, históricas, económicas y estadisticas de la 
isla de Puerto Rico escritas por D. Pedro Tomás de Córdoba (Vol. Tomo II). Puerto 
Rico: En la oficina del gobierno, a cargo de D. Balriano de Sanmillan. 
Correia de Lira, J. T. (2010). From mild climate's architecture to ´Third World´planning: 





History Society Conference, Istambul, Turkey. http://www.search-
document.com/pdf/1/10/richard-neutra.html 
Cortés Burgos, S. (1987). Plan para la coordinación de la mitigación de desastres naturales 
para la isla de Puerto Rico. (M.A. Planificación), Universidad de Puerto Rico-Río 
Piedras, San Juan P.R.    
Cortes Zavala, M. T. (1997). La memoria nacional Puertorriquena en Salvador Brau. Revista de 
Indias, LVII(211), 761-782.  
Cotto Morales, L. (2006). Desalambrar : orígenes de los rescates de terreno en Puerto Rico y su 
pertinencia en los movimientos sociales contempóraneos. San Juan, P.R.: Editorial Tal 
Cual. 
Covich, A. P., Crowl, T. A., Johnson, S. L., Varza, D., & Certain, D. L. (1991). Post-Hurricane 
Hugo Increases in Atyid Shrimp Abundances in a Puerto Rican Montane Stream. 
Biotropica, 23/4(Part A. Special Issue: Ecosystem, Plant, and Animal Responses to 
Hurricanes in the Caribbean), 448-454.  
Cross, J. A. (2001). Megacities and Small Towns: Different Perspectives on Hazard 
Vulnerability. Environmental Hazards, 3(2), 63-80.  
Cruz Roja Americana Puerto Rico. (1999). Informe administrativo Huracán Georges (pp. 46). 
San Juan, P.R.: Cruz Roja Americana Puerto Rico. 
Cunningham, J., & Ramos, O. (1956). Presidente de la Asociación Puertorriqueña de 
Agricultores dijo cosecheros caña de la isla obtendrán U$750,000 en compensación 
federal por pérdidas del huracán Betsy y crédito necesario para rehabilitar sus fincas, El 
Mundo.  
Cuny, F. C. (1987). Sheltering the urban poor: Lesson and strategies of the Mexico City and San 
Salvador earthquakes. Open House International, 12(3), 16-20.  
Cyr, J. F. S. (2005). Review of At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and Disasters. 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 2(2), 1-5.  
Daly, C., Helmer, E. H., & Quinones, M. (2003). Mapping the climate of Puerto Rico, Vieques 
and Culebra. International Journal of Climatology, 23, 1359-1381.  
David, L., S., S. D., & Lazo, J. K. (2007). Economic Value of Hurricane Forecasts: An Overview 
and Research Needs. Natural Hazards Review, 8(3), 78-87.  
David, P. A., Maude-Griffin, R., & Rothwell, G. (1996). Learning by accident? Reductions in the 
risk of unplanned outages in US nuclear power plants after Three Mile Island. Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 13(2), 175-198.  
Dávila, A. M. (1997). Sponsored identities : cultural politics in Puerto Rico. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Davis, G. W. (1902). Report of the Military Governor of Porto Rico on Civil Affairs,  from 
October 18, 1898, to April 30, 1900.  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office 
Retrieved from 
http://archive.org/stream/reportofmilitary00puer/reportofmilitary00puer_djvu.txt. 
De Jesús Toro, R. (1982). Historia económica de Puerto Rico. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western 
Pub. Co. 
DeGraff, J. V., Bryce, R., Jibson, R. W., Mora, S., & Rogers, C. T. (1989). Landslides: Their 
extent and significance in the Caribbean. In E. E. Brabb, B. L. Harrod & A. A. Balkema 
(Eds.), Landslides: Extent and economic significance (pp. 51-80). Rotterdam: A.A. 
Balkema. 





Delano, J. (1941). A land and utility municipal housing project, Ponce, Puerto Rico. In L.-U.-P. 
P. [P&P] (Ed.), (pp. transparency color). Washington, D.C: Library of Congress Prints 
and Photographs Division. 
Delano, J. (1946). Construcción de la Represa Caonillas en Utuado. In Colección de Fotos del 
Periódico El Mundo Identificador (Bib #) 666070 (Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 20 cm, pp. 1 
fotografía :b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Departamento de Recursos Naturales, Agencia Estatal de Defensa Civil, & Servicio Nacional de 
Meteorología. (1993). Estudio de evacuación para huracanes para la costa sur de Puerto 
Rico. San Juan, P.R. 
Departamento de Transportación y Obras Públicas. (2010). Visión, Misión, Historia  Retrieved 
11/10/2012, 2011, from http://www.dtop.gov.pr/vtexto/ 
Deryugina, T. (2011). The Dynamic Effects of Hurricanes in the US: The Role of Non-Disaster 
Transfer Payments. Job Market Paper. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Cambridge, MA. Retrieved from http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/6166 
Dietz, J. L. (1989). Historia económica de Puerto Rico Río Piedras: Ediciones Huracán. 
Dietz, V. J., Rigau-Perez, J. G., Sanderson, L., Diaz, L., & Gunn, R. A. (1990). Health 
Assessment of the 1985 Flood Disaster in Puerto Rico. Disasters, 14(2), 164-170.  
Dinwiddie, W. (1898). Puerto Rico: its conditions and possibilities. New York and London: 
Harper and Brother Publishers. 
Dinzey-Flores, Z. Z. (2007). Temporary Housing, Permanent Communities. Public Housing and 
Design in Puerto Rico. Journal of Urban History, 33(3), 467-492.  
Divarkala, P., & Macari, E. J. (1998). Stability Analysis of Slopes in Western Puerto Rico. 
Proceedings(ASCE Geo-Congress 98: Stability of Natural Slopes in the Coastal Plain. 
ASCE Geotechnical Special Publication No. 77), 59-68.  
DIVEDCO. (1965). ¿Qué sabemos del Huracán? In División de Educación de la Comunidad 
(Ed.), (3rd ed.). San Juan P.R. 
División de Educación de la Comunidad. (n.d.). Nuestro Mundo Periódico-Cartelón de la 
DIVEDCO,. In d. l. C. d. C. Reproducción digital del cartel con núm. de identificación 
PER-004 (Ed.), (Vol. 74x56 cm). San Juan, P.R. : Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto 
de Río Piedras. 
Doniger, B. (Writer) & DIVEDCO (Director). (1958). Huracán. In D. d. E. d. l. Comunidad 
(Producer). Puerto Rico: DIVEDCO. 
Dougherty, D. (2005). Chapter Thirty-seven. Grounded Theory Research Methods. In J. A. C. 
Baum (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Organizations: Blackwell Reference Online. 
Duany, J. (2005). The Rough Edges of Puerto Rican Identities: Race, Gender, and 
Transnationalism. Latin American Research Review, 40(3), 177-190.  
Duany, J. (2007). The Nation in the Diaspora: The Multiple Repercussions of Puerto Rican 
Emigration Revista de Ciencias Sociales (New Series), 17, 118-153.  
Ducas, D. (1934, Mar. 14, 1934). First Lady’s Visit Disturbs Some on Isle, International News 
Service/ Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. Retrieved from 
http://centennial.journalism.columbia.edu/1934-eleanor-roosevelt/ducas-1934-
3/index.html 
Dunion, J. P., Landsea, C. W., Houston, S. H., & Powell, M. D. (2003). A Reanalysis of the 






Dunlap, R. E., & Catton Jr, W. R. (1994). Toward an ecological sociology: The development, 
current status, and probable future of environmental sociology. Ecology, society and the 
quality of social life, 11-31.  
Dunn, G. E. (1961). The Hurricane Season of 1960. Monthly Weather Review, 89, 99-108.  
Dunn, G. E., Davies, W. R., & Moore, P. (1956). The Hurricane Season of 1956. Monthly 
Weather Review, 84(12), 436-443.  
Echevarría Rosas, S. (2006). Plan estratégico para la reducción de vulnerabilidad a los 
huracanes en Vieques. (M.P.), Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan P.R.    
Eckerman, I. (2006). The Bhopal Disaster 1984 - working conditions and the role of the Trade 
Unions. Asian Pacific Newsletter on occupational health and safety, 13(2).  
Edel, M. (1962). Land reform in Puerto Rico. Caribbean Studies, October, 26-60.  
Edel, M. (1963). Land reform in Puerto Rico. Caribbean Studies, January, 28-50.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building Theories from Case Study Research. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(4), 352-550.  
El Mundo. (1948). Construcción del proyecto hidroeléctrico en la represa de Caonillas. In 
PRDH01402050 (Ed.), (Vol. 26 x 21 cm, pp. 1 fotografía: b y n). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1949). Represa Caonillas en Utuado como parte de proyecto hidroeléctrico de la 
Autoridad de las Fuentes Fluviales. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo 
Identificador (Bib #) 1067227 (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan 
P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1952). Escuadrón de reconocimiento de huracanes de la Marina de Estados Unidos 
frente a avión. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo PRDH014PH02225 (Ed.), 
(Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1954a). Escombros en el área donde estuvo situado el arrabal Hoare. In Colección de 
Fotos del Periódico El Mundo PRDH01401478 (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : 
b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1954b). Storer, Cartner y Glavin observando el modelo de la refinería que se 
construirá en la Isla (pp. 1 fotografía : b y n ; 21 x 26 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1955). Estibadores en huelga rodeando un caño en las cercanías del muelle de Ponce  
(pp. 1 fotografía : b y n ; 26 x 21 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1956a). Brotes de influenza en Aibonito, Comerío y Naranjito después de Betsy, El 
Mundo, p. 1.  
El Mundo. (1956b). Escasez en materiales de construcción demora rehabilitación viviendas 
víctimas Betsy, El Mundo, p. 6.  
El Mundo. (1956c, 14 Sept). Escuela Vocacional Metropolitana hará 6,000 casas para víctimas 
de Betsy, El Mundo, p. 13.  
El Mundo. (1956d). Gestionan ayuda federal para cafetaleros isla afectados por Betsy por 
U$1,100,000, El Mundo, p. 7.  
El Mundo. (1956e). Gobernador Muñoz Marín hablando con un campesino cuya casa fue 
averiada por el huracán, Carretera Caguas-Cayey. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El 
Mundo (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de 





El Mundo. (1956f). Luis A. Ferré pide a Munoz que rectifique y solicite ayuda a E.U., El Mundo, 
p. n.a.  
El Mundo. (1956g, 13th of August). Muñoz dará otra ayuda para el pueblo, El Mundo.  
El Mundo. (1956h). Repartirán mil toneladas de alimentos entre 100,000 familias semanalmente, 
El Mundo, p. 4.  
El Mundo. (1956i, 14 Sept). Salen a Yabucoa alumnos del Colegio de Ingeniería de Mayaguez 
que ayudarán en la rehabilitación, El Mundo, p. 23.  
El Mundo. (1956j). Santa Clara vino a demostrar lo juiciosa que ha sido la política 
puertorriquena fomentada en gran parte por dineros y programas federales de construir 
viviendas de hormigón para clases pobres, El Mundo, p. 6.  
El Mundo. (1957a, 17 de Enero). Isla recibió mayor parte de fondos por desastres por huracán, El 
Mundo, p. 18.  
El Mundo. (1957b, 23 de mayo). R. Higgs tratará época huracanes, El Mundo, p. 2.  
El Mundo. (1960a). Radar del Negociado del Tiempo en el Aeropuerto de Isla Verde. In 
Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo identificador (Bib #) 1077996  16/julio/1960 
(Ed.), (pp. 1 fotografía : b y n ; 21 x 26 cm). San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1960b). Radar del Negociado del Tiempo en el Aeropuerto de Isla Verde. In 
Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo PRDH014PH02224 (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm, 
pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río 
Piedras. 
El Mundo. (1969). Vista de edificios frente al Hotel La Concha en el Condado (pp. 1 fotografía: 
b y n). San Juan, P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Espinosa, M. (2000). Sanitary and American: Disease Eradication Efforts and the 
Transformation of Puerto Rico After 1898. Paper presented at the LASA, Pittsburg. 
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/Lasa2000/EspinosaMariola.pdf 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico. (1993). Orden Ejecutiva del Gobernador del Estado 
Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico para Establecer la Coordinación de Funciones Ejecutivas 
para Casos de Desastres o Emergencias.  San Juan PR. 
Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, & Departamento de Recursos Naturales. (1991). Plan de 
Mitigación de Riesgos Naturales del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico.  San Juan 
PR. 
Esterrich, C. (2009). Edenes insostenibles: El campo de la ciudad en la intentona cultural de los 
cincuenta. Centro Journal, XXI(1 Spring), 181-199.  
Evans, G. (2005). Measure for Measure: Evaluating the Evidence of Culture's Contribution to 
Regeneration. Urban Studies, 42(5/6), 959-983.  
Everham, E. M. (1996). Hurricane disturbance and recovery : an empirical study of vegetation 
dynamics in the Luquillo Experimental Forest, Puerto Rico. (Ph. D.), State University of 
New York, Syracuse.    
Ewing, B. T., Brown Kruse, J., & Sutter, D. (2007). Hurricanes and Economic Research: An 
Introduction to the Hurricane Katrina Symposium. Southern Economic Journal, 74(2), 
315-325.  
Fassig, O. L. (1928). San Felipe – The Hurricane of September 13, 1928, at San Juan, P. R. 





Federal Emergency Management Agency. (1999). The President's Long Term Recovery Action 
Plan For Puerto Rico.  Washington:  Retrieved from 
http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=10211. 
Federal Interagency flood hazard mitigation team response report for Puerto Rico. (1985). 
Interagency hazard mitigation report. In response to the October 10, 1985 disaster 
declaration. In FEMA (Ed.). Washington D.C.?: FEMA Region II of the Department of 
Natural Resources, Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
Felix, E., Hernández, L. A., Bravo, M., Ramirez, R., Cabiya, J., & Canino, G. (2011). Natural 
Disaster and Risk of Psychiatric Disorders in Puerto Rican Children. Journal of 
Abnormal Child Psychology, 39(4), 589-600.  
FEMA. (1989). Guía para la construcción de viviendas resistentes a huracanes en Puerto Rico. 
Carolina, P.R. : Federal Emergency Management Agency. 
FEMA. (1990). San Juan, Puerto Rico Metropolitan area hurricane evacuation study (Vol. [v. 
1.] Technical summary -- v. 2. Vulnerability analyses -- v. 3. Appendices). San Juan, 
P.R.: Department of Natural Resources, State Civil Defense, National Weather Service. 
FEMA. (1999). Construction guide for one and two family dwelling in hurricane and seismic 
zones: in accordance with Planning Regulation #7 , building codes for Puerto Rico. 
Washington, D.C.: FEMA. 
Fernández, D. S., & Fetcher, N. (1991). Changes in light availability following Hurricane Hugo 
in a subtropical montane forest in Puerto Rico. Biotropica, 23(4a), 393-399.  
Fernández Gordián, O. (2003). Huracán Santa Clara. In O. Fernández Gordián (Ed.), Cuentos 
Puertorriqueños de los años 50-60-70s (pp. 11-34). San Juan?: Fernández Gordián, 
Osvaldo  
Fernández, I. (2000). La dislocación poblacional y exodo migratorio como resultado de San 
Ciriaco. In R. R. Rivera (Ed.), La llegada del Cíclope : percepciones de San Ciriaco a 
cien años de su visita. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. 
Fernández, J. A. (1965). Architecture in Puerto Rico. New York: Architectural Book Publishing. 
Fernández, R. (1996). The Disenchanted Island: Puerto Rico and the United States in the 
twentieth Century. Westport CT: Praeger Publishers. 
Figueroa Diaz, V. (1996). Performance of steel roof decks subjected to repeated wind loading. 
(MS), University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez.    
Figueroa, J. M. (1958). Huracán. In Colección de Carteles disponible en la Colección 
Puertorriqueña del Sistema de Bibliotecas núm. de identificación FJM-001 (Ed.), (Vol. 
75x52 cm, pp. serigrafía, color; Depto. de Instrucción Pública. División de Educación y 
División de la Comunidad). San Juan, P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río 
Piedras. 
Findlay, E. J. S. r. (1999). Imposing Decency : the politics of sexuality and race in Puerto Rico, 
1870-1920. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Fischer, F. (1996). Risk Assessment and Environmental Crisis: Towards an Integration of 
Science and Participation In S. F. Campbell, S. (Ed.), Readings in planning theory. 
Cambridge; Oxford: Blackwell. 
Fleming, J. (2009, November 5, 2009). Historical Perspectives on “Fixing the Sky”. Statement 
Before the Committee on Science and Technology U.S. House of Representatives. Online 
manuscript retrieved on July, 10, 2011, Washington D.C. 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research. Qualitative Inquiry, 





Fontán y Mera, V. (1868). La memorable noche de San Narciso y los temblores de tierra; 
narración verídica de todos los acontecimientos ocurridos en la isla de Puerto-Rico 
durante los meses de octubre, noviembre y diciembre del año 1867. San Juan P.R.: Imp. 
del Comercio. 
Forester, J. (1989). Planning in the face of Power. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Foster, G. M. (1983). The Demands of Humanity: Army Medical Disaster Relief U. S. A. Center 
of Military History (Ed.)   Retrieved from 
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/misc/disaster/ch6.htm  
Fowles, G. M. (1910). Down in Porto Rico (Vol. Revised Edition). New York: Young People's 
Missionary Movement of the United States and Canada. 
Francis, J. K. (2000). Comparison of Hurricane damage to several species of urban trees in San 
Juan, Puerto Rico. Journal of Arboriculture, 26(4), 189-197.  
Francis, J. K., & Gillespie, A. J. R. (1993). Relating gust speed to tree damage in Hurricane 
Hugo 1989. Journal of Arboriculture, 19(6 November), 368-373.  
Frangi, J. L., & Lugo, A. E. (1998). A Flood Plain Palm Forest in the Luquillo Mountains of 
Puerto Rico Five Years After Hurricane Hugo. Biotropica, 30(3), 339-348.  
Friedmann, J. (1981). Planning as Social Learning. Working Paper Series, Institute of Urban and 
Regional Development, 343, 1-7.  
Frost, J. L. (2005). Lessons from Disasters: Play, Work, and the Creative Arts. Childhood 
Education 82(1), 2-8.  
Fuente, A. d. l. (2001). A nation for all : race, inequality, and politics in twentieth-century Cuba. 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. (2005). Masacre de Ponce (1937). Enciclopedia 
de Puerto Rico  Retrieved 05/10, 2011, from 
http://www.enciclopediapr.org/esp/article.cfm?ref=06102005 
Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. (2010). Chronology of the Governors of the 19th 
Century. 2005-2012 Enciclopedia de Puerto Rico August 26. Retrieved Jan 20, 2012, 
from http://www.enciclopediapr.org/ing/article.cfm?ref=08121201&page=2 
Fuste, J. I. (2010). Colonial laboratories, irreparable subjects: the experiment of ´(b)ordering´ 
San Juan´s public housing residents. Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, 
Nation and Culture, 16(1), 41-59.  
Gandía Córdova, R. (1899). Estado actual de Ponce, sus necesidades y medios económicos para 
satisfacerlas. Introducción de Luis Porrata Doria. Ponce: Municipality of Ponce. 
Gangia, J. M., & Barowskyb, E. (2009). Listening to Children's Voices: Literature and the Arts 
as Means of Responding to the Effects of War, Terrorism, and Disaster. Childhood 
Education, 85(6 Special Issue: International Focus Issue 2009: Helping Children Cope 
With the Impact of War, Terrorism, and Disaster), 357-363.  
Gannon, M. R., & Willig, M. R. (1994). The effects of hurricane Hugo on bats of the Luquillo 
experimental forest of Puerto Rico 
by Biotropica, 26(3), 320-331.  
García-Colón, I. (2006). Buscando Ambiente. Hegemony and Subaltern Tactics of Survival in 
Puerto Rico's Land Distribution Program. Latin American Perspectives, 146(33 n.1), 42-
65.  
García-Colón, I. (2006). Playing and eating democracy: The Case of Puerto Rico’s land 





García-Palencia, A. J., Saffar, A., & Godoy, L. A. (2008). Curvas de fragilidad debidas a viento 
para edificaciones industriales metálicas. Revista Internacional de Desastres Naturales, 
Accidentes e Infraestructura Civil, 8(2), 165-182.  
García, B. (2004). Cultural Policy and Urban Regeneration in Western European Cities: Lessons 
from Experience, Prospects for the future. Local Economy, 19(4), 312-326.  
García Colón, P. (Ed.). (2000). Tras las huellas del pasado. Mosaico de historia de Puerto Rico: 
siglos XIX y XX. San Juan, Humacao P.R.: Isla Negra; Decanato de Asuntos Académicos, 
Recinto de Humacao, Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Gardner Robinson, A. (1899). The Porto Rico of today: Pen Pictures of the People and the 
Country. New York: Charles Schribner's and Sons. 
Garriott, E. B. (1899). Forecast and Warning. Monthly Weather Review, XXVII(9), 348-395.  
Garriott, E. B. (1899). Forecast and Warning. Monthly Weather Review, XXVII(8), 343-348.  
Geertz, C. (1963). Peddlers and princes; social change and economic modernization in two 
Indonesian towns. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Geertz, C. (1973). The Interpretation of Cultures. NY: Basic Books. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration. 
Cambridge: Polity  
Giddens, A. (1986). The constitution of society : outline of the theory of structuration (1st pbk. 
ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity. 
Gilbert, C. (1998). Reply to Hewitt. In E. L. Quarantelli (Ed.), What is a disaster? perspectives 
on the question. London: New York: Routledge. 
Gill, D. A., Picou, J. S., & Ritchie, L. A. (2012). The Exxon Valdez and BP Oil Spills. A 
Comparison of Initial Social and Psychological Impacts. American Behavioral Scientist, 
56(1 January), 3-23  
Gillman, H. (2005). "Do Anything" Spending Powers, and the New Deal. Law and History 
Review, 23(2), 443-450.  
Gilot, A. (1905). Playa de Ponce. In S. No.7 (Ed.). Ponce: CNB. 
Gilot, A. (n.d.). New Delicias Park. Paseo de las Delicias. In S. No.34 (Ed.). Ponce: CNB. 
Gingerich, C. (Producer). (1946-1948, 06/07/2001). Hurricane shelter with door. Clayton 
Gingerich 1946-48 Retrieved from 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/tlehman/448288513/in/set-72157600048677402 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine. 
Glynn, P. W., Almodóvar, L. R., & G., G. J. (1964). Effects of Hurricane Edith on marine life in 
La Parguera, Puerto Rico. Caribbean Journal of Science 4(2), 335-345.  
Gobierno de Puerto Rico. (2009-2012). Terremotos: ¿Por que debemos prepararnos?  San Juan 
PR: Agencia Estatal para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administración de Desastres 
Retrieved from www.manejodeemergencias.gobierno.pr. 
Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Oficina del Gobernador, & Junta de Planificación. (1997). Hortense y 









Gobierno de Puerto Rico, Oficina del Gobernador, & Junta de Planificación. (1999). Impacto 





Goldenberg, S. B., Landsea, C. W., Mestas-Nunez, A. M., & Gray, W. M. (2001). The recent 
increase in Atlantic Hurricane activity: Causes and implications. Science, 293(5529,), 
474-480.  
González, J. (Producer). (2007, March, 10). Remembering Puerto Rico’s Ponce Massacre. 
Democracy Now. The War and Peace Report. [Story] Retrieved from 
http://www.democracynow.org/2007/3/22/remembering_puerto_ricos_ponce_massacre 
González, J. L. (1990). Antología personal. San Juan: Universidad De Puerto Rico. 
González Padín Co. Inc. (1930-1945). Hotel Condado (pp. Black and white, hand painted color). 
San Juan PR: González Padín Co. Inc. 
González Padín Co. Inc. (c. 1920's). Condado lagoon and hotel in the early 1920s (pp. Black and 
, hand painted color). San Juan PR: González Padín Co. Inc. 
González, R. G. (2007). Development of hurricane based fragility curves for wood-zinc houses 
in Puerto Rico. (Ph.D.), University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez.    
González Vales, L. E. (2007). El Situado Mexicano y la financiación de las fortificaciones de 
San Juan de Puerto Rico.  San Juan: Oficina de Servicios Legislativos de la Asamblea 
Legislativa de Puerto Rico Retrieved from 
http://www.oslpr.org/spanish/master.asp?nav=HISTO. 
Gordon, J. (2010). Trauma Healing for Haitian Red Cross Staff and Volunteers (Croix Rouge 
Haitien). How we're helping Haitian Red Cross volunteers and staff heal Psychology 
Today Magazine. Retrieved from Unstuck: Healing Ourselves. The journey out of 
depression website: http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/unstuck-healing-
ourselves/201006/trauma-healing-haitian-red-cross-staff-and-volunteers-croix-ro 
Government of Canada. (2009). 1956- Betsy. Environment Canada  Retrieved 11/12, 2011, from 
http://www.ec.gc.ca/Hurricane/default.asp?lang=En&n=E80F433C-1 
Grace, M. F., & Klein, R. W. (2002). Natural Disasters and the Supply of Home Insurance. SSRN 
eLibrary. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.816924 
Grace, R. J. (1956). Weather Notes: Betsy's Roving Eye. Monthly Weather Review, 84(8 August 
1956), 311-312.  
Guarch, J. M., & Querejeta, A. (1992). Mitología Aborigen de Cuba. Deidades y Personajes. La 
Habana: Publicigra. 
Guiney, J. L. (1999, November 15 2011). Preliminary Report Hurricane Georges 15 September - 
01 October 1998 5 January. from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1998georges.html 
Gunther, J. (1941). Inside Latin America. New York: Harper & Brothers. 
Gutiérrez Calvache, D., Fernández Ortega, R., & González Tendero, J. (n.d.). Estilo Patana: 
propuesta para un nuevo estilo ideográfico en el extremo más oriental de Cuba. Grupo 
Espeleológico Pedro A. Borras, Grupo Espeleológico Fernando Ortiz and Sociedad 







Guzmán-Grajales, S. (1992). The effect of litter, nutrients, and light on seedling populations in 
the Luquillo Experimental Forest after Hurricane Hugo. (M.S.), Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, San Juan P.R.    
Guzman-Grajales, S. M., & Walker, L. R. (1991). Differential Seedling Responses to Litter After 
Hurricane Hugo in the Luquillo Experimental Forest, Puerto Rico. Biotropica, 23(4), 
407-413.  
Hairr, J. (2008). Great Hurricanes of North Carolina. Charleston, SC: The History Press. 
Hanappi, H. (n.a.). Chapter One. What Is Political Economy? In H. Hanappi (Ed.). Vienna: 
Technical University of Vienna. 
Hardie-Forsyth, T. (1999). Communicating in an International Emergency. In S. Harrison (Ed.), 
Disasters and the media : managing crisis communications. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Business. 
Harper, B. A., Kepert, J. D., & Ginger, J. D. (2009). Guidelines for converting between various 
wind averaging periods in tropical cyclone conditions. Paper presented at the Sixth 
Tropical Cyclone RSMCs/TCWCs Technical Coordination Meeting 2 to 5 November 
2009 Brisbane, Australia. 
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/www/tcp/documents/Doc2.3_WindAveraging.pdf 
Hartwell, F. E. (1931). 'San Nicolás', the Tropical Storm of September 10, 1931 on Porto Rico. 
Monthly Weather Review, 59, 347-348.  
Heber, P. J. (1980). Atlantic Hurricane Season of 1979. Monthly Weather Review, 108(July), 
973-990.  
Heckley, C., Mues, L., Reis, A., & Taylor, H. (n.a). Estimating Floodplain Populations and 
Assessing Flood Risk and Flood Mitigation in Puerto Rico; Interactive Qualifying 
Project. (Bachelor of Science), Worcester Polytechnic Institute.    
Hernández, P. (1956a). Carlos Patterne director de desastres CR informa elaborarán plan 
rehabilitación post-huracán, El Mundo, p. 21.  
Hernández, P. (1956b). Hay unos 43,680 niños fuera de las escuelas en 52 municipios, El 
Mundo.  
Hernández, P. (1956c). Situación escolar es grave en 8 pueblos, afecta a miles de ninos, El 
Mundo, p. n.a.  
Hernández, P. (1956d). Vacunan a 3 mil personas contra tifoidea en Yabucoa, El Mundo.  
Hewitt, K. (1998). Excluded perspectives in the social construction of disasters. In E. L. 
Quarantelli (Ed.), What is a disaster? perspectives on the question. London: New York: 
Routledge. 
Hewitt, K. (Ed.). (1983). Interpretation of Calamity: From the Viewpoint of Human Ecology. 
Boston: Allen. 
Hilhorst, D., & Bankoff, G. (2004). Introduction: Mapping Vulnerability. In G. Bankoff, G. 
Frerks & D. Hilhorst (Eds.), Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People. 
London: Earthscan. 
Hilton Hotels. (n.d.). The New Caribe Hilton, San Juan, Puerto Rico. Gem of the 
Caribbean...now open. N.Y., P.R.: Hilton Hotels. 
Hites, R. A. (2011). Dioxins: An Overview and History. Environment Science and Technology, 
45(1), 16-20.  
Hobsbawm, E. (1983). Introduction: Inventing Tradition. In E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger (Eds.), 





Hopkins, A. (2001). Was Three Mile Island a 'normal accident'? Journal of Contingencies and 
Crisis Management, 9(2), 65 -72.  
House, C. T. J., Near, L. C. J. B. J., Shields, L. W. B., Celentano, M. R. J., Husband, M. D. M., 
Mercer, M. A. E., & Pugh, M. J. E. (1996). Weather as a Force Multiplier: Owning the 
Weather in 2025 (pp. 52): Air Force, Department of Defense. 
Hower, R. J. (1956). Family standing by remains of house after Hurricane Betsy. n.a.: n.a. 
Hsu, S. A., Martin Jr., M. F., & Blanchard, B. W. (2000). An Evaluation of the USACE's 
Deepwater Wave Prediction Techniques under Hurricane Conditions during Georges in 
1998. Journal of Coastal Research, 16(3), 823-829.  
Humphreys, S. L. (1989). An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate Polluter as a 
Common Law Criminal. American University Law Review, 39, 311-354.  
Hurtado Astaiza, C. A. (1992). Metodología para el análisis de vulnerabilidad de estructuras 
sometidas a vientos huracanados. (MS), University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez.    
Information Research Section PRRA. (1938). Puerto Rico in the Great Depression. Facts About 
the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration. New Deal Network  Retrieved 05/10, 
2012, from http://newdeal.feri.org/texts/578.htm 
International Art Therapy Organization. (2009). Art Therapy and Disaster Relief  Retrieved 
December 12, 2012, from http://www.internationalarttherapy.org/disaster.html  
International Sociological Association Visual Sociology Thematic Group TG05. (2012). TG05 
Statement. Visual Sociology, May(4), 1-28.  
IPCC. (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. In I. a. I. t. t. F. A. R. o. t. I. P. o. C. C. 
Contribution of Working Groups I, Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer; 
(Ed.), (pp. 151). Geneva: IPCC. 
Irizarry, R. (1997). Hurricane Marilyn economic recovery plan for the municipality of Ceiba (pp. 
33). San Juan P.R.: Graduate School of Planning and Economic Development University 
Center, University of Puerto Rico. 
Irizarry, R. L. (1997). Hurricane Marilyn economic recovery plan for the municipality of Loíza 
(pp. 25). San Juan, P.R.: Graduate School of Planning and Economic Development 
University Center, University of Puerto Rico  
Jarrod, H., & Vilella, F. J. (1999). Short-term effects of Hurricane Georges on frog populations 
of the Cordillera Central, Puerto Rico. Wildlife Research, September 39762-39762.  
Jha, A. K., Bloch, R., & Lamond, J. (2012). Cities and Flooding. A Guide to Integrated Urban 
Flood Risk Management for the 21st Century. Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
Jibson, R. W. (1986). Evaluation of landslide hazards resulting from the 5-8 October 1985 storm 
in Puerto Rico (Vol. Open-File Report, pp. 86-26): U. S. Geological Survey  
Jibson, R. W. (1989). Debris flows in southern Puerto Rico. In A. P. Schultz & R. W. Jibson 
(Eds.), Landslide processes of the eastern United States and Puerto Rico. Boulder, Colo.: 
Geological Society of America. 
Johnson, S. (2005). El Niño, Environmental Crisis, and the Emergence of Alternative Markets in 
the Hispanic Caribbean, 1760s-70s. The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 62(3, 
The Atlantic Economy in an Era of Revolutions (Jul., 2005)), 365-410.  
Kairns Champlin, H. (1933, July 15). Tropical Hurricane, The Saturday Evening Post, pp. 10-11, 
67-69.  
Kepert, J. D. (2006). Observed Boundary Layer Wind Structure and Balance in the Hurricane 






Kerry Picket. (2012). FDR pressed english on Puerto Ricans, The Washington Times. Retrieved 
from http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/watercooler/2012/mar/18/picket-fdr-
pressed-english-puerto-ricans/ 
Khanduri, A. C., & Morrow, G. C. (2003). Vulnerability of buildings to windstorms and 
insurance loss estimation Journal of Wind Engineering and Industrial Aerodynamics, 91 
(4), 455-468.  
Kilburn, B. W. (1898-1899). Plantation Joe Ponce, P.R. . In Achivo Histórico y Fotográfico de 
Puerto Rico photostream KILBURN (BWK) # 13276 (Ed.). Littleton, N.H. : Kilburn, 
Benjamin W. 
King, W. W. (2006 (1900)). Porto Rico. Report on the High Mortality on the Island (1900). 
Public Health Reports, 121(Supplement 1), 38-43.  
Kosar, K. R. (2005). Disaster Response and Appointment of a Recovery Czar: The Executive 
Branch’s Response to the Flood of 1927.  Washington D.C.:  Retrieved from 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33126.pdf. 
Kossin, J. P., A. Emanuel, K., & Vecchi, G. A. (2014). The poleward migration of the location of 
tropical cyclone maximum intensity. Nature, 509, 349-352.  
Landis, M. (2005). The Sympathetic State. Law and History Review, 23(2), 387-442.  
Larsen, M., & Andrew, S. (1993). A Rainfall intensity-duration threshold for landslides in a 
humid-topical environment, Puerto Rico. Geografiska Annaler, 75, 1-2.  
Larsen, M. C., & Parks, J. E. (1998). Map showing landslide susceptibility in the Comerío 
Municipality, Puerto Rico (Vol. Open File Report 98-566): U.S. Geological Survey. 
Larsen, M. C., Santiago, M., Jibson, R., & Questell, E. (Cartographer). (2004). Map Showing 
Susceptibility to Rainfall-Triggered Landslides in the Municipality of Ponce, Puerto 
Rico.  
Larsen, M. C., & Torres-Sánchez, A. J. (1992). Landslides Triggered by Hurricane Hugo in 
Eastern Puerto Rico, September 1989. Caribbean Journal of Science, 28(3), 113-125.  
Larsen, M. C., & Torres-Sánchez, A. J. (1995). Geographic relations of landslide distribution and 
assessment of land-slide hazards in the Blanco, Cibuco, and Coamo river basins, Puerto 
Rico (Vol. Water Resources Investigations Report 95-4029, pp. 56): U.S. Geological 
Survey  
Larsen, M. C., & Torres-Sánchez, A. J. (1998). The frequency and distribution of recent 
landslides in three mountain tropical regions of Puerto Rico. Geomorphology, 24, 309-
331.  
Larsen, M. C., & Wieczorek, G. (2004). Landslide hazards and mitigation in the tropics: 
examples from Puerto Rico, Venezuela, and the Dominican Republic. Paper presented at 
the Taller sobre Huracanes, Inundaciones y Deslizamien-tos, NOAA-NASA-USGS, 
Intercontinental Hotel, San Juan, PR.  
Lastra Aracil, J. J. (1983). El ABC sobre desastres naturales: huracanes. Carolina, P.R.: 
Imprenta el Impresor. 
Lavell, A. (1994a). Presentacion. In A. Lavell (Ed.), Viviendo en Riesgo. Comunidades 
vulnerables y prevención de desastres en América Latina. Bogota: La Red, Tercer Mundo 
Editores. 
Lavell, A. (1994b). Prevention and Mitigation of Disasters in Central America: Vulnerability to 
Disasters at the local level. In A. Varley (Ed.), Disasters, Development and Environment. 





Lepore, C., Kamal, S. A., Shanahan, P., & Bras, R. L. (Published online 25 February 2011). 
Rainfall-induced landslide susceptibility zonation of Puerto Rico. Environmental Earth 
Science(Special Issue), 1-15.  
Levy, T. A. (2010). Tobacco Growers and Resistance to American Domination in Puerto Rico, 
1899-1940. Commodities of Empire, Working Paper No.17, 1-29.  
Lewis, A. W. (1983). Crecimiento y fluctuaciones, 1870-1913. México: Fondo de Cultura 
Económica. 
Libbey, W. (1899). Princeton in the Spanish-American War. New Jersey: The Princeton 
University Press  
Lindblom, C. E. (1977). Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems. New 
York: Basic. 
Lines Escardo, A. (1998). La figura de Benet Viñes. Treballs de la Societat Catalana de 
Geografía, X(39), 153-166.  
Lizano Rodríguez, O. G. (1988). Modelo de predicción de olas generadas por huracanes en el 
Mar Caribe. (Ph.D.), University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez.    
Lizardi, J. (2013). ¿Muertos en moratoria?: Pasión y muerte en los centros urbanos en Puerto 
Rico. Unpublished. San Juan P.R.  
Lizardi, J. L. P. (2008). Ponce y los imaginarios de la capital alterna El Centro Histórico de 
Ponce. Ponce: Programa de Patrimonio Cultural de la Cooperación Española. 
Lofland, J. (1971). Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis. 
Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 
Lohse, D. (1998, Sep 24). Hurricane Georges Insured Losses Put At $1 Billion So Far, Wall 
Street Journal, p. 1.  
Lomascolo, T., & Aide, M. T. (2001). Seed and Seedling Bank Dynamics in Secondary Forests 
Following Hurricane Georges in Puerto Rico. Caribbean Journal of Science, 37(3-4,), 
259-270.  
London, J. (1998). Hurricane. New York: Lothrop, Lee & Shepard. 
López-Marrero, T., & Tschakert, P. (2011). From theory to practice: building more resilient 
communities in flood-prone areas. Environment and Urbanization, 23(1), 229-249.  
López de Haro, D., & Huerga. (1644). Primeras impresiones. 
López de Santa Anna, A. (1958). Los Jesuítas en Puerto Rico de 1858-1886: contribución a la 
historia general de la educación en Puerto Rico. Santander: Taller de Artes Graficas de 
los Hermanos Bedia. 
Malchiodi, C. (2008). When Trauma Happens, Children Draw, Part I and II. Children's art and 
the visual vocabulary of war. Psychology Today Magazine. Retrieved from The Healing 
Arts. The restoring power of imagination website: 
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-healing-arts/200805/when-trauma-happens-
children-draw-part-i 
Maldonado-Denis, M. (1980). The emigration dialectic: Puerto Rico and the USA. New York: 
International Publishers. 
Maldonado-Denis, M. (1987). Puerto Rico: una interpretación históricosocial. México: Siglo 
XXI. 
Maldonado, A. W. (1997). Teodoro Moscoso and Operation Bootstrap. Gainesville: University 
Press of Florida. 
Maldonado, A. W. (2006). Luis Muñoz Marín: Puerto Rico's Democratic Revolution 





Maldonado Muñoz, Z. (2009). Vulnerabilidad y resiliencia ante las amenazas costeras en el 
Municipio de Loiza, Puerto Rico. Revista Umbral, 1, 199-217.  
Malgrem, B., & Amos, W. (1999). Climate zonation in Puerto Rico based on principal 
components analysis and an artificial neural network. Journal of Climate, 12, 977-985.  
Margenat, A. (1956, Miércoles 15 de agosto). Cosecha Escasa: Sostienen Paso Huracán por las 
Isla Comprueba Pronóstico Aguacatero, El Mundo, p. n.a.  
Margenat, A. (1957, 22 de enero). Expertos interpretan florecida aguacates, dicen no habrá 
huracán, El Mundo, p. 2.  
Margenat, A. (1958a, 6 de junio). Habrá huracanes? Aguacates tienen perplejos a vaticinadores, 
El Mundo, p. 16.  
Margenat, A. (1958b, 9 de septiembre). Sexto sentido. Aguacateros afirman que ya sabían que 
huracán Fifí no soplaría aquí, El Mundo, p. 13.  
Margenat, A. (1959a). Confirman vaticinio, meteorólogos del aguacate dicen que este año no 
habrá huracán, El Mundo, p. 4.  
Margenat, A. (1959b). Espléndida florecida, meteorólogos del aguacate dicen que no habrá 
huracán este año, El Mundo, p. 14.  
Margenat, A. (1959c, 6 de octubre). Meteorologistas aguacateros cantan victoria por vaticinio 
sobre los huracanes de este ano., El Mundo, p. 2.  
Margenat, A. (1960, 3 de abril). Dicen los agoreros: Flor del aguacate parece indicar seria 
amenaza de ciclón este ano, El Mundo, p. 29.  
Mariani, C. (1953a). EFamilia Irizarry en su nueva vivienda localizada en la Barriada Pedro Juan 
Rosaly de Ponce. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo PRDH014PH01774 
(Ed.), (Vol. 15 x 23 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Mariani, C. (1953b). Funcionarios comprando primera casa para eliminar arrabal en Ponce. In 
Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo PRDH014PH01787 (Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, 
pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río 
Piedras. 
Marín, R. (1877). La villa de Ponce, considerada en tres distintas épocas. Estudio histórico, 
descriptivo y estadístico hasta fines del año 1876. Ponce: Establecimiento tipográfico el 
Vapor (Versión facsimilar, Editorial UPR, 1994). 
Márques, R. (1959). La Víspera del Hombre. San Juan: Club del Libro de Puerto Rico. 
Marshall, R. D. (1990). Performance of structures in Hurricane Hugo. National Institute of 
Standards and Technology Special Publication, 796(434-444).  
Martí, I. (1955). Ralph Higgs mostrando trayectoria de huracán en mapa del Caribe. El señor 
Ralph Higgs, director del Negociado del Tiempo, señala la trayectoria del huracán Conni 
(San Agapito), en su punto de más peligro para Puerto Rico. In Colección de Fotos del 
Periódico El Mundo (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Martínez, J. (1956). Organizan clases de alfabetización para refugiados en escuelas como 
resultados del huracán, El Mundo, p. 14.  
Martinez, R. A. (1984). The Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism and Puerto Rican Emigration, 
1879-1901. Journal of American Ethnic History, 3(2 (Spring, 1984)), 54-66.  
Martínez, R. A. (1984). The Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism and Puerto Rican Emigration, 





Marvel, T. S. (1994). Antonin Nechodoma: Architect, 1877-1928: The Prairie School in the 
Caribbean. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 
Masi, A. T., Timothee, R. A., & Armijo, R. (1958). Estudio Epidemiológico de un brote hídrico 
de Fiebre Tifoidea. Boletin de la Oficina Sanitaria Panamericana, Octubre, 287-293.  
Maskrey, A. (1994). Disaster Mitigation as a Crisis of Paradigms: Reconstructing after the Alto 
Mayo Earthquake, Peru. In A. Varley (Ed.), Disasters, Development and Environment. 
Chichester, England; New York: J. Wiley. 
Mathias Photo Shop. (c. 1930's). Condado Beach Hotel; San Juan, PR. In B1554 (Ed.),   (pp. 
Postcard "Technor quality views"). San Juan PR: Mathias Photo Shop. 
Matos Rodríguez, F. V. (1999). Spatial and Demographic Change in Nineteenth Century San 
Juan, Puerto Rico, 1800-1868. Journal of Urban History, 25(4), 477-509.  
Matta, J. (1981). The effects of hurricane David on the benthic macroalgae of a coral reef in La 
Parguera, Puerto Rico. (M.S.), University of Puerto Rico, Mayaguez Retrieved from 
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/general/lib/CREWS/lppr1.htm   
Maynard, R. H. (1945). Radar and Weather. Journal of Meteorology, 2(4), 214-226.  
McClure, K. (2011). The Rhetoric of Disaster: The Presidential Natural Disaster Address as an 
Emergent Genre. Relevant Rhetoric, Vol. 2(The Rhetoric of Disaster), 1-16.  
McCoy, A. W., & Scarano, F. A. (Eds.). (2009). Colonial crucible: Empire in the making of the 
modern American state. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press. 
McEntire, D. A. (2007). The Importance of Multi- and Inter-disciplinary Research on Disasters 
and for Emergency Management Disciplines, Disasters and Emergency Management: 
The Convergence and Divergence of Concepts, Issues and Trends from the Research 
Literature. Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher. 
McMahan, E. A., & Blanton, C. M. (1993). Effects of Hurricane Hugo on a population of the 
termite Nasutitermes costalis in the Luquillo Experimental Forest, Puerto Rico 
by Caribbean Journal of Science, 29(3-4), 202-208.  





Medina, M. (1989b, 1 de octubre). Ayuda Federal Huracán Hugo. FEMA. Administración 





Medina, M. (1989c, 7 de octubre). Especial, El Mundo. Retrieved from 
http://bibliotecadigital.uprrp.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/Caricatu/id/187/rec/7 
Medina, M. (1989d). Hugo, El Mundo. Retrieved from 
http://bibliotecadigital.uprrp.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/Caricatu/id/274/rec/2 
Medina, M. (1989e, 22 de octubre). Hugo Plebiscito, El Mundo. Retrieved from 
http://bibliotecadigital.uprrp.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/Caricatu/id/1048/rec/1  
Medina, M. (1989f). Paso de Hugo, El Mundo. Retrieved from 
http://bibliotecadigital.uprrp.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/Caricatu/id/535/rec/3 





Medina, M. (1989g). Reflexiones ante el paso de Hugo, El Mundo. Retrieved from 
http://bibliotecadigital.uprrp.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/Caricatu/id/482/rec/9 
Medina, M. (1989h, 30 de septiembre). Teleramaton Dale la Mano a PR, El Mundo. Retrieved 
from http://bibliotecadigital.uprrp.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/Caricatu/id/1311/rec/4 






Meléndez, E. (1993). Movimiento anexionista en Puerto Rico. Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico: 
Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Meléndez Vélez, E. (2005). The Puerto Rican Journey revisited: politics and the study of Puerto 
Rican migration. Centro Journal, 27(2 Fall), 192-221.  
Mercado, A. (1994). On the use of NOAA's storm surge model, SLOSH, in managing coastal 
hazards? the experience in Puerto Rico. NATURAL HAZARDS REVIEW, 10(3), 235-246.  
Mercado Avila, N. (1997). Plan de Revitalización para la zona histórica del poblado La Playa 
de Ponce. (M.Sc. Planificación Urbana), Universidad de Puerto Rico-Recinto Río 
Piedras, San Juan P.R.    
Meyer, G. (n.d.). Vito Marcantonio, Congressman for Puerto Rico: 1934-1936, 1938-1950  
Retrieved 06/7, 2011, from 
http://www.vitomarcantonio.com/vm_congressman_for_puerto_rico.html 
Miles, M. (2005). Interruptions: Testing the Rhetoric of Culturally Led Urban Development. 
Urban Studies, 42(5/6), 889-911.  
Miles, M., & Huberman, M. (1984). Qualitative Data Analysis: A source book for new methods. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Miles;, S., & R., P. (2005). Introduction: The Rise and Rise of Culture-led Urban Regeneration. 
Urban Studies, 42(5/6), 833-839.  
Millás, J. C. (1968). Hurricanes of the Caribbean and adjacent regions, 1492-1800. Miami: 
Academy of the Arts and Sciences of the Americas. 
Miller, B. I. (1964). A Study of the Filling of Hurricane Donna (1960) over land. Monthly 
Weather Review, 92, 389-406.  
Miller, P. G. (1922). Historia de Puerto Rico. NY: Rand McNally. 
Mills-Bocachica, W. (2003). Identity, Power and Place at the Margins: Negotiating difference in 
"El Barrio San Antón" Ponce, Puerto Rico. (PhD), Rutgers The State University of New 
Jersey, New Brunswick.    
Mills, N. (2006). Herbert Hoover and Hurricane Katrina. Dissent Magazine Online, Winter, 1.  
Miner Solá, E. (1996). Historia de los Huracanes en Puerto Rico. San Juan: First Book 
Publishing of P.R. 
Mings, R. C. (1968). Puerto Rico And Tourism: The Struggle for Cultural Autonomy among 
Developing Nations:The Case of Puerto Rico and Its Tourist Industry. Caribbean 
Quarterly, 14(3).  
Mitlin, D., Satterthwaite, D., & Stephens, C. (1996). City Inequality. Environment and 
Urbanisation, 8(2), 3-7.  





Molina Casanova, L. (Writer). (1988). Allá viene el Temporal. San Juan, P.R.: Producciones 
Molina Casanova, Inc.; Corporación de Producciones Culturales de Puerto Rico. 
Monroe, W. H. (Cartographer). (1979). Map showing Landslides and Areas of susceptibility to 
Landsliding in Puerto Rico.  
Monte, E. d. (n.d.). On the Climate of the West Indies and West Indian Hurricanes. Havana: 
Havana University. 
Mooney, C. C. (2007). Storm World: Hurricanes, Politics, and the battle over Global Warming. 
Orlando: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Morales, B. (1951). Comisión de la barriada Bella Vista, de Hato Rey, que protesta contra la 
alegada intención de eliminar dicha barriada. In I. B. 1043250 (Ed.),   (Vol. 1 
fotografía: b y n; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). San Juan 
PR: El Mundo, 24/ene/1951/ Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Morris, G. L., & Krishna, J. H. (1991). Hurricane Hugo and its effects on water supplies in the 
U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico (pp. 27). St. Thomas, VI: Water Resources Research 
Center, Caribbean Research Institute, University of the Virgin Islands. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917a). Apartment House Miramar Owners Axmayer and Son. In 
PRDH014PH00216 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n.; 23 x 19 cm). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917b). Cargando Tabaco. In PRDH013PC00397 (Ed.), (pp. 1 
tarjeta postal: b/n.;  8 x 13.17). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de 
Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917c). Central Lafayette, Guayama. In PRDH014PH00324 (Ed.), 
(pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n.; 24 x 18 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917d). Central Machete, Guayama. In Colección de Fotografías 
de A. Moscioni  n. 84a negativo n. 060 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 19 x 24 cm. ). San 
Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917e). El Fanguito, Santurce. In PRDH014PH00248 (Ed.), (pp. 1 
tarjeta postal: b/n; 19 x 24 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de 
Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917f). Making Straw hats, Cabo Rojo. In PRDH014PH00090 
(Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 20 x 25 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917g). Native house in Carolina. In PRDH014PH00126 (Ed.), 
(pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 20 x 25 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917h). Presbiterian Hospital, Condado. In PRDH014PH00061 
(Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 19 x 24 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917i). Private residence Miramar. In PRDH014PH00222 (Ed.), 
(pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 19 x 24 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917j). Represa del Río Tanamá, Arecibo. In PRDH014PH00193 
(Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 19 x 24 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 





Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917k). Residential houses in Santurce. In PRDH014PH00238 
(Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n.; 19 x 24 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917l). Typical huts of Porto Rico. In PRDH014PH00071 (Ed.), 
(pp. 1 tarjeta postal: b/n; 20 x 25 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917m). Un barrio de Hato Rey. In PRDH014PH00244 (Ed.), (pp. 
1 tarjeta postal: b/n.; 19 x 24 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de 
Río Piedras. 
Moscioni, A. (Between 1898-1917n). Viviendas Obreras. In PRDH014PH00316 (Ed.), (pp. 1 
tarjeta postal: b/n.; 24 x 19 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de 
Río Piedras. 
Moscoso, F. (2003). La Revolución Puertorriqueña de 1868: El Grito de Lares. San Juan PR: 
Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña. 
Mújica-Baker, F. (n.d. after 1998). Huracanes y Tormentas Tropicales que han afectado a Puerto 
Rico (pp. 22). San Juan, PR: Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico and Agencia Estatal 
para el Manejo de Emergencias y Administración de desastres. 
Mulcahy, M. (2006). Hurricanes, Poverty, and Vulnerability: An Historical Perspective (Online 
essay forum).  Retrieved July 2010, from Social Science Research Council 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Mulcahy/ 
Mundo, E. (1956a). Editoriales Huracán Betsy, El Mundo, p. 4.  
Mundo, E. (1956b, 3 Sept). Representante en PR del International Ladies Garment Union Robert 
Gladnick y el presidente de AFL-CIO H. Marcano hicieron entrega al Gobernador de 
cheque de U$ 25,000 como donativo del AFL-CIO nacional a las víctimas del huracán, El 
Mundo, p. 1; 22.  
Muñoz Marín, L. (1954). Puerto Rico and the U.S., Their Future Together. Foreign Affairs, 32(4  
(Jul., 1954)), 541-551.  
Muñoz Marín, L. (1957). Mensaje del Gobernador a la Legislatura de Puerto Rico 1957. San 
Juan P.R.: Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. 
Muñoz Marín, L. (n.d.). Operación Serenidad  Retrieved Jan, 30th, 2009, from 
http://www.flmm.com/pags_nuevas_folder/biografia_folder/op_serenidad.html 
Myers, J. (1998). Puerto Rico grinds through hurricane debris BioCycle, 39(12).  
n.a. (1903). Guánica Centrale: Sugar pans, Los Tachos. In Colección de Tarjetas Postales n. 512 
(Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: col.; 8.9 x 14 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
n.a. (1922). Guánica Centrale, Ensenada. In Colección de Tarjetas Postales n. 656 (Ed.), (pp. 1 
tarjeta postal: col.; 8 x 13.17 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto 
de Río Piedras. 
n.a. (1934). Franklin D. Roosevelt and Senator Valdes Mayaguz in Puerto Rico. In 48223830(56) 
(Ed.). Hyde Park, New York: Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. 
n.a. (1950). The Jayuya Uprising lasted for three day from 30 October 1950. History Files  
Retrieved 15 June, 2011, from 
http://www.historyfiles.co.uk/KingListsAmericas/CentralPuertoRico.htm 
n.a. (1953). The Caribe Hilton. San Juan, Puerto Rico. 
n.a. (c. 1920s-a). Hotel Condado-Vanderbilt beach (pp. Black and white). 





n.a. (c. 1950s). Vista aérea del área del Condado para los años 50. In I. B. 1079699 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 
fotografía: b y n ; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). San Juan 
PR: El Mundo17/feb/1969/Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
n.a. (c. 1960s). Condado Beach Hotel (pp. Postcard Curtechnicolor®3-D Natural Color 
Reproduction (Reg. USA Pat. Pending)). 
n.a. (n.d.). Switzerland of the Americas. 
National Archives. (2011). 126.4.2 Records of the Puerto Rican Hurricane Relief Commission 
(PRHRC) and its successor, the Puerto Rican Hurricane Relief Loan Section (PRHRLS). 
Records of the Office of Territories  Retrieved 03/10, 2011, from 
http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/126.html#126.4.2 
National Bar Association-International Law Section, & Program in lnternational Human Rights 
Law of lndiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. (2008). lnternational Human 
Rights Law & Hurricane Katrina: U.S. Government Fails to Comply with ICERD (pp. 
94). Geneva: United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination for 
its 72nd Session on the Occasion of Hearings on the 4th & Ch Periodic Reports of the 
United States of America (U.S.A.) on its Implementation of the lnternational Con vention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
National Climatic Data Center. (1932). Monthly meteorological notes at San Juan, Porto Rico, 
for the month of September, 1932. Asheville, North Carolina: National Climatic Data 
Center. 
National Hurricane Center. (2009). Experimental Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale  
Retrieved 10/10, 2010, from http://www.nws.noaa.gov/infoservicechanges/sshws.pdf 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (1980). Hurricanes David and Frederic as 
they concerned Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Miami: National Weather 
Service, Southern Region. 
National Research Council. (2004). Partnerships for Reducing Landslide Risk: Assessment of the 
National Landslide Mitigation Strategy. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
National Weather Service. (1989). Statement on Hurricane Hugo (revised). Published memo.  
San Juan, Puerto Rico: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
National Weather Service. (2013). Tropical Cyclone Definitions Department of Commerce 
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration 
National Weather Service Retrieved from 
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01006004curr.pdf. 
Neely, W. (2006). The Major Hurricanes to Affect the Bahamas: Personal Recollections of Some 
of the Greatest Storms to Affect the Bahamas. Bloomington, Ind.: Authorhouse. 
Negri, A., Golden, J. H., & Updike, R. (2004). The Hurricane-Flood-Landslide Continuum: 
Forecasting Hurricane Effects at Landfall. Forecast, 1-7.  
Neumann Gandía, E. (1987). Verdadera y Auténtica Historia de la Ciudad de Ponce. Desde sus 
primitivos tiempos hasta la época contemporánea: resultado de prolijas investigaciones. 
San Juan, P.R.: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña. 
Neutra, R. (1944, 12/2/1944). Puerto Rico performs. Richard Neutra Papers: Articles 
Miscelaneous. Planning and Fabrication (PL),  (Box 176/ Folder 7). UCLA/ Young 
Research Library/ Special Collections Neutra, Los Angeles. 






NOAA/AOML. (1998). Georges: (19-28 September 1998)  Retrieved 10 Jan, 2012, from 
http://www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/HFP98/Georges_sum.html 
NOAA/AOML. (n.a.). Year 1867  Retrieved May 15, 2011, from 
www.aoml.noaa.gov/hrd/Landsea/Partagas/1865-1870/1867.pdf 
Nuñez, E. (1981). Tropical ciclone structure and intensity change. (PhD), Colorado State 
University.    
O'Keefe, P., Westgate, K., & Wisner, B. (1976). Taking the Naturalness out of Natural Disasters. 
Nature 260(15 April), 566–567.  
O'Leary, D. R., Rigau-Pérez, J. G., Hayes, E. B., Vorndam, A. V., Clark, G. G., & J., G. D. 
(2002). Assessment of dengue risk in relief workers in Puerto Rico after Hurricane 
Georges, 1998. The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 66(1), 35-39.  
Official Navy Photo. (1951). Civil Air Patrol students visit the Weather Bureau Office at the San 
Juan Airport; [Lieutenant J.R. Herb; Oscar Arana; Mrs. Aurora de Lugo; Dr. Mervin K. 
Strickler, Jr.; and Dr. D.C. McDowell]. In I. B. 1054951 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 fotografía : b y n ; 
21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). San Juan PR: El Mundo, 
6/julio/1951/Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Oficina de la Defensa Civil. (19?). Qué hacer en caso de huracanes, inundaciones, marejadas. 
San Juan P.R.: La Oficina. 
Oficina de la Defensa Civil. (1954). Manual del vigilante. San Juan P.R.: La Oficina. 
Oficina de la Defensa Civil. (1960). Statement of understanding between the Office of Civil 
Defense and the American Red Cross relating to disaster operations. San Juan P.R.: The 
Office. 
Oficina Estatal de Conservación Histórica de Puerto Rico. (n.d.). Restauracion Edificio Rafael 
Martinez Nadal.  San Juan PR: SHPO. 
Oliver- Smith, A. (1996). Disaster Studies. In D. a. M. E. Levinson (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of 
Cultural Anthropology, . Lakeville:CT: American Reference Publishing Company. 
Oliver-Smith, A. (1994). Peru, 31 mayo, 1970: 500 años de desastre. Desastres y Sociedad, 
2(Especial: Tragedia, cambio y desarrollo), 4-18.  
Oliver-Smith, A. (2006). Disasters and forced migration in the 21st Century. Understanding 
Katrina. Perspectives from the Social Sciences  Retrieved 04/06, 2011, from 
http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Oliver-Smith/ 
Oliver-Smith, A., & Hoffman, S. M. (2002). Theorizing Disasters: Nature, Power and Culture. 
Santa Fe: School of American Research Presss. 
Online Puerto Rico Seismic Network. (2005). Earthquake of 1918  Retrieved 06/01, 2011, from 
http://redsismica.uprm.edu/english/Info/quake1918.php 
Ortiz Colom, J. (2005). The Essence of Puerto Rican Historic Architecture. Personal copy, San 
Juan. 
Ortíz Díaz, A. L. (2000). San Ciriaco: el azote divino. In R. R. Rivera (Ed.), La llegada del 
Cíclope : percepciones de San Ciriaco a cien años de su visita. San Juan, P.R.: 
Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. 
Ostertag, R., Scatena, F. N., & Silver, W. L. (2003). Forest Floor Decomposition Following 
Hurricane Litter Inputs in Several Puerto Rican Forests. Ecosystems, 6(3), 261-273.  
Pabón Battle, L. H. (2000). San Ciriaco y las mentalidades que circundaban la salud pública: una 
mirada estructural. In R. R. Rivera (Ed.), La llegada del Cíclope : percepciones de San 






Padilla, V. M. (1960, 9 de septiembre). Luis A. Ferré cree la isla debe pedir ayuda a gobierno de 
EU en desastre, El Mundo, p. 2.  
Paine, R. T., Ruesink, J. L., Sun, A., Soulanille, E. L., Wonham, M. J., Harley, C. D. G., . . . 
Secord, D. L. (1996). Trouble on Oiled Waters: Lessons from the Exxon Valdez Oil 
Spill. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 27, 197-235.  
Palinkas, L. A., Downs, M. A., Petterson, J. S., & Russel, J. (1993). Social, Cultural, and 
Psychological Impacts of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill. Human Organization, 52(1 / Spring 
), 1-13.  
Palm, R., & Hodgson, M. E. (1993). Natural hazards in Puerto Rico. Geographical Review, 
83(3), 280-289.  
Pando, M. A., Ruiz, M. E., & Larsen, M. C. (2004). Deslizamientos en Puerto Rico producidos 
por lluvias: Descripción General. Revista Internacional de Desastres Naturales, 
Accidentes e Infraestructura Civil, 4(1), 53-66.  
Pantojas-García, E. (1990). Development Strategies as Ideology. Puerto Rico´s Export-Led 
Industrialization Experience. Colorado: Lynne Rienner. 
Pantojas-García, E. (2007). Federal funds and the Puerto Rican economy: Myths and Realities. 
Centro Journal, XIX(2), 208-223.  
Paralitici, J. C. (2004). Sentencia impuesta: 100 años de encarcelamientos por la independencia 
de Puerto Rico. San Juan: Editorial Puerto. 
Partido Conservador. (1899). Numero extraordinario. Boletín Mercantil, 61(Septiembre), 1-32.  
Parton, G. (1993). Why am I a primitivist. Wild Earth, 3(1), 12-14.  
Paul Susman, P. O'Keefe, & Ben Wisner. (1983). Global disasters, a radical interpretation. In K. 
Hewitt (Ed.), Interpretations of Calamity from the Viewpoint of Human Ecology (pp. 
263-283). Boston, MA: Allen and Unwin. 
Peerles Litho Co. (c. 1950s). The Condado Beach Hotel; San Juan, Puerto Rico (pp. Postcard). 
Chicago Ill.: Peerles Litho Co. 
Perez-Lugo, M. (2004). Uses in Disaster Situations : A New Focus on the Impact Phase. Media, 
74(2), 210-225.  
Pérez, N. A. (2002). The last Coquí. Long Beach, NY: LIBROS, Encouraging Cultural Literacy. 
Pérez, R. (2002). Narrating Memories: Discourses of Development and the Environment in a 
Puerto Rican Coastal Region. Centro Journal, XIV(2), 211-227.  
Perloff, H. S. (1950). Puerto Rico´s Economic Future. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Perpiñá y Pibernat, J. (1899, 31 agosto). Circular sobre el ciclón del glorioso San Ciriaco y 
compañeros mártires habido en Puerto Rico el día 8 de agosto de 1899. Boletín 
Eclesiástico, 27. 
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accidents: Living with high-risk technologies. NY: Basic Books. 
Perrow, C. (2011). Fukushima and the inevitability of accidents. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
67 (6 November/December), 44-52.  
Philen, R. M., Combs, D. L., Miller, L., Sanderson, L. M., Parrish, R. G., & Ing, R. (1992). 
Hurricane Hugo-Related Deaths: South Carolina and Puerto Rico, 1989 Disasters, 16(1), 
53-59.  
Phipps, T. E. (c.1907). Bullicio en el barrio. In PRDH013PC00831 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: 
b/n.; 8.7 x 13.17 cm). Ponce P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Picó, F. (2006). Historia General de Puerto Rico (3. ed.). San Juan, P.R.: Ediciones Huracán. 
Picó, F. (2008). Puerto Rico inside and out: Changes and Continuities. Princeton, New Jersey: 





Picó, R. (1953). The Role of Planning in Puerto Rico. Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 285(Puerto Rico a Study in Democratic Development), 70-
75.  
Picó, R. (1955). Planning in Puerto Rico. marriage and family living, 17(2, Housing and 
Community Development), 113-117.  
Picó, R. (1969). Nueva geografía de Puerto Rico: física, económica y social. Río Piedras PR: 
Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Picó, R. (1974). The geography of Puerto Rico ([1st ed.). Chicago,: Aldine Pub. Co. 
Pielke Jr., R. A., Rubiera, J., Landsea, C., Fernández, M. L., & Klein, R. (2003). Hurricane 
Vulnerability in Latin America and The Caribbean: Normalized Damage and Loss 
Potentials. NATURAL HAZARDS REVIEW, 4(3 August), 101-114.  
Poey, A. s. (1862). Table chronologique de quatre cents cyclones qui ont sévi dans les Indes 
Occidentales et dans l océan Atlantique nord: pendant un intervalle de   2 années. Paris: 
Imprimerie Administrative de Paul Dupont. 
Polk, J. (1942). The Plight of Puerto Rico. Political Science Quarterly, 57(4).  
Post, B., Schuh and Jernigan, Inc.,. (1994). Hurricane Storm Tide Atlas Municipalities of: 
Yabucoa, Humacao, Naguabo and Ceiba, Fajardo, Luquillo and Rio Grande: U. S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, FEMA and Puerto Rico Civil Defense. 
Prewitt Diaz, J. O. (1999). Stressors in Puerto Rican Children as a result of Hurricane Georges. 
Education, 119(4), 658-663.  
PRRA. (193?-a). Arroyo model house for homesteader. In v. Colección de Fotografías 
Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 15 
(Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
PRRA. (193?-b). Bird's eye perspective of Juan Morell Campos at Barrio Canas, Ponce. In v. 
Colección de Fotografías Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration 
(PRRA), foto número 23 (Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
PRRA. (193?-c). Canal de Toro Negro. In v. Colección de Fotografías Digitalizadas de la Puerto 
Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 23 (Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, 
pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río 
Piedras. 
PRRA. (193?-d). Eleanor Roosevelt housing project. In v. Colección de Fotografías 
Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 20 
(Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
PRRA. (193?-e). Experimental house for homesteader. In v. Colección de Fotografías 
Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 16 
(Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
PRRA. (193?-f). Falansterio. In v. Colección de Fotografías Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico 
Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 23 (Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, pp. 1 
fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
PRRA. (193?-g). housing project. In v. Colección de Fotografías Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico 
Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 6 (Ed.), (Vol. 20 x 25 cm, pp. 1 





PRRA. (1935). Arrabal denominado "Berlin" en Ponce. In v. Colección de Fotografías 
Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 8.  
(v. 17) IMG0008  (Ed.), (Vol. 25 x 20 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Pubill, F. (1900). La administración municipal de Ponce. Memoria de las gestiones practicadas 
en la administraci municipal de Ponce, por los alcaldes y ayuntamientos que ha tenido 
desde el año 1882 al 1900. Ponce: Municipality of Ponce. 
Puerto Rican Hurricane Center. (2011). The Site of Hurricanes in Puerto Rico and Tropical 
Cyclones Worldwide  Retrieved 06/10, 2011, from http://huracanado1.tripod.com/ 
Puerto Rico Board of Fire Underwriters. (1937). Minimum rates applicable to Puerto Rico for 
fire insurance, hurricane insurance [and] riot and civil commotion. San Juan, P.R.: Casa 
Baldrich. 
Puerto Rico Dept. of Natural Resources. (1980). Coastal flood hazards and responses in Puerto 
Rico: an overview (pp. 19). San Juan, Puerto Rico. 
Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration. (1936). Hurricane Research. Mr. Kenninck y su 
ayudante en el laboratorio. In v. Colección de Fotografías Digitalizadas de la Puerto Rico 
Reconstruction Administration (PRRA), foto número 27 (Ed.), (Vol. 23 x 24 cm, pp. 1 
reproducción, b y n). San Juan: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras  
Quarantelli, E. L. (Ed.). (1998). What is a disaster? perspectives on the question. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Quiles Rodríguez, E. (1998). Taller de diseño de vivienda permanente para los damnificados del 
Huracán Georges. In Escuela de Arquitectura Universidad de Puerto Rico (Ed.), (pp. 28 ). 
Río Piedras, P.R. 
Quiles Rodríguez, E. (2009). La Ciudad de los Balcones. Rio Piedras, PR: Editorial Universidad 
de Puerto Rico. 
Quiles Rodríguez, E. R. (2003). San Juan tras la fachada : una mirada desde sus espacios 
ocultos (1508-1900) (1st ed.). San Juan: Instituto de Cultura Puertorriqueña. 
Quintero, A. G. (1986). Conflictos de clase y politica en Puerto Rico (Fifth edition ed.). Rio 
Piedras, Puerto Rico: Ediciones Huracán. 
Quintero Rivera, A. G. (2003). Ponce la capital alterna. Sociología de la sociedad civil y la 
cultura urbana en la historia de la relación entre clase, "raza" y nación en Puerto Rico. 
Ponce: Centro de Investigaciones Sociales de la Universidad de Puerto Rico y Poncenos 
de Verdad. 
Quintero Rivera, Á. G. (1988). Patricios y plebeyos: burgueses, hacendados, artesanos y 
obreros. Las relaciones de clase en el Puerto Rico de cambio de siglo. San Juan PR: 
Ediciones Huracán. 
Rahola Photo Supply. (c. 1950s). The Condado Beach Hotel; San Juan, Puerto Rico. In 6170 
(Ed.), (pp. Postcard Chrome). San Juan PR: Rahola Photo Supply. 
Rahola Photo Supply. (n.d.-a). Old Fort San Geronimo, Caribe Hilton Hotel and Normandie 
Hotel, San Juan, Puerto Rico (pp. Chrome color). San Juan PR: Rahola Photo Supply. 
Rahola Photo Supply. (n.d.-b). Puerto Rico, San Juan overview (pp. Chrome color). San Juan 
PR: Rahola Photo Supply. 
Ramírez de Arellano, R. W. (1933). Los huracanes de Puerto Rico. San Juan, P.R.: Negociado 





Raphael Tuck and Sons "Oilette". (n.d.). Old Sugar Mill, Cacique River. In Colección de 
Tarjetas Postales n. 414 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: col.; 8.7 x 13.18 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Real Photo. (early 1920s). Condado Vanderbilt Hotel (pp. Black and white). San Juan PR: Real 
Photo. 
Real Photo Post Card. (1932). Ruins of Central El Carmen, San Ciprian, Sept. 26-1932, Porto 
Rico. 
Real Photo Post Card. (c. 1930's). Hotel Condado Vanderbilt as seen from Santurce (pp. Black 
and white). San Juan PR. 
Redemptorists under the Southern Cross. (1928). Redemptorists under the Southern Cross. San 
Juan, P.R: s. n. 
Reid, H. F., & Taber, S. (1919a). The Porto Rico Earthquake of 1918 (pp. 74). Washington D.C.: 
Report of the Earthquake Investigation Commission, House of Representatives 66th 
Congress, Document 269, 1st Session, November 19, 1919. 
Reid, H. F., & Taber, S. (1919b). The Porto Rico Earthquake of 1918 with descriptions of earlier 
earthquakes. Report of the Earthquake Investigation Commission. Washington D.C.: 
USGPO. 
Rigau, J. (1992a). Puerto Rico 1900. San Juan PR: Rizzoli. 
Rigau, J. (1992b). Puerto Rico 1900: turn-of-the-century architecture in the Hispanic 
Caribbean, 1890-1930. New York: Rizzoli International. 
Rigol, I. (2005). Reflexiones sobre las áreas históricas. Carta de La Habana, 35, n.a.  
Ripp, M., & Lukat, A. H. T. (2013). Crisis: an Opportunity for Historical Cities --built cultural 
heritage as a factor of urban resilience/Krisen: Chancen für die Altstadt? Zur Rolle des 
gebauten Kulturerbes als urbaner Resilienzfaktor. Heft 2, 2, 149-161.  
Rivera Grajales, M. L., & González Rivera, R. E. (1999). Respuestas comunitarias ante un 
desastre natural : mecanismos de manejo y sistemas de apoyo formales e informales en el 
proceso de recuperación tras el embate del Huracán Georges en las comunidades de La 
Península de Cantera en San Juan y Viví Arriba en Utuado, Puerto Rico a mayo de 1999. 
(M.S.W.), Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan P.R.    
Rivera Gutiérrez, R. (n.d after 2008). Módulo Autoinstruccional: Preparación ante Emergencias 
y Desastres (pp. 34). San Juan PR: Oficina de Preparación y Coordinación de Respuesta 
en Salud Pública del Departamento de Salud de Puerto Rico, Centro de Preparación en 
Salud Pública -UPR. 
Rivera, J. D., & Miller, D. S. (2006). A brief history of the evolution of United States' natural 
disaster policy. Journal of Public Management & Social Policy, 12 Spring(1), 5-14.  
Rivera, J. D., & Miller, D. S. (2007). Continually Neglected: Situating Natural Disasters in the 
African American Experience. Journal of Black Studies, 37(502), 502-522.  
Rivera Quiñones, I. (2010, September 13). Recuerdan fallecidos por huracán Donna, Online, 
Primera Hora, p. Online edition September 13. Retrieved from 
http://www.primerahora.com/recuerdanfallecidosporhuracandonna-419700.html 
Rivera, R. (1956, 30 Agosto). El ejército dona 1,300 casetas a víctimas de Betsy en el puesto de 
Tortuguero, El Mundo, p. 1.  
Rivera, R., & Rodríguez, A. (n.a.). La identidad de la palabra un acercamiento a la literatura 
testimonial; temas musicales/ Huracán. [1 sound disc ; 4 3/4 in. + 1 Book]. Aguadilla, 





Rivera Ruiz, A. B., & Llanes Santos, J. (2008). National Register of Historic Places Registration 
Form.  Washington, D.C.: United States Department of the Inferior. National Park 
Service. 
Rodin, M., Downs, M., Petterson, J., & Russell, J. (1992 ). Community impacts resulting from 
the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Organization Environment 6(3 (September)), 219-234.  
Rodriguez-Durán, A., & Vázquez, R. (2001). The bat Artibeus jamaicensis in Puerto Rico (West 
Indies): seasonality of diet, activity, and effect of a hurricane. Acta chiropterologica    
3(1), 53-61.  
Rodríguez-Trias, H. (1994). Puerto Rico, Where Sterilization of Women Became "La 
Operación". Political Environments  1(Spring).  
Rodríguez Beruff, J. (1988). Politica militar y dominación: Puerto Rico en el contexto 
Latinoamericano Ediciones Huracán. 
Rodríguez Centeno, M. M. (2000). Tiempos de crisis: Los campesinos y el café en Puerto Rico 
durante el cambio de siglo y la Gran Depresión. Agroalimentaria, 11(Diciembre ), 1-23.  
Rodríguez, H., & Troche, M. n. (1994). Preparación y mitigación en Puerto Rico: un análisis 
organizacional. Desastres y Sociedad, 2(2  Especial: Tragedia, Cambio y Desarrollo), 19-
41.  
Rodríguez, M. (1954a). Casitas demolidas en Santurce para construir la Avenida Baldorioty de 
Castro. In I. B. 1044859 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 fotografía: b y n; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de 
Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). San Juan PR: El Mundo, 23/abr./1954/ Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Rodríguez, M. (1954b). Representantes de agencias gubernamentales reunidos para discutir plan 
durante temporada de huracanes. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo (Ed.), 
(Vol. 19 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, 
Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Rodríguez, M. (1955). Arrabal La Playita ubicado en la laguna del Condado en Santurce. In 
Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo Identificador (Bib #) 1040955 (Ed.), (Vol. 18 
x 24 cm., pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de 
Río Piedras. 
Rodríguez, M. (1956). Empleados Junta Planificación destruyendo una de las casuchas del 
arrabal clandestino cerca de la Escuela Israel. In Colección de Fotos del Periódico El 
Mundo PRDH014PH01535 (Ed.), (Vol. 17 x 22 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). San Juan 
P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Rodriguez Martinó, G., Hernández, A., & Lugo, A. (1993). Sueño en El Yunque. San Juan: 
Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Rodríguez, M. B. (1953). Trabajadores derribando las últimas casuchas del arrabal de la laguna 
del Condado. In I. B. C. d. F. d. P. E. Mundo (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm., pp. 1 fotografía: b 
y n). San Juan P.R.: El Mundo, 07/may/1953/ Universidad de Puerto Rico Río Piedras. 
Rodríguez, M. R. (2002). Representing Development: New Perspectives About the New Deal in 
Puerto Rico 1933-36. Centro Journal, XIV(2).  
Rodríguez Pedraza, C. D. (1993). Efectos del Huracán Hugo sobre plantaciones y bosques 
secundarios pareados en el Bosque Experimental de Luquillo, Puerto Rico. (M.S.), 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, San Juan P.R.    
Rodríguez Rivera, H., Cólon Rivera, C. R., Gutiérrez Sánchez, J., & Rodríguez Rivera, V. 
(1993). Natural hazards mitigation : A proposal on natural disaster in Puerto Rico : An 





Minority Research Center of Excellence, San José. CR. 
http://www.crid.or.cr/digitalizacion/pdf/eng/doc5441/doc5441.htm 
Rojas Daporta, M. (1958). Satélites los vigilarán, tratarán de desviar a los huracanes antes que 
aumenten en intensidad, El Mundo, p. 1.  
Rojas, M. (1959). Secuela de Edith. Señalan los callos, aguacates y truenos dijeron a tiempo que 
no habría temporal, El Mundo, p. 1.  
Rojas Torres, J. M. (2012, November 21). Miami Science Museum Inaugurates "Hurricanes" 
Exhibition, Eclectic Network Magazine News. Retrieved from 
http://www.examiner.com/article/miami-science-museum-inaugurates-hurricanes-
exhibition 
Roosevelt, E. (1934). Our Island Possessions. Women in World History, Puerto Rican Labour 
Movement  Retrieved Nov. 9, 2009, from 
http://chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/modules/lesson16/lesson16.php?menu=1&s=5 
Roosevelt, F. D. (1934). 134 - Remarks in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The American Presidency 
Project.  Retrieved 10/2, 2012, from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=14722. 
Roosevelt Jr., T. (1929). Children of Famine, New York Herald Tribune.  
Roosevelt Jr., T. (1934). Puerto Rico: Our link with Latin America. Council on Foreign 
Relations, 12(2), 271-280.  
Rosado Bauza, A. L. (1997, June 22nd). La marejada ciclónica de San Ciriaco, El Nuevo Día.  
Rosario Natal, C. (n.d.). Luis Muñoz Marín, Arthur Garfield Hays y la Masacre de Ponce: Una 
revelación documental inédita. Online manuscript retrieved 05/10/2011 
http://kalathos.metro.inter.edu/Num_1/Mu%F1oz_y_Masacre_de_Ponce.pdf, San Juan 
P.R. 
Rosario Rivera, R. (2000a). Una visión fotográfica y estadística de los estragos causados por el 
huracán San Ciriaco en la isla de Puerto Rico. In R. Rosario Rivera (Ed.), La llegada del 
Cíclope: percepciones de San Ciriaco a cien años de su visita. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación 
Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. 
Rosario Rivera, R. (Ed.). (2000b). La llegada del Cíclope : percepciones de San Ciriaco a cien 
años de su visita. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. 
Rosenn, K. S. (1963). Puerto Rican Land Reform: The History of an Instructive Experiment. The 
Yale Law Journal, 73(2), 334-356.  
Salivia, L. A. (1972). Historia de los temporales de Puerto Rico y las Antillas, 1492 a 1970 (2. 
ed. ed.). San Juan, P. R: Editorial Edil. 
Sanabria Santaliz, E. (1983). Después del huracán. In E. Barradas (Ed.), Apalabramiento: diez 
cuentistas puertorriqueños de hoy Hanover, N.H.: Ediciones del Norte. 
Sanabria Santaliz, E. (1995). After the hurricane. In M. Fernández Olmos & L. Paravisini-Gebert 
(Eds.), Remaking a lost harmony: stories from the Hispanic Caribbean (pp. 249). 
Fredonia, NY: White Pine Press. 
Sanchez Cappa, L. (1956). Médico teme epidemia en Maunabo, industrias de Arecibo están 
paralizadas. Senala igual peligro amenaza a Yabucoa; pide medicinas, ropa, El Mundo, p. 
1.  
Sanders, E. J., Rigau-Pérez, J. G., Smits, H. L., Deseda, C. C., Vorndam, V. A., Aye, T., . . . 
Bragg, S. L. (1999). Increase of leptospirosis in dengue-negative patients after a 
hurricane in Puerto Rico in 1996 [correction of 1966]. The American Journal of Tropical 





Sanderson, D. (2000). Cities, disasters and livelihood. Environment and Urbanisation, 12(2), 93-
102.  
Santamaría García, A. (1994). Los ferrocarriles de servicio público de Puerto Rico (1870-1990). 
Revista Complutense de Historia de América, 20, 207-228.  
Santana, B. (1956, 21 Sept.). Distribuyen ayuda de envío de grupo de iglesias cristianas realizado 
por Consejo Evangelico en 10 pueblos afectados por Betsy, El Mundo, p. 5.  
Santana, B. (1956). Ralph Higgs, Jefe del Negociado del Tiempo, dijo dicha agencia funciona 
independiente de EU o el mundo, El Mundo, p. 15.  
Santana, M. (2000, Saturday 21 October 2000). El café al estilo Buena Vista, El Nuevo Día, p. 
50.  
Santiago-Valles, K. (2007). “Our race today [is] the only hope for the World": an African 
Spaniard as Chieftain of the struggle against "Sugar Slavery" in Puerto Rico, 1926-1934. 
Caribbean Studies, 35(1 (January - June)), 107-140.  
Santiago Caraballo, J. (2000). El gobierno militar ante los efectos del huracán San Ciriaco. In R. 
R. Rivera (Ed.), La llegada del Cíclope : percepciones de San Ciriaco a cien años de su 
visita. San Juan, P.R.: Fundación Puertorriqueña de las Humanidades. 
Santiago, R. (1956, 11 Sept). Ferré dona U$ 10,000 para víctimas de Betsy, El Mundo, p. 4.  
Santiago, R. (1956a). Hay escasez de materiales de construcción informan a Muñoz, El Mundo, 
pp. 1,16.  
Santiago, R. (1956b). Moscoso cree necesaria ayuda de todo el país para programa de 
reconstrucción, El Mundo, p. 16.  
Santiago Sosa, R. (1956a). No citarán las Cámaras a reunión. Isla rehusará ayuda exterior, El 
Mundo, pp. 1, 14.  
Santiago Sosa, R. (1956b). Tuvo reunión con gabinete tras huracán, vio pocos daños en su 
recorrido, El Mundo, pp. 1, 30.  
Santos Rivera, L. (1992). Efectos psicológicos del huracán Hugo en Puerto Rico sobre niñ0s y 
niñas refugiados entre las edades de 5 a 13 años. (Ph.D.), Centro Caribeño de Estudios 
Postgraduados, San Juan.    
Sattler, D. N., Preston, A. J., Kaiser, C. F., Olivera, V. E., Valdez, J., & Schlueter, S. (2002). 
Hurricane Georges: A Cross-National Study Examining Preparedness, Resource Loss, 
and Psychological Distress in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, Dominican Republic, 
and the United States. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 15(3), 339-350.  
Scarano, F. A. (1984). Sugar and slavery in Puerto Rico : the plantation economy of Ponce, 
1800-1850. Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press. 
Scarano, F. A. (1996). The Jíbaro Masquerade and the Subaltern Politics of Creole Identity 
Formation in Puerto Rico, 1745-1823. The American Historical Review, 101(No. 5 
(Dec.)), 1398-1431.  
Scarpino, C. (2009). A Waste of a Desert: Nevada and the Cold War Chemical Legacy. Other 
Modernities, Università degli Studi di Milano, 1, 1-15.  
Scatena, F. N., & Larsen, M. C. (1991). Physical aspects of Hurricane Hugo in Puerto Rico. 
Biotropica, 23(4A), 317-323.  
Scatena, F. N., Moya, S., Estrada, C., & Chinea, J. D. (1996). The first five years in the 
reorganization of aboveground biomass and nutrient use following Hurricane Hugo in the 






Scatena, F. N., Silver, W., Siccama, T. G., Johnson, A., & Sanchez, M. J. (1993). Biomass and 
nutrient content of the Bisley experimental watersheds, Luquillo Experimental Forest, 
Puerto Rico, before and after Hurricane Hugo, 1989. Biotropica, 25(1), 15-27.  
Schneider, S. K. (1990). FEMA, Federalism, Hugo, and 'Frisco. Publius, 20(3 The State of 
American Federalism 1989-1990; Summer, 1990), 97-115.  
Schneiderbauer, S., & Ehrlich, D. (2004). Risk, Hazard and People’s Vulnerability to Natural 
Hazards: A Review of Definitions, Concepts and Data. Brussels: European Commission-
Joint Research Centre. 
Schwartz, S. B. (1992). The Hurricane of San Ciriaco: Disaster, Politics, and Society in Puerto 
Rico 1899-1901. Hispanic American Historical Review, 72(3), 303-334.  
Schwartz, S. B. (2002). Review of Winds of Change: Hurricanes and the Transformation of 
Nineteenth-Century Cuba. By Louis A. Perez, Jr. (Chapel Hill, University of North 
Carolina Press, 2001). The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 33 2(Autumn, 2002), 
334-335.  
Schwartz, S. B. (2005). Hurricanes and the Shaping of Circum-Caribbean Societies. The Florida 
Historical Quarterly, 83(4 Spring), 381-409.  
Schwartz, S. B. (2015). Sea of Storms: A History of Hurricanes in the Greater Caribbean from 
Columbus to Katrina. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Scott, A. J. (1997). The Cultural Economy of Cities. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 21(2), 323-339.  
Scott, A. J. (2000). The cultural economy of cities : essays on the geography of image-producing 
industries. London ; Thousand Oaks: SAGE. 
Scott, J. C. (1990). Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: 
Yale University Press. 
Seguinot Barbosa, J., Batista, J. L., & Sánchez Celada, M. (2008). Evaluación de riesgos por 
inundaciones en los municipios de Carolina y Loíza, Puerto Rico. GeoFocus, 8, 115-138.  
Seijo, C. E. (1965). Los ciclones en las Antillas y leyes establecidas sobre los mismos: 
recopilación de estudios ciclónicos. San Juan, P.R.: Corp. de Artes Gráficas Romualdo 
Real. 
Senior, C. (1953). Migration and Puerto Rico’s population problem. The Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, 285(1), 130-136.  
Senn, H. V., & Stevens, J. A. (1965). A summary of empirical studies of the horizontal motion of 
small radar precipitation echoes in Hurricane Donna and other tropical storms National 
Hurricane Research Laboratory report (Vol. 74, pp. 55). Washington D.C.: U.S. Govt. 
Print. Off. 
Sepúlveda, A. (2009). Viejos cañaverales, casas nuevas. Muñoz versus el síndrome Long. La 
Torre: Revista de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 14(53-54), 279-314.  
Sepúlveda Rivera, A. b. (2004). Puerto Rico Urbano : atlas histórico de la ciudad 
puertorrique a. San Juan, P.R.: Carimar. 
Severino, C. E. (1999). Los procesos de urbanización y metropolitización de San Juan: factores 
principales del consumo de espacio y de la configuración territorial de la sociedad 
puertorriqueña. In F. E. Martínez, (comp.). (Ed.), Futuro económico de Puerto Rico: 
antología de ensayos del Proyecto Universitario sobre el Futuro Económico de Puerto 
Rico. Río Piedras PR: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Shell Oil Company Incorporated. (19?). Mapas Shell, zona de huracanes. San Juan P.R.: Shell 





Shultz, J. M., Russell, J., & Espinel, Z. (2005). Epidemiology of Tropical Cyclones: The 
Dynamics of Disaster, Disease, and Development. Epidemiologic Review, 27(1), 21-35  
Silvestrini, B. G., & Luque, M. D. (1991). Historia de Puerto Rico: Trayectoria de un pueblo. 
San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Cultural. 
Simpson, V. C. (2006). Four decades of Puerto Rican emigration: Different contexts, same 
realities. Centro Journal, XVIII(2 fall ), 49-61.  
Skidmore, M., & Toya, H. (2002). Do natural disasters promote long-run growth? Economic 
Inquiry, 40(4), 664-687.  
Sloterdijk, P. (2009). Terror from the Air. Cambridge, MA The MIT Press. 
Smilana, C. (2009). Building Resiliency to Childhood Trauma through Arts-based Learning. 
Childhood Education, 85(6 Special Issue: International Focus Issue 2009: Helping 
Children Cope With the Impact of War, Terrorism, and Disaster), 380-384.  
Smith, K. (1992). Environmental Hazards. Assessing Risk and reducing Disasters. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Smith, N. (1984). Uneven Development: Nature Capital and the Production of Space. Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell. 
Smithsonian Institution. (2001-2004). Archives, Manuscripts and Photographs Catalogs. 
Smithsonian Institution Research Information Systems (SIRIS). Puerto Rico Division of 
Community Education [DIVEDCO] Poster Collection, 1940-1990.  Retrieved June 18, 
2010, from http://siris-
archives.si.edu/ipac20/ipac.jsp?uri=full=3100001~!174422!0&term=#focus 
Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? In C. Nelson & L. Grossberg (Eds.), Marxism 
and the Interpretation of Culture (pp. 120-130). London: McMillan. 
Sriramachari, S. (2004). The Bhopal gas tragedy: An environmental disaster. Current Science, 
86, 905-920.  
Stallings. (1998). Disaster and the theory of social order. In E. L. Quarantelli (Ed.), What is a 
Disaster? London, New York: Routledge. 
Stern, N. (2007). The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Stipe, R. E. (2003). Some Preservation Fundamentals. In R. E. Stipe (Ed.), A Richer Heritage 
(pp. 23-34). Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press. 
Strobl, E. (2008). The Macro-economic Impact of Natural Disasters in Developing Countries: 
Evidence from Hurricane Strikes in the Central American and Caribbean Region. 
Developpement Durable. Discussion Paper.   
Strothmeyer, & Wyman. (c.1899). Primitive Shipping - unloading Lighters at Playa - Seaport of 
Ponce. In S. F. G. F.-P. R.-.-S. Juan (Ed.), Library of Congress (pp. 1 photographic print 
on stereo card : stereograph). New York, N.Y: Strohmeyer & Wyman. 
Suchar, C. S. (1997). Grounding Visual Sociology Research in Shooting Scripts. Qualitative 
Sociology, 20(1), 33-55.  
Tannehill, I. R. (1945). Hurricanes, their nature and history, particularly those of the West 
Indies and the southern coasts of the United States (6th ed.). Princeton; London, H. 
Milford: Princeton University Press: Oxford University Press. 
Tannehill, I. R. (1956). Hurricanes, their nature and history, particularly those of the West 
Indies and the southern coasts of the United States ([9th ed.): Princeton Univ. Press. 





The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. (2006). When Disasters Strikes. A Human 
Rights Analysis of the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. General Situation Hearing of Natural 
Disaster and Human Rights, Friday, March 3, 2006 (pp. 49). Berkeley, CA: International 
Human Rights Law Clinic 
UC Berkeley Boalt Hall School of Law. 
The Omaha Bee-News. (1928). Hurricane Sweps Florida! 1,000 are dead in Porto Rico, The 
Omaha Bee-News. Retrieved from 
http://fox41blogs.typepad.com/.a/6a0148c78b79ee970c019aff6fda93970d-500wi 
The Weather Channel. (post 2012). Hurricane: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale, from 
http://www.weather.com/outlook/weather-news/hurricanes/articles/hurricane-saffir-
simpson-wind-scale_2010-05-24 
Thomas, G. (2011). A typology for the case study in social science following a review of 
definition, discourse and structure. Qualitative Inquiry, 17(6), 511-521.  
Tisdale, C. F. (1960). The weather and circulation of September 1960. Monthly Weather Review, 
88, 353-361.  
Tobin, G. A., & Montz, B. E. (1997). Natural hazards: Explanation and integration. New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Tooker, H. V. (1956, 15 de Agosto). Como en Okinawa. Yabucoa es un Pueblo Fantasma, El 
Mundo.  
Toro Ferrer/Courtesy Archivo de Arquitectura y Construcción de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
(2012). Tropicalismo. Hotel La Concha perspective drawing. ArchitectureWeek, C1.3. 
Retrieved from ArchitectureWeek website: 
http://www.architectureweek.com/2012/0808/culture_1-4.html 
Torrence, R., & Grattan, J. (2002). Natural Disasters and Cultural Change. London; New York: 
Routledge. 
Torres-Sierra, H. (1996). Storm-tide elevations caused by Hurricane Hugo on the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and Puerto Rico, September 18, 1989 Open-file report (pp. 47). Reston, Va.?: 
U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Geological Survey. 
Torres, T. (1953). Vista de los asistentes a la inauguración del Caserío Llorens Torres. In I. B. 
1050312 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 fotografía: b y n; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del 
Periódico El Mundo). San Juan PR: El Mundo, 27/julio/1953/ Universidad de Puerto 
Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Torres, T. (1954?). Funcionario explicándole al gobernador Muñoz Marín funcionamiento 
maquinaria de aguas de represa. In (Bib #)995948 Identificador (Unique ID)UI PRHDL 
Identificador (PRDH)PRDH01401336 (Ed.), (Vol. 21 x 26 cm, pp. 1 fotografía : b y n). 
San Juan, P.R.: Periódico El Mundo. 
Torres, T. (1955). Casas que destruyen para dar paso a la construcción de la Avenida Baldorioty 
de Castro. In I. B. 1045073 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 fotografía: b y n; 21 x 26 cm, pp. Colección de 
Fotos del Periódico El Mundo.). San Juan PR: El Mundo,  22/mayo/1961/ Universidad de 
Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Torry, W. I. (1979). Hazards, Hazes and Holes: a Critique of the Environment as Hazard* and 
General Reflections on Disaster Research. The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe 
canadien, 23(4), 368-383.  
Tossas, A. G. (2006). Effects of Hurricane Georges on the Resident Avifauna of Maricao State 





Trías, H. (1953). Inundaciones en la sección H de Puerto Nuevo. In U. 14968 (Ed.), (Vol. 1 
fotografía : b y n ; 20 x 25 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo.). San 
Juan PR: El Mundo, 14/08/53/ Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Trías Photographer. (1955). Vista Aérea del estado en que se encuentran los trabajos del primer 
tramo de la Avenida Baldorioty de Castro, sector de Isla Verde. In I. B. 1044914 (Ed.), 
(Vol. 1 fotografía: b y n; 24 x 15 cm, pp. Colección de Fotos del Periódico El Mundo). 
San Juan PR: El Mundo, 10/dic./1955/Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río 
Piedras. 
Tufiño, R. (1954?). Temporal. In http://136.145.174.31/u?/Grab-Plena (Ed.), (Vol. 32 x 60 cm). 
San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Tufiño, R. (n.d.). A mis hermanos hispanos y amigos de otros lugares! Entre el monte y el mar 
Puerto Rico te saluda y te invita a conocer esta Isla Borincana! In 
PRHD013PO00248(DVD#9) (Ed.), (Vol. 65x46 cm, pp. Formato original: cartel: 
serigrafía, color. de la Colección de Carteles disponibles en la Colección Puertorriqueña 
del Sistema de Bibliotecas de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. ). 
San Juan, P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Tugwell, R. G. (1945). Forty-Forth Annual Report of the Governor of Puerto Rico, 1944. San 
Juan P.R.: Oficina Insular de Compras, Division de Imprenta/University of Florida 
George A. Smathers Libraries, Digital Collections. 
Tugwell, R. G. (1974). The Stricken Land. New York: Double Day & Co. 
Turner, B. L., Kasperson, R. E., Matson, P. A., McCarthy, J. J., Corell, R. W., Christensen, L., . . 
. Schiller, A. (2003). A framework for vulnerability analysis in sustainability science. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 100(14), 8074-8079.  
U. S. Coast Guard Marine Safety Office. (2000). San Juan Instruction M16600: Heavy Weather 
Contingency Plan.  San Juan. 
U.S. Army Signal Corps. (1899). Chart X. West Indian Hurricane Isobars, 8am, August 8, 1899  
Retrieved 10/05, 2010, from http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/rescue/mwr/027/mwr-027-08-
c10.pdf 
U.S. Homeland Security. (2006). Civil Defense and Homeland Security: A Short History of 
National Preparedness Efforts (Vol. , pp. 1-36). Washington D.C.: U.S. Homeland 
Security. 
Uffret, J. M. (1956, Lunes 13 de Agosto 1956). Huella de destrucción. Periodista cubre la ruta de 
Betsy, El Mundo, pp. cover page, 30.  
UN. (2005). Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and 
Communities to Disasters. Paper presented at the World Conference on Disaster 
Reduction18-22 January 2005, Kobe, Hyogo; Japan. 
UN/ISDR. (2004). Living with Risk: A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives. Geneva: 
UN Publications. 
UNDP. (2004a). Cultural liberty in today's diverse world. New York: UNDP. 
UNDP. (2004b). Reducing Disaster Risk: A Challenge for Development. A Global Report. New 
York: UNDP - Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. 
United States Geographical Survey. (2012). Historic Earthquakes, Puerto Rico Region, 1867 






United States Geological Service. (n.a.). Earthquake History of Puerto Rico. Earthquake 
Hazards Program  Retrieved 06/10, 2011, from 
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/puerto_rico/puerto_rico_history.php 
Universidad Interamericana de Puerto Rico Recinto Metropolitano. (2012). Manual de Seguridad 
(pp. 234). San Juan PR. 
UP. (1956, 15 de Agosto). No han recibido petición de ayuda, El Mundo, p. 1.  
US. Dept. of Commerce. (1990). National Disaster Survey Report: Hurricane Hugo, September 
10- 22, 1989 (pp. 61). 
USGS. (1991). Elements of slope hazard evaluation: Guidelines for determining landslide risk.  
Guaynabo: PR. 
Valle Caballero, J. L. (1997). Hurricane Marylyn economic recovery plan for the municipality of 
Culebra (pp. 23). Mayagüez, P.R: Economic Development University Center, University 
of Puerto Rico. 
Van Bloem, S. J., Lugo, A. E., & Murphy, P. G. (2006). Structural response of Caribbean dry 
forests to hurricane winds: a case study from Guánica Forest, Puerto Rico. Journal of 
Biogeography, 33(3), 517-523.  
Van Middeldyk, R. A. (1903). The History of Puerto Rico, from the Spanish discovery to the 
American occupation. New York: Appleton and Company. 
Vargas Carcaña, A. J. (1997). Effects of debris removal and fertilizer addition to the abundance, 
diversity and richness of leaf litter spider species at two elevations in Hurricane 
damaged forests in Puerto Rico. (M.S.), Universidad de Puerto Rico.    
Varley, A. (1994). The exceptional and the everyday: Vulnerability analysis in the international 
decade for natural disaster Reduction. In A. Varley (Ed.), Disasters, Development and 
Environment. Chichester, England; New York: J. Wiley. 
Vásquez Zapata, L. (2000, June 4). Ponce, un Perfil Urbano, Sunday Magazine long article, El 
Nuevo Día, pp. 11,12,13.  
Vázquez-Pérez, J. F. (2006). Henry Klumb: Tropical Tropes. Modernism Magazine, 9(2).  
Ventresca, M. J., & Mohr, J. (2005). Chapter Thirty-five. Archival Research Methods. In J. A. C. 
Baum (Ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Organizations: Blackwell Reference Online. 
Verrill, A. H. (1914). Porto Rico past and present and San Domingo of today. New York: Dodd, 
Mead and Company. 
Vilella, F. J., & Fogarty, J. H. (2005). Diversity and Abundance of Forest Frogs (Anura: 
Leptodactylidae) before and after Hurricane Georges in the Cordillera Central of Puerto 
Rico. Caribbean Journal of Science, 41(1), 157-162.  
Viñes, B. (1877). Apuntes relativos a los huracanes de las Antillas en septiembre y octubre de 
1875 y 76 Discurso leido en la Real Academia de Ciencias Médicas, Físicas y Naturales 
de la Habana. Habana: Tip. El Iris. 
Viñes Martorell, B. (1877). Apuntes relativos a los huracanes de las Antillas en septiembre y 
octubre de 1875 y 76 Discurso leido en la Real Academia de Ciencias Médicas, Físicas y 
Naturales de la Habana. Habana: Tipografia El Iris. 
Viñes Martorell, B. (1877). ”Viaje científico (de exploración por diversos puntos de la Isla). 
Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Médicas, Físicas y Naturales de La Habana, 
T.13, 427.  
Viñes Martorell, B. (1877-78). Apuntes relativos a los huracanes de las Antillas en septiembre y 
octubre de 1875-1876. Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Médicas, Físicas y 





Viñes Martorell, B. (1886). Las tempestades de Cuba, 14 de noviembre de 1886. Anales de la 
Real Academia de Ciencias Médicas, Físicas y Naturales de La Habana, T.23, 339-340.  
Viñes Martorell, B. (1894). Investigaciones relativas a la circulación y traslación ciclónica de los 
huracanes de las Antillas. Anales de la Real Academia de Ciencias Médicas, Físicas y 
Naturales de La Habana, T.31, 158.  
Vingboons, J. (Cartographer). (1639). De Eylanden en Vastelanden van Westindien Retrieved 
from http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/h?ammem/gmd:@field%28NUMBER+@band%28g3300+lh000029%29%29 
Vivoni, E. (Ed.). (1989). Antonín Nechodoma: umbral para una nueva arquitectura Caribeña. 
Rio Piedras PR: Archivo de Arquitectura y Construcción, Escuela de Arquitectura UPR  
Vivoni Farage, E. (2006). Henry Klumb and Poetic Exuberance in Architecture. In E. Vivoni 
Farage (Ed.), KLUMB: An Architecture of Social Concern. Rio Piedras, PR: La Editorial 
Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Vivoni Farage, E., & Alvarez-Curbelo, S. (1997). Ilusión de Francia : arquitectura y 
afrancesamiento en Puerto Rico (1. ed.). San Juan, P.R.: Archivo de Architectura y 
Construcción de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Vivoni Farage, E., & Curbelo Alvarez, S. (1998). Hispanofilia : arquitectura y vida en Puerto 
Rico, 1900-1950 = Hispanophilia : architecture and life in Puerto Rico 1900-1950 (1. 
ed.). San Juan: Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico. 
Vivoni Farage, E., & Gallart, M. F. (2003). Modernidad Tropical, Arquitectura y fuerza creativa 
de la decada de 1950. In E. Vivoni Farage & M. F. Gallart (Eds.), Modernidad Tropical, 
Arquitectura y fuerza creativa de la decada de 1950. San Juan PR: Oficina Estatal de 
Preservacion Historica. 
Vogt, K. A., Vogt, D. J., Boon, P., Covich, A., Scatena, F. N., Asbjornsen, H., . . . Ranciato, J. F. 
(1996). Litter dynamics along stream, riparian and upslope areas following Hurricane 
Hugo, Luquillo Experimental Forest, Puerto Rico. Biotropica, 28(4), 458-470.  
Wade, P. (1997). Race and ethnicity in Latin America. Chicago, Ill. ; London: Pluto Press. 
Wadsworth, F. H., & Englerth, G. H. (1959). Effects of the 1956 hurricane on forests in Puerto 
Rico. Caribbean Forester, 20(3/4), 38-51.  
Waide, R. B. (1991). The Effect of Hurricane Hugo on Bird Populations in the Luquillo 
Experimental Forest, Puerto Rico. Biotropica, 23(4), 475-480.  
Waide, R. B. (1991). Summary of the responses of animal populations to hurricanes in the 
Caribbean. Biotropica, 23(4a), 508-512.  
Waldrop Photographic Co. (1913). Cutting Sugar-Cane in Porto Rico. In Colección de Tarjetas 
Postales n.137 (Ed.), (pp. 2 tarjetas postales: col.; 13.15 X 18.17 cm. de la Colección de 
Tarjetas Postales). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Waldrop Photographic Co. (1918). Bananas in Porto Rico. In PRDH013PC00133 (Ed.), (pp. 1 
tarjeta postal: col. 13.15 x 18.17 cm). San Juan P.R.: Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto 
de Río Piedras. 
Waldrop Photographic Co. (n.d.-a). An Old Cane-Mill in Porto Rico. In Colección de Tarjetas 
Postales n. 129 (Ed.), (pp. 1 tarjeta postal: col.; 13.15 x 18.17 cm. ). San Juan P.R.: 
Universidad de Puerto Rico, Recinto de Río Piedras. 
Waldrop Photographic Co. (n.d.-b). They Have no Stokings to Hang (pp. Reproducción digital 
de la tarjeta postal núm. 731, de la Colección de Tarjetas Postales). San Juan: 





Walker, L. R. (1991). Tree damage and recovery from Hurricane Hugo in Luquillo Experimental 
Forest, Puerto Rico. Biotropica, 23(4a), 379-385.  
Walker, L. R., Lodge, D. J., Brokaw, N. V., & Waide, R. B. (1991). An introduction to 
hurricanes in the Caribbean. Biotropica 23(4a), 313-316.  
Walsh, J. P., Corbett, R., & Siepert, S. D. (2012). San Ciriaco Hurricane. Storms to Life  
Retrieved May 5th, 2012, from http://www.ecu.edu/renci/StormsToLife/about.html 
Weaver, P. L. (1986). Hurricane damage and recovery in the montane forests of the Luquillo 
Mountains of Puerto Rico. Caribbean Journal of Science, 22(1-2), 53-70.  
Weightman, R. H., Mitchell, C. L., & Hartwell, F. E. (1932). West Indian Hurricanes of August 
and September, 1932. Monthly Weather Review, 60(9), 177-179.  
Weiss, R. I., McKie, K. L., & Goodman, R. A. (2007). The Law and Emergencies: Surveillance 
for Public Health–Related Legal Issues During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. American 
Journal of Public Health, April; 97(Supplement 1), 73-81.  
Wijkman, A., & Timberlake, L. (1984). Natural disasters: acts of God or acts of man? London: 
Earthscan. 
Willoughby, H. E., Jorgensen, D. P., Black, R. A., & Rosenthal, S. L. (1985). Project 
STORMFURY, A Scientific Chronicle, 1962-1983. Bulletin of American Meteorological 
Society, 66, 505-514.  
Wisner, B. (2001). A New Earthquake in El Salvador, and an Old Problem: Neoliberalism  
Retrieved 12-15, 2009, from 
http://online.northumbria.ac.uk/geography_research/radix/elsalvador2.html#A%20New%
20Earthquake  
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., & Davis, I. (2004). At Risk: Natural hazards, People’s 
Vulnerability, and Disasters (2nd edn ed.). London: Routledge. 
Woodruff, J. D., Donnelly, J. P., Mohrig, D., & Geyer, W. R. (2008). Reconstructing relative 
flooding intensities responsible for hurricane-induced deposits from Laguna Playa 
Grande, Vieques, Puerto Rico Geology, 36(5), 391.  
Woolbright, L. L. (1991). The impact of hurricane Hugo on forest frogs in Puerto Rico. 
Biotropica, 23(4a), 462-467.  
World Meteorological Organization, & Economic and Social Comission for Asia and the Pacific. 
(2011). Review of the Tropical Cyclone Operational Plan. Paper presented at the 
WMO/ESCAP Thirty-eighth session,  Panel on Tropical Cyclones 21 to 25 February 
2011, New Delhi, India. https://www.wmo.int/…ocuments/Doc6_OPPlan_ADD-1.doc 
Wunderle, J. J. M. (1999). Pre- and post-hurricane fruit availability: implications for Puerto 
Rican parrots in the Luquillo mountains. Caribbean Journal of Science, 35(3-4), 249-
264.  
Yanow, D. (2014). Interpretive Analysis and Comparative Research. In I. Engeli & C. Rothmayr 
(Eds.), Comparative policy studies: Conceptual and methodological challenges (pp. 131-
159). Basingstoke: Palgrave  Macmillan. 
Yin, R. K. (1984). Case Study Research: Design and Methods (First edition ed.). Thousand Oaks 
CA: Sage Publications. 
Yin, R. K. (2003). Case Study Research, Design and Methods (3rd ed. ed.). Newbury Park: Sage 
Publications. 
Yoshioka, P. M., & Yoshioka, B. B. (1987). Variable Effects of Hurricane David on the Shallow 





Yoshioka, P. M., & Yoshioka, B. B. (1989). Effects of wave energy, topographic relief and 
sediment transport on the distribution of shallow-water gorgonians of Puerto Rico. Coral 
Reefs, 8(3), 145-152.  
Zahner, M. H. (1899). Women washing clothes, Ponce. In Archivo Histórico y Fotográfico de 
Puerto Rico photostream unnumbered series (Ed.). Niagara Falls, N.Y.: M.H. Zahner. 
Zahner, M. H. (c.1899). Griffith & Griffith. In Stereoviews of Puerto Rico 046 (Ed.). Niagara 
Falls, N.Y: Griffith & Griffith. 
Zimmerman, J. K., Everham, E. M., Waide, R. B., Lodge, D. J., Taylor, C. M., & Brokaw, N. V. 
L. (1994). Responses of tree species to hurricane winds in subtropical wet forest in Puerto 








Chapter N.VIII Case Study Comparisons, Recommendations and 
Conclusions 
 
VIII.1.1 Theme 1. CHARACTERIZATION Sub-question 1.1 How are hurricanes San 
Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara characterized? 
The three Cape Verdean hurricanes had similar tracks but diverse wind strength, associated rains 
and duration; leading to their retrospective categorization as level 4, 5 and 1 in the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale respectively. For casualties, San Ciriaco can be characterized as the 
local benchmark because it is the deadliest hurricane recorded in Puerto Rico. Its severe impacts 
correlate to its strength, and widespread poverty, political instability, accumulated disaster 
effects, lack of planning, infrastructure, knowledge, warning, and comprehensive relief. San 
Felipe remains the strongest hurricane recorded on the island, yet its casualties reduced to almost 
a 10
th
 of San Ciriaco’s. Planning and other structural conditions remained feeble; yet, better 
forecasting, a basic warning system and precarious self-built rural shelters helped. Santa Clara 
casualties amounted to 0.4-0.5 per cent of San Ciriaco’s; it was weaker and shorter; besides 
knowledge, warning, planning, investment, and relief had improved, whilst self-built rural 
shelters also helped. Vulnerability reduction was inconsistent though; four years later, hurricane 






Qualitative information shows that the three hurricanes affected the Puerto Rican economy, 
environment and society. They essentially hit the same sectors; export crops, food security, 
public health and the built environment. Testimonies expose subtle or blatant changes such as 
affected crops and owners, decaying agriculture and religion, recently established industries and 
public institutions, and developing technology, infrastructure, education, housing, public health, 
media and relief. Yet, lack of precise indicators or retrospective approximations hinders 
evaluations and comparisons. Data about economic losses is generic, uneven and unreliable; 
mainly concerned with the formal economy and built environment; I could not find 
reconstruction projections and budgets. More unknown are damages to informal housing and 
economies. Besides, records persistently disregard location of casualties and injured citizens, 
their socio-economic background and other circumstances that could clarify the political 
economy of disasters. Disaster images and testimonies were mostly the prerogative of wealthy, 
conservative, white men, usually in power. They also produced discourses, policies and official 
memories, although spared from suffering. For San Ciriaco and Santa Clara respectively, middle-
income men limitedly left their imprint in literature and media. I could not find records of how 
marginalized citizens confronted and remembered the tragedies, or how they could have 
influenced policies accordingly. 
 
The contexts of the hurricanes were differently characterized by instability; all reflected 
changing asymmetrical power relationships between the island and the U.S. through 






VIII.1.2 Theme 1. CHARACTERIZATION. Sub-question 1.2. What characterizes the 
production of knowledge around hurricanes San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara in 
multidisciplinary, artistic, regional, local, multi-hazard, and multi-storm terms? 
In terms of multidisciplinary academic studies, meteorological research was constant whilst 
forestry studies addressed San Felipe and Santa Clara and epidemiology papers addressed San 
Ciriaco and San Felipe. Essentially hurricanes were climatological concerns; their social, 
economic, political, environmental and cultural dimensions were irrelevant to study, which in 
turn narrowed research and policy-making. San Ciriaco has been more investigated based on its 
proximity to the island’s most dramatic change, whilst Santa Clara has been overlooked. Nearly 
all the meteorological, forestry and epidemiology publications were written by foreigners, in 
English; seemingly Puerto Ricans confronted barriers to higher education, research and 
publishing. The circulation of those publications is limited to a local university library or 
specialized journals, often unavailable online or only at a cost. Also, disciplinary knowledge 
production was sporadic and uneven, addressing recent events and with a short-term reflection 
margin. Retrospective research started in the 1990s, with history followed by economics. 
 
The hurricanes have been memorialized through writings, plastic arts, audio, audiovisual and 
dance. All artistic productions were authored by island-based Puerto Ricans, except for one 
group in the U.S.; which signals a broader accessibility to the cultural sphere vis-à-vis the 
academic sphere. Those works were usually self-funded; the Commonwealth commissioned a 
mural slightly before Santa Clara, and multi-media pedagogic materials soon after. 
Municipalities and the federal government remained aside from artistic productions. In other 





federal or local entities, regardless of their disaster management influence. Some works reached 
high circulation, such as the song ‘Temporal’, books incorporated in mainstream curricula and 
post-Santa Clara materials. Based on the dance performance “Angelito Borincano”, some 
diasporic Puerto Ricans cherished to commemorate and share hurricane experiences with other 
immigrants. Cultural manifestations probably influenced the collective memory and 
understanding of hurricanes; yet, they essentially continue understudied. 
 
In regional terms, the three cases expose the Circum-Caribbean as a microcosm of insularism 
and rivalry, created by geography and colonial policies, which enhances underdevelopment. 
Those hurricanes affected several territories, outside and within the island; yet only for San 
Felipe relief entities wrote two brief multi-country short reports, without comparisons. 
Fragmented news and short references addressed local impacts but there were no studies, the 
island remained the unit of analysis. Lack of comparative multi-scalar data and studies exposing 
similarities and differences when facing the same threat undermines denaturalizing so-called 
“natural disasters”. 
 
Potentially concurrent although less frequent events were overlooked as catalysts for integrated 
multi-risk knowledge and policy production. The worst earthquakes and tsunamis (1867 and 
1918) exacerbated San Narciso and San Felipe respectively. Each risk challenged construction 







In multi-storm terms, the three hurricanes catapulted knowledge production; contemporary minor 
storms and floods are under examined and isolated. Such emphasis blurs the understanding of 
multi-scalar disasters as long-term interconnected processes. 
 
VIII.1.3 Theme 2. CAUSATION. Sub-question 2.1. How did economic growth and 
urbanization cause vulnerability or resilience to San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
Throughout Spanish colonialism until the mid 20
th
 century, all engines of economic growth were 
vulnerable to hurricanes and the structure of profit appropriation exposed people differently. 
Coastal occupation for gold extraction increased profits, accessibility, and exposure to floods, 
hurricanes, surges and tsunamis. Although colonizers and creoles exploited people and resources, 
storms undermined Puerto Rico as an economic venture until 18th century sugar and coffee 
exports boomed along coastal growth, without economic redistribution. Post San Ciriaco, U.S. 
corporations displaced elite Creoles, intensified environmentally degrading sugar production, 
invested in new export crops, and left declining coffee highlands. A crisis ensued, worsened by 
San Felipe, San Zenón, San Nicolás and San Ciprián. The New Deal and the Commonwealth 
promoted a less inequitable formula of economic growth, but environmental degradation 
continued, with great social and economic costs. 
 
Urban primacy redefinition during the turn of the 20
th
 century reshaped the island and risk 
exposure. A territorially spread network of cities was rejected, as San Juan regained preeminence 
whilst Ponce and Mayagüez declined. Macro and meso territorial decisions were made by 
appointed administrators -first Spanish, then Americans and finally some Puerto Ricans-, and 





tourist investors and developers-. Self-interest undermined a political project of democratic, 
sustainable development with equitable redistribution. In the mid 20th century, remittances sent 
by Puerto Rican emigrants to the U.S. empowered lay citizens to make micro-level choices that 
reduced extreme poverty and vulnerability, reshaping urbanization. 
 
Planning and investment increased from very low levels during the Spanish regime, slightly 
more in the early U.S. administration until the New Deal and Commonwealth expansions. 
Protection of lay citizens was added to commodities and elites; but planning, investment and 
state violence also secured questionable U.S. interests. 
 
Infrastructure grew from mainly serving export-oriented needs to encompass production and 
consumption; transport and water works were prioritized, simultaneously diminishing and 
creating risks. Private foreign investors expanded the interrupted coastal Spanish railroads and 
maritime projects. New Deal-Commonwealth launched motorway networks overpowered 
railroads, bolstered private owners and developers, car over mass transport, and suburban sprawl 
over compact growth; whilst razing urban areas and degrading ecosystems –some of which 
buffered disasters-. Water management changed from very small engineering projects serving 
potable water to few buildings, next serving irrigation and limitedly expanding urban provision, 
to finally become a top federal strategy to jointly manage water and disasters. The local 
hydraulic regime changed through vast projects mainly for irrigation, human consumption, 
industrialization and hydroelectricity. In the short term, new hydraulic systems handled hazards 
and improved living conditions; later they enhanced hazards and hardened recovery vis-à-vis 





floods, overflow and collapse of levees, canals and dams became a top issue; floods became the 
most expensive disaster. 
 
Risk-prone areas were habitually occupied by low-income groups based on exclusionary land 
markets, until 20
th
 century technology created a false sense of safety based on the modernity 
belief that it was possible and desirable to dominate and recreate nature. New urbanization took 
place in desiccated areas and beach fronts that were risk-prone. 
 
The main urban growth pattern can be described as ‘uneven geographical development’, with 
stark disparity between what upper income groups enjoyed compared with the abject poverty of 
the vast majority, vulnerable to disasters and everyday life hazards. The New Deal launched 
urban development interventions, which became massive post WWII. 
 
Housing legislation and programs went from absent, to basically insufficient, to make Puerto 
Rico rival the top states receiving federal funds. The New Deal promoted diverse prototypes, low 
and middle density units, at a pace that was in short supply for the accumulated deficits. For the 
Commonwealth, housing was essential; suburban expansion and slum clearance became 
paradigmatic, prompting extensive, low-density projects that soon became problematic also for 
their inability to foresee disasters. Land tenure, housing production scale, construction methods 
and financing empowered vast segments of society, whose quality of life and hazard resilience 
changed from being destitute slum residents to titled citizens in formal, durable housing units. 





Architectural, planning and policy records conventionally prioritized the elitist historical built 
environment; recent works target precarious settlements using miscellaneous viewpoints to show 
diverse urban experiences. Disasters remain understudied though. 
 
VIII.1.4 Theme 2. CAUSATION. How did socio-cultural hierarchies, collective memory 
and knowledge production cause vulnerability or resilience to San Ciriaco, San Felipe and 
Santa Clara? 
Disaster vulnerability and social hierarchy correlated, and the most consistent vectors of 
difference were race, class, nation of origin and gender; religion and language lost preeminence. 
Ideology and political status were conflictive sources of social difference during late Spanish 
rule and the 1930s-early 1950s
148
. Since the 1950s, high and middle-income segments also 
experienced vulnerability due to urbanization changes. 
 
Powerful groups justified unfair hierarchy for their benefit through discursive constructs. 
American administrators took over Spaniards and Creoles keeping some discriminatory patterns, 
including disenfranchising locals vis-à-vis foreigners and impoverished and marginalized 
citizens vis-à-vis elites. Projects merging identitarian constructs with political reivindications 
were first voiced by pro-independence Creoles confronting Spanish discrimination; their claims 
endorsed exclusionary and vulnerability enhancing conditions for lay citizens. During initial U.S. 
rule, constructing a local cultural identity could be equated with punishable subversion and 
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 In between, pro-independence groups were not organized or large enough to make their claims noticeable public 





separatism. Merged identitarian and political reivindications criticized American oppression 
idealizing a peaceful, patriarchal hispanophilic history; a view shared later by top leaders. 
 
Neglected public education worsened everyday life and crises during the Spanish colony and 
initial U.S. rule; whilst insufficient New Deal investment and English imposition were also 
detrimental. Puerto Ricans took charge just before the Commonwealth setup, introducing local 
history and institutionalizing Spanish. The Commonwealth negotiated a non-confrontational 
identitarian formula tied to public education. It shaped the official construction of history with 
Spanish notions of hierarchy and the myth of rural harmonious mestizaje. Thus, it followed core 
tenets justifying inequality and disregarded the hardship endured by marginalized citizens. The 
Commonwealth created ICP and DIVEDCO to guide a controlled transition to modernity, 
strengthening education through the arts, identity construction and cultural heritage preservation. 
DIVEDCO produced and disseminated pedagogic materials and ICP promoted ‘apolitical’ local 
culture and identity claims. Such approach cultivated cultural sensibilities attached to patriotic 
sentiments, but hampered separatism.  
 
All identitarian-political and education initiatives omitted the construction of collective disaster 
memories and awareness; thus, religious superstitions and rural beliefs prevailed. For centuries, 
Catholicism determined what a disaster was, its causes and responses. Rural citizens trusted 
changes in animal behavior, vegetation and bodily sensations. Until the mid-20
th
 century, even 
mainstream newspapers and professional associations followed popular beliefs, whilst the power 






Meteorology went from no database and a brand new observatory, to cutting edge technology 
used for systematic regional longitudinal research, influenced by U.S. military aims. The 
complex growth of technical information reflects how emerging disaster studies and 
management prioritized science to advance knowledge through maps, graphs, tables and images 
such as land, aerial and satellite photography and radarscope. The 1950s advent of television 
transformed public awareness concerning hurricanes; Dr. Dawson Clay McDowell merged 
cultural and scientific understandings to attract viewers, which remains noteworthy as 
meteorology and anthropology are usually disconnected. 
 
VIII.1.5 Theme 3. RELIEF Sub-question 3.1. How did a previous relief experience or 
process create influential conditions for the relief stage of San Ciriaco, San Felipe and 
Santa Clara? 
The preceding benchmarks are respectively the San Narciso crisis, the Great Mississippi floods, 
and the U.S. disaster management transformation from the New Deal until the mid-1950s; they 
reflect that until the 1930s relief provision was a neglected governmental responsibility worsened 
by improvised trial and error. Throughout the Spanish colony, relief was delegated to local 
authorities; post-San Narciso, the Governor’s unfeasible taxation demands showed 
irresponsibility even during an extreme emergency that risked insurgence. During the Mississippi 
floods, state and local institutions were responsible yet unable to undertake relief. Instead of a 
federal response, the Red Cross gained an ad-hoc quasi governmental role, unbound to public 
accountability, and emphasized volunteerism supported by professionals. Army presence only in 





institution. In the New Deal, old and new federal entities tackled crises with a wide scope, 
narrowed later by ideological biases; state and local authorities retained an important role. 
 
Governmental relief neglect related to the prevailing underlying ideas of what caused disasters. 
With religion having a pivotal role in public life, ascribing disasters to a fair punishment of God 
served to deter plans and investment. Also, the scale in which the disaster was addressed served 
to detach unaffected remote governmental institutions. Local resources were intensively 
extracted, islanders had duties towards central and distant administrations but lacked rights to 
demand even relief; at best, they could negotiate. Thus, the local scale was conveniently 
positioned as a responsibility of home institutions and individuals. Another damaging idea was to 
correlate relief with vagrancy, not with entitlements; thus, citizens had to meet extreme demands 
to survive. Moreover, by blaming the forces of nature, not social interactions, it was hard if not 
impossible to tame disasters. Conversely, beliefs in domesticating and recreating ecosystems and 
environmental processes filtered among New Deal governmental tasks, which prompted hazards. 
Contemporary views linked disasters and war, or disasters and economic growth, and separated 
disasters from culture and politics, with contradictory consequences. 
 
Relief biases and abuses in all cases are hazy, possibly because most records were not authored 
by suffering citizens, often illiterate, whose goal was survival. Yet, controversies highlight the 
contested nature of impromptu relief, with incongruities concerning evacuation, supply 







Policy-making reflects the consolidation of disaster management and its transformation into a 
governmental duty. Post-San Narciso planning and infrastructure were unevenly implemented. 
Post-Mississippi flood interventions favored free markets and credit schemes resulting in fiascos. 
Yet, they precluded the most radical legislative change in U.S. history concerning flood control, 
reshaping and increasing federal involvement in municipal and state tasks; which the New Deal 
reinforced. Next, diverse institutions raised life standards and safety. Grassroots education for 
disaster awareness took priority over other cultural interventions, focusing on atomized agency 
during emergency. 
 
All cases triggered political challenges. In the first, poor disaster management could have fed a 
pro-independence struggle, along other causes. In the second, relief flaws added to the frustration 
of African-Americans, influencing their presidential vote. In the third, federal lack of headship 
and perceived intrusiveness pressured powerful decision-makers. 
 
 
VIII.1.6 Theme 3. RELIEF Sub-question 3.2. Which were the defining elements for 
hurricane relief and incipient policy trends concerning San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa 
Clara? 
Iterative challenges to launch relief and priorities expose absence of responsible institutions, 
insufficient funds and clear procedures; besides complex political frictions, deep-rooted poverty, 
widespread destruction –with varying degrees-, and lack of awareness about hurricanes due to 
limited development of knowledge vis-à-vis beliefs. Inexperience was mentioned during San 





year lapse after San Felipe, although federal and island governments had invigorated disaster 
management. Political dissent is prominent in the two last hurricanes, as during San Ciriaco 
locals were unclear about the new U.S. authorities and their potential interactions. Top-down 
oppression mechanisms and bottom-up frustration existed during San Felipe and Santa Clara; in 
the former they were about to get worse, in the latter grassroots dissent was obliterated. Avoiding 
starvation, public health outbreaks, homelessness, agricultural collapse, and governmental 
anarchy were prioritized in a context of scarce personnel, materials, medicines, clothes, food and 
other supplies. Moreover, harsh mechanisms of social control post San Ciriaco and San Felipe 
were central; relief was a magnanimous reward to be hardly won. By Santa Clara, that viewpoint 
had changed. Still, it was central to guarantee U.S. dominion, undermine non-conforming right 
wing voices -the left was dismantled-, and secure the Governor’s position and the 
Commonwealth. Handling disasters always needed caution vis-à-vis frail political configurations 
that included changing equations of dependency and underdevelopment. 
 
Unstable relief providers reflect lack of institutionalization and accountability. Given the 
emergency and weakness of local organizations, U.S. institutions stepped in during the first two 
cases. Their biases were not openly challenged by local authorities and citizens, exposing lack of 
avenues for dissent. Post-San Ciriaco, the Army’s chain of command, strict supervision and 
derogatory assumptions undermined the short and long-term betterment of marginalized citizens 
in dire need. Post-San Felipe, the Red Cross’ mistakes transplanted from the Great Mississippi 
floods, brief temporal engagement and derogatory assumptions again hindered marginalized 
citizens. Post-Santa Clara, a local yet unprepared institution took over, the Commonwealth, with 





Underlying relief paradigms backing governmental neglect were difficult to change. One 
example is the separation between federal and local spheres, with emphasis on locals providing 
for themselves, superseded by Santa Clara. Another example is the constant presence of and calls 
for charitable and entrepreneurial entities and volunteers in charge. 
 
Consistently, powerful groups gained relief advantages over those most in need. On the one hand 
were Creole planters, exporting entrepreneurs and unscathed municipalities initially, and large 
U.S. sugar corporations and coffee planters later. Their power to secure funding lasted until 
Santa Clara, with limited -if any- obligations to redistribute or report back. On the other hand 
were rural workers, small farmers, urban and rural homeless; they became more impoverished 
but were denied help to stop idleness. During Santa Clara the latter assumption was not aired in 
available records. Yet, during its key yearly speech to the Puerto Rican Congress, the Governor 
eschewed the worsened conditions of urban slum dwellers, the help they received and targets to 
help them; which could be seen as detachment from a large group of disempowered citizens. 
 
VIII.2. Recommendations 
My research finished in the mid 20
th
 century, narrowing the scope of pertinent specific 
recommendations to the following: 
 
The research should continue until now, in order to grasp what happened in the last six decades. 
Possible extreme or deviant cases to study are hurricanes Donna (1960), Hugo (1989), Georges 





counterpoint to Santa Clara, the greatly increased flood casualties need a critical explanation. 
Hugo is more relevant because it happened during a critical timing, it enables a longer term view 
of disaster management, and it received media and research attention as it blasted other 
territories. The contemporary crisis was the dissolution of the initial Commonwealth political 
formula and economic model, dependent on outmoded and polluting industries, shrinking 
remittances and federal transfers, evaporated tax exemptions which propelled the flight of 
investors, long-term effects of corruption and mismanagement, and external changes such as the 
Oil Crisis and new fiscal paradises overseas. A plebiscite was scheduled to redefine the 
controversial political status, after alternance of PNP and PPD. Moreover, a beloved television 
character –Don Cholito- had incorporated hurricanes in his comedic repertoire, which can be 
seen as an indicator of a collective perception of disaster safety soon to be shattered. As shown 
below, a plethora of newspaper cartoons reflects old themes –destruction, underdevelopment, 
dependency, religion- and new ones –such as costly last minute “hurricane specials’, a 
fundraising Telemarathon, the fragility of formal, low-cost suburban housing and the hurricane 
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The Puerto Rican Public 
Aministration is tied and frustrated 
in front of the federal help for Hugo 
labelled for FEMA (Miche Medina, 
1989b). 
Debris from fallen construction 
and vegetation are heavy burdens 
on the “Plebiscito” locked box 
(Miche Medina, 1989e). 
Months later, Vieques island was 
still hard hit, and this image 
resembles Santa Clara; although all 
the family is well-dressed and the 
ruined house is modern (Medina, 
1990). 
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A fallen tree “the passing of Hugo” tramples a man 
named “the People”; near, a water bottle is empty 
and damaged, a light bulb is broken. A bird carries 
the messages of “patience and understanding” 
(Miche Medina, 1989f). 
With a black island map behind, a larger than life 
figure of Jesus oversees widespread destruction; 












Georges reached category 4 and it was the first hurricane to traverse the island after San Ciprián. 
Impacts include eight casualties, around $2 billion losses in housing, electricity, water, sewage, 
roads, agriculture and tourism. U.S. and Puerto Rican officials prepared a plan that forbid 
rebuilding in risk prone areas and needs assessment. Although Irene was less destructive, it 
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Hugo is about to blow a formal, low-cost, suburban house 
despite “precautions” taken by residents (Miche Medina, 
1989d). 
President Bush arrives with help; Gov. Hernández 
Colón says “the pieces are coming” to a man trapped 
inside a smashed old car representing Puerto Rico 
(Miche   Medina, 1989). 
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Citizens of all ages, shapes and colors 
head to the fundraising Telemarathon, in 
the light of insufficient public resources 
to tackle the crisis (Miche Medina, 
1989h). 
An angry man searches his pocket to 
pay for seemingly expensive emergency 
groceries, whilst the cashier timidly 
offers the bill (Miche Medina, 1989c). 
Hugo is portrayed as a 
giant Big Bad Wolf 
blowing a tiny modern 






exposed increasing impact of floods -particularly on basic infrastructure-, effectiveness of 
evacuation and shelters, and federal funds dependency. 
 
Comparative multi-scalar disaster studies, from micro-territories to the Greater Caribbean region 
would advance disaster knowledge and policy-making. There is a gap about localities and their 
resources, coalitions, material conditions, leadership, conflicts, and memorializations. Filling 
such gap could explain strengths and limitations of municipal disaster management, and advance 
local empowerment. Also, micro-level community responses have been usually overlooked; yet, 
they could offer more diverse and creative solutions than top-down procedures, and expose how 
those failed on the ground. 
 
It would be relevant to continue interdisciplinary studies covering multiple storm, hazards, minor 
incident, everyday life dynamics vis-à-vis disasters, and new extreme scenarios including 
pollution from old abandoned industries and modern pharmaceuticals, bombing zones-, and 
systemic hydraulic failures. 
 
The contributions of the cultural sphere could shed light on resilience and vulnerability 
processes; particularly, post-Santa Clara DIVEDCO materials would be useful for countries in 
backward conditions. Interviews with related DIVEDCO workers and citizens could reveal 






Capturing oral histories, pictures, mental maps and other testimonies of underrepresented 
affected groups would finally bring some justice to their experiences, and could clarify their 
fears, hopes, superstitions, knowledge, needs and assessments. 
 
Resulting from participatory histories, an exhibit that travels to schools, universities, ICP centers 
or municipal entities -particularly in places hit by disasters or at risk-, would enrich the collective 
construction of disaster memories. 
 
Cost benefit analysis of maintaining risk-prone urban areas vis-à-vis expropriations and 
demolition could sustain expropriations, limits to growth and densification. 
 
Finally, appointing an institution or network of institutions to call for existing information, 
collect and disseminate it free of charge, online and in paper, would advance disaster knowledge 
and the foundations for policy-making. 
 
VIII.3 Conclusions 
Research Question: In terms of informing policies, what are the key lessons from the disaster 
management changes that happened during the transition of Puerto Rico from a Spanish colony 
to a Commonwealth of the United States? 
Disaster management vastly improved mirroring shifting ideas of God, nature, knowledge and 
humanity; always influenced by the dependent position of the island. Historically, citizens tried 





practices; some of which endured colonization and modernization into the mid 20
th
 century. 
Disaster management emerged haphazardly; at first it was ineffective and improvised relief, 
without much preventive or reconstructive policy-making. The official perception of hurricanes 
changed from being essentially uncontrollable religious or natural events, to natural events that 
could be tamed with technology, physical changes and policies. Yet, it was a more nuanced 
confluence of environmental, economic, social, cultural, and political factors that enabled storms 
to become destructive disasters affecting the Puerto Rican economy, environment and society. 
The social groups that experienced higher resilience or vulnerability during a disaster 
respectively corresponded to the groups that were best and least served during relief and who 
could or could not produce public transcripts and policies. Such division resulted from 
entrenched social and political arrangements, including citizens’ rights, colonial administrative 
policies, social hierarchies that merged local and external power dynamics, and notions of 
habitus. Eventually, the growing understanding of citizens’ rights was critical to reduce hurricane 
casualties and the worst forms of vulnerability through New Deal and Commonwealth 
developmental projects. By also including contentious aims though, they created other forms of 
underdevelopment and dependency from the US; whilst technology and modernity paradigms 
bolstered new risks that would become rather costly. Simultaneously, disaster management 
became a federal responsibility, which reached Puerto Rico; but it was the unplanned intersection 
of a hodge-podge of disciplines, approaches and institutions, centered on physical interventions 
and neglecting the role of culture and the political economy of disasters with negative lasting 
impacts. Although improvised, contradictory and controversial; the main factors enabling the rise 
of disaster management were increased governmental leadership, knowledge construction, public 





VIII.3.a) Governmental leadership 
Governmental leadership is basic, and becomes more competent if consistent, coordinated, self-
critical and pro-equity. A designated governmental layer should foresee the integration of 
external entities -foreign or federal- and locals –such as proactive and reliable municipalities, 
religious and volunteering organizations, and individuals-. Contradictory effects of Army 
involvement demand caution. Likewise, media presence of leaders can be distortively used for 
personal, ideological and other inappropriate aims, demanding mechanisms of public 
accountability. 
 
VIII.3.b) Knowledge construction 
Disaster management is nurtured by the construction of different forms of knowledge. Science 
significantly contributes; yet it needs constant self-reflexivity to refine its aims, amalgamate 
disciplines in systematic, proactive approaches that have ample time frames and spatial scales, 
integrate infrequent and different hazards, and become useful. Quantitative and qualitative 
records of casualties that show differentiated vulnerability and impacts enable clearer diagnoses 
and can inform effective interventions. Similarly for information about damages of formal and 
informal built environments and economies. The construction and propagation of disaster 
knowledge through the arts can be a local, spontaneous, self-funded, positive process that 
fortuitously reaches high circulation. Yet, governments could significantly contribute sponsoring, 
elaborating and disseminating materials of pedagogic and aesthetic value; and supporting 








VIII.3.c) Public awareness 
The construction of public awareness targeting different audiences is essential, with cultural 
sensitivity to address religious, rural and urban popular beliefs and practices –whether useful, 
harmless or counterproductive- and translate scientific knowledge to explain multiple disasters, 
their complete life cycles and interconnections. A humorous yet respectful, initially improvised 
blend of cultural and scientific meanings of hurricanes was efficient during decades in Puerto 
Rico. Warning systems are crucial and have been successful even with rustic means of 
communication backed by local participation–as in late 19
th
 century in Cuba-, more so when 
combining modern technology with interpersonal and grass-roots dynamics. The same structures 
can improve post-disaster processes. Pedagogic audiovisual materials can be attention-grabbing, 
memorable and particularly useful to engage illiterate and under-schooled groups. A systematic 
effort to freely circulate and discuss such materials can reinforce general public awareness and 
should reach the most vulnerable citizens -due to location and vectors of social difference-. 
Preparing individuals and families for emergency is a basic facet of disaster management, better 
if integrated within a broader culture of resilience in which collective organizations request 
safety from preventable disasters and participation as rights. 
 
VIII.3.d) Preventive planning and investment in hard and soft infrastructure  
This factor is possibly the hardest to track due to multiple actions and stakeholders involved 
throughout time. A basic step is to discern the traditional path and political economy of planning 
and investment in relation to disaster vulnerability. Socially stratified vulnerability can be seen as 
a collective decision –of the most dominant societal factions, political representatives and 
technocrats- about the degrees of insecurity considered acceptable for different persons; in other 





when the profession would be considered nascent by today’s standards, it reduced risks to the 
elites and protected commodities; thus, the problem was systematic exclusion of underprivileged 
citizens that multiplied and cemented their vulnerability. Although planning is increasingly 
specialized, it must incorporate disaster management and its cultural meanings, and relate them 
to more traditional areas of expertise such as land use policies. Also, it ought to question core 
tenets of modernity and technology such as unlimited resource use and ecosystemic changes. For 
instance, conventional systems to simultaneously deliver potable tap water, generate 
hydroelectricity and control floods can raise living standards and reduce vulnerability; yet, they 
may contain the seeds of their own crisis. Lack of closed systems of recovery, reuse and recycle 
generate unnecessary costs and pollution, triggering new systems pumping water from more 
distant reservoirs or aquifers. Extensive hydro-engineering modifications to control floods can 
become counterproductive. Purposive urbanization of risk-prone artificially transformed 
ecosystems tends to generate old or new hazards in due course. Planners in developed and 
developing countries need to re-examine modernity paradigms, particularly vis-à-vis increased 
risk scenarios. They must consider how and when to retrofit or change existing systems; and if 
planning for new ones, they can adapt successful examples, avoid costly and risk-enhancing 
mistakes or innovate. 
 
VIII.3.e) Relief provision 
Relief provision should grow in content and scope, reviewing its social meanings and trajectory. 
When seen as an improvised, devout or charitable act is problematical; more so if offered by 
unaccountable and inexperienced entities and individuals that see disaster survivors as potential 





institutionalized task of legally responsible, multi-scalar governmental leaders. Crudely, this 
stage tends to expose and sometimes reinforce political dependency, underdevelopment, 
inequality and vulnerability. Simultaneously, the crisis may provide temporary political 
momentum in favor of progressive projects, policy and legislative changes. 
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Annex 1. Cross-case comparison tables 
 
Table 3. Theme 1. CHARACTERIZATION. 1.1 How are hurricanes San Ciriaco, San 
Felipe and Santa Clara characterized? 
Theme 1. Characterization      Sub-question 1.1 Hurricane profiles 
 San Ciriaco (1899) San Felipe (1928) Santa Clara (1956) 
Basic data Cape Verdean hurricane, estimated 
Category 4 in the Saffir-Simpson 
Scale; copious and lasting rain. 
Cape Verdean hurricane, estimated 
Category 5 in the Saffir-Simpson 
Scale, the strongest recorded in 
Puerto Rico; copious rain. 
Cape Verdean hurricane, 
estimated Category 1 in the 
Saffir-Simpson scale, 
relatively small, weak and 
fast; modest rainfall. 
3,100-3,400 casualties. 312 casualties. 9-16 casualties. 
Widespread destruction. 
Cataclysmic impacts on export 
crops, food security, public health, 
built environment –particularly 
scarce infrastructure and 
overabundant precarious housing-. 
Widespread destruction. Vast 
impacts on export crops, food 
security, public health, built 
environment –particularly 
infrastructure, public buildings, 
schools and abounding precarious 
housing-. 
Widespread destruction. 
Impacts on export crops, 
food security, public health, 
education, built 
environment – particularly 
infrastructure, industries and 
abounding precarious 
housing-. 
Context Unstable times, the U.S. had taken 
over the island from Spain months 
before, after the Spanish-American 
War. 
Unstable times, the U.S. had 
consolidated ‘imperialism by 
neglect’. 
Unstable times, from the 
New Deal to the 
Commonwealth, those were 
the most violent years in 
modern history. 
 Four centuries of Spanish 
detachment from Puerto Rican 
development and extractive policies 
created inequality, poverty, 
vulnerability and turmoil. San 
Ciriaco showed the fault lines of this 
asymmetrical relationship. 
Three decades of U.S. overt 
detachment from Puerto Rican 
development and extractive policies 
created the conditions for an 
impending economic and civil 
breakdown. San Felipe showed the 
fault lines of this asymmetrical 
relationship. 
Over two decades of 
incongruous U.S. rule 
included plans and actions to 
ameliorate socio-economic 
conditions, exploitative 
interventions and repression. 
Santa Clara showed the fault 




Men in positions of power: Spanish, 
U.S. and Puerto Rican politicians, 
elite members, intellectuals, public 
officials, foreign military, 
merchants, planters, religious 
authorities, doctors, and scientists. 
Men in positions of power:  U.S. 
and Puerto Rican politicians, elite 
members, intellectuals, public 
officials, foreign relief providers, 
and scientists. 
Men in positions of power: 
U.S. and Puerto Rican 
politicians and elite 
members; and men part of a 
growing middle-class: 
intellectuals, scientists, 




Marginalized citizens due to gender, 
class, race, and age. 
Marginalized citizens due to 
gender, class, race, and age. 
Marginalized citizens due to 
gender, class, race, age, and 
left-wing/pro-independence 
ideology. 
Main biases Upper class, top-down, male 
perspective of the event. 
Upper class, top-down, male 
perspective of the event. 
Upper class, top-down, male 





Table 4. Theme 1. CHARACTERIZATION. 1.2 What characterizes the production of 
knowledge around hurricanes San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara in multidisciplinary, 
artistic, regional, local, multi-hazard, and multi-storm terms? 
 
THEME 1. CHARACTERIZATION:    Sub-question 1.2 Knowledge production 
 San Ciriaco (1899) San Felipe (1928) Santa Clara (1956) 
Multi-
disciplinary  
Scientific studies: meteorology 
(1/1899) and epidemiology 
(1/1900). 
History (1/1992) and history-
related (all 2000) discussing 
photographic and statistic 
overview of the damages (1), 
position of the military 
government (1) and Catholic 
church (1), literature (1), health 
(1) and migration (1). 
Scientific studies: meteorology 
(1/1928), forest biology (2/1929, 
1930). 
History (1/2005). 
Scientific studies: meteorology 
(3/ 1956, 1956, 1959), forest 
biology (1/1959) epidemiology 
(1/1958) and economics with a 
focus on education (1/2005). 
Arts Novels ‘Estercolero’ (1901), 
‘Mancha de Lodo’ (1903), 
‘Gestación’ (1905), ‘El hijo de 
Carmen o Aventuras de un 
Obrero’ (1909), ‘Tierra Adentro’ 
(1911), and ‘La Gleba’ (1912). 
Texan-based musical ‘Sembrando 
Herencia’ (2007). 
Novel ‘La Víspera del Hombre’ 
(1959). 
Song ‘Temporal’ (n. d.). 
Mural ‘Temporal’ (1952-1954). 
Award-winning documentary 
‘Allá viene el Temporal’ (1988). 
‘Huracán’ film, 2 posters, booklet 
and bulletin (1958). 
Short story ‘Huracán Santa Clara’ 
(2003). 




No comparative regional studies. No comparative regional studies. 
Two multi-site short relief reports 
(2/ 1928, 1929). 
No comparative regional studies. 
Local No studies of local impacts. No studies of local impacts. No studies of local impacts. 
Multi-hazard No studies co-analyze concurrent 
complex emergencies, possible if 
expanding the temporal frame to 
include droughts, hurricane San 
Narciso, a seism, tsunami and 
aftershocks all in 1867. 
No studies co-analyze concurrent 
complex emergencies, possible if 
expanding the temporal frame to 
include hurricane San Hipólito in 
1916; San Fermín seism, tsunami 
and aftershocks in 1918. 
Concurrent earthquakes and 
tsunami (1943 and 1946) were 
insignificant. 
Multi-storm No studies, typical listings of 
preceding hurricanes and storms. 
No studies, typical listings of 
preceding hurricanes and storms. 
No studies, typical listings of 







Table 5. Theme 2. CAUSATION.2.1. How did preceding economic growth and 
urbanization caused vulnerability or resilience to San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
 
THEME 2. CAUSATION:     Sub-question 2.1 Economic growth and urbanization vis-à-vis risks 
 San Ciriaco (1899) San Felipe (1928) Santa Clara (1956) 
Growth 
engines 
Export crops to Spain, 
mainly sugar and coffee; 
controlled by elite Puerto 
Ricans. 
Export crops to the U.S., mainly 
sugar; tobacco, fruits–citrus, 
pineapple, banana-, and coconuts 
were relevant also; all controlled 
by large U.S. corporations. 
Decaying coffee chiefly exported 
to Europe, controlled by Puerto 
Ricans. 
Decaying export crops to the U.S., 
mainly sugar; controlled by large U.S. 
corporations. Government targeted 
industrialization, institutional reform, 
emigration, tourism, and construction. 
Vast gains for corporations, mixed 
results for lay citizens. 
Territorial 
patterns 
Coastal over mountainous 
urbanization, enhancing 
hazards such as floods, 
hurricanes, surges and 
tsunamis. 
Coastal over mountainous 
urbanization, enhancing hazards 
such as floods, hurricanes, surges 
and tsunamis. 
Coastal over mountainous 
urbanization, enhancing hazards such 
as floods, hurricanes, surges and 
tsunamis. 
San Juan was the capital but 
Ponce was the top growth 
pole, and Mayagüez was 
ranked third. 
San Juan became the top growth 
pole again, Ponce and Mayagüez 
declined, the highlands 
depopulated. 
San Juan remained the top growth 
pole, Mayagüez and Caguas distantly 
followed, Ponce declined, the 
highlands depopulated. 
Spanish administrators and 
elite Puerto Rican merchants 
and planters had made key 
territorial decisions. 
U.S. administrators and 
corporations had made key 
territorial decisions. 
U.S. administrators and corporations, 
and Puerto Rican officials had made 
key territorial decisions.  
Remittance-receiving families made 
influential micro-level decisions. 
Planning and 
investment 
Very low levels; underlying 
assumption of protecting 
commodities, not lay 
citizens. 
Relatively increased levels; 
underlying assumption of 
protecting commodities, not lay 
citizens. 
 
Increased levels allegedly based on 
scientific studies; underlying 
assumption of protecting commodities 
and gradually lay citizens, but keeping 
questionable U.S. interests and aims 
by force if needed. 
  Island government-promoted light 
industries first, heavy industries next; 
U.S. emigration coastal tourism, and 
construction. 
Infrastructure Mainly export-oriented 
public works and transport 
infrastructure. 
Mainly export-oriented public 
works and transport 
infrastructure. 
Export-oriented, production and 
consumption public works and 
transport infrastructure. 
Transport projects included 
ports, bridges, lighthouses, 
interrupted roads, and a tiny 
fractional private railroad 
network. 
Transport projects included 
ports, bridges, private airports, 
roads, and an expanded private 
railroad network that brokenly 
circled the coast and did not link 
the highlands due to 
topographical hindrances and 
unprofitability. 
Transport projects included bridges, 
an international airport, and a 
motorway network that connected the 
island, breaking railroads. The 
motorway aided private owners and 
developers, car over mass transport, 
and suburban sprawl over compact 
growth; whilst razing bionetworks, 
formal and precarious housing. 
Small water management 
interventions provided for 
few well-off housing and 
official buildings. 
Hydraulic projects included 
irrigation canals, river dams, 
hydroelectric plants, dykes and 
few filter beds, mains, and pipes 
to bring water to better-off 
Hydraulic projects included irrigation 
canals, large river dams, hydroelectric 
plants, dykes, levees, flood walls, and 
far-reaching water systems for 









There were no engineering 
interventions that enabled 
formal agricultural and 
urban growth on risk-prone 
areas. 
By the end of this time period, 
engineering interventions 
became a valued federal flood 
control, disaster management and 
planning strategy; and enabled 
limited formal agricultural and 
urban growth on risk-prone 
areas. 
Federal large-scale engineering 
interventions merged water and flood 
management, expanding agricultural 
and urban growth on risk-prone areas, 
thus mitigating and creating 
vulnerability. New hydraulic systems 
coped with minor and moderate 
hazards in the short term; but flood-
prone urbanization grew due to a false 
sense of safety. Danger increased 
during extreme weather-events and 
system failures; recovery hardened. 
Negligible formal beach 
front urbanization, few 
export or military 
constructions. 
Incipient high-end housing and 
tourism in San Juan heralded 
beachfront urbanization, with 
privatized access and changes of 
ecosystems that buffered storms 
and surges. 
Formal deluxe and aggressive 
beachfront urbanization privatized 
access and obliterated ecosystems that 
buffered storms and surges, increasing 
vulnerability. 
Exclusionary land markets 
prompted low-income 
groups to occupy marginal 
risk-prone areas. Due to the 
fragility of their structures, 
they mostly caused 
reversible changes to 
ecosystems that buffered 
storms and surges. 
Exclusionary land markets 
prompted more low-income 
groups to occupy marginal risk-
prone areas. Despite the fragility 
of their structures, their 
increasing density damaged 
ecosystems that buffered storms 
and surges. 
Exclusionary land markets prompted 
large numbers of low-income groups 
to occupy marginal risk-prone areas. 
Despite the fragility of their 
structures, their heavy density 
destroyed ecosystems that buffered 
storms and surges. 
  Heavy industries in the Southern coast 
caused degradation and toxic risks. 
Urban growth 
patterns 
Uneven trends, no 
systematic governmental 
interventions. 
Uneven trends, few systematic 
governmental interventions. 
Uneven trends insufficiently changed, 
despite public projects and funding. 
High-end areas incorporated 
vanguard designs and 
technologies. 
High-end areas incorporated 
vanguard designs and 
technologies. 
High-end areas incorporated vanguard 
designs and technologies. 
Average state of 
urbanization remained 
extremely precarious for the 
everyday life and vulnerable 
to disasters. 
Average state of urbanization 
remained extremely precarious 
for the everyday life and 
vulnerable to disasters. 
PRRA tackled urbanization deficits 
limitedly. Post WWII construction fed 
the GNP and improved safety 
gradually; housing was top. Suburban 
formal housing, car-dependent, low-
density individual homeownership 
with minimal standards and facilities, 
vast deforestation and topographical 
changes. Slum clearance in prime real 
estate hit communities of color mainly 




No legislation or programs. Insufficient legislation and 
programs. 
Increased legislation and programs. 
 The 1903 Homestead Act 
introduced affordable, low-
density housing for formally 
employed citizens. It was 
endorsed by laws in 1906 and 
1920. The 1923 Hogares Seguros 
PRRA, the Design of Public Works 
Committee and Puerto Rican Housing 
Authority bought land, cleared slums, 
creatively but inadequately built urban 
and rural housing. The 1949 U.S. 





law created the Homestead 
Commission to guide urban 
development and provide plots or 
housing for urban workers. Yet, 
deficits grew exponentially. 
and new construction. Unrivaled post-
WWII housing investment became a 
Commonwealth symbol. 
Housing was built 
individually or in small 
groups. 
Housing was built individually or 
in small groups. 
PRRA increased scale and pace of 
construction insufficiently; post 
WWII massive production, 
organization and financing. 
 The 1903 Homestead Act 
allowed laborers to own the land 
they tilled, but did not affect U.S. 
corporations and local elites. The 
unapplied 1917 Jones-Shafroth 
Law limited corporations to own 
up to 500 acres. 
Since the 1940s, the Land Authority 
promoted a contentious land reform 
enacting the 1917 Jones-Shafroth Law 
and Title V of the 1941 Land Law; 





Elitist emphasis blurs unfair 
differences in urban life and 
disaster experiences. 
Elitist emphasis blurs unfair 
differences in urban life and 
disaster experiences. 
Elitist emphasis still although popular 
projects by famous authors have 
received attention also. 
Contemporary specialized and 
governmental publications addressed 
urban changes from top-down 
viewpoints. Recent multifocal studies 
of the informal and precarious built 
environment show urban life variety, 







Table 6. Theme 2. CAUSATION. 2.2. How did preceding socio-cultural hierarchies, 
collective memory and knowledge production caused vulnerability or resilience to San 
Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
 
THEME 2. CAUSATION:       Sub-question 2.2 Socio-cultural hierarchies, memories and knowledge of 
disasters 
 San Ciriaco (1899) San Felipe (1928) Santa Clara (1956) 
Social 
hierarchies 
White, male, Catholic Spaniards 
in top positions during the 
Spanish colony; white, male, 
Protestant, English-speaking 
Americans during U.S. 
occupation. White, male, wealthy 
Puerto Ricans followed. Poor 
locals were at the bottom of both 
social ladders; mainly if jíbaros, 
black, women, children and 
elderly. Country of origin, class, 
race, religion, language, ideology 
and political status were the most 
conflictive differences. 
White, male, English-speaking 
Americans in top positions; 
white, male, rich Puerto Ricans 
followed. Poor locals were at the 
bottom of the social ladder; 
mainly if jíbaros, black, women, 
children and elderly. 
All Puerto Ricans were in a legal 
citizenship vacuum from 1898 to 
1917. Country of origin, class, 
race, ideology and language 
were the most conflictive 
differences. 
White, male, English-speaking 
Americans in top positions; 
increasingly followed by white, 
male, elite or technocrat Puerto 
Ricans. Poor Puerto Ricans were 
at the bottom of the social ladder; 
mainly if jíbaros, black, women, 
children and elderly. Country of 
origin, class, ideology and 
political status preferences were 
the most conflictive differences. 
High disaster vulnerability 
correlated to adverse living and 
working conditions, education, 
healthcare, and food insecurity. 
High disaster vulnerability 
correlated to adverse living and 
working conditions, education, 
healthcare, and food insecurity. 
High disaster vulnerability 
correlated to adverse living and 
working conditions, education, 
healthcare, and food insecurity. 
Justification  First, Spanish birth and 
hispanophilia justified Spaniard 
supremacy and anti-Puerto Ricans 
stereotypes.  
Next, U.S. birth and the Black 
Legend -anti-hispanophilia - 
justified American supremacy 
and anti-Puerto Ricans 
stereotypes, akin to those 
embraced by Spaniards. 
Landed and business elites could 
be judged unreliable and sub-par 
by Spaniards and Americas. The 
poor and working class was seen 
as lazy, ignorant and stubborn by 
Spaniards, Americans and elite 
Puerto Ricans. 
U.S. birth and the Black Legend 
-anti-hispanophilia - justified 
American supremacy. Pro-
Americanization policies 
endorsed censorship, equated 
affirmations of cultural identity 
with punishable subversion and 
separatism, and imposed 
linguistic dominance. 
Landed, entrepreneurial and 
public servant elites could be 
judged unreliable and sub-par by 
Americans. 
The poor and working class 
could be seen as lazy, ignorant 
and stubborn by foreigners and 
elite Puerto Ricans. 
During PRRA, American 
supremacy was less blatantly 
justified; yet Pro-
Americanization policies 
endorsed censorship, equated 
affirmations of cultural identity 
with subversion and separatism 
to be punished, and kept 
linguistic dominance. 
Next, the Commonwealth used 
Spanish colony notions to define 
cultural heritage endorsing 
hispanophilia, the myth of 
harmonious mestizaje in the rural 
past, promoting blanqueamiento 
ideals, Jibaro, Spanish, and even 






Extremely low public education 
levels. 
Low public education levels. Lacking public education. Since 
the mid 1950s, ICP and 
DIVEDCO advanced arts, 
education, identity and cultural 
heritage. 
English substituted Spanish as the 
official language of public 
education (1899). 
English as the official language 
of public education was a 
hindrance. 
English ceased to be the official 
language of public education 
(1949). 
Limited teaching of local history, 
the curriculum was pro-Spanish 
and turned pro-U.S. 
Limited teaching of local history, 
pro-American curriculum. 
Increased teaching of local 
history. DIVEDCO produced 





promoted ‘apolitical’ local 
culture and identity. 
Pro-independence creoles 
promoted local culture and 
identity claims endorsing 
exclusionary and vulnerability-
enhancing conditions. 
Merged identitarian and political 
reivindications addressed rural 
decay; an idealized, peaceful, 
and patriarchal hispanophilic 
past vis-à-vis US oppression. 
Future Commonwealth leaders 
addressed cultural sensibilities 
attached to patriotic sentiments, 
to hinder separatism and channel 
social changes. 
Identitarian constructions and 
public education excluded 
hurricane memories and 
awareness. 
Identitarian constructions and 
public education excluded 
hurricane memories and 
awareness. School books 
included hurricane lists. 
Identitarian constructions and 
public education excluded 
hurricane memories and 
awareness. Post 1956, 




Indigenous groups had developed 
superstitions but also valid 
knowledge, including storm 
forecasting. 
Spaniards believed that 
indigenous forecasting and all 
associated ideas were related to 
Satan, which justified destruction. 
 
Although contemporary data 
was not found, a subsequent 
documentary indicates that 
people trusted forecasting based 
on animals in distress, the 
presence of coastal birds flying 
inland to avoid storms, and 
avocado crop forecasting. 
People trusted forecasting based 
on falling spider webs, animals in 
distress, pain in calluses, the 
presence of a coastal bird flying 
inland to avoid storms, and 
avocado crop forecasting. 
Allegedly, ancestral heritage 
supported the latter belief. 
Catholic traditions included 
invoking God, the Virgin Mary 
and saints during a crisis; 
naming storms according to 
Saint Day; using churches and 
chapels as ad-hoc refuges (due to 
their sturdiness, lack of secular 
options and role of religion); and 
processions. 
Catholic traditions included 
invoking God, the Virgin Mary 
and saints during a crisis; 
naming storms according to 
Saint Day; using churches and 
chapels as ad-hoc refuges (due 
to their sturdiness, lack of 
secular options and role of 
religion). 
Catholic traditions included 
invoking God, the Virgin Mary 
and saints during a crisis; and 
naming storms according to 
Saint Day (Americans proposed 
alphabetical order). Disaster 
homeless sheltered in public 
schools. 
Catholic authorities and 
parishioners explained disasters 
as God’s wrath towards 
deserving sinful people. No 
records of Americans matching 
religion, sins and disasters. 
No records of public diatribes by 
religious leaders and 
parishioners explaining disasters 
as God’s wrath towards 
deserving sinful people. 
 
No records of public diatribes 
by religious leaders and 
parishioners justifying disasters 
as explaining wrath towards 
deserving sinful people. 
Scientific 
knowledge 
Meteorology grew obeying 
martial U.S. objectives. 
Meteorology lost weight; the 
U.S. was not at war. 
Meteorology grew obeying 
martial U.S. objectives. 
During late Spanish control, 
Cuban meteorology included 
Puerto Rico. The Spanish-
American War motivated the 
Army Signals Corp to launch 
Caribbean meteorological 
research. Under the U.S. 
National Weather Service, the 
San Juan Weather Bureau was 
barely established before San 
Ciriaco; it built useful 
knowledge.  
S.J. Weather Bureau equipment 
improved and adjacent WKAQ 
radio station rapidly broadcasted. 
PRRA funded modest academic 
investment to enhance military 
weather studies. Meteorology 
rose during WWII to protect 
aviation, and the Cold War as 
‘Weather control’ was a military 
priority and two hurricane 
seasons brought destruction. 
1950s hurricane policies were 
top-down, controlled by the 
military, bureaucrats and 
scientists; delinked from social 
sciences and humanities, or 
participatory approaches. Cold 
War logic bonded floods, storms, 





Record keeping followed 
simplistic assumptions of data, 
disregarding causation and 
differentiated impacts. 
Record keeping followed 
simplistic mainstream 
assumptions of data, disregarding 
causation and differentiated 
impacts. 
Record keeping followed 
simplistic mainstream 
assumptions of data, disregarding 
causation and differentiated 
impacts. 
Predominance of religion and 
ignorance over underdeveloped 
science and knowledge. Very 
limited media dissemination. 
Decreased dominance of 
religion, but widespread 
ignorance was not offset by 
underdeveloped science and 
knowledge. Growing media 
dissemination. 
Decreased dominance of 
religion; traditional beliefs 
widely valued as new costly 
technology and modernity 
paradigms. Science and media 
confronted religious dogmas, 
superstitions, and ignorance. TV 






Table 7. Theme 3. RELIEF. 3.1. How did a previous relief experience or process create 
influential conditions for the relief stage of San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
 
THEME 3. RELIEF:         Sub-question 3.1 Previous disaster 
 San Ciriaco (1899) San Felipe (1928) Santa Clara (1956) 
Disaster  1867 droughts, San Narciso 
hurricane, seismic crisis. 
Scarce data.  
1927 Great Mississippi River 
floods. 
Transformative processes: the 
New Deal, WWII, the Cold 
War, 1950s storms. 
Relief provider Municipalities, but most of 
them were broke, unable to 
launch successful post-disaster 
actions. 
The Spanish government first 
posed unfeasible demands, 
latter offered uneven help. 
The American Red Cross, a 
congressionally-chartered quasi-
governmental entity run by 
professionals and volunteers, 
became almost a federal 
disaster-response agency using a 
‘governing by network’ scheme. 
Old and new federal institutions 
expanded disaster management 
during the New Deal, WWII and 
the Cold War; Civil Defense 
became paramount. State and 
local governments had 
prominent roles also. 
Underlying 
paradigms 
The Spanish Crown and island 
representatives should not 
address local ‘natural’ disasters 
or God’s wrath towards 
deserving sinful people. 
The federal government should 
not address local ‘natural’ 
disasters. 
The federal government should 
address ‘natural’ disasters and 
war. Allegedly, technical 
disaster management with a 
martial bias was tied to 
economic growth, not politics or 
culture. 
The Spanish Crown stepped in 
only during critical situations 
endangering its rule. 
The Army stepped in only if 
havoc was vast. 
Civil Defense mainly taught 
self-protection to citizens, until 
the government stepped in. 
Religious entities and 
charitable wealthy citizens 
could engage and impose their 
prejudices without oversee or 
accountability. 
Charitable and private entities 
were endorsed to undertake 
relief and reconstruction. 
Religious entities offered help. 
Private entities and volunteerism 
were welcome to undertake 
relief and reconstruction. 
Municipalities undertook some 
relief and reconstruction tasks. 
Locals were to provide for 
themselves. 
State and local institutions 
should undertake relief and 
reconstruction. 
Locals were to provide for 
themselves.  
Aid indulged vagrancy, 
recipients had to earn it. 
State and local institutions 
should handle non-martial crisis 
preparedness and reconstruction.  
Anti-communist bias deterred 
collective organization.  
Biases in relief 
distribution 
No data was found, possibly 
because relief was minimal, 
not systematized or records 
have been lost. 
Race and class-based 
discrimination. 
No data was found. By the 
1950s, reconstruction was not a 
federal task, causing 
disincentives and conflicts. 
Controversies  Municipalities could not meet 
the island government’s 
request of overdue municipal 
payments due to increasing 
expenses; planters could not 
afford taxes and payments for 
the right to import goods for 
consumption. Both requests 
were eliminated; yet, tensions 
remained. 
Royal expenses had not 
translated into infrastructure 
that would have reduced 
Poor African-Americans unjustly 
delayed from evacuation and 
relief supplies. 
In the worse cases, Black 
evacuees in Red Cross refugee 
camps were brutalized, forced to 
work or barred from leaving.  
Agricultural, housing and funding 
relief neglected evacuees. 
Decentralized execution implied 
minimal federal supervision and 
lax accountability of relief 
workers. 
Sexist division of tasks, 
overvaluing so-called manly 
activities.  
President Truman increased 
military and civil defense 
expenses, after critiques for lack 
of headship during a potential 
crisis. 
Temporary housing in a 







Lack of public utility works 
reinforced the Creoles’ rebuff 
of Spain, and rising grass-roots 
discontent. 
Despite federal budget surplus, 




Incipient proposal of extensive 
public works, including 
reconstruction of bridges, 
docks, roads and public 
services. 
Highly variable 
implementation; hard to 
correlate to the disaster crisis, 
local political upheaval, 
changes in Spain or the 
Governor’s mood. 
There are no recorded policy-
changes to reduce and mitigate 
disasters as a governmental 
responsibility, requiring 
investment and planning. 
New private and state 
reconstruction corporations in 
charge of a credit provision plan, 
but failed to make loans to 
citizens in need and became 
fiascos. 
The 1928 Flood Control Act and 
Okeechobee (San Felipe) 
changed flood control 
management by the Corps of 
Engineers, state and federal 
legislation.  
More federal involvement into 
spheres left to state and local 
authorities.  
A template of disaster relief used 
in Puerto Rico. 
Disaster management became a 
federal task. 
Standard Project Hurricane to 
define flooding protection 
systems, building and zoning 
codes, and urban growth. It was 
methodologically flawed, as 
hurricane Katrina showed. 
Federal administrations skipped 
cultural interventions related to 
disasters, but an education 
campaign that insisted on 




Some Spanish officials 
foresaw deplorable relief as a 
catalyzer to fight colonialism, 
heralding the decline of Spain. 
In September of 1868, before 
reconstruction was decided, 
the failed Grito de Lares 
insurrection was launched. The 
crisis could have been an extra 
motivation to coalesce around 
a pro-independence armed 
struggle (a claim that needs 
further research). 
The man in charge of relief, 
Herbert Hoover, gained control of 
the media, minimized his 
administrations’ failures and 
reshaped himself from a non-
contender to a national hero 
deserving the presidency in 1928.  
Paradoxically, relief failures such 
as abuses in the camps and 
Hoover’s failed promises to 
African-Americans alienated Black 
voters in his re-election campaign 
four years later. 
The New Deal launched federal 
disaster engagement, which 
shrank towards conservatives 
since the 1940s. A martial bias 
was brought grouping war and 
disasters, neglecting non-
bellicose preparations, funding 
climatic experiments, stressing 
individual preparedness and 
voluntary engagement, and 
leaving reconstruction to local 
and state spheres. Leadership 
during a crisis was interpreted 







Table 8. Theme 3. RELIEF 3.2. Which were the defining elements for hurricane relief and 
incipient policy trends concerning San Ciriaco, San Felipe and Santa Clara? 
THEME 3. RELIEF:         Sub-question 3.2 Case study 
 San Ciriaco (1899) San Felipe (1928) Santa Clara (1956) 
Main 
challenges 
Multifaceted political tensions, 
meager federal engagement, 
poverty, vast destruction, new 
inexperienced authorities, 
cash-depleted Creoles and 
municipalities, religion and 
beliefs trumpeting embryonic 
science and knowledge. 
Multifaceted political tensions, 
meager federal engagement, 
top-down oppression, bottom-
up frustration, poverty, vast 
destruction, beliefs trumpeting 
incipient science and 
knowledge. 
Multifaceted political tensions, 
increased federal and island 
government partaking yet 
inexperienced for disasters, top-
down oppression, bottom-up 
frustration, poverty, destruction, 
beliefs clashing with faltering 
science and knowledge. 
 The priorities were to 
minimize starvation, tend to 
the worst agricultural damages, 
stop vagrancy, and secure U.S. 
control. 
The priorities were to avoid 
food, health and housing 
crises, tend to the worst 
agricultural damages, stop 
vagrancy and deter rebellion. 
The priorities were to avoid food, 
health and housing crises, tend to 
the worst agricultural damages, 
and secure the Commonwealth 
and Gov. positions. 
Relief provider The U.S. Army, which created 
the San Juan Charity Board, 
town boards, an advisory 
board and military inspection 
zones. 




The federal government joined 
when asked. 




Federal involvement in state 
and local affairs had to be 
limited to extreme crisis. 
The Army joined if havoc was 
vast. 
Locals were to provide for 
themselves. 
Charity and entrepreneurial 
entities were endorsed in relief 
and reconstruction. 
Aid was defamed as vagrancy 
indulgence, recipients must 
earn it. 
Federal involvement in state 
and local affairs had to be 
limited to extreme crisis. 
The Army joined if havoc was 
vast. 
Locals were to provide for 
themselves. 
Charity and entrepreneurial 
entities were endorsed in relief 
and reconstruction. 
Aid was defamed as vagrancy 
indulgence, recipients must 
earn it. 
Increased federal help depended 
on state authorities’ request. 
The Army joined if havoc was 
vast. 
The Commonwealth would 
provide for locals showing 
sovereignty and solid policy-
making. 
Charity, entrepreneurial entities 
and volunteers welcomed in relief 
and reconstruction. 
Biases in relief 
distribution  
Biased assertions by 
Americans and Creoles 
justified discipline and denial 
of universal relief provision.  
Tax breaks for intact 
municipalities, planters and 
entrepreneurs.  
Planters distributed food 
among workers, with few 
obligations including a grip to 
avoid vagrants. 
Race and class-based 
discrimination in refugee 
camps, provision of food, 
seeds, farm implements, rural 
employment and housing 
rebuilding. 
Most federal credits and 
compensations went to U.S. sugar 
corporations and coffee planters, 
used to secure relief. 
Limited funding to small-scale 
local farmers growing pineapple, 
tobacco, plantains and bananas, or 
foodstuff for local consumption. 
Controversies Relief on the coffee highlands 
was insufficient and caused 
unemployment, disease, 
migration, starvation and death 
among the poor. 
Rotting food distributed 
among workers and disaster 
victims was eventually 
Inadequate donated used U.S 
clothing. 
Rationed food for children and 
women shrank to pay for 
work. Failed food relief set off 
hunger and death. 
Reconstruction payments hurt 
workers. 
Entrenched vulnerability, i.e. 
scarce construction materials; 
housing, food and clothes deficits; 
medical crisis; isolated towns and 
rural areas, and agricultural 
damages. 
Deficient local responses; delayed 






Disaster migrants abroad 
endured harsh conditions; and 
faced eviction in urban slums. 
U.S. Congress debated harsh 
propositions. 
Initial farming help to coffee 
planters failed. Second phase 
included underpaid clean-up 
and housing rebuilding 
without redistribution. Lack of 
supplies delayed repairs. 
Camp refugees lacked 
transitioning support. 
Migrants in urban slums faced 
eviction. 
U.S. Army helped less. 
U.S. Congress debated harsh 
propositions. 
opposed; right-wing retorted. 
The S.J. Weather Bureau’s 
imprecision and reliance from the 
U.S. hurt local responses. 
Meager highland relief caused 
hunger, disease, unemployment, 
migration and death. 
Migrants endured harsh lives, and 
faced eviction in urban slums. 
Policy-
changes 
Prioritization of sugar exports, 
controlled by U.S. 
corporations; coffee neglect; 
displacement of creoles, 
increased vulnerability. 
Return of U$2 million from 
island generated taxes since 
occupation, used for 
insufficient infrastructure 
repairs and to coerce workers. 
Revalidation of San Juan 
primacy; increased migrants 
and slums. 




Meteorology used for political, 
fundraising and scientific 
purposes.  
Brief coffee relief program 
helped planters, but co-opted 
them and created dependency. 
Coffee workers disadvantaged. 
The new Puerto Rican 
Hurricane Relief Commission 
was delinked from 
redevelopment, planning, or 
disaster management goals. It 
should give credit to farmers 
who reunited tenure, assets or 
other economic conditions; it 
failed to make loans to those 
who needed them and became 
a fiasco. 
Reduction of federal relief and 
reconstruction funds. 
In 1932, acting Gov. James 
Beverly used his San Felipe 
experience for San Ciprián 
disaster management, such as 
instructing mayors to create 
emergency committees and a 
relief fund, and publicizing a 
plan of warning flags flying 
from city halls and churches. 
Improvised free food distribution 
and literacy lessons. 
Use of wind resistant materials, 
continue self-help scheme with 
governmental provision of 
materials, promote individual 
ownership, reduce apartments costs 
via plots and services projects, 
exempt payments and arrears, and 
restrict the right to sale to avoid 
speculation 
New institutions to tackle housing 
and buyers cooperatives. 
DIVEDCO’s new educational 
materials focused on individual 
preparedness to storms. 
Political 
consequences 
Pitiable disaster relief 
weakened the option of 
independence and laid the 
ground for underdevelopment. 
Pitiable disaster relief fueled 
underdevelopment and 
independence demands, 
worsened after San Ciprián 
(1932). The crisis, neglect and 
injustices radicalized Puerto 
Ricans in armed platforms. 
Poor disaster relief served the 
opposition to challenge the 
Governor and disaster protocol 
whilst publically building ties 
with the U.S. President, signaling 
what was possibly the first crisis 
of the Commonwealth project. 
 
 
